



Crisis and Hope in Africa

The Enough Project at ten years

May 2017

An Enough Forum publication





Cover Image: A woman in Abyei, May 2011
Credit: Enough Project

Enough Forum

Enough Forum Presented by the Enough Project, the Enough Forum is a platform for dynamic discourse engaging critical issues, challenges, and questions among thought leaders, field researchers, and policy experts. Opinions and statements herein are those of the authors and participants in the forum, and do not necessarily reflect the opinion or policy recommendations of the Enough Project.

Crisis and Hope in Africa

The Enough Project at ten years

By Colin Thomas-Jensen
May 2017

In late 2006, I spent a weekend at a hotel in downtown Philadelphia with an extraordinary group of human rights activists. The meeting, convened by the Bay Area-based foundation Humanity United, was the first step toward building a new organization—one that would use field-based research and analysis of armed conflict and focused advocacy to generate greater political will in the United States and elsewhere to take bold policy decisions to end genocide and mass atrocities in Africa. Three years earlier, the Government of Sudan had begun a military campaign against its citizens in Darfur. The atrocities were met with widespread global condemnation and launched the Save Darfur Coalition, a major grassroots movement focused on ending the killing, which the George W. Bush administration called genocide. Our goal in Philadelphia was ambitious, borne not just from a collective sense of outrage over the brutality of conflicts at the time across East and Central Africa, but also from the belief that the strong bipartisan constituency built around ending genocide in Darfur could be a game-changer in affecting policy change on a broader agenda.

Colin Thomas-Jensen is a fellow at the New America Foundation and a research fellow at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum's Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide. From 2013 to 2017, Colin served as senior policy advisor to U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power. Previously, he worked at the U.S. Department of State as the special advisor to the U.S. Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan. Colin was the senior policy advisor for the Enough Project from its founding in 2007 until 2010.

- 1 [The Enough Project • enoughproject.org](https://enoughproject.org)
Enough Forum: Crisis and Hope in Africa
The Enough Project at ten years

More than 10 years on, I am proud to say that meeting's result—the Enough Project—is an established and important voice on human rights and atrocity prevention. Enough's work continues to impact the international response to atrocities and affects positive change where it matters most: in countries and communities where extreme violence and human rights abuses are most acute. In a time of both increased grassroots activism in the United States and discouraging signs that the United States is retreating from an international leadership role in responding when civilians are targeted *en masse* by governments or armed groups, Enough's mission is as relevant and even more vital now than it was at its founding in Spring 2007.

Enough's Founding Agenda

The Enough Project was founded by Africanists, led by Gayle Smith and John Prendergast. While Syria's six-year cataclysm is the most sobering reminder of the need for activism in response to the blight of mass violence wherever it occurs, Enough emerged in response to the deadliest conflicts in Africa at the time: ending genocide in Darfur, consolidating a fragile peace agreement between Sudan and South Sudan, combatting sexual violence and other atrocities in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and ending the scourge of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) across Central Africa. Enough added Somalia to its agenda in 2008, as Ethiopia's invasion of the country two years earlier and scorched earth counterinsurgency campaign in its capital Mogadishu (and against Somali communities inside Ethiopia) represented a major atrocity risk we could not ignore. And in 2014, with internecine violence in the Central African Republic (CAR) spiraling out of control, Enough began reporting on the regional and economic drivers of the conflict.



*Gayle Smith and John Prendergast, co-founders of the Enough Project at a panel, February 2014.
Photo: Enough Project*

While these conflicts have evolved significantly in the 10 years since Enough's founding, civilians still bear their corrosive brunt. Fewer than three years after South Sudan's secession from Sudan, a civil war erupted in the world's newest nation. With government and opposition forces stoking ethnic rivalries and committing widespread abuses, the United Nations in late 2016 warned of imminent genocide and declared famine in February 2017, with millions of civilians ultimately at risk. The threat of state-sponsored atrocities continues in Darfur and South Sudan's 2011 independence spawned a new internal conflict in Sudan's South Kordofan and Blue Nile states—a war in which the tactics of the Khartoum government have devastated civilian populations. In the DRC, conflict dynamics remain fluid, with armed groups and government forces routinely targeting civilians and an ongoing political crisis over President Joseph Kabila's future that has pushed the country to the precipice of more widespread fighting and atrocities, and possibly a new civil war. Regional military successes against the LRA have reduced the armed group's core strength from thousands of militia a decade ago to just an estimated 100 fighters, most of whom are isolated in remote areas of CAR and the border of Sudan and South Sudan, and northeastern Congo. However, the April 2017 withdrawal of U.S. Special Operations forces and the subsequent announced pullout of Ugandan troops from the military campaign will greatly weaken this effort and increases the prospect that the LRA could—with revenue generated from gold and illegal wildlife trafficking along with potential support from its longtime patron, Sudan—regenerate and increase attacks on civilians. The situations in Somalia and CAR are

fragile, with 6 million Somalis now facing famine and Central Africans still perilously divided along regional and religious lines.

2007 – 2017: Evolving Threats to Civilians

Sudan and South Sudan

The Sudanese government's actions to exterminate three of Darfur's main ethnic groups had by 2007 already fundamentally altered the region's demography. The regime had driven the Fur, Zaghawa, Maasalit, and other communities it accused of supporting rebel groups off their land and across the border to become refugees in Chad or into sprawling and insecure camps for internally displaced people. The political process to end the conflict had ground to a halt after multiple failed mediation efforts, a dangerous proxy war between Sudan and Chad intensified, and thousands of aid workers struggled amidst continued insecurity and bureaucratic obstructionism to assist nearly 3 million Darfuris, in what was at the time the world's largest humanitarian operation.



Residents flee violence in Abyei, March 2011. Photo: Enough Project

The severity of the Darfur crisis—and the public attention surrounding it—had sucked out much of the oxygen from the international effort to shore up and enforce the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Sudanese government and rebels based in South Sudan. Ending this devastating war had for nearly a decade been a U.S. foreign policy priority, and the direct involvement of U.S. diplomats from the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations was critical to securing an agreement. By 2007, the CPA was in danger of collapse, with the Sudanese government actively slow-walking or undermining its implementation, most dangerously in the contested and volatile Abyei region. “An All-Sudan Solution: Linking Darfur and the South,” Enough’s first paper on South Sudan written by former U.S. diplomat and longtime Sudan hand Roger Winter and Prendergast, analyzed the interconnectedness of the looming failure of the peace agreement and the continued conflict in

Darfur, imploring policymakers to mount a full-court press on both fronts and focus more attention on the obvious flashpoint in the disputed area of Abyei.

As anyone who has worked in government can attest, elections can concentrate policymakers' minds on neglected problems, and the April 2010 vote in Sudan was a case in point. With South Sudan's self-determination vote scheduled for the following January, the election refocused international attention on CPA implementation and the likely secession of South Sudan in 2011. I had left Enough in 2010 and joined the U.S. State Department, working as an advisor to the U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan. With South Sudan's self-determination referendum fast approaching and all available polling showing that South Sudanese would vote overwhelmingly for independence (the final tally was 99% in favor), we and the rest of the international community began preparing for the near certain establishment of a new, land-locked, and desperately poor state in one of the world's most conflict-prone regions. Enough's reporting during this critical period in Sudan's history reinforced the urgency of supporting a peaceful and credible referendum and helped to maintain our focus on addressing the continued volatility in Abyei and other areas along the border.

The good news was that South Sudan at independence had significant international support, with the United States, United Kingdom, and Norway deepening a "Troika" of donors that had rightly championed the self-determination of South Sudan's people and invested politically and financially in the new nation's success. The bad news was that South Sudan's political leaders had, rather than standing up functioning ministries and forging the unity necessary to build a new nation, spent the six years between the peace agreement's signing and the referendum pilfering state resources. The dismal state of South Sudan's army at independence in July 2011 was the clearest warning sign of the crisis that erupted two and half years later. South Sudan's President Salva Kiir had shied away from the difficult challenge of downsizing and reforming the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)—which in 2011 accounted for at least 50 percent of the national budget (though this figure was likely much higher due to off-the-books arms deals)—and continued to purchase tanks, helicopters, and other heavy weapons systems in anticipation of a possible resumption of war with Khartoum. Kiir responded to internal rebellions by appointing militia leaders as SPLA generals and loosely integrating their forces into the already bloated and fractious SPLA. The SPLA rarely differentiated between civilians and combatants in its response to opposition armed groups.

As my State Department colleagues and I worked with international partners throughout 2011 and 2012 to hammer out the details of post-separation economic and security arrangements between Juba and Khartoum, we grappled with a chasm of mistrust between the two sides. Sudan's May 2011 military seizure of Abyei in the run-up to the referendum and continued support for armed opposition groups in South Sudan reaffirmed the worst fears in Juba and militarized its response to internal threats. The conflict that erupted in Jonglei State in the spring and summer of 2013 was a preview of the civil war that erupted in December. In Jonglei, the South Sudan government responded to a rebellion by stoking ethnic rivalries, arming proxy militias, attacking civilians, and restricting U.N. peacekeepers' and humanitarians' access to the conflict zone. At the same time, the running political feud between President Kiir and his First Vice President, Riek Machar—one that dated back to the mid-1990s, when Machar had sided with the Khartoum government against his former SPLA comrades—came to a head in July, when Kiir removed Machar from his post and purged other political opponents from the ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) party. The warning signs of a wider conflict were unmistakable, and when Kiir accused Machar of a coup attempt in December 2013, South Sudan exploded.

More than three years on, the people of South Sudan continue to pay the horrendous cost of this power struggle among South Sudan's violent and venal elites. The war has dangerously exacerbated ethnic divides in the country, and the United Nations has warned of possible genocide. The fighting

has displaced 3.5 million people, including more than 830,000 South Sudanese who have fled south to Uganda since a major flare-up of violence in July 2016—the single largest exodus of refugees in Africa since the Rwanda genocide 22 years ago. With the government systematically obstructing the movement of U.N. peacekeepers and humanitarian access to the most vulnerable populations, 100,000 people are experiencing famine and another 1.1 million are on the brink of starvation.

As the United States and others sought to build leverage on the government and the rebels to halt atrocities and negotiate a peace deal, actor George Clooney and Prendergast launched The Sentry. A partnership between Enough and Not On Our Watch, The Sentry is an initiative to follow stolen assets and to disrupt corrupt networks responsible for genocide or other mass atrocities in Africa. By late 2013, I had left my position with the special envoy's office to become the senior policy advisor on Africa to the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Samantha Power. From my time there, I can attest to the value of The Sentry's initial September 2016 report on South Sudan, "War Crimes Shouldn't Pay," and subsequent Sentry meetings with President Barack Obama, Vice President Joe



The Sentry co-founder George Clooney at a press conference launching the report, "War Crimes Shouldn't Pay," on September 12, 2016. Photo: Enough Project

Biden, Secretary of State John Kerry, National Security Adviser Susan Rice, Treasury Secretary Jack Lew, and other key officials in helping build the case for the United States to enhance financial pressures against the kleptocratic networks fueling the violence in South Sudan. Moreover, The Sentry's work demonstrates the underlying greed driving the conflict in South Sudan and disproves the fallacy that war and atrocities are simply an outgrowth of ethnic hatred. A critical question is whether President Donald Trump's administration will make ending the conflict and preventing further famine a foreign policy priority or stand idle while South Sudanese suffer gruesome atrocities and succumb to starvation at the hands of their failed leaders. Activists from across the political spectrum should remind our leaders that South Sudan's fate has always been a bipartisan concern and press for continued and strong U.S. leadership to end this conflict.

In Sudan, the International Criminal Court's 2010 arrest warrants for Sudanese President Omar al Bashir and other Sudanese officials on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity did little to deter state-sponsored atrocities in Darfur, and the war continued to churn in the run-up to South Sudan's 2011 independence. Tragically, South Sudan's secession gave rise to a new conflict in the rump state of Sudan, in the so-called "Two Areas" of South Kordofan and Blue Nile. While the CPA included provisions to protect the rights of SPLA supporters in Sudan, the Sudanese government undermined the agreement's implementation in the Two Areas and, one month before South Sudan's independence, attacked SPLA fighters in the Two Areas, who had refused to disarm and join the Sudanese army. The opposition dubbed itself the SPLM-North (SPLM-N) and aligned itself with Darfur-based rebel groups to form a broader political-military coalition opposed to President Bashir's National Congress Party (NCP).

Inside the Obama administration, we worked to prevent the conflict from spiraling out of control, but our efforts ran aground, and President Bashir launched yet another all-out assault on his own people. Khartoum expelled aid workers and terrorized civilians by barrel-bombing villages and agricultural areas under opposition control, sending refugees fleeing to South Sudan and Ethiopia, and creating a severe humanitarian crisis for those who stayed behind. At the end of 2010, Clooney and Prendergast launched the Satellite Sentinel Project (SSP), a collaborative effort between Enough, Not On Our Watch, DigitalGlobe, and initially, the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative. SSP collected and analyzed satellite imagery in areas of Sudan, South Sudan, and the surrounding region where evidence of or culpability for war crimes was hidden because the independent collection of evidence was banned or obstructed. SSP's efforts at highlighting atrocities committed in these regions was supplemented by ongoing campaigns spearheaded by Enough and partner organizations, and included protests at the Sudan Embassy in Washington, DC, which resulted in the arrests of prominent members of Congress, activists, and the SSP co-founders.

With South Sudan's independence, Sudan faced the economic uncertainty that accompanied the loss of its largest source of revenue: oil. A September 2012 agreement that the United States helped negotiate between Khartoum and Juba established an oil-sharing arrangement and a process to determine final status of the (still) disputed territories along the border. However, Sudan could not diversify its economy quickly enough to stave off the impact of an 85 percent reduction in oil revenue. In late 2013, popular frustrations boiled over in street protests in the capital Khartoum that the regime suppressed in typically brutal fashion. Desperate for economic support, Sudan pivoted from its close relationship with Iran, which, in large part due to U.S. sanctions, was no longer capable of providing Sudan a financial lifeline. Sudan sought funds from Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states—funds it needed to continue to wage war in the Two Areas and Darfur.

Buoyed by new funds from its allies in the Gulf, the government launched a major offensive in 2015 aimed at crushing the remaining rebel groups and ending the war. Out of the headlines for nearly a decade, Darfur was again aflame as the assault led by the government's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces displaced 450,000 people.

With hundreds of thousands of newly displaced Darfuris, and Enough and other human rights groups reporting widespread atrocities, Khartoum's relationship with the United States reached a low point. Many of us in the U.S. government began looking for new ways to build leverage with the regime to improve security and increase humanitarian access in Darfur and the Two Areas, and to make progress on other policy priorities, including countering the Islamic State and other terrorist groups, defeating the LRA, and ending the war in South Sudan. Enough's report in April 2016, "Modernized Sanctions for Sudan: Unfinished Business for the Obama Administration," focused on increasing and better targeting financial pressure on the regime. However, many U.S. policymakers were wary of levying further sanctions and, as President Obama had sought to do with other nations the United States had

isolated for decades, focused on reducing the trust deficit between Washington and Khartoum by incentivizing positive behavioral change. The United States' early 2017 decision—strongly opposed by Enough—to suspend for six months some economic sanctions against Sudan recognized improvements over the previous six months, but allows the Donald Trump administration to “snapback” those sanctions if that progress does not continue. With a review of the policy set to take place in June, activists must make their voices heard to ensure that the current U.S. administration does a rigorous review of Sudan’s behavior since the sanctions were suspended to determine whether a full lifting of those sanctions is truly warranted.

The Democratic Republic of Congo

The security situation was deteriorating in the DRC in 2007, with civilians in eastern Congo caught in a vice grip between government forces (and their proxies) and various rebel militia. Just five years earlier, the government and several opposition groups had signed an accord ending “Africa’s World War,” a devastating conflict in which at least nine African countries had lined up behind either the Congolese government or one of the more than 20 armed groups arrayed against it in part in a bid to secure access to the DRC’s immense natural resources. The peace agreement paved the way for national elections in July 2006, which, with heavy investment by donors and the logistical support from the United Nations, were largely peaceful and relatively credible. The winner, current President Joseph Kabila, faced immediate security challenges in the east, where another Rwanda-backed rebellion led by former Congolese general Laurent Nkunda was gaining momentum, the National Congress for the Defense of People (CNDP). Within months of the vote, eastern DRC was again on fire; the human cost of nearly a decade of unrelenting conflict was extraordinary. In May 2007 the International Rescue Committee released a comprehensive mortality survey that estimated 5.4 million people had died in the DRC since 1998 mainly as a result of the conflict, making it far and away the deadliest conflict since World War II.

I traveled to the DRC for Enough five times from 2007 to 2010 to examine conflict dynamics in the region and document the corrosive impact of violence on civilians. While government forces and opposition armed groups were equal opportunity abusers, the plight of Congolese women and girls was particularly acute. Such was the severity of the crisis that we decided to focus much of Enough’s initial research and advocacy on highlighting the linkages between the epidemic of rape and sexual violence, the conflict overall, and the battle for control of Congolese mineral wealth—particularly gold, and tantalum, tungsten, and tin, which we called the “3Ts.” These minerals make up critical components of many consumer electronics and jewelry. We believed that making clear the connection between one of the most repugnant aspects of the conflict and the products such as cell phones, laptops, and later jewelry which had become an integral part of so many peoples’ lives, we could begin to build an activist base to support efforts to get at one of the DRC’s main drivers of violence and atrocities.



*A gold mine in South Kivu, DRC, April 2011.
Photo: Sasha Lezhnev/Enough Project*

While conflicts in the DRC are frequently local, driven by intense competition for land and political control, national level political machinations in Kinshasa and the thorny dynamics amongst the countries of the Great Lakes region—particularly the volatile relationship between the DRC and Rwanda—have exacerbated local tensions and intensified the level of violence, particularly in the east. The continued presence in eastern DRC of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a militia led by some of the individuals responsible for the 1994 Rwandan genocide, has served as a pretext for repeated military intervention in eastern Congo and Rwanda’s support for proxy forces that, in theory at least, protect its national security. But Rwanda has also derived significant economic benefits from its meddling in the DRC, as much of the illegal trade in conflict minerals has flowed through Rwanda, lining the pockets of military officials and other elites. Secret negotiations in 2009 between President Kabila and Rwandan President Paul Kagame led to the suspension of the Congolese government’s FDLR support, Rwanda’s arrest of General Nkunda (a Congolese rebel commander with close ties to Kigali), and the deployment of its forces to the DRC, ostensibly to hunt down the FDLR’s leadership. But the ulterior motive for the numerous incursions by Rwandan forces was clear: to secure control of key mining areas by armed groups aligned with Kigali.

In 2008-10, Enough worked closely with a bipartisan coalition in Congress to support U.S. legislation to counteract the conflict minerals trade, including multiple trips to the DRC to consult with Congolese organizations, advising congressional staff, and working with activists to push the bills over the hump. This legislation, promulgated by Sens. Sam Brownback, R-Kansas; Dick Durbin, D-Ill.; and Russ Feingold, D-Wis.; along with Reps. Jim McDermott, D-Wash.; and Frank Wolf, R-Va., ended up as a provision in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act that requires greater transparency in the supply chains for electronics, jewelry, and other companies that use the 3Ts and gold in their products.



Enough Project organized demonstration calling on Apple to remove conflict minerals from its supply chain, June 2010. Photo: Enough Project

President Kabila’s initial response to the legislation was to enact a counterproductive mining ban that caused hardship in eastern DRC. The new law’s early implementation proved challenging, as the certification process needed to green-light conflict-free mines was slow and cumbersome. However, the law has now spurred numerous reforms, including the first-ever certification and mine assessment process for minerals from Congo and a more transparent bagging and tagging process. Conflict-free minerals exports have increased steadily since then, and Dodd-Frank has had a positive effect on the security situation. In 2010, the United Nations reported that armed groups controlled nearly all of the mines in

the east; by 2016 that number was down to 20 percent. Almost 79 percent of miners at tin, tantalum, and tungsten mines surveyed in the DRC now work at conflict-free mines, according to a study by the International Peace Information Service in October 2016. Over the years, Congolese advocates and organizations have come out in support of Dodd-Frank, citing positive impacts and also recommending ways to make the law more effective. Correspondingly, exports of conflict-free minerals reached record levels in 2016, and, with support from the United States and other donors, the regional countries established a minerals certification process to monitor mining areas and determine whether or not they are conflict-free.

Incentivizing conflict-free mining has made Rwandan involvement in the DRC less profitable and deprived many armed groups—including the FDLR—the fuel for their insurgencies. The dismantling of the Rwandan-backed Congolese rebel group known as M23 in 2013, with significant work done by then-U.S. Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa and the Democratic Republic of the Congo Russ Feingold and major support by Enough, has meant that for the first time since 1996 Kigali does not have a significant armed proxy in eastern DRC. Importantly, the number of internally displaced persons has also decreased from 3.4 million in 2008 to 1.9 million in 2016.

Unfortunately, as security in the east has gradually improved since 2013, President Kabila’s decision not to step down when his constitutional mandate expired in December 2016 and his government’s violent response to the resulting popular protests threaten to plunge the DRC into much greater instability again. Throughout 2016, while Congo’s National Conference of Bishops (CENCO) led efforts to negotiate a political solution to the crisis, we in the U.S. government worked to build leverage for the talks by ramping up the pressure on individuals responsible for atrocities, including targeted sanctions against multiple government officials for their role in violence against anti-Kabila protestors. The shaky implementation of a late 2016 agreement between Kabila and opposition groups plus the sudden death in February of an important opposition leader, Étienne Tshisekedi, has added to the dangerous uncertainty over whether Kabila will step down and allow elections to determine his successor. The February massacre of civilian protesters in Kasai province, the subsequent kidnapping and murder of members of the U.N. panel of experts sent to investigate, and continued predations by security forces, armed groups, and militias in Kasai and in the east (most notably the growing strength and ferocity of the Allied Democratic Forces, a Ugandan rebel group) are warning signs that activists and policymakers, who care about atrocity prevention, must address to prevent the DRC from spiraling back into civil war.


As the situation has deteriorated, Enough has led efforts on multiple fronts in support of a peaceful transition. These efforts include a coordinated push for U.S. and European Union sanctions, including securing and providing evidence to senior U.S. officials; supporting and working closely with my former colleague Tom Perriello when he was U.S. Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region; even traveling with and facilitating meetings between Perriello and other U.S. officials with civil society groups and miners in Congo; and ongoing investigations through The Sentry to highlight the economic motivations and corruption that fuels violence and repression. For example, The Sentry worked with the *New York Times* to publish information in December 2016 about \$95.7 million that went missing from the state-owned mining company Gécamines.

Lord’s Resistance Army

In 2007, as the conflict in eastern DRC spiraled downward, civilians in isolated, northeastern Orientale province were suddenly confronted by one of Central Africa’s most ruthless armed groups: the LRA. Over the previous 20 years, the LRA and its leader Joseph Kony had laid waste to communities across northern Uganda and South Sudan, kidnapping tens of thousands of children to serve as fighters, porters, and sex slaves. A 1998 “60 Minutes” story on the LRA had actually pushed me toward a career in human rights; I was shaken to my core as I watched LRA abductees who had escaped the group’s clutches recount the depravities they had endured and been forced to inflict on other men, women, and children across the region. By 2005, the LRA’s campaign of violence and abuses committed by the Ugandan military in its heavy-handed response had forced 1.7 million Ugandans into squalid camps, leading to one of the world’s worst human rights and humanitarian emergencies. The peace agreement between Sudan and South Sudan was signed that year, and one of the immediate consequences was the withdrawal of the Sudanese government’s formal support to the LRA, which for years had been a proxy for Khartoum against South Sudanese rebels and their Ugandan backers.

By 2006, an increasingly effective and more disciplined Ugandan military effort had forced Kony to accept a cease-fire and relocate across the border into northeast DRC, where the LRA set up a base in Garamba National Park. On his back foot and facing an ICC arrest warrant, Kony began negotiations that year with the Ugandan government, mediated by then-South Sudanese Vice President Machar.

At Enough's launch in 2007, the limitations of that process were apparent, and our initial research focused on how to construct the necessary leverage to secure an agreement to dismantle the insurgency and avoid enabling the LRA to use negotiations as a smokescreen behind which it could regroup, rebuild, and resume the conflict. Enough sought to highlight the dangers when Prendergast traveled with actor Ryan Gosling and advocate and freelance writer Jimmie Briggs to northern Uganda, where traumatized communities still lived in fear of the LRA. Upon their return, they worked with longtime Ugandan peace negotiator Betty Bigombe to press for greater attention and action on Capitol Hill, at the United Nations, and in the media, while Enough worked with organizations including Invisible Children and Resolve to educate and build a constituency to push for strong U.S. action. Our analysis at Enough that Kony planned to resume the war was tragically prescient, and after a series of LRA attacks against civilians in late 2008, the Ugandan army (with support from the United States) attacked Kony's camp in Garamba and launched a coordinated offensive against the LRA with forces from the DRC and South Sudan dubbed "Operation Lightning Thunder." The attack on Kony's camp was unsuccessful as he and his followers had abandoned the site hours earlier. While Enough was supportive of increased military pressure against the LRA, we and other advocacy groups were critical of failure by military planners to build effective civilian protection into their counterinsurgency operations. In the five months following the attack, the LRA abducted at least 250 children, raped scores of women and girls, and killed more than 1,000 civilians, including the massacre of 143 Congolese during Christmas celebrations in remote areas of the DRC. Throughout that spring, I and others at Enough along with other advocacy groups worked closely with the office of then-Sen. Feingold and other Senate offices to draft the Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act, which President Obama signed into law in May 2010 and represented a major victory for activists. The law required the U.S. government to develop a comprehensive strategy to respond to the LRA crisis, including expanding efforts to "apprehend or remove Joseph Kony and his top commanders from the battlefield."



Elephant ivory seized from poachers in Garamba, DRC, January 2013. Photo: Enough Project

In October 2011, the United States began deploying Special Operations Forces to Central Africa under Operation Observant Compass to partner with Ugandan and other regional armies in the hunt for Kony. The LRA had expanded its area of operations over the previous 18 months, with groups of fighters active in northeast DRC and across the border in southeastern Central African Republic. While U.S. forces worked with the Ugandans to encourage defections from the LRA and develop leads on the whereabouts of Kony and other senior leaders, the LRA moved deeper into the CAR and began crossing another border into a Sudanese-controlled (but disputed with South Sudan) territory called Kafia Kingi. In 2013, Enough published,

"Kony's Ivory: How Elephant Poaching in Congo Helps Support the Lord's Resistance Army," a seminal report that exposed the LRA's lucrative involvement in elephant poaching. Though weakened from increased military pressure, the LRA's increasing role in criminal wildlife trafficking networks and

relationships with rebel groups in the Central African Republic—where violence erupted in 2012 and accelerated throughout 2013—and the Sudanese army offered vital lifelines to Kony and his remaining followers. Disrupting those lifelines became a central element of the strategy to defeat the LRA.

LRA commander Dominic Ongwen's surrender to U.S. forces in early 2015 was a major blow to the armed group, and in the months that followed the Ugandan army, with U.S. support, further degraded the LRA's capacity forcing many of the 150 or so remaining fighters into Kafia Kingi. Yet while the United States' improving relations with Sudan could yield information that leads to a successful operation to remove Kony from the battlefield and end the insurgency, the United States began withdrawing its forces from the counter-LRA fight in April. Following the announced U.S. troop withdrawal, the Ugandan army declared its own withdrawal, effectively halting the military pressure that has, over the past nine years, significantly reduced the LRA threat to civilians. The prospect of the LRA's regeneration—by expanding its poaching activities and leveraging its relationship with the armed groups that threaten the fragile peace in CAR—is a terrifying prospect and one that activists must generate pressure on the United States to prevent by ensuring that U.S. forces remaining in the region have a continued role in developing leads on Kony's whereabouts and, if he is located, supporting regional efforts to remove him from the field of battle.

Enough in 2017: Renewing the Movement to Prevent Genocide and Mass Atrocities

Enough's launch was timely. The conflicts on which we chose to focus our work had, to varying degrees, bipartisan activist and congressional constituencies and the Save Darfur movement had focused activists' energies on an African cause in a way not seen since the anti-apartheid movement 20 years earlier. President Bush had declared Darfur a genocide and appointed a high-level special envoy focused on peace efforts in Sudan. The Bush administration had also opened a U.S. State Department office in eastern DRC to support regional diplomacy there, and begun deepening U.S. military cooperation with Uganda to pursue the LRA. In early 2009, less than two years after Enough's launch, President Obama took office and redoubled U.S. efforts to prevent a new war between Sudan and South Sudan, intensified U.S. diplomacy in the DRC (eventually appointing a special envoy in 2013), and deployed U.S. forces to Central Africa in a bid to dismantle the LRA once and for all. President Obama presided over the 2012 establishment of an Atrocities Prevention Board, convened by the National Security Council. And when atrocities erupted in the Central African Republic later that year, the United States, led by Amb. Power in New York, helped to marshal a strong international response that likely prevented an even more destructive conflict.

Ten years on from Enough's founding, with conflict and famine intensifying in South Sudan and a political crisis in the DRC careening toward possible implosion (not to mention the conflict and famine that stalks the Lake Chad Basin and Somalia), I believe we have an opportunity and a responsibility to recapture a spirit of activism and bipartisanship to reinforce the urgency and smart policy necessary to address these challenges.

Enough is constantly evaluating where and how it has had a positive policy impact and where its efforts have fallen short. Recognizing the role that economic drivers, greed, and corruption have played in fueling conflict, Enough has, over the past two years, shifted its analytical approach and focused more resources on highlighting these linkages, including through research to follow the money trail and support the United States' and others' efforts to disrupt the economic incentives for violence and conflict. While these reports help fill critical gaps in support of sanctions against those responsible for atrocities, the challenge of political will is constant.

As Enough moves into its next ten years, I believe it must cultivate new champions in Congress and reengage with constituency groups (students, Evangelicals, and others) capable of the type of citizen-driven action that helped make ending genocide in Sudan a U.S. foreign policy priority, forced companies to take measures to end the conflict minerals trade that fuels atrocities in the DRC, and pushed Congress and the Obama administration to support a U.S. military deployment to defeat the LRA. While these crises have evolved significantly since Enough launched in 2007, the cause is no less urgent. The time to stand up and be counted is now.