

Splintered warfare

Alliances, affiliations, and agendas of armed factions and politico-military groups in the Central African Republic

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Abbreviations, full names, and top leaders of armed groups in the current conflict

	Group's acronym	Full name	Main leaders
1	RPRC	Rassemblement Patriotique pour le Renouveau de la Centrafrique	Zakaria Damane
2	FPRC	Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique	Nourredine Adam
3	MPC	Mouvement Patriotique Centrafricain	Mahamat al-Khatim
4	MPC-Siriri	Mouvement Patriotique Centrafricain (Siriri = Peace)	Mahamat Abdel Karim
5	MLCJ	Mouvement des Libérateurs Centrafricains pour la Justice	Toumou Deya Gilbert
6	Séléka Rénovée	Séléka Rénovée	Mohamed Moussa Dhaffane
7	Muslim self-defense groups	Muslim self-defense groups - Bangui	(multiple leaders)
8	MRDP	Mouvement de Résistance pour la Défense de la Patrie	Séraphin Komeya
9	Anti-Balaka local groups	Anti-Balaka Local Groups	(multiple leaders)
10	Anti-Balaka Ngaïssona	Coordination nationale des ex-anti-Balaka	Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona
11	Anti-Balaka Mokom	Anti-Balaka/Mokom Wing	Maxime Mokom
12	3R	Retour, Réclamation et Réhabilitation	Sidiki Abass
13	LRA	Lord's Resistance Army (Armée de Résistance du Seigneur)	Joseph Kony
14	FCCPD	Front du Peuple Congolais pour le Changement et la Démocratie	John Tshibangu
15	RJ	Révolution Justice	Armel Ningatoloum Sayo
16	RJ-Belanga	Révolution Justice (splintered group)	Bertrand Belanga
17	FDPC	Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain	Martin Koumtadji (aka Abdoulaye Miskine)
18	UPC	Union pour la Paix en Centrafrique	Ali Darassa

Abbreviations, full names and top leaders of past armed groups

Group's acronym	Full name	Main Leaders
APRD	Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la Démocratie	Jean Jacques Demafouth
CPJP	Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix	Charles Massi – Abdoulaye Hissène
CPJP Fondamentale	Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix (Fondamentale)	Nourredine Adam
CPSK	Convention des Patriotes pour le Salut de Kodro	Mohamed Moussa Dhaffane
FPR	Le Front Populaire pour le Redressement	Baba Laddé
UFDR	Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement	Michel Djotodia, Zakaria Damane, Abakar Sabone
UFR	Union des Forces Républicaines	Florian Bedaya-Ndjadder

Graphic Legend:

Colored lines: type of armed group (category of affiliation)

- Yellow ->** Armed groups related to/derived from the Séléka (formed at the end of 2012)
Orange -> Armed groups related to/derived from the Ange-Félix Patassé regime (in power between 1993-2003)
Green -> Armed groups related to/derived from the anti-Balaka movement (formed starting from 2013)
Blue-> Armed groups originally/derived from neighboring countries

Orange line in the center: military and political alliances

2015: The Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC) and anti-Balaka/Mokom wing sign a peace agreement (in January), and the two respective political leaders of these groups (Michel Djotodia and François Bozizé) form a political alliance (in April). This alliance between the two groups is commonly called the "Alliance of the Nairobists" (with the group members called the "Nairobists").

October 2016: The Rassemblement Patriotique pour le Renouveau de la Centrafrique (RPRC) officially joins the call of Nourredine Adam, leader of the FPRC, to form a coalition. The RPRC joins the "Nairobists."

October 2016: The Mouvement Patriotique Centrafricain (MPC) leads joint action with the coalition between the FPRC and the RPRC; together these three ex-Séléka groups and the anti-Balaka/Mokom wing form "the Coalition."

Thickness of line: level of capability to do harm

- Thick line:** High capability to do harm
Medium line: Medium capability to do harm
Thin line: Weak capability to do harm

Orange highlight: former heads of state with political interests, connections to armed groups

- François Bozizé** Political figure associated with the anti-Balaka/Mokom wing
Michel Djotodia Political figure associated with the FPRC led by Nourredine Adam

See separate sections on each group for much more detail on:

- Each group's date of creation
- The ethnic identities and affiliations of each group's leaders
- The locations of each group's military strongholds
- Each group's record of participation in political processes/dialogues
- Each group's past affiliations with other groups
- Each group's ideology and grievances
- Each group's military strategies
- Each group's and leaders' military alliances
- Each group's main political agenda
- The international sanctions (travel bans, asset freezes) that affect (particularly the leaders of) each group

See separate sections on "the Coalition" (formed by the FPRC, RPRC, MPC and the anti-Balaka/Mokom wing) including detail on:

- Date of creation
- Members
- Main leaders
- Past affiliations
- What led "the Coalition" to emerge
- Military strategies
- Conflict financing
- Political agenda
- Sources of internal tensions

Introduction

Today the Central African Republic (CAR) is home to more than 14 armed factions, a multitude of local militia groups, groups of regional mercenaries, and a national army that is in disarray. The country is essentially held hostage by armed actors with various profiles and motives. Though their origins and outward motivations may differ, these armed actors have one thing in common: they are all responsible for widespread atrocities committed against civilians, and they are all engaged in fratricidal struggles for control of the country's resources.

Central African armed factions and politico-military groups began to proliferate in CAR in 2005, mostly in opposition to the regime of François Bozizé. Since 2014, these groups have flourished, imposing a *de facto* partition and engaging in economic predation as part of their central strategy. By controlling large parts of the country, the leaders of these armed groups have undermined the principle of territorial sovereignty and imposed a system that benefits the leaders and the sponsors at the population's expense. This economic system is characterized by widespread looting, the trafficking of natural resources and arms, illicit taxation and extortion, a costly system of protection for people and companies, and numerous kidnappings for ransom. Driven by the power of guns, this predatory system perpetuates violence against civilians and strengthens the positions of leaders and their networks in the conflict.

In the past few months, representatives of armed groups have been invited—with all expenses paid—to the presidential palace in Bangui, to Luanda, Angola, to N'Djamena, Chad, and more recently to Rome, Italy,¹ for peace talks.² These negotiations have not yet resulted in a cessation of hostilities agreement, much less a ceasefire or a viable political process with the government of President Faustin Archange Touadéra and the myriad politico-military groups.³ As a result, new groups continue to emerge while others splinter into many smaller factions, further complicating peace talks.

The leaders of certain armed groups have forged varying and evolving military alliances with one another for opportunistic reasons: to increase the threat they pose to the central government and strengthen their negotiation power. Since September 2016, a coalition of various armed groups—which included ex-Séléka factions [Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC), Rassemblement Patriotique pour le Renouveau de la Centrafrique (RPRC), Mouvement Patriotique Centrafricain (MPC)] and one anti-Balaka group (led by Maxime Mokom)—has stoked sectarian violence and intercommunal tensions. “The Coalition,” as it is called, has expanded its areas of control and attacked humanitarian workers, U.N. staff and armed groups like Union pour la Paix en Centrafrique (UPC) that refuse to join their alliance. Criminal groups have taken advantage of this security vacuum and flourish. Civilians pay the heaviest price in this protracted crisis.

Subsequent reports by the Enough Project and The Sentry will analyze some of these dynamics in greater detail and provide analytical tools to better understand the deep motives of the key actors involved in this armed conflict. Here we seek to briefly describe these different groups and leaders and provide an overview of their interests and motivations.

One important note to underscore: these graphic depictions and descriptions can be considered at most a snapshot in time of the situation as it looks to the best of our knowledge as of late July 2017. The nature of the various armed groups, the alliances, the dynamics, and the political motives are not stable or permanent. On the contrary, the situation in CAR is extremely volatile. Armed factions unify, splinter, break apart partially or fully, and change leaders at a local or national level on a weekly or even daily basis.

I- POLITICO-MILITARY GROUPS AND ARMED FACTIONS

1/ – Rassemblement Patriotique pour le Renouveau de la Centrafrique (RPRC)	
Date of creation	November 2014, in Birao*
Main leaders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gontran Djono Ahaba (Gula ethnic group) • Zakaria Damane (Gula ethnic group)
Military stronghold	Bria†
Participation in political processes/dialogues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bangui Forum (2015): Yes • Disarmament process (DDRR): Yes • Sant'Egidio mediation:‡ Yes
Past affiliations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Ex-liberators" (2002-2003)§ • Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement (UFDR: 2006-2012)** • Séléka Coalition (2012-2013) • Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC, until November 2014)
Ideology and grievances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RPRC leaders maintain a climate of permanent crisis and intercommunal tension to justify their existence by the need to protect civilians from the insecurity. Leaders say that they act in self-defense against the central leadership's authoritarian and predatory governance. RPRC leaders also denounce a policy that marginalizes the northeastern regions of the country. "Ex-liberators" seek the compensation they were promised for their participation in the March 2003 coup that brought Bozizé to power.⁴ • Despite these grievances, the leaders have never intended to change the system, as the predatory Séléka regime demonstrated in 2013.⁵ • In October 2016, the RPRC formed a coalition with the FPRC and the anti-Balaka/Mokom wing. These coalition members have systematically attacked the UPC positions and the Peuhl/Fulani communities,⁶ arguing that UPC and Peuhl/Fulani people are foreigners. • This evolving ideology remains instrumental in the process of RPRC leaders seeking to legitimize their presence and have their interests and grievances recognized by the international community.
Military alliances	<p>Known as part of "the Coalition," the RPRC operates in partnership with:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The FPRC (since October 2016) • The anti-Balaka/Mokom wing associated with François Bozizé (since October 2016) and anti-Balaka groups in Haute Kotto province (in central CAR), particularly the Banda ethnic group • The Mouvement Patriotique Centrafricain (MPC, since October 2016)
Military strategies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The military strength of the RPRC has increased since the group joined the FPRC-MPC-anti-Balaka/Mokom wing Coalition since October 2016, giving the group better access to military equipment. • For more information on the military strategy of "the Coalition" that has left hundreds of people killed and hundreds of thousands newly displaced since October 2016 see part II, "The Coalition" [FPRC, RPRC, MPC, anti-Balaka/Mokom]."
Main political agenda	<p>Leaders of the RPRC had been perceived as a moderate ex-Séléka faction that has been involved in all political and dialogue processes. However, since October 2016, the RPRC has responded to FPRC leader Nourredine Adam's call to form a coalition of ex-Séléka factions. The RPRC now shares the FPRC's strategy, ideology, and grievances—while remaining its own distinct entity. Since the end of 2016, the RPRC's main objective has been to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overthrow the central government based in Bangui and reestablish a Séléka regime; or, • If they fail to regain power, to have official partition of the country (with Bambari as the new capital of the Dar El Kuti or Logone state).⁷ <p>In all scenarios, the RPRC leaders seek to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Obtain general amnesty for the leaders and the combatants, with the lifting of all multilateral and bilateral targeted sanctions imposed on individuals; • Maintain the <i>de facto</i> partition of the country and allow for the exploitation of the country's resources; and • Obtain political and military positions in the government.
International sanctions imposed	None

* Birao is the capital of Vakaga province, in the far northeast of CAR, on the border with Chad and Sudan.

† Bria is the capital of Haute-Kotto province, in central-eastern CAR.

‡ For more information on the Sant'Egidio initiative see endnote 1.

§ For more information on the "ex-liberators" see Appendix, section A.

** For more information on the UFDR see Appendix, section E.

2/ Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC)	
Date of creation	August 2014, in Birao*
Main leaders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nourredine Adam (Runga ethnic group) • Michel Djotodia (Gula ethnic group) • Abdoulaye Hissène (Runga ethnic group) • Haroun Gaye (father originally from Sénégal; mother from CAR, the Yakoma ethnic group) • Mahamat Bachar (Gula ethnic group) • Tidjani Hamid (Runga ethnic group)
Military stronghold	Birao, Ndélé, Bria, Kaga-Bandoro†
Participation in political processes/dialogues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bangui Forum (2015): No • Disarmament process (DDRR): Yes (since June 9, 2017) • Sant'Egidio mediation:‡ Yes
Past affiliations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Ex-liberators" (2002-2003)§ • Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix** (CPJP) and CPJP Fondamentale†† (2008-2012) • Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement** (UFDR: 2006-2012) • Séléka (2012-2013) • "The Nairobiists" [an alliance between FPRC and anti-Balaka/Mokom wing] (since 2015)
Ideology and grievances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FPRC leaders maintain a climate of permanent crisis and intercommunal tension to justify their existence by the need to protect civilians from the insecurity. Leaders say that they act in self-defense against the central leadership's authoritarian and predatory governance. FPRC leaders also denounce a policy that marginalizes the northeastern regions of the country. "Ex-liberators" seek the compensation they were promised for their participation in the March 2003 coup that brought Bozizé to power.⁸ • Despite these grievances, the leaders have never intended to change the system, as the predatory Séléka regime demonstrated in 2013.⁹ Instead, the FPRC leaders have manipulated the perceived threat of anti-Balaka violence against the Muslim community to justify the need to protect them.¹⁰ Since losing political power in January 2014, the FPRC leaders have claimed that cohabitation between the populations of the northeast and those of the southwest is impossible.¹¹ • At the end of 2016, the Union pour la Paix en Centrafrique (UPC) positions and ethnic Fulani communities were systematically attacked when UPC refused to join Nourredine Adam's call to form a coalition, now composed of the FPRC, RPRC, MPC, and the anti-Balaka/Mokom wing.¹² • This evolving ideology remains instrumental in the process of FPRC leaders seeking to legitimize their presence and have their interests and grievances recognized by the international community.
Military alliances	<p>Known as part of "the Coalition," the FPRC operates in partnership with:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The anti-Balaka/Mokom wing-François Bozizé (since January 2015; signatory of the Nairobi agreement with the FPRC)¹³ • The Rassemblement Patriotique pour le Renouveau de la Centrafrique (RPRC, since October 2016) • The Mouvement Patriotique Centrafricain (MPC, since October 2016)
Military strategies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Since July 2016, Nourredine Adam has called on the ex-Séléka factions (FPRC, MPC, RPRC, and Union pour la Paix en Centrafrique, UPC) to create an alliance, together with the anti-Balaka-Mokom wing, in order to strengthen their negotiating power.¹⁴ UPC leaders refused to join this call. Abdoulaye Hissène and Maxime Mokom coordinated the military operations of this group, known as "the Coalition," which is composed of the FPRC, MPC, RPRC and anti-Balaka/Mokom groups. Systematic attacks against the UPC positions and Fulani communities led to "the Coalition" gaining control of additional areas. The FPRC, together with "the Coalition," intensified pressure on the country's economic resources to increase the conflict financing. • For more information on the military strategy of "the Coalition" that has left hundreds of people killed and hundreds of thousands newly displaced since October 2016 see part II, "The Coalition" [FPRC, RPRC, MPC, anti-Balaka/Mokom]."
Main political agenda	<p>Since losing political power in January 2014, the FPRC's main objective has been to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overthrow the central government based in Bangui and reestablish a Séléka regime; or, • If they fail to regain power, to have official partition of the country (with Bambari as the new capital of the Dar El Kuti or Logone state).¹⁵ <p>In all scenarios, the FPRC leaders seek to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Obtain general amnesty for the leaders and the combatants, with the lifting of all multilateral and bilateral targeted sanctions imposed on individuals; • Obtain special treatment for former presidents;¹⁶ and • Maintain the <i>de facto</i> partition of the country and allow for the exploitation of the country's resources.

* Birao is the capital of Vakaga province, in the far northeast of CAR, on the border with Chad and Sudan.

† Ndélé is capital of Bamingui-Bangoran province; Bria is capital of Haute-Kotto province; Kaga-Bandoro is capital of Nana-Grébizi province.

‡ For more information on the Sant'Egidio initiative see endnote 1.

§ For more information on the "ex-liberators" see Appendix, section A.

** For more information on the CPJP see Appendix, section F.

†† For more information on the CPJP Fondamentale see Appendix, section G.

‡‡ For more information on the UFDR see Appendix, section E.

International sanctions imposed	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Nourredine Adam: U.N. sanctions since May 9, 2014;¹⁷ U.S. sanctions since May 13, 2014; African Union sanctions since March 25, 2013¹⁸• Michel Djotodia: U.S. sanctions since May 14, 2014;¹⁹ African Union sanctions since March 25, 2013²⁰• Haroun Gaye: U.N. sanctions since December 17, 2015²¹• Abdoulaye Hissène: U.S. sanctions since April 12, 2017;²² U.N. sanctions since May 17, 2017²³
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3/ Mouvement Patriotique Centrafricain (MPC)	
Date of creation	July 2015
Main leader	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mahamat al-Khatim (Chadian Arab – Salamat ethnic group) • Idriss Ahmed El-Bachar (Chadian Arab)
Military stronghold	Moyen-Sido, [*] Kabo, [†] Kaga-Bandoro [‡]
Participation in political processes/dialogues	Bangui Forum (2015): Yes Disarmament (DDRR) process: Yes Sant'Egidio mediation: [§] Yes
Past affiliations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Ex-liberators"^{**} • Séléka (2013) • Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC, 2014–first half of 2015)
Ideology and grievances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MPC leaders maintain a climate of permanent crisis and intercommunal tension to justify their existence by the need to protect civilians from the insecurity. Leaders say that they act in self-defense against the central leadership's authoritarian and predatory governance. MPC leaders also denounce a political system that marginalizes the CAR-Chadian Arab communities. "Ex-liberators" seek the compensation they were promised for their participation in the March 2003 coup that brought Bozizé to power.²⁴ • Despite these grievances, the leaders have never intended to change the system, as the predatory Séléka regime demonstrated in 2013.²⁵ • At the end of 2016, the Union pour la Paix en Centrafrique (UPC) positions and ethnic Fulani communities were systematically attacked when UPC refused to join "the Coalition," composed of the FPRC, RPRC, MPC, and the anti-Balaka/Mokom wing.²⁶ • This evolving ideology remains instrumental in the process of MPC leaders seeking to legitimize their presence and have their interests and grievances recognized by the international community.
Military alliances	MPC has developed two main sets of military alliances. (1) MPC is part of "the Coalition," and since October 2016 the MPC operates in partnership with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The FPRC • The Rassemblement Patriotique pour le Renouveau de la Centrafrique (RPRC) • The anti-Balaka/Mokom wing allied with François Bozizé Since May 2017 Mahamat al-Khatim has been chief of staff for "the Coalition." (2) Since 2016 MPC has had an alliance with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Révolution Justice This is an opportunistic alliance based mainly on sharing economic revenues in areas they both control. MPC remains stronger than RJ.
Military strategies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The military strength of the MPC was already strong in 2016, but since the group joined "the Coalition" in October 2016, its strength has increased significantly, allowing MPC members to better access military equipment. • For more information on the military strategy of "the Coalition" that has left hundreds of people killed and hundreds of thousands newly displaced since October 2016 see part II, "The Coalition" [FPRC, RPRC, MPC, anti-Balaka/Mokom wing]."
Main political agenda	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Since 2015, MPC leaders have been perceived as more moderate than the FPRC leaders. The MPC's main political agenda has been to obtain political and military positions in the government, ensuring CAR citizens with Chadian origin are included in the political system. However, since joining "the Coalition formed" by FPRC, RPRC and the anti-Balaka/Mokom wing in October 2016, the MPC leaders have supported the FPRC's agenda that seeks to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overthrow the central government based in Bangui and reestablish a Séléka regime; or, • If they fail to regain power, to have official partition of the country (with Bambari as the new capital of the Dar El Kuti or Logone state)²⁷ In all scenarios, the MPC leaders seek to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Obtain general amnesty for the leaders and the combatants, with the lifting of all multilateral and bilateral targeted sanctions imposed on individuals; • Maintain and expand the <i>de facto</i> partition of the country and allow for the exploitation of the country's resources; and • Obtain political and military positions in the government.
International sanctions imposed	None

* Moyen-Sido is a town in northern CAR, at the border with Chad.

† Kabo is a market town in northern CAR, in Ouham province.

‡ Kaga-Bandoro is a market town in northern CAR, in Nana-Grébizi province.

§ For more information on the Sant'Egidio initiative see endnote 1.

** For more information on the "ex-liberators" see Appendix, section A.

4/ Mouvement Patriotique Centrafricain (MPC) Siriri – MPC “Paix”	
Date of creation	June 2017, in Bangui
Main leaders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mahamat Abdel Karim, aka “General Ambosoro” (Chadian Arab – Salamat ethnic group) • Saleh Zabadi (Chadian Arab – Salamat ethnic group)
Military stronghold	Bangui, Kaga-Bandoro*
Participation in political processes/dialogues	None known as of July 2017.
Past affiliations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “Ex-liberators”† • “The Coalition” [Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC), MPC (led by Mahamat al-Khatim), Rassemblement Patriotique pour le Renouveau de la Centrafrique (RPRC), and the anti-Balaka/Mokom wing]
Ideology and grievances	This group emerged in June 2017, after serious, well-organized, deadly attacks with heavy weapons erupted beginning in May in the southeastern town of Bangassou (almost 500 km east of Bangui) that initially resulted in the deaths of a hundred people and the displacement of thousands more. ²⁸ MPC Siriri is a splinter group that broke off of the MPC group led by Mahamat al-Khatim. The leaders and the combatants from MPC Siriri are mostly composed of Arab Muslims who refuse to be associated with the abuses of “the Coalition” against the Muslims, particularly Arabs. There is a conflict between members of this group and Abdoulaye Hissène and his troops.
Military alliances	None known as of July 2017
Military strategies	Attacks are committed against the leaders of the FPRC, particularly in Bria. Since the group left “the Coalition” last June, their military strength is significantly weaker than the MPC group that is led by al-Khatim
Main political agenda	This group has not articulated its political agenda yet, but it believes that any peace process should involve Chad. The leaders seek to obtain political and military positions in the government, with greater political inclusion of Central African-Chadian individuals.
International sanctions imposed	None

* Kaga-Bandoro is a market town, in northern CAR, in Nana-Grébizi province.

† For more information on the “ex-liberators” see Appendix, section A.

5/ Le Mouvement des Libérateurs Centrafricains pour la Justice (MLCJ)	
Date of creation	2008, in Birao*
Main leader	Toumou Deya Gilbert (Kara ethnic group)
Military stronghold	Birao
Participation in political processes/dialogues	Bangui Forum (2015): Yes Disarmament process (DDRR): Yes Sant'Egidio mediation: [†] Yes
Past affiliations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Ex-liberators"[‡] • Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement (UFDR)[§] – (MLCJ splintered from the UFDR in 2008) • Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain (FDPC)** led by Abdoulaye Miskine (military alliance in 2009) • Séléka (2012-2013)
Ideology and grievances	The group seeks compensation for the "ex-liberators" and argues that the northern regions of CAR have been marginalized by the successive regimes. The MLCJ leaders remain close to the ideology promoted by the FPRC led by Nourredine Adam and the RPRC led by Zakaria Damane.
Military alliances	None, but MLCJ is unofficially part of "the Coalition" composed of the FPRC, RPRC, MPC, and the anti-Balaka/Mokom wing. The MLCJ has unofficially merged with the RPRC.
Military strategies	Confronted with financial difficulties, the group has merged with RPRC and is indirectly involved in the strategy implemented by "the Coalition."
Main political agenda	<p>The MLCJ leaders have supported the FPRC's agenda, which seeks to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overthrow the central government based in Bangui and reestablish a Séléka regime; or, • If they fail to regain power, to have official partition of the country (with Bambari as the new capital of the Dar El Kuti or Logone state).²⁹ <p>In all scenarios, the MLCJ leaders seek to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Obtain general amnesty for the leaders and the combatants, with the lifting of all multilateral and bilateral targeted sanctions imposed on individuals; • Maintain and expand the <i>de facto</i> partition of the country and allow for the exploitation of the country's resources; and • Obtain political and military positions in the government.
International sanctions imposed	None

* Birao is the capital of Vakaga province, in the far northeast of CAR, on the border with Chad and Sudan.

[†] For more information on the Sant'Egidio initiative see endnote 1.

[‡] For more information on the "ex-liberators" see Appendix, section A.

[§] For more information on the UFDR see Appendix, section E.

** For more information on the formation of the FDPC see Appendix, section D.

6/ Séléka Rénovée	
Date of creation	October 2014, in Bangui
Main leader	Mohamed Moussa Dhaffane (Borno ethnic group)
Military stronghold	None. Dhaffane is based in Bangui and the group has no combatants deployed in the country.
Participation in political processes/dialogues	Bangui Forum: Yes Disarmament process (DDRR): Yes Sant'Egidio mediation: [*] Yes
Past affiliations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Convention des Patriotes pour le Salut de Kodro[†] (CPSK: August-December 2012) • Séléka (2013) • Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC, joined briefly in 2014)
Ideology and grievances	Séléka Rénovée promotes peace and reconciliation between Muslims and non-Muslims. It calls for the unity of the country and for an end to violence. ³⁰
Military alliances	None currently. Previously allied with the anti-Balaka coalition led by Patrice-Edouard Ngaissona.
Military strategies	None
Main political agenda	The leader seeks political positions within the current government.
International sanctions imposed	Mohamed Moussa Dhaffane: under African Union sanctions since March 25, 2013 ³¹

^{*} For more information on the Sant'Egidio initiative see endnote 1.

[†] For more information on the CPSK see Appendix, section I.

7/ Muslim self-defense groups in Bangui	
Date of creation	December 2013
Main leaders	Groups not active officially
Military stronghold	Bangui – PK5 or KM5 (different names for the same place)
Participation in political processes/dialogues	Disarmament process (DDRR): Yes (represented as “ex-self-defense” groups)
Past affiliations	None
Ideology and grievances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • These self-defense groups emerged in December 2013 in Bangui’s Muslim neighborhood of PK5. Initially composed of young Muslims mobilized to protect the communities from anti-Balaka attacks and reprisals, these self-defense groups were quickly organized by the Séléka leaders who were based in Bangui. These Séléka leaders manipulated young fighters for political gain and introduced military command and control structures.³² The PK5 area became an area where heavy weapons and heavily-armed Séléka combatants circulated. • In 2015, ex-Séléka leaders took PK5 hostage, and self-defense groups were manipulated by politicians and Séléka leaders for political and personal gain. • In August 2016, after the departure of Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC) leaders from PK5,³³ four self-defense groups remained active but had less strong political motives. Fearing arrests, the leaders did not want to lay down arms.³⁴
Military alliances	None currently. Previously Séléka factions, particularly the FPRC, represented by sanctioned individuals Abdoulaye Hissène and Haroun Gaye in PK5 in 2015.
Military strategies	As of July 2017, these groups suspended their activities, with the killings of two leaders (Abdoul Danda and Issa Kappi “50/50”) in clashes and the execution of another leader (Big Man). Self-defense groups in the Muslim area of PK5 could, however, be reactivated when the local population perceives a need, or the Séléka leaders and local fighters see political or economic opportunities.
Main political agenda	None
International sanctions imposed	None

8/ Mouvement de Résistance pour la Défense de la Patrie (MRDP)

Date of creation	August 2016, in Bambari
Main leaders	Séraphin Komeya, spokesperson
Military stronghold	Bambari*
Participation in political processes/dialogues	No. The group has nearly disappeared. As of July 2017, most of the combatants have joined other local anti-Balaka groups in Bambari.
Past affiliations	Anti-Balaka movement
Ideology and grievances	The group seeks to free the country from ex-Séléka combatants, which they consider to be foreigners stealing the country's resources. They plan to first "liberate" Bambari and later "liberate" the rest of the country.
Military alliances	None, but close to the anti-Balaka groups.
Military strategies	Attack U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) troops until the international community takes action against ex-Séléka combatants.
Main political agenda	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The group's rhetoric is similar to that of other anti-Balaka groups.³⁵• As of July 2017, this group is not very active, and it remains weaker than the other anti-Balaka groups.
International sanctions imposed	None

* Bambari, a market town, is the capital of Ouaka province in south-central CAR.

9/ anti-Balaka (local groups)	
Date of creation	Emerged in 1980/1990, particularly in northern CAR
Main leaders	Local leaders acting autonomously
Military stronghold	Throughout the country, particularly in western CAR
Participation in political processes/dialogues	Disarmament process (DDRR): Yes – represented as ex-anti-Balaka groups
Past affiliations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Self-defense groups • anti-Balaka movement (from 2013)
Ideology and grievances	Self-defense groups emerged due to the high level of criminality and insecurity in rural areas in the 1980s and 1990s. In 2013, most of these groups joined the anti-Balaka movement to hunt down the Séléka fighters and Muslims who were perceived as complicit in the Séléka abuses. Some local anti-Balaka groups currently remain active. They have taken advantage of the climate of impunity, and they act as bandits.
Military alliances	Self-defense groups
Military strategies	The self-defense groups can be seen as standing forces that can re-activate themselves when they perceive the need. ³⁶ They represent a significant threat to peace, despite not having any specific political agenda or any specific military training.
Main political agenda	None
International sanctions imposed	Alfred Yekatom (aka “Colonel Rombhot”): U.N. sanctions since August 20, 2015 ³⁷

10/ National coordination of the ex-anti-Balaka	
Date of creation	2014
Main leaders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona • Igor Lamaka, spokesperson
Military stronghold	Sakai,* Bangui, with satellite groups located in the west that are affiliated with the central coordination unit
Participation in political processes/dialogues	Bangui Forum (2015): Yes Disarmament process (DDRR): Yes Sant'Egidio mediation: [†] Yes
Past affiliations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Members of the François Bozizé regime • Cocora (a self-defense militia meaning "bow" in Sango to fight the Séléka)
Ideology and grievances	The anti-Balaka group led by Ngaïssona has justified its existence by the threat the ex-Séléka factions represent for the non-Muslim community. The group perceives a need to protect the homeland from "foreigners." This group refuses to disarm as long as the Séléka groups keep their arms.
Military alliances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None currently but the group is seeking to form an alliance with the anti-Balaka/Mokom wing • Previous alliance with Séléka Rénovée led by Mohamed Moussa Dhaffane
Military strategies	This group relies on a network of local groups throughout Bangui and in the west of the country.
Main political agenda	The group mainly represents the political aspirations of its leader, Ngaïssona, who was a candidate in the presidential and legislative elections. Ngaïssona's candidacy was rejected by the transitional government. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The leaders seek power, with political and military positions within the current government and the integration of the combatants into the national army. • The leaders seek a general amnesty. To increase their negotiating power to gain political and military power with the central government, along with amnesty for past actions, the leaders of the National coordination of the ex-anti-Balaka seek to strengthen the group's negotiating power through alliances with others.
International sanctions imposed	None

* Sakai is a small village in western CAR, located between Bangui and Mbaiki, the capital of Lobaye province in southwestern CAR.

[†] For more information on the Sant'Egidio initiative see endnote 1.

11/ anti-Balaka - Maxime Mokom wing (associated with François Bozizé)	
Date of creation	2015, in Bossangoa*
Main leaders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • François Bozizé (Gbaya ethnic group) • Maxime Mokom (Gbaya ethnic group)
Military stronghold	Bangui, with groups spread out in different locations through the west, center, and east who are affiliated with the central coordination unit in Bangui.
Participation in political processes/dialogues	Bangui Forum (2015): No Disarmament process (DDRR): Yes Sant'Egidio mediation: [†] Yes
Past affiliations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Most of the leaders and combatants were members of Bozizé's presidential guards, army officers under the Bozizé regime, and/or in self-defense groups. • Cocora³⁸ was a self-defense group, formed in December 2012, by Levy Yakété, with the support of François Bozizé, to combat the threat posed by Séléka. • Anti-Balaka coordination unit led by Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona
Ideology and grievances	This group has justified its existence by the threat ex-Séléka factions represent to the non-Muslim community. The anti-Balaka-Mokom group says it will not disarm as long as the Séléka keep their arms.
Military alliances	The anti-Balaka/Mokom wing is part of "the Coalition" composed of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The FPRC (since January 2015; a signatory of the Nairobi agreement) • The Rassemblement Patriotique pour le Renouveau de la Centrafrique (RPRC, since October 2016) • The Mouvement Patriotique Centrafricain (MPC, since October 2016)
Military strategies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Since January 2015, the anti-Balaka group led by Maxime Mokom has joined the Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC) led by Nourredine Adam, together forming the "Alliance of the Nairobists." This opportunistic alliance has been motivated by a desire by each to increase their negotiating power and leverage against the central power and the international community. The security situation further deteriorated when both the FPRC and the anti-Balaka/Mokom wing were denied the right to participate in the electoral process at the end of 2015. This situation led to widespread violence. • In July 2016, Nourredine Adam tried to form a coalition composed of ex-Séléka factions and the anti-Balaka/Mokom wing, with a military coordination unit led by Abdoulaye Hissène and Maxime Mokom. This coordinated set of groups, known as "the Coalition," has been responsible for the rapid deterioration of the security situation beginning September 2016, which has worsened drastically since May 2017. • For more information on the military strategy of "the Coalition" that has left hundreds of people killed and hundreds of thousands newly displaced since October 2016 see part II, "'The Coalition' [FPRC, RPRC, MPC, anti-Balaka/Mokom]."
Main political agenda	The main objective of the anti-Balaka faction led by Maxime Mokom is to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overthrow the central government and bring François Bozizé back to power. In all scenarios, the leaders seek to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Obtain general amnesty for the leaders and the combatants, which includes the lifting of all multilateral and bilateral targeted sanctions imposed on individuals; • Obtain special treatment for the former presidents; and • Obtain political and military positions.
International sanctions imposed (travel bans, asset freezes)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • François Bozizé: U.N. sanctions since May 9, 2014;³⁹ U.S. sanctions since May 13, 2014⁴⁰ • Maxim Mokom: U.S. sanctions since April 12, 2017⁴¹

* Bossangoa is the capital of Ouham province, in western CAR. It is also the birthplace of François Bozizé.

[†] For more information on the Sant'Egidio initiative see endnote 1.

12/ Retour, Réclamation et Réhabilitation (3R)	
Date of creation	End of 2015, in northwestern CAR
Main leaders	General Sidiki Abass (said to be Cameroonian – Peuhl/Fulani ethnic group)
Military stronghold	Near Kouï, a town in northwestern CAR (near the border with Cameroon)
Participation in political processes/dialogues	Disarmament process (DDRR): Yes (since 2017) Sant'Egidio mediation:* No
Past affiliations	None
Ideology and grievances	The leaders say they fight against the anti-Balaka militias and Révolution Justice (RJ) combatants who threaten the Fulani/Peuhl communities living in southwest CAR. The 3R group also seeks to end the marginalization of the Peuhl/Fulani communities in CAR.
Military strategies	Control the territory and strategically key road axes connecting towns and benefit from the economic resources (particularly cattle). There are regular clashes with anti-Balaka groups and Révolution Justice (RJ) combatants, all seeking to steal cattle or impose taxes on the Fulani communities.
Military alliances	None
Main political agenda	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain the <i>de facto</i> partition to benefit from the country's resources through taxation and kidnapping; and • Seek integration and military positions within the national army.
International sanctions imposed	None

* For more information on the Sant'Egidio initiative see endnote 1.

13/ Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) (French: L'Armée de Résistance du Seigneur)	
Date of creation	1987, in northern Uganda; active in eastern CAR since 2008 ³³
Main leaders	Joseph Kony
Military stronghold	Eastern region of CAR
Participation in political processes/dialogues	No
Past affiliations	None
Ideology and grievances	None
Military strategies	Smaller groups deploy in different areas to attack, abduct, and kill people. The LRA also loots goods and is involved in the trafficking of natural resources (ivory, gold, diamond) and arms.
Military alliances	None but from time to time, they have collaborated with ex-Séléka factions
Main political agenda	None
International sanctions imposed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LRA: U.N. sanctions since March 7, 2016⁴² • Joseph Kony: U.N. sanctions since March 7, 2016⁴³ • Ali Kony (son of Joseph Kony): U.N. sanctions since March 7, 2016⁴⁴ • Salim Saleh Kony (son of Joseph Kony): U.N. sanctions since March 7, 2016⁴⁵

³³ For more information on the LRA presence in CAR before 2013 see Appendix, section K.

14/ Front du Peuple Congolais pour le Changement et la Démocratie (FCCPD)	
Past affiliations	FCCPD, politico-military group from the Democratic Republic of the Congo ("Congo")
Date of creation	Presence in CAR since 2013
Main leaders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • John Tshibangu • Freddy Libeba • Alexandre Mitshiabu
Military stronghold	Bangui, Bambari
Military alliances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC) of Nourredine Adam • Rassemblement Patriotique pour le Renouveau de la Centrafrique (RPRC) of Zakaria Damane
Participation in political processes/dialogues	No
Political agenda	The group seeks to overthrow Congolese President Joseph Kabila.
International sanctions imposed (travel bans, asset freezes)	Three leaders were arrested by the CAR authorities in June 2017, ⁴⁶ but none of them are under sanctions.

15/ Révolution et Justice (RJ)	
Date of creation	End of 2015
Main leader	Armel Ningatoloum Sayo
Military stronghold	Bedam (60 kilometers from Paoua, Ouham-Pendé province), northwest CAR
Participation in political processes/dialogues	Disarmament process (DDRR): Yes Sant'Egidio mediation: Yes
Past affiliations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leaders and combatants were part of the Ange-Félix Patassé regime, before François Bozizé took power in 2003 and hunted pro-Patassé • "Ex-Liberators"^{**} • Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la Démocratie (APRD)[†] • Self-defense groups present in northwest CAR
Ideology and grievances	RJ leaders said they formed the group to protect the people from the persistent insecurity in northwestern CAR.
Military strategies	The group relies on a network of self-defense groups located in northwestern CAR. RJ has developed a system of taxation and <i>de facto</i> partition in the areas they control. The RJ elements cohabit with the Mouvement Patriotique Centrafricain (MPC) elements led by al-Khatim in areas they both control.
Military alliances	MPC (since early 2016)
Main political agenda	The leaders seek to obtain military and political positions in the government and to maintain the <i>de facto</i> partition that allows them to benefit from the country's economic resources.
International sanctions imposed	None

* For more information on the "ex-liberators" see Appendix, section A.

† For more information on the APRD see Appendix, section B.

16/ Révolution et Justice (splinter faction)	
Date of creation	2016, in northwestern CAR
Main leader	Raymond Belanga
Military stronghold	Bedam (60 kilometers from Paoua, Ouham-Pendé province), northwest CAR
Participation in political processes/dialogues	Disarmament process (DDRR): Yes Sant'Egidio mediation:* Yes
Past affiliations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Part of the Ange-Félix Patassé regime before François Bozizé took power in 2003 • Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la Démocratie (APRD) • Self-defense groups located in northwestern CAR • Révolution et Justice group led by Armel Ningatoloum Sayo (2015)
Ideology and grievances	Armel Ningatoloum Sayo was nominated minister of youth in August 2014 and minister of urban planning in October 2015. Raymond Belanga became the group's leader, but there have been tensions between Sayo and Belanga over which will lead the group.
Military strategies	The group relies on a network of self-defense groups located in northwestern CAR. RJ has developed a system of taxation and <i>de facto</i> partition in the areas it controls. RJ elements cohabit with the Mouvement Patriotique Centrafricain (MPC) elements led by al-Khatim in areas they both control
Military alliances	None
Main political agenda	This faction seeks military and political positions in the central government.
International sanctions imposed (travel bans, asset freezes)	None

* For more information on the Sant'Egidio initiative see endnote 1.

17/ Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain (FDPC)	
Date of creation	2003
Main leader	Martin Koumtamadji alias Abdoulaye Miskine (originally from Chad – Sara ethnic group). Abdoulaye Miskine has been based in Brazzaville, Republic of Congo, since the end of 2014.
Military stronghold	Foroh, a town in western CAR (near the border with Cameroon)
Participation in political processes/dialogues	Bangui Forum (2015): No Disarmament process (DDRR): Yes (since June 2017) Sant'Egidio mediation: Yes
Past affiliations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Miskine was chief of staff for the presidential guards under the Ange-Félix Patassé regime (before François Bozizé took power in 2003). • Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain* (FDPC – From 2003) • Briefly joined the Séléka coalition (2013)
Ideology and grievances	Initially motivated to overthrow the regime of François Bozizé (in place from 2003 to 2013), the group has not articulated a clear ideology.
Military strategies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Despite having only about 200 men, the group can do a great deal of harm. • Since 2014, the group has been kidnapping people from Cameroon and demanding ransom payments. • By deploying fighters in the west, the FDPC poses a significant threat to the security of the transportation of people and goods between Douala, Cameroon, and Bangui.⁴⁷
Military alliances	None
Main political agenda	The group has not articulated a political agenda, but it seeks political and military positions within the current government.
International sanctions imposed	Abdoulaye Miskine: U.S. sanctions since May 13, 2014 ⁴⁸

* For more information on the presence of FDPC between 2003 and 2013 see Appendix, section D.

18/ Union pour la Paix en Centrafrique (UPC)	
Date of creation	October 2014, in Bambari*
Main leader	Ali Darassa (Fulani/Peuhl ethnic group)
Military stronghold	Bambari (until February 2017) – Alindao [†] (current)
Participation in political processes/dialogues	Bangui Forum (2015): Yes Disarmament process (DDRR): Yes Sant'Egidio mediation: [‡] Yes
Past affiliations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Front Populaire pour le Redressement[§] (FPR: 2010-2012) • Convention des Patriotes pour le Salut de Kodro (CPSK: August-December 2012) • Séléka coalition (2012-2013) • Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC, joined briefly in 2014)
Ideology and grievances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UPC leaders justify the group's existence by the continuous threats and attacks against the Muslims and particularly the Peuhl/Fulani community. • The UPC denounces marginalization and the systematic looting and taxes imposed on their cattle. • The UPC also seeks access to education and literacy for the Fulani people.
Military alliances	None known as of July 2017
Military strategies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In 2016, the UPC was the strongest armed faction in CAR and was expanding its areas of control, particularly over economic resources, leading to rising tensions with the other ex-Séléka factions. • Since the end of 2016, widespread attacks by "the Coalition" (FPRC, RPRC, MPC, anti-Balaka-Mokom) and foreign mercenaries against the UPC and the Fulani community have weakened the UPC military force. UPC fighters left their stronghold in Bambari in March 2017 and now occupy the Alindao area. • As of July 2017, the UPC remains strong, particularly because of its strong military command and its access to arms and ammunition from the region, particularly Sudan and the DRC.
Main political agenda	<p>UPC leaders have always said that they are not interested in overthrowing the central government and their political agenda has mainly been focused on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintaining and expanding the <i>de facto</i> partition that allow the leaders and the group to benefit from the country's resources, including by imposing significant taxes on cattle herders and on other economic resources. • Receiving military positions and getting UPC combatants integrated within the central government and the national armed forces.⁴⁹
International sanctions imposed	None

* Bambari is located in south-central CAR. It is the capital of Ouaka province and the third largest city in CAR.

[†] Alindao is a town and sub-province within Basse-Kotto province, in central CAR. Alindao lies on a road that connects Bambari to Bangassou.

[‡] For more information on the Sant'Egidio initiative see endnote 1.

[§] For more information on the FPRC see Appendix, section J.

II- "THE COALITION" [FPRC, RPRC, MPC, ANTI-BALAKA/MOKOM]

"The Coalition," active since October 2016	
Date of creation	October 2016
Members of the Coalition	<p>"The Coalition" includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC, founder) • Rassemblement Patriotique pour le Renouveau de la Centrafrique (RPRC, since October 2016) • Mouvement Patriotique Centrafricain (MPC, since October 2016) • Anti-Balaka/Mokom wing (since 2015 – signatory of the alliance of the "Nairobiists")
Main Leaders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political leaders: Nourredine Adam (FPRC), Michel Djotodia (FPRC), Gontran Djono Ahaba (RPRC), François Bozizé (anti-Balaka/Mokom wing) • Chief of staff: Mahamat al-Khatim (MPC) • Military operations coordinators: Abdoulaye Hissène (FPRC), Zakaria Damane (RPRC), Azor Kalité (RPRC), Maxime Mokom (anti-Balaka)
Past affiliations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Séléka (for: FPRC, RPRC, MPC: 2012-2013) • Anti-Balaka movement (for: anti-Balaka/Mokom wing) • The "Alliance of the Nairobiists" (for: FPRC, Anti-Balaka/Mokom wing)
Conditions of emergence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • After presidential and legislative elections were held, the new government decided to not include leaders of armed groups. Nourredine Adam, leader of the FPRC and former number 2 of Séléka, returned to Ndélé, in northeastern CAR, at the end of April 2016, after visiting N'Djamena, Chad.⁵⁰ • Nourredine Adam's ambition was to reunify ex-Séléka factions (FPRC, RPRC, MPC, UPC) to increase their collective threat and leverage in negotiations with the new government and the international community. • On October 18-19, 2016, a large assembly was organized in Bria, but only the RPRC officially joined.⁵¹ The MPC and UPC groups took a more independent posture. However, positions in the newly formed group were kept vacant for future MPC and UPC leaders. • Confronted with UPC resistance to join the coalition and its expansionist approach in the east,⁵² the new coalition formed by FPRC, RPRC, the anti-Balaka/Mokom wing, and finally the MPC waged war against the UPC fighters beginning in November 2016. They systematically attacked the UPC positions and also the Fulani communities over their perceived affiliation with the UPC group.⁵³ • The situation further deteriorated in May 2017 when about 700 men entered the city of Bangassou in the southwest of the country, heavily equipped and killed about 100 Muslims, encircled the U.N. bases and killed a peacekeeper⁵⁴ and about 100 Muslims.
Military strategies	<p>Since May 2017, "the Coalition's" military strategy has been to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Attack groups and communities refusing to join their alliance (particularly the UPC and the Fulani communities); • Stoke sectarian violence and intercommunal tensions; • Expand their areas of control over the country's economic resources' • Attack humanitarian workers, U.N. peacekeepers, and U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) peacekeeping bases (these incidents were mostly committed by anti-Balaka militias); • Fuel anti-MINUSCA sentiment among the civilians in areas under their control; • Create confusion about the true perpetrators of crimes by conflating the activities of organized armed factions with those of "unidentified" self-defense groups at the community level; and • Recruit the heavily armed and militarily trained foreign mercenaries, particularly Chadian and Sudanese combatants, who regularly cross CAR's borders.
Conflict financing	<p>In August 2016, Abdoulaye Hissène and Haroun Gaye left the capital, Bangui, in a "violent exodus" to join the general assembly of groups in Bria.⁵⁵ Since that time, Abdoulaye Hissène has become a crucial element in the field for "the Coalition." His first strategy was to exert pressure on the country's economic resources, including by taking control of mining sites. This strategy allowed "the Coalition" to significantly self-finance its war effort.</p>
Common objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthen collectively their power of negotiation and increase the threat they represent; • Obtain general amnesty for the leaders and the combatants, with the lifting of all multilateral and bilateral targeted sanctions imposed on individuals; • Obtain special treatment for the former presidents (François Bozizé and Michel Djotodia); • Maintain and expand the <i>de facto</i> partition of the country and allow for the exploitation of the country's resources that benefit the leaders and the group; and • Obtain political and military positions within the government.
Internal tensions	<p>Internal tension and competition center on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The sharing of economic resources; • Positions; and • Military tactics.


Appendix: Armed factions and politico-military groups emerging in CAR between 2003 and 2012

- A. "Ex-liberators"** refer to the Central African and Chadian combatants who François Bozizé recruited in the early 2000s and who helped Bozizé "liberate" Bangui by successfully unseating President Ange-Félix Patassé in March 2003. Bozizé promised these combatants financial compensation, vehicles, and integration into the Central African national armed forces. But Bozizé never fully respected his commitment. These "ex-liberators" have threatened peace and security in CAR since 2004 for several reasons, and Bozizé repressed them. Many fled north and joined armed groups, particularly the Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la Démocratie (APRD), Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement (UFDR), and Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix (CPJP).
- B. Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la Démocratie (APRD)** – 2005-2012: The APRD was established in the northwest region of CAR that is the birthplace of Ange-Félix Patassé. The majority of APRD members come from the Sara-Kaba ethnic group. APRD combatants came from elements of Patassé's presidential guard and from self-defense groups.⁵⁶ Numerous APRD members joined the group because of abuses committed against those close to Patassé and because of Patassé's exclusion from the 2005 elections.⁵⁷ In 2010, the APRD had approximately 6,000⁵⁸ poorly equipped fighters that acted sometimes as protectors and sometimes as bandits.
- C. Union des Forces Républicaines (UFR)** – created in December 2005: The UFR was established by Lt. Florian N'Djadder-Bedaya, a former member of the presidential guard under Ange-Félix Patassé. After initially joining the APRD, N'Djadder-Bedaya created the UFR. The UFR has denounced the impunity and poor governance of the François Bozizé regime.⁵⁹ In 2010, N'Djadder-Bedaya announced that the UFR would transition from a politico-military group to a political party as he joined the 2010 presidential race as a candidate.⁶⁰
- D. Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain (FDPC)** – active beginning in 2003: The FDPC was created by Martin Koumtamadji, alias Abdoulaye Miskine, the former chief of the presidential guard of Ange-Félix Patassé. Miskine led more than 500 mercenaries to counter the progression of François Bozizé's Chadian and Central African "liberators" in 2003. Miskine was responsible for numerous abuses and crimes against civilians for which there has been no accountability.⁶¹ In 2008, the FDPC controlled a small territory in northern CAR between the town of Kabo and the Chadian border. The group began to launch attacks against national Central African armed forces beginning in 2008.⁶² The force size was approximately 150 combatants in 2010,⁶³ and the FDPC is still an actor in the CAR crisis.
- E. Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement (UFDR)** – 2006-2012: The UFDR was created by Michel Djotodia, Zakaria Damane, and Abakar Sabone. The group was a fusion of three armed groups: (1) the Mouvement des Libérateurs Centrafricains pour la Justice (MLCJ), led by Abakar Sabone; (2) the Groupe d'Action Patriotique pour la Libération de la Centrafrique (GAPLC), led by Michel Djotodia; and (3) the Front Démocratique Centrafricain (FDC), led by Justin Hassan, a former member of Patassé's presidential guard. The armed group was essentially composed of members of the Gula ethnic group, the ex-liberators, and former members of Patassé's presidential guard—all marginalized and disappointed with the Bozizé regime.⁶⁴ Based in the northeastern regions of CAR, the group had a more centralized military structure compared to that of the APRD. The combatants (numbering approximately 2,200 in 2010)⁶⁵ had military uniforms, grenades, artillery, and "technicals" (vehicle-mounted heavy machine guns).⁶⁶ Although the UFDR had been established out of a sense of injustice, the group was characterized by predation and committed numerous abuses against civilians. The UFDR was one of the founding Séléka groups, and Djotodia's connections with Sudan help explain the Sudanese mercenary recruits in Séléka's ranks.
- F. Convention des Patriotes pour la Paix et la Justice (CPJP)** – 2008-2012: This armed group operated in northeastern CAR and emerged in response to the abuses committed by the UFDR against the ethnic Runga communities. The CPJP's political wing was led by Charles Massi, who held multiple ministerial positions in the regimes of both Patassé and Bozizé. After Massi's death in early 2010, Abdoulaye Hissène declared himself leader of the CPJP, but divisions erupted, creating two new movements: (1) CPJP Fondamentale, led by Nourredine Adam; and (2) Convention des Patriotes pour le Salut de Kodro (CPSK), led by Mohamed Moussa Dhaffane. CPJP had approximately 250 combatants in 2010.⁶⁷
- G. Convention des Patriotes pour la Paix et la Justice (CPJP Fondamentale)** – 2011-2012: This group was led by Nourredine Adam, an ethnic Runga who had returned from travels in Chad, Egypt, Israel, and Persian Gulf countries.⁶⁸ He presented himself as the legitimate president of CPJP while claiming that Abdoulaye Hissène was using the group for "personal and monetary interests." The internal division stemmed from these allegations.⁶⁹ In 2012, the CPJP Fondamentale of Nourredine Adam, called a "man of

N'Djamena,⁷⁰ allied itself with the Convention des Patriotes pour le Salut de Kodro (CPSK) led by Mohamed Moussa Dhaffane and the Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement (UFDR) led by Michel Djotodia to form Séléka. The narrative summary for U.N. sanctions for Nourredine Adam notes, "Without Nouredine's assistance and close relationship with Chadian Special Forces, the Seleka would likely have been unable to wrest power from former CAR President Francois Bozize."⁷¹

- H. Mouvement des Libérateurs Centrafricains pour la Justice (MLCJ)** – created in 2008: Created by Abakar Sabone, an ex-liberator, this armed group broke away from Michel Djotodia's UFDR.⁷² In 2009 it allied with the FDPC. Its members are tied to the ethnic Kara people of northeastern CAR. In 2010, the group included approximately 500 combatants.⁷³ The group, by way of its leader, is still active in the CAR crisis.
- I. Convention des Patriotes pour le Salut de Kodro (CPSK)** – 2012-2012: Former Convention des Patriotes pour la Paix et la Justice (CPJP) member Mohamed Moussa Dhaffane created the CPSK in August 2012 with the aim of founding the Séléka with the UFDR and CPJP Fondamentale. Following the signing of the Libreville accord in January 2013, Dhaffane was appointed Minister of Forestry, a strategically important post. Dhaffane was confirmed in the position by the Michel Djotodia regime. Dhaffane has gradually distanced himself from other Séléka leaders and positioned himself as a political leader.
- J. Front Populaire pour le Redressement (FPR)** – 2008-2012: The FPR was created by Mahamat Abdelkader Baba Laddé, a former armed police officer and Chadian rebel of Peuhl origin who was present in Darfur between 2006 and 2008. Laddé's FPR established itself in CAR between 2008 and 2012, and its combatants committed numerous abuses, citing the marginalization of pastoral Peuhl people.⁷⁴ In February 2012, Laddé declared, "the objective of the FPR is to unseat two regimes: the one in Chad and the one in CAR." He added, "Bozizé has his own enemies and rebellions. We will support any Central African rebellion that can unseat Bozizé's regime."⁷⁵ In September 2012, against all expectations, Laddé was welcomed with great ceremony by the Chadian government in N'Djamena.⁷⁶
- K. Lord's Resistance Army (LRA, "Armée de Résistance du Seigneur" in French)** – appeared in CAR in 2008: Composed of approximately 200 combatants,⁷⁷ LRA elements are based mainly in the southeast and east of CAR in mobile units. They have committed numerous abuses, and LRA fighters are implicated in the trafficking of natural resources and weapons.

Chronology and evolution of armed movements in CAR: 2005 to 2017



Endnotes

¹ The Community of Sant'Egidio is a Catholic lay group that engages with warring parties in many parts of the world to prevent conflict and encourage peace talks. The Community of Sant'Egidio has been involved in helping to bring representatives of armed groups in CAR together to discuss disarmament, demobilization, and a political dialogue, an effort that resulted in a signed agreement on June 20, 2017 that was immediately followed by an outbreak of violence in central CAR.

² Multiple peace mediation initiatives for CAR have emerged since 2014 in an attempt to bring a sustainable peace, but thus far none of these initiatives have been successful. In 2015, with Chadian leadership, the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) had some success in convincing the Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC) and the anti-Balaka faction led by Maxime Mokom to join CAR's Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion and Repatriation (DDRR) process and support the country's electoral process. At the end of 2016, a new mediation, led by Angola, emerged at the request of CAR President Faustin Archange Touadéra. After the government of Angola organized meetings with representatives of the CAR government and armed groups at the end of 2016, the African Union took the lead in 2017 and organized additional meetings, with the support of Chad and Economic Community of Central African States/ Communauté Économique des États de l'Afrique Centrale (ECCAS/CEEAC) member states. In March 2017, the Catholic Community of Sant'Egidio began a new mediation initiative. A few meetings were organized in Rome, and the CAR government, political parties, and 13 politico-military groups signed an agreement on June 20, 2017. The following day, widespread violence and clashes erupted between armed groups in the Bria area (capital of Haute-Kotto province in central CAR).

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¹⁰ Dukhan, "Dangerous Divisions."

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¹² Dukhan, "En finir avec l'impunité pour éviter un nouveau nettoyage ethnique en Centrafrique"; Dukhan, "Ending Impunity to Prevent the Renewed Threat of Ethnic Cleansing in the Central African Republic."

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