Tusk Wars
Inside the LRA and the Bloody Business of Ivory

By Ledio Cakaj
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Executive Summary

New field research from the Enough Project shows that the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is weakened to an unprecedented point, counting only 120 armed fighters in its ranks, scattered across three countries in central Africa. Despite its weakened state, the LRA continues to pose a threat to local populations in Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and in South Sudan, with 150 recorded attacks and 500 abductions of civilians for the first eight months of 2015 and 200,000 people displaced.

Based on new interviews with recent LRA defectors, LRA founder and leader Joseph Kony was based in the Sudan-controlled enclave of Kafia Kingi as of May 2015, an area he has rarely moved from since 2011. His initial base in 2011 was reportedly 10 miles from the Sudan Armed Forces garrison in Dafak, South Darfur, and his last known location in May 2015 was at the foot of Mount Toussoro at the Kafia Kingi-CAR border. According to recent LRA defectors, Kony is unlikely to move deeper into South Darfur, as that area is more populated and insecure, and he would be much more likely to be spotted. There is a slight possibility that Sudanese army troops are unaware of the exact whereabouts of Kony himself, but LRA defectors have consistently claimed that the local Sudanese military personnel has knowledge of the presence of LRA groups in Kafia Kingi, a stark contrast to the Government of Sudan’s persistent denials of LRA presence in its territory.
Kony has gradually lost some control over his troops, who are increasingly likely to leave the ranks or disobey his orders. Nine of Kony’s personal bodyguards made an attempt on his life in mid-2015 – the first time that has ever occurred. African Union forces and U.S. advisors have also made communications within the LRA very difficult, with Kony out of touch with some of his commanders for months or even years at a time. U.S.-led defection campaigns are having some success, as recently escaped LRA fighters express they trust U.S. advisors more than they do the A.U. forces, and seven recent defectors walked for a month attempting to access a U.S. base in CAR. On October 23, 2015, President Obama reauthorized the U.S. support mission for an additional year.

Despite the successes of the A.U.-U.S. counter-LRA mission, Kony has continued to traffic ivory, secured by fighters in DRC’s Garamba National Park. New field research by the Enough Project provides new details about the traffic of ivory from DRC into Kafia Kingi, and the transaction between the LRA and Sudanese merchants. In Enough Project staff interviews conducted earlier in 2015, ex-LRA combatants described trading ivory directly with Sudan Armed Forces officers. Under direct orders from Kony, LRA commanders, in particular his two oldest sons, Salim and Ali, barter the ivory with merchants from the South Darfur town of Songo, in exchange for food, uniforms, and ammunition. One LRA group is based in DRC’s Garamba National Park (GNP), where it poaches elephants and secures the ivory. Another group, led by a young man called Owila, then transports the ivory from northeastern DRC to Kafia Kingi through CAR. The tusks are likely trafficked to Nyala, South Darfur, and on to Khartoum for export abroad, primarily to Asia.

Recent defectors from Kony’s group have emerged with large amounts of fresh ammunition that was obtained by trafficking ivory. The independent research organization C4ADS conducted headstamp analysis on spent rounds found by rangers in Garamba National Park following recent LRA and Janjaweed attacks. They concluded that the ammunition was manufactured in Serbia (LRA), as well as Iran, Sudan, and Italy (Janjaweed) [see Appendix I]. Defectors also report that Kony is hoarding some of the larger ivory tusks in anticipation of a “rainy day” for the LRA. The conflict-ivory trade perpetuates the poaching of more elephants, the illicit trafficking of ivory, and violence against civilians. LRA groups have also pillaged some amounts of gold and diamonds from mining areas in eastern CAR, and Kony reportedly keeps small quantities of gold and diamonds with him in Kafia Kingi.

The LRA, as well as Sudanese and South Sudanese poachers, pose a vital risk to the lives of the Garamba National Park rangers, who are on the front lines of what they refer to as ‘an open war.’ The rangers need support, as their activities protect not only elephants but also civilians who live in the park’s vicinity. The rangers have already proven effective in reducing the number of elephants killed by the LRA in the last three years as well as deterring some LRA attacks against civilians in northeastern DRC. However, if more action is not taken to support anti-poaching efforts and counter the LRA, the rangers believe that the elephant population, reduced from approximately 20,000 in the 1980s to fewer than 1,000 in 2015, could soon be wiped out entirely.
Recommendations

1. Now that the U.S. support mission to the African Union Regional Task Force (AU-RTF) has been reauthorized, the U.S. advisors should make the mission’s primary goal to bring Joseph Kony to justice. The U.S. assistance mission should also provide additional airlift capacity to the AU-RTF and increase its programs to entice LRA fighters to defect.

2. In the Fiscal Year 2016 appropriations process, Congress should continue to robustly support counter-LRA operations and support that Kony’s removal should be the mission’s goal. The House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee should pass the bipartisan Congressional LRA resolutions, H.Res. 394 and S.Res. 237, which support the U.S. mission and calls for an expansion of reintegration programs for ex-combatants as well as anti-poaching programs.

3. The United States should take a more prominent role in countering Sudan’s complicity in aiding the LRA. The U.S. counter-LRA mission should continue to deploy advisors close to the areas controlled by Sudan in Kafia Kingi so it can gather precise intelligence on Kony’s whereabouts. U.S. advisors and their African Union partner forces should establish a Safe Reporting Site at the newly established U.S. base in Sam Ouandja, CAR, and heavily advertise this defection opportunity to LRA groups in the area.

4. Sudan should allow troops of the African Union Regional Task Force (AU-RTF) access to the Sudan-controlled enclave of Kafia Kingi to pursue Joseph Kony and remaining LRA groups.

5. Justice officials in regional governments, including in the Congolese military courts and the new Special Criminal Court in CAR, should investigate and build dossiers against the high-level perpetrators of elephant poaching, ivory trafficking, and related atrocity crimes, including LRA commanders and facilitators, in order to establish deterrence for the ongoing poaching crisis. The U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime should assist in the investigations and prosecution strategies.

6. Foreign courts, particularly in the European Union and the United States, with jurisdiction over individuals and companies suspected of high-level involvement in illegal ivory trafficking should investigate the most serious cases of trafficking, natural resource pillage, money laundering, and other related crimes. Such individuals and companies should also face targeted sanctions where evidence shows violation of E.U., U.S., or U.N. sanctions regimes aimed at supporting peace in central Africa.

7. The U.S. advisors on the counter-LRA mission and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service should work more closely with the Garamba National Park rangers and help interdict the trade from Congo to Sudan, and Congress should provide adequate funding for the anti-poaching work in this region.

8. As the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) finalizes the rule on U.S. restrictions on ivory sales and imports, it should maintain narrow exemption language in order to eliminate loopholes that would allow ivory traffickers to continue to bring ivory into the United States in smaller trinkets. In particular, FWS should keep the proposed trading ban intact on items "wholly and primarily" made of ivory. Furthermore, FWS should maintain the proposed burden-shifting scheme, such
that ivory carriers and importers should bear the burden of proving they are eligible to import ivory under specific exemptions.

9. Members of Congress should co-sponsor the Global Anti-Poaching Act, H.R. 2494, introduced by Ed Royce (R-CA) and Eliot Engel (D-NY), and the Senate should move swiftly in conjunction with their House colleagues to address this serious issue. If passed, the bill would help create consequences for atrocity perpetrators sustaining themselves through wildlife trafficking by making wildlife trafficking a predicate offense for money laundering, and support the professionalization of partner countries’ park rangers.

Introduction

The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) of 2015 is undeniably in decline. Numbers of fighters have been depleted due to defections and military pressure from a Ugandan-led African Union Regional Task Force (RTF), supported with logistical assets, combat training, and U.S. military advisors. The RTF has pushed leader Joseph Kony into the Sudan-controlled Kafia Kingi enclave, away from the majority of the LRA groups based in the Central African Republic (CAR) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The continuous military campaign has caused internal dissent within the LRA, which in turn has made Kony increasingly violent toward the rank and file. In an effort to reassert lost control, Kony has ordered the execution of low-level LRA fighters. These recent executions have caused increased discontent within the LRA and defections of fighters and senior commanders.

Despite its weakened state, the LRA continues to pose a threat to local populations in CAR, DRC, and, less frequently, in South Sudan. Attacks against civilians and pillage of resources are common and can result in abductions. Violence committed against abductees can include murder, sexual and gender-based abuse, and beatings. There were over 150 recorded LRA attacks for the first eight months of 2015, taking place in CAR and DRC, according to the LRA Crisis Tracker, a data collection platform that gathers real time incidents from community based radios.15 During the same period, there were over 500 abductions and nine recorded deaths.16 Continued LRA violence has caused the displacement of approximately 200,000 civilians displaced across central Africa.17

Another worrying trend is the LRA’s continued poaching of elephants mostly in DRC’s Garamba National Park and trading of ivory with Sudanese merchants in Kafia Kingi, an area sandwiched between Sudan and
South Sudan on the border with eastern CAR. The barter of ivory for food, clothes, and ammunition remains a crucial lifeline for Kony, personally, as he uses these resources almost exclusively for himself and his own group. Barter of tusks from slain elephants provides ammunition and other supplies to Kony and his group, resulting in continued violence against civilians and the poaching of more elephants. However, Garamba National Park rangers provide welcomed support in countering the LRA. By protecting elephants and limiting the LRA’s access to ivory, the rangers have deterred some attacks and have thus helped protect communities living around the park.

Despite the wildlife rangers’ valiant efforts, Garamba’s elephant population is declining rapidly. Apart from the LRA, armed Sudanese riders commonly known in the region as Janjaweed, South Sudanese poachers, and allegedly soldiers from the national army and police, also kill elephants in Garamba. The rangers are often in the line of fire and some have lost their lives trying to protect the park’s wildlife. Garamba’s park rangers need increased support to stop the massacre of elephants and to continue deterring LRA attacks against civilians.

The Current State of the LRA

Nearly 30 years after its emergence, the *modus operandi* of Kony’s group remains largely the same, according to interviews with recent LRA defectors in July 2015. Split into small groups in order to increase mobility and the chances of escaping pursuers while maintaining a clear line of command with Kony at the top, the LRA of 2015 is astonishingly similar to that of 1987 when it was born. A major difference, however, is Kony’s increased inability to supervise all of his groups and hampered ability to communicate due to the sheer distance between the groups; some groups are hundreds of miles apart from one another. This has led to isolation, indiscipline, and defections.

LRA Groups, Locations, and Movement

Within the LRA, there are approximately 120 armed men, including 80 of Ugandan origin mostly from the Acholi sub-region. Additionally, approximately 100 to 120 women and children – the number fluctuates due to temporary abductions – are also part of the various LRA groups. The different LRA groups remain nearly constantly on the move, trying to escape pursuing Ugandan soldiers in CAR, and Congolese soldiers in DRC. The main groups will often split into smaller groups of about eight to ten armed men and a similar number of women, children, or recent abductees. Of all the LRA groups in operation, three are the most important:

**Group Kony**

A small group of about 35 armed men and 15 women and children is led by Kony’s two oldest sons Salim and Ali, and a bodyguard called Otim Larwedo, usually referred to as “DG,” for Director-General. Within this group is Kony’s personal unit, also referred to as escorts, which has fewer than 20 armed men and is commanded by veteran fighters Alphonse Lamola and Okot Odek. Salim, who is reportedly 23 years old, with Larwedo as his deputy, commands a group of approximately a dozen fighters who often deploy to the CAR border to meet other groups, especially in order to bring in ivory.
According to former combatants, Ali, 21, has three personal bodyguards. His deputy is Okot Lukwang, who is also the director of intelligence. Ali and Lukwang are in charge of negotiating ivory prices with Sudanese merchants from the small town of Songo located in Kafia Kingi. Kony, his sons, and some of his ‘wives’ – predominantly women who were abducted in Uganda, South Sudan, CAR and DRC and forced to ‘marry’ Kony – have been based in Kafia Kingi since at least early 2011. Kafia Kingi is a disputed territory between Sudan and South Sudan currently under the control of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The group’s members move roughly within a territorial triangle inside Kafia Kingi delineated by the Adda River in the south, the Umbelasha River to the north, and the CAR border to the west.

Kony’s first and longest-standing base in Kafia Kingi was located along the banks of the Umbelasha River, about 10 miles southwest of an SAF garrison in Dafak. Kony named this base Adek Ming (meaning ‘no stupidity’ in Acholi) after it became the site of the execution of four LRA fighters allegedly ordered by Kony in late 2012 and early 2013. Immediately prior to an incursion of Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF) commandoes in early 2013, Kony moved his group from Adek Ming into CAR. He then returned to Kafia Kingi with a leaner force of about 60 people, including some women and children. Kony’s group, which splits into three or more smaller units, has established temporary bases throughout Kafia Kingi, including most recently a small base only one mile southwest of the Dafak SAF garrison, or nine miles northeast of Adek Ming.

Former combatants reported various movements of Kony inside CAR, mostly in the vicinity of the border with Kafia Kingi, from 2011 to 2015, but he spent most of his time inside Kafia Kingi. In late 2014, Kony reportedly walked much further south into CAR than usual, making it as far as 10 miles north of Obo, where Ugandan troops and U.S. military advisers are based.

According to two former combatants, Kony came close to Obo, CAR, in 2014 and persuaded an LRA commander, Dominic Ongwen, to abandon his base in DRC’s Bomu Orientale forest and return with Kony to Kafia Kingi. Ongwen joined Kony in Kafia Kingi, but after a severe beating he escaped, surrendering to U.S. advisors in early 2015. Former combatants believe that Kony wanted to make an example of Ongwen, who had openly disobeyed Kony’s orders to join him in Kafia Kingi for close to two years, another case of Kony’s eroding authority.

Kony’s last known location, provided by seven defectors from his group who left Kafia Kingi on May 16, 2015, was in Kafia Kingi on the border with CAR, likely at the foot of Mount Toussoro (GPS coordinates 9.06667, 23.23333), or ‘stony mountain,’ as described by the recent defectors. He had already abandoned his base near the stony mountain by June 20, 2015, when a Ugandan army unit, alongside four recent defectors, checked the position, and uncovered a cache of 30 AK-47 machine guns.

It is unlikely Kony has moved beyond Kafia Kingi, further into Darfur, as he is aware of his vulnerability in an unfamiliar area with high insecurity. A Ugandan army source said, “Kony does not trust anyone and he does not want to be controlled [by the SAF]. He is likely still in Kafia Kingi, probably in one of his old positions on [river] Umbelasha.” Kony’s movements in the aftermath of a Ugandan army incursion in 2013 in Kafia Kingi - moving briefly into CAR before returning to Kafia Kingi - might also be a good indicator of his current behavior.
Group Owila

A second important group, which often serves as a source of replacements for Kony’s personal security group, is composed of about 20 armed men and led by a young man called Owila. Another fighter in his mid-to late 20s, Owila is at times part of Kony’s larger group but he often moves to CAR’s Haut-Mbomou prefecture in order to facilitate the transit of ivory consignments from DRC to Kafia Kingi. Owila has become an important commander in recent years, as his contribution to securing the safe transition of ivory from the DRC group to Kony is key to the success of the LRA’s overall operations and survival.

Group Aligatch

A third group, led by yet another young fighter nicknamed Aligatch, is based in DRC’s Haut Uele district. It often moves in and out of Garamba National Park to poach elephants for meat and ivory. While group members consume the animals’ meat and fat, the ivory is stored, usually buried, and taken out of DRC every few months. Aligatch or his deputy then transports the ivory to southeastern CAR, where Owila’s men move it close to Kafia Kingi before handing it over to Kony’s son, Salim. Aligatch has about 30 armed men under his command.

Other groups and the LRA’s potential for getting more deeply involved in conflicts in CAR

A fourth group, also based in southeastern CAR is led by another young man not yet in his 30s, named Oloo. This group counts close to 100 people, including many women and children, who divide into five smaller groups. These groups are responsible for repeated attacks on small villages around Mboki as well as alongside the Mbomou River, the border between CAR and DRC.

Some of Oloo’s groups were also likely responsible for abductions and looting near the small town of Mbrés in Nana Gribizi prefecture, more than 120 miles west of any known LRA attack. According to three children abducted by the LRA in Morobanda, near Mbrés, on February 2, 2015, the LRA group abducted 17 people from an internally displaced population of many hundreds who had left Mbrés for Morobanda, following clashes between units formerly under Séléka and Anti-Balaka forces.

Oloo’s groups’ apparent cooperation with an unknown ex-Séléka commander is a worrying sign of the LRA’s ability to potentially become involved in larger conflicts in CAR. Testimony from one of the Morobanda abductees points to a clear understanding between the LRA group and a particular ex-Séléka unit. “When we were walking from Mbrés to Sam Ouandja the [ex-]Séléka attacked us [the LRA group]. They shot at us then everyone fell on the ground. One of the LRA said something in Arabic and [ex-]Séléka stopped shooting. The LRA commander and [ex-]Séléka men talked together and we stayed there for two days. [Ex-]Séléka brought us food and drinks and then we left.”

However, in the case of Oloo’s group and in a separate, and better-known instance of cooperation between ex-Séléka and an LRA group near Nzako in Mbomou Prefecture, it appears both are the result of individual agreements between low-level leaders, rather than a strategic decision between Kony and ex-Séléka commanders. The lack of a strategic alliance between the LRA and ex-Séléka is in large part due to the heterogeneous nature of both groups, which is even more pronounced in the case of ex-Séléka, a
loose group of fighters loyal to local commanders interested primarily in personal gain. An NGO worker said of a prominent former Séléka commander, a close advisor to former CAR President Michel Djotodia who was allegedly involved in negotiations with the LRA Nzako group, “He is interested in making money, not any religion or ideology.”

In late 2013, following the death of Okot Odhiambo, a top LRA commander indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity, Oloo took charge of many people formerly in Odhiambo’s group, including Kony’s stepbrother, David Olanya. Similar to most LRA groups outside Kafia Kingi, Oloo receives little to no support from Kony, forcing his groups to attack civilians in order to loot food, clothes, and medicine. As with all groups outside of Kafia Kingi, Oloo and his group often beat and kill people to steal their food, engaging in a literal battle for survival.

Two or three other LRA groups, moving within CAR’s Haut-Mbomou and Mbomou prefectures, seem to operate either entirely independent of Kony’s command or devoid of any means to establish contact with the LRA leader. The LRA’s current troop strength is at an all-time low while their vulnerability is at an all-time high. If the Aligatch or Kony groups were significantly weakened, the entire organization would be damaged beyond repair, as these two groups essentially constitute the LRA of 2015.

Command and Control – Internal Dissent

The LRA has been in decline since the December 2008 Ugandan army offensive against LRA bases in Garamba, code-named Operation Lightning Thunder (OLT). Mainly Ugandan troops, under the diplomatic umbrella of the African Union with help from U.S. military advisors, continue to pursue LRA groups in CAR and, less frequently, in parts of South Sudan. Congolese soldiers are responsible for dealing with the LRA inside DRC as the Congolese government does not allow Ugandan troops on Congolese soil. The ongoing A.U.-U.S. counter-LRA mission has had a debilitating impact on LRA communications and strategy.

Kony deploys two people in charge of communications, referred to as “signalers,” with high frequency radios to make contact with a few group commanders. Aware that the A.U./Ugandan army monitors and often breaks their coded messages, Kony’s signalers are unable to maintain frequent and open channels of communication. Kony is so terrified of the radio signals being triangulated, and his location revealed, he dispatches the signalers tens of miles away from his location, passing messages via runners, who spend days trekking back and forth between Kony – who does not stay in a single place for long – and the signalers. Similarly, the commanders receiving Kony’s messages are afraid of being located and minimize communications.

The lack of proper communication and the sheer distance between groups and Kony, who has not seen some commanders for several years, has caused disobedience and outright dissent among some of the rank and file. It has also caused Kony to turn against his own men, often ordering severe beatings and outright executions. Feeling perhaps the loss of control he once exercised meticulously slip away, Kony’s efforts to reassert his authority have backfired. Many have left, depleting the LRA’s numbers and destroying morale.
Former senior commanders such as Dominic Ongwen, Opiyo Sam, and Okello Okutti have left in the past two years, joining other commanders who defected in the aftermath of Operation Lightning Thunder, such as Charles Arop and Caesar Achellam. Kony abandoned or ignored these men, even though they had dedicated all of their lives to Kony’s cause, to paraphrase one such former top commander.  

Disillusionment with Kony, harsh conditions caused by the AU-RTF forces, and sheer anger at having been taken against their will and forced to do Kony’s bidding, are the major reasons low-level fighters mention for their defections. But while the majority of former combatants in the past have expressed a sense of fear or even respect for Kony, sentiments changed particularly around the start of 2013, following the executions of four LRA fighters, allegedly killed on Kony’s orders.  

Six recent LRA defectors stated they had tried to assassinate Kony, an event which is unprecedented. As one of the six said, “We were fed up with Kony beating or killing people for the smallest things.” He was referring to specific incidents in late 2012 and early 2013 when Kony allegedly ordered the executions of four fighters, including his former chief bodyguard, Patrick Otto Agweng. Furthermore, beatings for many LRA fighters on Kony’s orders, including that of Dominic Ongwen to within an inch of his life in late 2014, generated a lot of anger, some of it manifested in the assassination attempt. “Kony liked killing so we wanted to give him a taste of it,” said one of the former combatants.  

Some LRA fighters disillusioned with Kony, but who are too afraid of defecting for fear of being killed by the army or prosecuted in Uganda, have remained in the bush operating independently. Such is likely the case with a group of about 25 people, including a few women and children, led by Acaye Doctor and another fighter nicknamed Charromon. Two additional, but much smaller groups, are also nominally part of the LRA but do not heed Kony’s orders. It is unclear if the two groups want to leave the LRA or simply remain in the bush, but act independently of Kony.  

The majority of former combatants claim that remaining LRA fighters want to leave but be able to defect to U.S. soldiers, who they trust more than the Ugandans. The seven men who came out in Obo in June 2015 suggested that one of the reasons they walked from Kafia Kingi to Obo was so that they could surrender to the U.S. military advisers. According to many former combatants, most people still in the LRA believe the Ugandan soldiers might harm or force them to join the Ugandan army after leaving the LRA, while the U.S. troops are regarded in a more positive light. Finding, perhaps, a solution in which U.S. military advisors become the main recipients of defectors through increased numbers of Safe Reporting Sites might help encourage more LRA fighters to abandon the fight. 

9 The Enough Project  •  enoughproject.org
Tusk Wars
Inside the LRA and the Bloody Business of Ivory
Sustenance and Finances – Ivory, Gold, and Diamonds

Despite the LRA’s sharp decline, Kony is not yet finished, finding instead yet another way to prolong his authority and the misery of the civilians at the receiving end of LRA violence. Ivory, acquired mostly by poaching elephants in DRC’s Garamba National Park, has provided crucial resources for Kony, who trades the tusks for bullets, boots, and uniforms as well as food.

Former combatants have stated that in early 2011 after Kony settled in Kafia Kingi, he issued orders for all groups based in DRC and CAR to find ivory and transport it to his base, away from the reaches of the Ugandan army. In 2012, one of Kony’s former personal bodyguards, Binansio Anum, a.k.a. “Binany,” allegedly carried out the first ivory smuggling trip from northeastern DRC to Kafia Kingi, via southeastern CAR. According to reports, he delivered 38 tusks to Kony in November 2012. On his return to Garamba Park, intent on killing yet more elephants as allegedly instructed by Kony, Binany was shot dead by Ugandan soldiers. However, his death did not stop the LRA from poaching elephants.

Elephant tusks from Garamba have continued to make it into Kafia Kingi since then, albeit at lower rates each year, due to increased vigilance from park rangers and the decline of the LRA groups based in Congo. Interviews with former combatants and LRA researchers in 2013, 2014, and 2015 indicate that the LRA groups have killed fewer elephants each year due to military pressure, decreased numbers of fighters, and a more robust response from the Garamba rangers.

The smuggling route – from Congo to Kafia Kingi

A number of fighters entrusted by Kony to oversee the traffic of ivory have either been killed or have defected. Recently, Aligatch, a young man likely in his late 20s, has been in charge of securing ivory from Garamba. After assembling enough ivory stock to make the journey worthwhile, Aligatch and his group carry the ivory to CAR where Owila takes charge and later delivers it to Kony’s son, Salim, and his bodyguards. The LRA usually transports the ivory in the dry season, roughly between the months of October and April, as it is harder to cross rivers and cut paths through dense bushes during the rainy months, from May to September.

Salim transports the tusks from CAR to Kafia Kingi, a dangerous mission that underlines the importance of ivory to Kony, who is willing to risk his son’s life in order to secure the precious loot. Kony’s second oldest son, Ali, is on the barter side of the ivory business, dealing with traders in Kafia Kingi, an equally risky proposition given the treacherous nature of their business and lack of mutual trust.

Aligatch, Owila, and Salim often use the route to Kafia Kingi first mapped out by Kony on his way out of DRC in 2010, and later perfected by Binany in 2012, thus becoming known to LRA fighters as the ‘Binany pathway.’ The route involves exiting northern DRC just south of Mboki, CAR, and continuing northeast into CAR, leaving Obo to the east and eventually Djemah to the west. Aligatch moves northwest in DRC from Garamba Park to Doruma and eventually east of the Western Bomu Reserve, a large forested area on the border with CAR. Aligatch has reportedly changed the handover location frequently in the past, meeting Owila in various locations north of Bomu, along the Mbomou River, southeast of Mboki, CAR, and further northeast along Binany’s pathway.
Owila and his group move the tusks to the southeastern outskirts of the Zemongo forest in CAR, close to the South Sudan border and Kafia Kingi, where they often meet with Salim and his men. Staying clear of the Zemongo, the group walks to Kafia Kingi keeping to the northeast, hugging the CAR-South Sudan border and entering Kafia Kingi just south of Mount Abu Rasein, on a cow path used by the nomadic cattle herders known in the region as the Mbororo. In 2009 and 2010 LRA groups trying to make it to Kafia Kingi attempted to enter from the south, crossing the border into South Sudan’s Raja County of Western Bahr el Ghazal state. They were met with resistance on the path by armed civilians, Darfuri rebels, and the SPLA. They have avoided the route in the past five years, using instead the Binany pathway.
At times, ivory is buried on the way to Kafia Kingi before reaching Kony’s camp, usually in close proximity to the CAR-Kafia Kingi border. Salim discloses the location to his father in GPS coordinates or in reference to old LRA positions. More recently, former fighters indicated the ivory has been brought to LRA camps inside Kafia Kingi. According to them, Kony does not trust many people to bury the ivory.65

A former combatant said, “Only Kony and his children [Salim, Ali, and Candit, who is just 11 years old] and trusted bodyguard Lukwang deal with the ivory. When the tusks come into camp, the five wait until nightfall when we are all sleeping and leave to go bury the tusks. They return late into the night. Ali and Lukwang go back to fetch the tusks when they need to barter for them with the Arabs [Sudanese merchants].”66

The exact numbers of tusks that LRA groups have brought to Kony in the last four years are difficult to establish but estimates are relatively low, particularly when compared to other well-established poaching networks in the region. Based on former combatant testimony, Binany brought 38 in 2012 and other groups carried between 20 to 30 tusks each year in 2013 and 2014, or approximately 100 pieces in total.67 A Ugandan army commander claimed that Kony received 60 tusks in the first three months of 2015 alone but these claims were not supported in interviews with recent returnees.68 Three former combatants claimed Salim had left in April 2015 to meet Owila in CAR in order to bring tusks to Kafia Kingi, and that a previous delivery of 15 tusks took place in October 2014.69

**Resupplying through ivory**

Kony’s son, Ali, and Lukwang regularly meet with Sudanese merchants to barter ivory for goods. Testimony from former combatants has consistently pointed to LRA dealings in the market of Songo, a small town east of Dafak, as early as mid-2011, soon after Kony and his group settled in Adek Ming.70 Photographs of documents recovered from that abandoned base in early 2013 by an alleged Ugandan army commando unit, show transactions conducted by LRA members in the Songo market throughout 2012.71 These included buying food using U.S. dollar bills or bartering bush meat for flour and cooking oil.

Prominent in these notes is the name of Aimee, a young Congolese ‘wife’ to Kony, who has been recently assigned the position of deputy to the high-ranking bodyguard and intelligence director Lukwang, a significant departure from the standard LRA practice of not placing women in positions of leadership.72

Kony realized he could secure supplies for ivory and used LRA fighters who speak Arabic to find appropriate contacts, which proved no easy feat.73 Former combatants described the difficulty of finding good contacts, which included dangerous exchanges with armed riders the combatants referred to as Janjaweed. “We traded with the Janjaweed twice, gave the ivory for food. But they were not good people, they were angry. Kony said we should not trust them and find someone else, so we never met with them again.”74

Kony’s men eventually settled on two merchants, both from Songo in Kafia Kingi. One trader, known to LRA combatants as ‘the chief of merchants of Songo,’ and ‘the biggest merchant in Songo with five shops,’
meets with Ali and his bodyguard once or twice a month to negotiate the price of the ivory. The trader then sends men on small motorbikes, who bring food and exchange it for the agreed amount of ivory.

“[The trader] would come to our camp twice a month, he drove from Songo on a small Senke [Chinese-made] motorcycle and it usually took him a full day to get to us,” said a former Kony bodyguard. “After the boss [Ali] agreed on the ‘price’ for ivory with [the trader] and the date for the RV [rendezvous, or meeting the trader] sent five or six men on motorcycles with the agreed amount of food,” according to a former personal bodyguard of Ali, Kony’s son. Often the ivory, particularly pieces that are fewer than 20 pounds and shorter than six feet, is exchanged for food, clothes and medicine, especially antibiotics and anti-malarial pills.

Testimony from former fighters, who witnessed the amount of food bartered for tusks, indicates that the LRA receives a baseline of about $9 per pound of ivory in food, clothes, and medicine. For instance, “We once received 15 sacks of flour for five small tusks, shorter than one meter.” It would mean that for five tusks weighing about 33 pounds total the LRA received about $300 worth of flour.

For medium-sized tusks, at about three feet long, the price goes up to about $18 per pound, according to former combatants. Clearly Kony and Ali understand that the price of ivory increases exponentially based on the size of the tusk but the LRA prices are still a bargain for the Songo merchants. In southeastern CAR, a cheap but fairly scarce market, medium-sized tusks sell for $36 to $55 per pound, while in northeastern DRC the price is upward of $68 per pound. Some estimates from South Sudan have indicated prices at roughly $90 per pound. The average tusk weight of a 60-year-old African elephant male is 135 pounds, whereas the average weight of a female tusk is 20 pounds. The ivory’s value increases exponentially as it reaches its end market, but one tusk is still relatively valuable for the LRA, which is primarily interested in food and ammunition.

A second Songo trader known to former LRA fighters has also provided food in exchange for ivory. Both traders have also delivered ammunition, particularly bullets for AK-47 assault rifles and a rockets for RPG-7s (rocket-propelled grenade launchers) in exchange for ivory when instructed by Ali on his father’s orders. A group of seven LRA combatants, formerly with Kony’s group in Kafia Kingi, who surrendered to the Ugandan army in early June 2015, had on them a combined 280 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, which they claimed was given to them by Ali. This amount of ammunition is unusually large, particularly when compared to other LRA fighters, not in Kony’s group, who defect only with a few rounds on them. Such was also the case with almost all former combatants who defected between 2009 and 2013.
At present, Kony does not make contact with the traders or outsiders in general, whether in Kafia Kingi, CAR or DRC. He has specifically ordered his troops to never disclose his whereabouts to outsiders. A former fighter said, “Kony does not get involved, he does not talk to anyone outside of the LRA. He is afraid of being killed because as he said, ‘the whole world hates him.’”\textsuperscript{82} It was a sentiment shared by the Ugandan army commander, Colonel Michael Kabango, who said, “Kony does not trust anyone outside of the LRA. He is afraid of everyone and he is always hiding. It is one of the reasons we can’t get close to him.”\textsuperscript{83}

**Sudan**

Despite the continued stay of LRA groups in Kafia Kingi, often one mile away from the SAF barracks in Dafak, SAF officers might not be aware of the presence of Kony himself in the vicinity. It is also entirely possible that both Songo traders are not SAF personnel. As a former LRA fighter said, “[The traders] are armed but that does not mean they are soldiers, it is so dangerous in Darfur that everyone is armed.”\textsuperscript{84} In other interviews conducted by the Enough Project staff in 2015, several other former LRA combatants also say that they traded ivory directly with Sudanese army officers in Kafia Kingi.\textsuperscript{85}

It is inconceivable, however, that the SAF, especially the small Dafak unit, is unaware of the LRA temporary camps in their area of operations. Many reports in the past based on former combatant testimony have pointed to contact between LRA fighters and SAF personnel.\textsuperscript{86}

Former combatants and Ugandan army military intelligence analysts believe that both Songo traders bartering with the LRA are either collaborating with the Sudanese army, or are affiliated with one of many pro-government militias in the region. At least one of the traders has supplied the LRA with what appears to be AK-47 rounds manufactured in Iran and Khartoum, believed to be standard SAF-issued ammunition.

Sudanese officials have consistently denied the presence of LRA camps and Kony in their territory, even as recently as September 2015 when an African Union verification mission visited Khartoum to discuss the LRA.\textsuperscript{87} While there is a slight possibility Sudanese army troops are unaware or unsure about Kony’s whereabouts, the presence of LRA groups in Kafia Kingi is known to local army personnel. And unless Khartoum-based military officials maintain no communications or control over the troops in Kafia Kingi, it remains difficult to believe Sudanese officials’ denials of the LRA’s presence in their territory.

**The ivory smuggling route – onward from Kafia Kingi**

What happens to the ivory when it leaves the hands of the Songo merchants is less clear. The ivory is likely transported to bigger markets, rather than kept locally, with two possible exit routes: north to Khartoum or south toward Juba and eventually Uganda. Interviews with traders in CAR and other relevant sources revealed that the ivory goes north toward Khartoum rather than south. Many of the interviewees believe
the ivory is transported usually in pickup trucks, from Songo to Nyala, the capital of South Darfur state, and eventually to Khartoum and Omdurman, the Sudanese capital and its twin city. There is less clarity on the fate of ivory in Khartoum but a small, historical market in ivory trinkets in Omdurman has shrunk in recent years, as demand from abroad increased.

A recent article and documentary by National Geographic “Explorer“ showed the creation of fake ivory tusks embedded with a tiny GPS-tracking system in LRA-affected areas.88 The tusks were introduced into the illicit ivory supply chain. As the tusks were transported by unknown handlers, the electronic chips emitted their coordinates that were captured by a satellite. A map provided by National Geographic traces the journey of the fake tusks from north of Mboki, CAR – where they were apparently planted – to Songo in Kafia Kingi. Their route appears to follow the Mbororo cattle path, parts of which inside CAR are often used by the LRA, and enters Kafia Kingi from the south, via Western Bahr el Ghazal – the old LRA route.89 The tusks were last recorded as being in the East Darfuri town of Ed Daein, about 90 miles southwest of Nyala. The tusks apparently traveled on parts of the route known to be used by the LRA, but it is not known if this group or another involved in ivory trafficking, such as poachers from CAR or Mbororo, were in possession of the fake tusks, a sad reminder of the many groups involved in the traffic of ivory.

According to interviews with various sources in CAR and South Sudan, the ivory might follow the same trafficking route as marijuana, which is grown in large quantities by some Kafia Kingi residents in some areas where the LRA has operated for the last four years.90 Former combatants, who have escaped from Kafia Kingi since late 2012, have mentioned a few instances where armed men threatened or attacked LRA members. The armed men were guarding marijuana fields in southern Kafia Kingi, in the vicinity of Raja County, Western Bahr el Ghazal.91 Four former LRA combatants referred to the Songo traders as jahi (‘marijuana’ in Acholi) men. One said, “We did not communicate with the SAF, only with the people who grew marijuana in the bush. They spoke to us in Arabic. We bought food from them. They used donkeys and motorcycles. We exchanged ivory for sorghum.”92

A confidential source knowledgeable about power dynamics in Southern Darfur claimed that marijuana trafficking, and likely ivory also, takes place with the full support of local SAF commanders and under the patronage of a former Sudanese government minister.93 More information, however, is needed to fully corroborate these claims.

Kony has ordered Ali to not trade the largest tusks, weighing over 20 pounds and longer than six and a half feet.94 According to one former combatant, Kony is planning to use the large tusks, diamonds, gold, and money to purchase a large quantity of anti-personnel mines, which he has instructed Ali to order from one of the traders.95 Kony claimed he wants to mine the area surrounding his camp to protect himself from military pursuit. It is likely also a desperate attempt on Kony’s part to boost the battered morale of his fighters, he clearly recognizes. As he has reportedly been telling his men in Kafia Kingi, “I know you will abandon me soon but I will continue to fight, even if I am left only with my three sons.”96
Gold and diamonds

In addition to ivory, Kony possesses some amounts of diamonds, gold, and U.S. currency, looted by LRA fighters in CAR, primarily Owila’s group. Having become aware of their worth, it appears most LRA units in eastern CAR resort to looting gold and diamonds from artisanal miners, which are then bartered for food. Former combatants claimed that LRA groups in CAR are under standing orders from Kony to loot diamonds, gold, and U.S. dollars. Kony does not use the rough diamonds, gold nuggets and the cash to purchase food, saving them instead, “for something bigger,” as he has told his bodyguards.

An All-Out War: Protecting Elephants from the LRA and Other Predators

The wildlife rangers of Garamba National Park (GNP) in the DRC’s northeast provide a steady and reliable force in the fight against poaching and the LRA. Bordering two countries with pronounced levels of insecurity has been highly problematic for the park and its diverse wildlife including forest and savannah elephants, which are both hunted for their ivory. But while the LRA threat has subsided in the last three years, GNP rangers man the front lines in what they describe as ‘an open war’ with increasingly belligerent poachers, particularly coming from South Sudan. “It is not our job as rangers to fight armed rebels,” said a ranger, “but we cannot take any chances with the LRA, Janjaweed or the SPLA who shoot at us to kill, without thinking twice.”

LRA threat

GNP rangers are well aware of the LRA and its capacity for violence. Former LRA deputy commander to Kony, Vincent Otti, first entered Garamba in late 2005 and eventually established LRA bases in the northwestern part of the park, in the so-called Azande hunting grounds. From there, the LRA launched a series of bloody attacks in December 2008 and January 2009, as retaliation for Operation Lightning Thunder. One such attack was directed against the park’s main offices in Nagero. Ten people died, including six rangers and four family members, while six people were abducted. Had the rangers not fought back, the casualties would have been higher as was the case with similar attacks in the towns of Faradje, Duru, and Doruma which left a combined 1,000 people dead. Over the years the level of LRA violence has gradually subsided, in part due to a weakening of the LRA in DRC but also due to a more robust response from the GNP administration, which at least since the start of 2014 has trained and deployed an increasing number of rangers on a greater number of patrols. As a result, elephant poaching by LRA fighters appears to have declined. Binany’s group poached between 15 and 20 elephants in roughly 12-14 months from the end of 2010 until around mid-2012, while subsequently other LRA groups have poached 10 to 15 elephants in 2013 and 10 or so in 2014. The number of elephants poached by the LRA in 2014 is roughly less than 10% of the total number of poached elephants rangers found in Garamba that year.

The rangers are often the only armed force to protect civilians living in the vicinity of the park from LRA attacks. On February 16, 2015, the LRA attacked a truck on the Ariwara to Dungu road, in Nakofo, about 13 miles west of Nagero. Two people were killed and three were seriously injured. The rangers were the first to respond to the attack, establishing a security perimeter that allowed the local population to...
continue to use the vital axis. On April 13, 2015, rangers returning from patrol encountered an LRA ambush 5.5 miles west of Nagero. The rangers returned fire emanating from a group of five armed LRA men, killing one. Since then, there have been no reported LRA sightings in the park or the vicinity, although Aligatch’s small group continues to operate in the park’s northwest, according to former combatants.

Janjaweed

While LRA poaching has been reduced, the rangers have had to deal with other threats, some much more lethal than the LRA. Armed riders originating from various Darfuri tribes in Sudan, commonly known as Janjaweed, have been known for poaching missions in eastern and western CAR as well as in the GNP. These armed riders are thought to be responsible for the killings of a large numbers of elephants in Bouba Ndjida National Park in Cameroon in November 2011 and Dzanga bai in western CAR in May 2013. A recent report by the United Nations Panel of Experts for CAR claimed that Sudanese poachers are responsible for wiping out the elephant population in eastern CAR, “from thousands to about 400.”

The Janjaweed are well organized, “almost like a small army complete with supply convoys,” according to a conservation expert. They follow routes similar to those the LRA uses, often utilizing Mbororo cattle paths, descending from Darfur into southeastern CAR via the Zemongo forest, coming out in Djemah, crossing the road between Ligoua and Bassigbiri and towards the Mbomou River. They continue east alongside the Mbomou, south of Zemio, and often into DRC and the Garamba National Park. At times the armed riders are intercepted by the rangers but often they go unnoticed given the GNP’s vastness, about 8,000 square miles.

“We don’t see the Janjaweed very often these days, it is possible that they are good at hiding from us,” said a veteran ranger, adding that the Janjaweed know the park well having first been sighted in late 2004. More recently, the rangers came across a Janjaweed camp in Garamba on February 28, 2015, where they found nine elephant tails and a jerry can full of elephant fat, as well as candy wrappers with Arabic writing on them and a dead donkey. “We were too late, they had already taken the ivory up toward CAR,” said the chief warden.
Ugandan soldiers come across Janjaweed caravans in southeastern CAR but usually leave them alone. “They [Janjaweed] are friendly when they see us [Ugandan soldiers] on the way down [south, towards Congo], but they are very hostile on the way up [northwest, towards Darfur] because they are probably carrying [ivory],” said Ugandan army commander Kabango, adding “but we are not sure and we cannot fight everybody here anyway. Our job is dealing with the LRA.”

A clash between the Ugandan soldiers and a large Janjaweed group of ‘hundreds’ as described by a Ugandan soldier who claimed to have been present, in May 2010 near Djemah left many dead on both sides.

SPLA

According to park rangers, the biggest current threat to both elephants and wildlife rangers in Garamba are poachers from South Sudan, reportedly part of the police or the national army, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). There was a lack of clarity on the part of GNP officials and rangers whether the attackers are from active SPLA units or deserters and affiliates. The chief warden said the SPLA, or rather people from South Sudan wearing what appeared to be military or police uniforms, remained a constant threat to wildlife and rangers alike. “The SPLA target the rangers specifically, they set up ambushes to hunt us down. It is unlike anything I have ever seen.”

The chief was specifically referring to an incident that occurred in the park’s north near the South Sudanese border on June 17, 2015, where one ranger and two Congolese soldiers were killed in what appeared to be an ambush. The ranger and the two soldiers, who were part of an anti-poaching patrol unit, were shot early in the morning soon after they woke up, in what appeared to be a well-organized, coordinated attack. “They [the attackers] knew what they were doing,” said the chief, “There were 15 of them, judging from the tracks, who clearly had a military background, they were not simple poachers. They killed our guys from five meters away, execution style.”

While SPLA forces have poached for a long time in the region, infighting following the December 2013 armed conflict between former Vice President Riek Machar, President Salva Kiir and forces loyal to each, has exacerbated the wildlife killings, openly accepted by South Sudanese officials. The poaching, and associated violence, has trespassed the border fueled by the high price that ivory fetches. “The South Sudanese are ready to die for ivory, rather than spare the elephant or the ranger. Because it is so lucrative,” Garamba’s chief warden said. “Here in Ariwara and Nabiapai I have heard a kilogram [of ivory]
goes for $200. There are markets in Yei and Maridi [South Sudan] also. With 20 kilograms, you make a lot of money.”

GNP officials recounted a few recent instances of SPLA poaching. On May 7, 2015, for instance, rangers came across a large group of South Sudanese poachers, some in SPLA uniforms, who were in the process of killing elephants and who resorted to shooting at the rangers. One poacher was killed in the fire exchange and the rangers recovered 19 tusks, the poachers left behind. Another recent attack took place on October 5, 2015, when rangers clashed with a large armed group, believed to be South Sudanese soldiers, in Garamba’s northeast. One guard was injured and two Congolese army soldiers, deployed alongside the rangers as part of a new policy to protect the park from South Sudanese poachers, are believed dead.

Rough estimates based on conversations with park rangers and park officials, indicate that out of the 130-150 elephants poached each year in the GNP, South Sudanese poachers are responsible for about 80% of all elephant killings. At this rate there won’t be many elephants left in Garamba National Park, which as of July 2015 had a total population of roughly 1,000 elephants. “It is possible Garamba will become like eastern CAR,” said a conservation expert where a once thriving elephant population has been almost completely decimated.
Appendix I

C4ADS is a non-profit research organization in Washington, D.C. that conducted headstamp analysis of the spent rounds found in Garamba National Park. C4ADS is a partner of the Enough Project on the Sentry, an initiative which seeks to dismantle the networks of perpetrators, facilitators, and enablers who fund and profit from Africa’s deadliest conflicts.
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<th>Caliber</th>
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<th>Production Facility</th>
<th>Year of Production</th>
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<td>1987</td>
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<td>Janjaweed</td>
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Endnotes

1 Estimates from author interviews with former LRA combatants, CAR, South Sudan and Uganda, June and July 2015.
3 Author interviews with four Ugandan former combatants, Obo, CAR, June 23, 2015, and one Congolese former combatant and one South Sudanese former combatant, Yambio, South Sudan, June 27-28, 2015.
4 Ibid.
7 Author interviews with four Ugandan former combatants, Obo, CAR, June 23, 2015, and one Congolese combatant and one South Sudanese former combatant, Yambio, South Sudan, June 27-28, 2015.
8 Various author interviews with former LRA combatants, CAR, South Sudan and Uganda, June and July 2015.
9 Ibid.
10 Author interview with C4ADS personnel, Washington, DC, July 29, 2015.
11 Author interview with Ugandan Army commander, Colonel Michael Kabango, Obo, CAR, and Yambio, South Sudan, June 2015.
12 Author interviews with four Ugandan former combatants, Obo, CAR, June 23, 2015, and one Congolese combatant and one South Sudanese former combatant, Yambio, South Sudan, June 27-28, 2015.
13 Author interview with chief coordinator, Garamba National Park (GNP), July 8, 2015.
16 Ibid.
20 Estimates from author interviews with former LRA combatants, CAR, South Sudan and Uganda, June and July 2015.
22 The Enough Project • enoughproject.org
Tusk Wars
Inside the LRA and the Bloody Business of Ivory
Almost all former combatants talk of very difficult conditions when in the LRA, including constantly foraging for food in the forest or attacking civilians for their food and clothes.

Various interviews in CAR, South Sudan, and Uganda, June and July 2015.


24 Author interviews with eight former LRA combatants, Gulu, June 2013.

25 Author interviews with four Ugandan former combatants, Obo, CAR, June 23, 2015, and one Congolese former combatant and one South Sudanese former combatant, Yambio, South Sudan, June 27-28, 2015.


27 Author interviews with Jackson J., Yambio, June 28, 2015, and Paweiya M., Yambio, June 28, 2015.


29 Author interviews with four Ugandan former combatants, Obo, CAR, June 23, 2015, and one Congolese former combatant and one South Sudanese former combatant, Yambio, South Sudan, June 27-28, 2015.

30 Ibid.

31 Author interview with Ugandan military source, Gulu, Uganda, July 1, 2015.

32 Ibid.


35 All information and estimates from interviews with former combatants in CAR, South Sudan and Uganda, June and July 2015.

36 Ibid.

37 Author interviews with seven people from Mboki and vicinity, CAR, who were abducted by the LRA in 2015. Mboki, CAR, June 24, 2015.


39 Author interviews with Teodi, Mirabelle and Esther, Obo, CAR, June 22, 2015.

40 Author interview with Teodi N., Obo, CAR, June 22, 2015.

41 Author interviews with former LRA combatants in CAR, South Sudan, and Uganda, June and July 2015. There was a consensus among the fighters that there was no strategy to cooperate with the ex-Séléka. See also, The Resolve, “The Kony Crossroads: President Obama’s Chance to Define His Legacy on the LRA Crisis,” (August 2015), available at http://www.theresolve.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/The-Kony-Crossroads-August-2015.pdf

42 Author interview with CAR NGO representatives, Washington D.C., November 6, 2013.

43 Almost all former combatants talk of very difficult conditions when in the LRA, including constantly foraging for food in the forest or attacking civilians for their food and clothes.

44 Various interviews in CAR, South Sudan, and Uganda, June and July 2015.


47 Author interviews with four Ugandan former combatants, Obo, CAR, June 23, 2015, and one Congolese former combatant and one South Sudanese former combatant, Yambio, South Sudan, June 27-28, 2015.


49 Author interview with Opiyo Sam, Gulu, Uganda, July 2, 2015.


51 Author interview with Jackson J., Yambio, June 28, 2015.

52 Ibid.

53 Author interview with Ugandan military intelligence analyst, July 2015.

54 One of these groups is led by veteran fighter Onen ‘Unita Angola,’ another former senior commander shunned by Kony. See The Resolve, “The Kony Crossroads,” (August 2015).

55 Author interviews with four Ugandan former combatants, Obo, CAR, June 23, 2015, and one Congolese former combatant and one South Sudanese former combatant, Yambio, South Sudan, June 27-28, 2015.

56 This is almost a universal feeling with all former combatants interviewed in the last three to four years.

57 Various author interviews, particularly with eight former combatants, Gulu, Uganda, June 2013.


59 However, weather patterns have been irregular in recent years, at times raining little during the rainy seasons. LRA groups carrying ivory have also become adept at finding paths and river crossings even during rainy seasons. Best spots have also been noted down as GPS coordinates.

60 Author interviews with four Ugandan former combatants, Obo, CAR, June 23, 2015, and one Congolese former combatant and one South Sudanese former combatant, Yambio, South Sudan, June 27-28, 2015.

61 Author interview with Ugandan army source, Gulu, Uganda, July 2, 2015.

62 Ibid. And author interviews with four Ugandan former combatants, Obo, CAR, June 23, 2015, and one Congolese former combatant and one South Sudanese former combatant, Yambio, South Sudan, June 27-28, 2015.


64 Author interviews with eight former LRA combatants, Gulu, June 2013. There are at least four reported cases of LRA fighters being killed on the road from Raja to Kafia Kingi.

65 Author interviews with four Ugandan former combatants, Obo, CAR, June 23, 2015, and one Congolese former combatant and one South Sudanese former combatant, Yambio, South Sudan, June 27-28, 2015, and interviews with eight former LRA combatants, Gulu, June 2013.

66 Author interview with Patiela M., Yambio, June 28, 2015.

67 Not all tusks brought to Kony are necessarily from elephants the LRA kills. There have been a few cases of LRA fighters stealing ivory from others, particularly Mbororo or local poachers.

68 Author interviews with Colonel Michael Kabango, Obo, CAR and Yambio, South Sudan, June 2015.

69 Author interviews with four Ugandan former combatants, Obo, CAR, June 23, 2015, and one Congolese former combatant and one South Sudanese former combatant, Yambio, South Sudan, June 27-28, 2015.

As recounted by the six former combatants who left Kafia Kingi in May 2015.

LRD combatants learned Arabic in the mid-1990s when the LRA maintained camps in Central Equatoria, Sudan, under the care of the SAF.

Author interview with Jackson J., Yambio, June 28, 2015.

Author interview with Patiela M., Yambio, June 28, 2015.

Author interview with Jackson J., Yambio, June 28, 2015.

Author interview with Jackson J., Yambio, June 28, 2015.

Estimate based on information that they were given 15 10-kilogram bags of flour, which cost $2 per kilogram of flour.

All estimates based on conversations with people who did not claim involvement in the ivory trade but were aware of prices in their respective countries of origin. Prices and weights were discussed in terms of kilograms and later converted to pounds.


They claimed to have had almost double the amount of rounds when they left Kafia Kingi but spent many rounds fighting an LRA group coming after them. Interviews with four Ugandan former combatants, Obo, CAR, June 23, 2015, and one Congolese former combatant and one South Sudanese former combatant, Yambio, South Sudan, June 27-28, 2015.

Author interview with Patiela M., Yambio, South Sudan, June 27, 2015.

Author interview with Michael Kabango, Yambio, South Sudan, June 27, 2015.

Author interview with Patiela M., Yambio, South Sudan, June 28, 2015.

One former senior LRA commander noted, “I was in Sudan in 2013, in Songo, Dibisare, and Dafak. Our mission was to meet Bashir’s soldiers to chart out a way of collaborating. … They gave us supplies – medical drugs and food. Then we bartered our ivory for weapons and ammunition. We could get 25 containers of bullets for 1 tusk. We had 10 tusks. Our main interest was in the bullets, because we had enough weapons. We dealt with high commanders of Bashir, particularly Col. Salah Ahmed. Sudanese army planes then came from Nyala to barter. Ivory was the most important for them.” Enough Project staff interview with former senior LRA commander, March 9, 2015. An LRA fighter who defected in 2014 highlighted, “The ivory is always exchanged with bullets from Arabs and Sudan soldiers while at other times some civilians also buy ivory from LRA.” Enough Project staff interview with LRA defector, March 29, 2015. A third ex-combatant said, “I was also involved in trading and used to move with Otim Fery. The renowned buyers are Lt. Abdulwap (intelligence officer) [who] lives in Darfur; Col. Mohamed Abdelimum and Capt. Ali, all from Sudan… These things are usually sold in Darfur and afterwards sold in unknown places to him.” Enough Project staff interview with former LRA combatant, March 29, 2015.


91 Author interviews with eight former LRA combatants, Gulu, June 2013.


93 Three different people who claimed knowledge of the trafficking patterns in the Darfur region, including Kafia Kingi, stated that the merchants involved in the ivory market are middlemen, working for bosses ‘based in Khartoum.’

94 Kony clearly understands that the value of the large tusks in terms of worth per kilogram is much higher than the smaller pieces. Four former combatants claimed Kony allowed only once the barter of a single ivory tusk longer than two meters and ‘extremely heavy,’ likely more than 30 kilograms. The four said [the trader] gave them in return 150 bags – or roughly 500 kilograms – of sorghum flour. Interviews with Okello A., Dabasiko J., Wokorach S., and Nyeko R., Obo, CAR, June 25, 2015.

95 Author interview with Jackson J., Yambio, June 28, 2015.


97 Members of an LRA group who spent more than a year in Nzako were under orders from the group commander, Alphonse Lamola, to secure gold and diamonds, which Lamola exchanged with an ex-Séléka group for food. Interview with Tabu S., Gulu, Uganda, July 1, 2015.

98 Author interviews with four Ugandan former combatants, Obo, CAR, June 23, 2015 and one Congolese former combatant and one South Sudanese former combatant, Yambio, South Sudan, June 27-28, 2015.


102 Various interviews with former LRA combatants, DRC, CAR, Uganda, South Sudan, 2012-2015.

103 In 2014, GNP rangers found 134 elephants that were poached, or rather found killed. Author interview with chief coordinator, GNP, July 8, 2015.

104 Author interview with GNP chief warden, July 8, 2015.

105 Author interviews with GNP rangers and other officials, July 7-8, 2015.

106 Author interviews with four Ugandan former combatants, Obo, CAR, June 23, 2015 and one Congolese former combatant and one South Sudanese former combatant, Yambio, South Sudan, June 27-28, 2015.

113 Author interview with conservation expert, New York, May 12, 2015.
114 Author interview with trader and traditional chief, Mboki, CAR, June 24, 2015.
115 Some of the rangers and other officials in GNP believe that some Janjaweed types also come down via South Sudan’s Lantoto National Park.
116 Author interview with chief coordinator, GNP, July 8, 2015.
117 Author interview with GNP chief warden, July 8, 2015.
118 Author interview with Michael Kabango, Obo, CAR, June 20, 2015.
119 Herbert Ssempogo, “Sudanese Militia Killed UPDF Soldiers,” New Vision, June 14, 2010, available at http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/12/722745. There were initial conflicting statements from Ugandan army officials, initially claiming 18 were killed, then 12 and then 10 as General Aronda told the New Vision. Compare this to the Ugandan army officials responses to a recent Al Shaabab attack in Janale, Somalia. UPDF officials said initially only 10 men were killed, then 12 and later President Museveni said the number of dead was 18 while six were captured alive.
120 Author interviews with park rangers, July 8-9, 2015.
121 Author interview with GNP chief warden, July 8, 2015.
122 Ibid.
124 Author interview with GNP chief warden, July 8, 2015.
125 Various interviews, GNP, DRC, July 7-8, 2015.
126 Secure, Empowered, Connected Communities (SECC), “Early Warning Alerts,” October 7, 2015. Available at http://us8.campaign-archive1.com/?u=8ae03e719de2fed003f1e902b&id=a06be0c3f5
127 Estimates based on conversations with conservation experts, researchers and GNP officials, May-June 2015.
128 Author interview with conservation expert, New York, May 12, 2015.