Rwanda’s Stake in Congo

Understanding Interests to Achieve Peace

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COVER PHOTO
Joseph Kabila, president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, shakes hands with Rwandan President Paul Kagame in 2012, alongside U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.  AP PHOTO/CRAIG RUTTLE
Every war has multiple causes, and eastern Congo is no exception. Numerous internal and international drivers have exacerbated tensions and widened regional cleavages. Warped and exploitative regional relationships have been one of the most critical factors in Congo becoming the site of the deadliest war in the world over the past two decades. Several of Congo’s neighbors have been deeply involved in the war, and the Congolese government’s deep corruption and bad governance have created conditions in which the army and a host of militias have operated with impunity and destabilized eastern Congo. The Congo-Rwanda relationship, however, has been at the heart of the decade-and-a-half-long war in Congo and is thus the focus of this report.

The aftermath of the Rwandan genocide spilled over into Congo in the mid-1990s, acting like gasoline on the fire of preexisting intercommunal tensions and conflict, as well as rapacious and indifferent governance by the Congolese government in its eastern provinces. Rwanda’s direct intervention in Congo at times and its periodic support for armed groups in eastern Congo have been central drivers of continuing conflict. Remarkably, however, no major international peace initiative has ever attempted to comprehensively analyze and address Rwanda’s security, economic, and political interests as part of a solution to Congo’s deadly violence. Unless those core interests—legitimate or illegitimate—that remain the engine of war are dealt with, there will continue to be blood.

The signing of a comprehensive peace framework in Addis Ababa last February, the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region—the so-called 11+4 Framework—provides a major opportunity for creative diplomacy to address these interests. This report will briefly outline Rwanda’s security, economic, and political interests, focusing primarily on the economic and security opportunities that have the capacity to transform the current incentives from ones of war to ones of peace.
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Security interests

Rwanda’s security interests in Congo center on containing what the Rwandan government states is an existential threat posed by the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, or FDLR, based in eastern Congo. The FDLR is an extremist Hutu armed group that helped lead the 1994 genocide against Rwandan Tutsis. The U.N. Group of Experts cites that the FDLR has at times been supported by elements of the Congolese army. The FDLR has approximately 1,500 to 2,500 troops—down from 100,000 troops in 1994—and includes Congolese fighters. The current Rwandan government, which defeated the regime that committed the 1994 genocide and subsequently took power in Kigali, the capital of Rwanda, believes that as long as any of these elements continue to operate in Congo with supporters in various countries around the world, they pose a threat greater than the sum of their current troop numbers, as they continue to be motivated by the ideology that fueled the genocide. The government is also worried that the FDLR may gain further external support, which would enable the group to quickly increase its threat level.

Rwanda experienced genocide at the hands of the leaders of the FDLR, and the significance of this to the current Rwandan authorities cannot be overstated. For them, this is not a run-of-the-mill rebel group like others that have proliferated in eastern Congo. It is an extremist group, many members of which participated in the killing of 800,000 people in 100 days in an attempt to destroy the Tutsi population and kill moderate Hutu leaders. Many Congolese and some external analysts, however, view the FDLR—much diminished from its heyday—as a red herring used to justify Rwandan interventions in eastern Congo. Nevertheless, the FDLR has a long history of creating instability and spawning reactionary armed groups in eastern Congo, has a hardcore leadership, has committed terrible atrocities against Congolese communities since 1994, and has reportedly attacked Rwanda four times over the past year.

Economic interests

Rwanda also has economic interests in Congo in natural resources, land, and cross-border trade. Some of its interests have led to illicit activities, while it has pursued others through legitimate means. Rwanda views itself as having “a strategic location as the gateway between East and Central Africa,” and minerals are a key part of this equation, as well as exported goods going to Congo. Rwanda has a domestic minerals sector but is also a transit point for Congolese minerals. Rwanda’s economy is reliant on the minerals trade because of the country’s significant trade deficit, something that worries senior Rwandan officials. Rwanda’s overall imports greatly outweigh exports because of a rising population increasingly reliant on imported goods, and its traditional exports—coffee and tea—are not enough to make up the balance. Minerals are critical in filling this gap, as they are the country’s second-highest generator of foreign exchange.
to Prime Minister Pierre Damien Habumuremyi, the mining sector “will continue to be among the top two foreign exchange earners,” and unlike before, government is devoted to processing the country’s raw mineral wealth to add value, so that “it has more value on the international market and can replace some of our imports.”

Rwanda has allegedly benefited significantly from minerals traders smuggling Congo’s conflict minerals—in particular, tin, tantalum, and tungsten—for several years, with some Rwandan traders allegedly relabeling Congolese minerals as Rwandan and selling them on the global marketplace, according to numerous U.N. Group of Experts’ investigative reports. One area of Kigali is nicknamed “Merci Congo,” after the high-rise developments allegedly built with money from eastern Congo.

In 2013, Rwanda’s tantalum exports have more than doubled from 2012, a 112 percent increase. There have been new investments in Rwanda’s domestic mining sector, with Rutongo mine having the largest output, but most appear to be from minor companies. According to regional diplomats and minerals experts, they could not have accounted for this dramatic rise in exports. Rwanda’s overall minerals exports are set to reach $230 million in 2013, a very high 69 percent increase from 2012, considering that the prices of tin and tungsten fell 18 percent during the same period, and tantalum prices only increased 38 percent. A handful of Rwandan-related business people also allegedly occupy significant stretches of land in the Masisi and Rutshuru territories in eastern Congo, some of which were acquired legitimately but some of which were grabbed forcibly by the former National Congress for the Defense of the People, or CNDP, rebel group and M23 elements.

Current international investment in mines across the Great Lakes region is paltry, with most mines only being explored at the very surface by so-called artisanal miners using pickaxes and rudimentary equipment. If the sector were developed by serious investment in conflict-free, semi-industrial, and industrial mining, and the artisanal trade was more formalized with better equipment and fair-trade, small-scale mining, there would be a greatly expanded economic pie for the entire region. This would bring far greater revenues to Congo, Rwanda, the region, and local communities.

Greater international scrutiny and regulation have started to change the economic equation to incentivize such a trade, but more steps are needed. The United States’ Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, for example, is now requiring companies purchasing minerals from Rwanda, Congo, and the broader region to trace and verifiably audit the minerals to mines of origin, in order to avoid purchases of untraceable conflict minerals. As one mining investor eyeing possible mines in the region said, “Dodd-Frank has made a huge impact, wildly beyond the architect’s dreams, on the economics of the whole mining supply chain. It puts pressure on the trader and makes it unprofitable for armed groups to mine … Investors like ourselves are now able to look at mines again.”
In order for investment to take place, however, conflict-free minerals certification must be completed. Two of the four components of the regional certification process—the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, or ICGLR—have been put in place, but the remaining two components that entail independent checks and audits to ensure conflict-free mining are still lacking. Because the regional governments have delayed putting this system in place, Rwanda is currently facing significant pressure from multinational corporations that will be unable to certify Rwandan minerals as “conflict free” unless the process is completed. Nevertheless, pilot investments that use Rwanda as a logistics base and therefore benefit both countries—such as the large-scale industrial gold mines in Congo operated by Canadian miner Banro Corporation that use Rwanda as a logistics hub—as well as recent investor interest in the Rubaya tantalum mines, are showing that there could be hope for a future of legal trade and investment that could be far more lucrative to both countries. The nature of the Rwanda-Congo economic relationship could change significantly if a transparent, certified-conflict-free trade in natural resources were to grow. Infrastructure development from the World Bank’s $1 billion in promised regional aid,23 improved governance—including greater security—and the application of the rule of law in Congo will also be important. Congo’s vast land and resources have much to offer to investors via the country’s small, landlocked neighbor. In return, Rwanda offers reliable financial and legal services for investment, well-paved roads, stable electricity, communications infrastructure, and closer links to seaports.

**Political interests**

Rwanda’s political interests in Congo are complex, and interpretations of them are hotly disputed. Some Tutsis in eastern Congo face security threats and live, like many other ethnic groups, in an environment rife with ethnic tension. The Rwandan government has stated on several occasions that it wants to prevent discrimination and violence against Tutsis in Congo. But there is evidence that Rwanda’s alleged support to numerous Congolese militias—including Raia Mutomboki, Forces de Défense Congolaise, or FDC/Guides, and Mai-Mai Sheka—has fueled ethnic tensions and actually increased Tutsi vulnerability. And senior Congolese Tutsi leaders have opposed Rwandan support for the CNDP; they are now opposing support for M23 forces. Kigali also has repeatedly stated its interest in repatriating the approximately 58,000 Congolese refugees who currently live in Rwanda and are a drain on its resources.24 Many Congolese allege that this is a fabrication, believing that Rwanda does not want to send the refugees back so that it can always have an excuse to intervene in Congo. A widespread belief in Congo also exists that Rwanda wants to annex the Kivu region of eastern Congo, a claim Rwanda, of course, denies.
Any analysis of Rwanda’s interests becomes even more complicated by the wildly divergent opinions regarding Rwandan President Paul Kagame. Some influential supporters tout Rwanda’s impressive post-genocide economic recovery but are uncritical of Rwanda’s role in Congo or questions related to Congo’s lack of internal political freedom. Others focus on political repression and human rights violations but overlook the progress Rwanda has made in other spheres. President Kagame’s government has been chastised in numerous U.N. and Human Rights Watch reports for destructive behavior in Congo and for repressive policies at home. The reality is rooted in both perspectives, and both need to be factored in when solving the world’s deadliest war.

The perceived zero-sum nature of Rwanda’s interests that fuel the war has to be transformed for the war to end. Regardless of whether one views Rwanda as an aggressor or a defender, failure to deal with Rwanda’s core interests in the peace process will ensure the continuing failure of conflict-resolution efforts. Rwandan interests are the proverbial elephant in Congo’s living room. Diplomats must account for these interests as they lead a regional peace process.

To promote peace, the United States, regional organizations, and the broader international community must build up strong disincentives against the aiding of proxy rebels and the smuggling of natural resources. They must create meaningful incentives for transparent, legitimate regional economic cooperation and make real efforts to end security threats posed to governments in the region by armed groups such as M23; the FDLR; the Allied Democratic Forces, or ADF; and others. The efforts of the international community have begun to swing in that direction, but they have not gone nearly far enough to tip the momentum toward peace. International diplomacy led by U.N. Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region Mary Robinson and backed by Boubacar Diarra, A.U. Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region; U.S. Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region Russ Feingold; and other states with influence can support a genuine, comprehensive peace process for which the long-suffering Congolese people have been waiting. Feingold, in particular, in the tradition of other successful U.S. envoys such as George Mitchell, Anthony Lake, and Richard Holbrooke, could help drive efforts by honing in on the roots of these regional conflict drivers and using U.S. influence to promote the economic and security solutions that give peace a chance.

Changing incentives from those of war to those of peace

The signing of the comprehensive peace framework known as the 11+4 Framework provides a major opportunity to address the interests of all parties involved in the conflict alongside the interests of civil society. The primary basis for any chance of ending the cycle of deadly conflict in eastern Congo resides in changing the economic incentives from ones of war to ones of peace. This in no way diminishes the urgent need for political reforms in Kigali, Kinshasa, the capital of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo; Kampala, the capital of Uganda; and elsewhere in the region. Nor does it diminish the importance of sanctioning any state support to armed groups or the need to address other conflict drivers. But the real opportunity for peace in the region is rooted in the fact that Rwanda’s economy is intimately linked with eastern Congo, a region far richer in natural resources than itself, while Congo’s economy is inextricably linked with Rwanda. Several Rwandan government officials and businessmen, in recent interviews with the Enough Project, said that the future of Rwanda depends in large measure on Congo. “A stable Kivu means a stable Rwanda,” an advisor to Rwandan President Kagame told the Enough Project in July.

Rwanda has long been involved in eastern Congo economically, as the vast majority of trade from the Kivu provinces in eastern Congo goes through Rwanda due to poor infrastructure links within Congo, the distance to Kinshasa, and lower transport costs to Rwanda. To date, much of this has been done in an illicit manner through the smuggling of Congolese tin, tantalum, and tungsten. Rwanda has a mining industry of its own, with the Rutongo tin mine—Rwanda’s largest tin deposit—and approximately 400 mines currently in Rwanda. This is dwarfed by eastern Congo, however, which has approximately 1,500 to 2,000 mines, and the U.N. Group of Experts has documented in several reports how smuggling of minerals has taken place from Congo to Rwanda.

But the nature of the Rwanda-Congo economic relationship could change significantly—as could that of the broader region, including Uganda—if infrastructure were to be more developed, political will for cooperation were to increase, and a transparent, certified-conflict-free trade in natural resources were to grow. Such a trade would offer countries throughout the region the opportunity to participate in a much-larger-scale regional economy driven by Congo’s natural resources—with Congolese businesses in the lead but transparent and legitimate Rwandan and other regional investors contributing as well.

Rwanda has limited natural resources, and its chief exports of coffee, tea, and domestically produced minerals are not enough to boost economic growth significantly. Rwanda is also landlocked, making transport costs for companies high. It has developed excellent infrastructure, however, in the form of well-paved roads, information-technology connectivity, and stable electricity; has overseen very high economic-growth rates; has the third-lowest level of corruption in Africa, according to Transparency International; is becoming an English-speaking nation; and according to the World Bank, has reduced its bureaucratic red tape to the point of being the world’s eighth-easiest place to open a business—above the United States. These factors make it an excellent location for potential investors, and President Kagame has realized that increased regional trade and investment are key ways to advance the economy.
Meanwhile, Congo has abundant natural resources but very poor roads and electricity supply and is in the bottom 10 percent and bottom 5 percent, respectively, on the world’s lists for corruption and conducting business. It also has extremely limited infrastructure to export resources to Kinshasa in the west; therefore, nearly all imports and exports go eastward through Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, and other neighbors. Clearly, Congo must improve in all of these areas, and the World Bank’s $1 billion for regional economic integration should contribute to this and should also include help increase trade within Congo, including between the Kivu provinces and the provinces of Orientale and Katanga.

This combination of factors points to a lesson from Southeast Asia. Similar to Singapore and Malaysia, Rwanda and Congo can grow together if Rwanda positions itself as a gateway for international businesses to invest in Congo’s natural resource sector, while attracting investors on the basis of good roads, electricity, transparent business regulations, and banking institutions. Singapore grew in a similar way from the 1960s to the 1990s by attracting investors interested in neighboring Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s natural gas and oil. Singapore focused on lowering its corruption, making corporate tax rates attractive, increasing higher education, and providing financial services to companies investing in the natural resources of Malaysia and Indonesia, which had higher levels of corruption and instability. Many companies set up headquarters in Singapore but invested in the neighboring countries, so it was a win-win result. All three countries benefited tremendously from this arrangement: Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore are now all in the top 20 percent of world economies.

Such a situation has already begun on a small scale in Rwanda and Congo, with the Canadian mining company Banro Corporation, for example, mining gold in Congo in areas that were formerly conflict mines but using Rwanda as a logistical supply base. A majority of mines in eastern Congo currently do not have companies investing in them; rather, they are either owned by individuals or have been declared “force majeure” so that the concession owners are not legally bound to develop the mines. As a result, the potential economic gains from a dramatically increased industrial or semi-industrial certified-conflict-free mining sector in eastern Congo and the region are enormous. As a senior member of Congolese President Joseph Kabila’s cabinet told the Enough Project in July, “We are open to regional economic integration; it could be a gateway for peace. We must agree with Uganda on oil, with Rwanda on methane gas … Mary Robinson should organize negotiations on this.” Similarly, as a major foreign investor in Rwanda’s mines told the Enough Project, “The potential of Congo’s minerals are much greater than those here.” A senior Rwandan official added, “A clean minerals trade will benefit everyone. We need the ICGLR certification process to succeed because otherwise, Congo is impossible to invest in.” Rwanda, Congo, and other ICGLR members need to make the ICGLR complete its critical certification process.
Economic solutions

On the economic side, more work must be done to help cut off cross-border smuggling while boosting transparent, legitimate trade that would benefit all parties. The commitment in the 11+4 Framework to enhance regional economic integration, the World Bank’s promised $1 billion for this work, the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act over the next year, and the creation of the Public-Private Alliance for Responsible Minerals Trade are all building blocks and incentives to support a more transparent, conflict-free economic trade. These key steps will incentivize further cooperation between Rwanda, Congo, and other regional states; increase trade within Congo; and help create a foundation for future peace.

Special Envoys Robinson and Feingold should press Presidents Kabila and Kagame to speed up the certification process for minerals, the ICGLR’s certification mechanism. Specifically, they should press Congo and Rwanda to ensure that the two critical elements of the system that ensure accountability—the Independent Mineral Chain Auditor and the Audit Committee—are fully functional by the end of 2013. Without these systems in place, Rwanda and Congo should not issue ICGLR certificates, as the system is not legitimate without accountability. Feingold should also press the electronics industry’s Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative to send an independent review mission to Rwanda to investigate conflict minerals smuggling and domestic production capacity, similar to the multistakeholder Kimberley Process fact-finding missions on blood diamonds. These steps would help stop smuggling and make it more costly for the illicit trade to continue, thereby helping move the countries toward legitimate, transparent economic cooperation.

Infrastructure in the form of roads, railroads, electrification, and more is desperately needed to help increase legitimate trade. Robinson and Feingold should work with the World Bank to speed up development of regional economic-integration projects to address the critical economic interests of the region. This could include roads, agriculture and energy projects, or mine valuations. Specifically, roads between mining zones such as Walikale and transit points such as Goma and Kisangani should be prioritized to speed up development. The Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries, or CEPGL, whose membership includes Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi, can potentially also help boost infrastructure, as it already has institutional mechanisms in place, concrete proposals on the table, and European funding reportedly committed to it. Kinshasa, however, often sees the CEPGL as a political giveaway to Rwanda, so it is necessary to also include greater intra-Congolese trade in the agreement and possibly have other regional states as members to reinvent the body. Furthermore, joint cross-border projects, such as methane-gas development in Lake Kivu, would bolster cooperation. If regional presidents could break ground on a project in 2013, it would send important signals to investors.
That would provide an incentive for legitimate regional cooperation, similar to former Clinton administration Special Envoy for Northern Ireland George Mitchell’s cross-border investment initiatives in Northern Ireland that helped incentivize peace between Northern and Southern Ireland by helping provide jobs and incentives for cooperation on security and political issues. This would enhance the political will for peace, as the countries would have a vested financial interest in cooperating with one another.

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**Key steps for U.N. Special Envoy Robinson and U.S. Special Envoy and Feingold**

1. Work with African leaders in the African Union; South African Development Community, or SADC; and the ICGLR to set up the next stage of the peace process: negotiations among regional states, inclusive of civil society, over the key underlying drivers of the war.

2. Make regional economic cooperation a centerpiece of the peace process. Specifically, press Congo and Rwanda to speed up the regional ICGLR minerals-certification process, ensuring that its remaining two steps, the accountability mechanisms of auditing and independent monitoring, are fully functional by the end of 2013. Also, work with the World Bank and regional organizations to speed up development of regional economic-integration projects, particularly for roads and electrification in eastern Congo, and ensure their effective, sustainable implementation.

3. Emphasize that any verified state support from any government in the region to any armed group will result in targeted sanctions or other escalating repercussions.

4. Work with the U.N. peacekeeping mission, the U.N. Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or MONUSCO, and regional partners to ensure that the U.N. Foreign Intervention Brigade addresses the region’s core security threats, particularly the armed groups that have caused so much death and destruction in eastern Congo, including the M23, the FDLR, and the ADF. To be more effective, the envoys should explore how targeted and enhanced military support from the United States and other governments could help buttress the Intervention Brigade’s capacity to carry out operations against the leaders of some of these armed groups. The United States and Uganda’s counter-Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA, mission could provide a model for the creation of more-effective operations using better intelligence, increased demobilization assistance, and more-effective targeted military operations.

5. Support increased efforts at accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity, both through the International Criminal Court and domestic processes.
1 The history of Congo hosting both Hutu and Tutsi Rwandan refugees goes back to before the colonial era. These refugees today are Congolese, including those fleeing Rwanda’s different famines—notably the 1940 famines—and other inter-Rwandan wars. Refugees have also contributed to insecurity in the Kivus, including the 1963–1965 conflict known as the Kanyarwanda War, with Hutu and Hunde and Nande refugees on one side and Nyanga, Nande and Nyanha on the other. Enough Project interview with regional expert, Goma, Democratic Republic of the Congo, October 2, 2013.


11 According to Rwanda’s stated vision for the future, “the economy of Rwanda is currently characterized by internal (budget deficit) and external (Balance of Payments) macroeconomic disequilibria . . . In addition, Rwanda’s exports, composed mainly of tea and coffee—whose prices are subject to fluctuations on the international market—have not been able to cover imports needs.” See Republic of Rwanda, “Rwanda Vision 2020.”


13 The Independent Reporter, “Rwanda turns to minerals to boost revenues.”

14 These are known in the region by their mineral-one names, coltan, cassiterite, and wolframite.


17 According to the Rwandan government, new “investors include Saphire Miners in Nyamasheke, Rogi Mining in Bubanza and Gicumbi (a gold project in a joint venture with Simba gold), TransAfrica in Gicumbi and Rusizi, and EMR Resources Rwanda Ltd (Rusizi, Karongi and Nyamasheke).” See The Independent Reporter, “Rwanda turns to minerals to boost revenues.”

18 Rutongo Mining controls the largest tin mine. Confidential interviews with Western diplomats and mining experts, Kigali, Rwanda, and Washington, D.C., July and September 2013.


21 Uganda’s economic interests in Congo are also very significant, particularly in gold, and are highlighted in a forthcoming Enough Project report, due in 2013. The Kasindi customs point in Beni territory is the Congo-Uganda border, for example, is the second largest in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

22 Enough Project phone interview with international mining investor, Washington, D.C., September 26, 2013.


28 This information is according to the tin association ITSCI, which bags and tags minerals in the region.

29 Enough Project interviews with German and U.S. mining experts on eastern Congo’s minerals, Washington, D.C., September 2013.


38 Enough Project interview with senior member of presidential cabinet, Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, July 16, 2013.

39 Enough Project interview with mining investor, Kigali, Rwanda, July 17, 2013.

40 Enough Project interview with senior Rwandan government official, Kigali, Rwanda, July 20, 2013.


42 This was previously known as the Conflict-Free Smelter program. See “The Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative,” available at www.conflictfreesourcinginitiative.org (last accessed October 2013).

Enough is a project of the Center for American Progress to end genocide and crimes against humanity. Founded in 2007, Enough focuses on the crises in Sudan, South Sudan, eastern Congo, and areas affected by the Lord’s Resistance Army. Enough conducts intensive field research, develops practical policies to address these crises, and shares sensible tools to empower citizens and groups working for change. To learn more about Enough and what you can do to help, go to www.enoughproject.org.