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Rethinking Sudan after Southern Secession

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Introduction and executive summary

Two new states—not one—joined the ranks of the international community on July 9, 2011, the day that marked the official independence of South Sudan from the remaining northern two-thirds of the country. Much attention has been focused on the obstacles that the new South Sudan will face. Less has been said of the fragility and potential for mass conflict that exists in what will be left of Sudan itself, and the policy changes needed to address this reality.

Since its independence, Sudan has experienced more years of violence than peace. Decades of misguided government policies under multiple regimes have economically and politically favored the Arab Riverine people while trying to impose a singular Arab-Islamic identity over what is an ethnically, religiously, and culturally diverse population. In the process, many communities have been left aggrieved and disenfranchised, which on numerous occasions has triggered violent rebellion, particularly on Sudan's peripheries. But instead of political reform or decentralization of power, Sudanese governments have consistently employed a strategy of divide and conquer, often accompanied by violent oppression. The consequences of these tactics were most vividly illustrated by the human devastation of the genocide in Darfur and the North-South civil war, and continue today in the Nuba Mountains. More generally, this strategy has resulted in a chronically unstable Sudanese state, a situation that secession does not change.

The international community's robust push for southern independence, while successful, has been the continuation of a long-standing piecemeal approach to Sudan that addresses the symptoms, rather than the root causes of the country's conflicts. Such an approach, marked by multiple peacekeeping missions and peace talks, has not achieved lasting or comprehensive peace throughout all of Sudan.

The international community must rethink its strategy vis-à-vis the North by pushing for a comprehensive approach that is inclusive of all of Sudan's regions and addresses the national issues that lie at the heart of all of Sudan's fissures. The fundamentally similar grievances that exist across Sudan's peripheries must be addressed on the national level, starting with an inclusive constitutional process that brings talks taking place between

the government and these peripheral communities into a single conversation. Without this necessary shift in policy, sustained peace and stability in both Sudans and the larger region will be impossible.

Southern secession ushers in an opportunity to begin to do this. The confluence of heightened economic pressures and political energy represents a moment of political reconfiguration in Sudan which could force the ruling National Congress Party, or NCP, to rethink its strategy going forward. The international community should do the same.

Pockets of instability and human insecurity across Sudan

Even with the secession of the South, Sudan continues to be plagued by multiple conflicts within its borders, as well as the potential for new conflicts to emerge. The most volatile of these in recent years have been the conflicts in the western region of Darfur, and in the Nuba Mountains region of South Kordofan state. The eastern and far northern areas of Sudan have previously organized formidable opposition movements to the regime, but these regions have remained relatively calm in recent years. Given the divisions that Khartoum has sowed among its population and its precarious economic situation, there is a chance that the number of conflicts within the North could increase.

Years after George W. Bush's administration first called the government-instigated violence in Darfur a genocide, this western region of Sudan continues to experience insecurity. Between December 2010 and March 2011 alone, the U.N. recorded over 70,000 Darfuris who were newly displaced, while over 80 government aerial attacks against civilian targets have already been documented so far this year.¹ With the abandonment of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement, the continued failure of peace negotiations in Doha, and the further splintering and realignment of rebel groups, it does not appear that the violence suffered by civilians will end any time soon.

In June, fighting between government forces and northern fighters previously allied with the Sudan People's Liberation Army, or SPLA, erupted in the border state of South Kordofan, following disputed elections and attempts by the northern Sudanese army to forcibly disarm the aggrieved fighters. Fighting, marked by indiscriminate air attacks, has spread throughout the state, displacing a reported 73,000 people.² Reports coming from the ground indicate that government forces are targeting civilians along ethnic and political lines, committing summary executions, and conducting house-to-house searches for opposition sympathizers. Humanitarian access to vulnerable populations remains limited.³

Other budding flashpoints have the potential to erupt into new conflicts as fractures between communities historically aligned with Khartoum and the government have grown. For example, disillusion with the government has spread among the nomadic Misseriya, many of whom were employed by the Sudanese government as militias

during the North-South war. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA, and the accompanying loss of government favor, left many Misseriya with a growing sense of abandonment and estrangement from the government.⁴ Recent reports of intense recruitment of Misseriya by the Justice and Equality Movement, or JEM, a Darfuri rebel group, signal the potential flashpoint that members of the Misseriya could pose should the perception of marginalization by the government prevail.⁵

Economic pressures on the North may result in the unraveling of a NCP-headed patronage system that has helped the party maintain power in its own and select constituencies' hands. Cuts to the North's expenditures means that support for the NCP may falter in some quarters—especially among those constituencies in the peripheries that have been NCP allies despite the regime's treatment of their regions—and open up new sources of grievances to manage. Citing an incident in which a Darfur state governor threatened violence after the amount of federal money disbursed to his state had significantly been cut, the International Crisis Group offers this assessment: “[I]f the [NCP] loses the ability to provide benefits,” profiteers of the patronage system “could easily abandon it. (...) Disagreements over resource allocation of many kinds are becoming extremely divisive (...).”⁶ Other measures taken to soften the economic blow have also stirred up unrest. Austerity measures, such as cuts to key subsidies, led to scattered protests in early 2011. Khartoum's faulty efforts at reinvigorating its agricultural sector as a means of generating non-oil revenue has in some cases led to increased dissatisfaction among farmers.⁷

Same regime, same tactics

Sudan will continue to be governed under the same regime that views stoking the peripheral unrest as its preferred means of ensuring personal survival, and has overseen nearly perpetual violence against its own population. The actions and words of the Khartoum regime in recent months offer little indication that the leadership will move toward a more inclusive strategy that addresses current and future dissent with genuine engagement rather than oppression, violence, and co-optation.

An undemocratic vision of Sudan

In mid-December, President Bashir announced that if southern secession took place, Sharia would continue to be the source of law and that “there will be no time to speak of diversity of culture and ethnicity.”⁸ This vision of Sudan sits at odds with the patchwork of varying religions and tribes in the country and threatens the many minority communities who do not identify with or support Bashir's version of an Arab-Islamist state. Bashir's words suggest that the regime will continue to pursue policies that favor the NCP's interpretation of political Islam and concentrate political, economic, and military power among the northern Riverine elite, further fueling the roots of conflict in Sudan.

Violent management of dissent

The Sudanese government continues to silence political dissent using brutal tactics. Scattered protests since January across major cities in Sudan have been met with force by the regime's omnipresent and sophisticated security apparatus. Arbitrary arrests and beatings are consistently employed to put an end to demonstrations; detainees have come forward to describe the severe psychological and physical torture committed by members of the government security services, including harsh beatings, electric shocks, sexual assault, and threats of those violent acts.⁹ The NCP defends its actions by invoking the state of emergency law, which is still in place in Darfur, Kassala, and Red Sea states, as well as the National Security Act, which was put in place in 2009. The state of emergency has been repeatedly used by the government as a means to arbitrarily arrest and detain people incommunicado, as well as to ban gatherings and peaceful demonstrations that may be political in nature. The National Security Act grants sweeping powers to the National Intelligence and Security Services, or NISS, including to arbitrarily arrest and detain, and to search and seize. Together, they allow the government to effectively intimidate or silence those who might speak against it.¹⁰

Across Sudan's restive regions, the regime also uses military means to respond to what are fundamentally social and political problems—even while peace processes remain an option. Indiscriminate air attacks, targeting of civilians based on political sympathies and ethnic affiliations, manipulation and obstruction of international humanitarian assistance, and the use of proxy militias to sow divisions between long coexisting communities, continue to be committed by Khartoum's forces in Darfur and South Kordofan. In South Kordofan, serious allegations of a government policy of ethnic cleansing have emerged.¹¹

Political machinations

Khartoum continues to disingenuously engage in peace processes related to Sudan's various conflicts, be it through the non-implementation of agreements it has already signed or through the manner of its participation in currently ongoing talks, such as those regarding Abyei, post-referendum issues, Darfur, and the 'Two Areas,' South Kordofan and Blue Nile.¹²

During the Darfur peace negotiations in Doha, Khartoum sent representatives lacking decision-making authority and put in place plans to domesticate the peace process, in order to manipulate the talks and undermine international involvement.¹³ At present, the NCP is pushing for the Liberty and Justice Movement, or LJM, to sign a draft document that has no hope of securing peace, but that will undoubtedly advance the government's plans to push the international community out of the process.

Despite ongoing negotiations to break the impasse on Abyei, the Sudanese regime forcibly occupied the region, strengthening its bargaining position vis-à-vis other post-referendum issues and creating an environment in which the holding of a referendum, or any other kind of negotiated resolution, would be impossible with the SPLM. Similarly, Khartoum allowed its military to engage in hostile actions against the northern sector of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, or SPLM-N, even though the CPA provisions for South Kordofan and Blue Nile had not been fulfilled and the African Union, or A.U., was already in the midst of negotiating the status of those fighters after secession.¹⁴

International mediators have often played into the hands of the NCP by allowing Khartoum to constantly change the rules of the game. In Darfur, for example, the government has been pushing for an internal “Darfur Political Process” as the only forum for talks despite the importance for negotiations to take place on neutral and secure ground. This idea has received support from some members of the international community, even though it remains incredibly impractical at this time. In talks on Abyei, the A.U. has consistently failed to press the NCP to make the necessary compromises, either on the definition of ‘Abyei resident’ in order to hold the referendum, or when an exhaustive list of extra-CPA solutions were put on the table.¹⁵ Further, through its May invasion of the area, the government has successfully changed the conversation from the status of Abyei to the more immediate problem of securing SAF’s retreat, thus delaying negotiations on the most crucial issues.

Khartoum’s political machinations are also well-documented in its management of the April 2010 elections, and its questionable involvement in the South Kordofan elections in May. In Darfur, long before the April elections, for example, the NCP had changed the political reality on the ground in Darfur by manipulating the census and registration processes, and redrawing electoral districts in its favor.¹⁶

A situation in flux

South Sudan’s secession will produce two fragile states that demand the continued attention of the international community. In the North, a period of political maneuvering is taking place alongside a number of critical processes that will help shape the state that Sudan becomes after secession. The international community should seize upon this window of opportunity—as the Sudanese leadership recalculates its relationship to its constituencies, its allies, its opponents, and the international community—to encourage the regime to engage in genuine dialogue with its population and move toward more inclusive governance, for the sake of its own stability and its future relationships with other countries.

Post-secession economic woes and increasing political pressures have necessitated a rethink within the NCP. Economic pressures resulting from the loss of oil revenues associated with secession could lead Khartoum to greater engagement with the West, resulting in greater international leverage over Khartoum's actions. At the same time, hardliners within the NCP have reportedly strengthened relations with Eritrean officials, cooperating in the trafficking of weapons through eastern Sudan for financial compensation. Some of those routes reportedly end in Gaza and begin in Tehran, adding Iran to the list of parties disinterested in the normalization of Sudan's relations with the larger international community, and especially the U.S.¹⁷ Politically, the NCP is also under pressure from some constituencies for its decision to let go of the South. A number of recent decisions made by the government—military invasion and occupation of Abyei, the sacking of former security advisor Salah Gosh, considered a moderate among Bashir's top associates, and attacks in South Kordofan—suggest that at the moment the NCP is intent on appeasing hardliners in the party and the military.

The South's secession has also prompted political posturing by opposition parties in the North seeking to fill the open seats in government left by the SPLM. In early 2011, a number of mainstream opposition parties came together as the National Coalition Front, or NCF, and called for a constitutional conference and a number of reforms, threatening regime change if those demands were not met.¹⁸ Although the coalition has issued the occasional public statement together, it has largely fragmented. In particular, the mainline opposition parties the Umma and the Democratic Union Party, or DUP, have entered into separate bilateral talks at the invitation of the NCP, undercutting the leverage that opposition unity might have posed, to the ire of other members.

Dialogue between the Umma and the NCP appears to have yielded progress on a number of key issues.¹⁹ Despite this progress, however, it is unlikely that talks will result in any kind of dramatic reform or political transformation. The Umma and the DUP appear to be more interested in what share of the government they can acquire—which depends on cooperation with the NCP—than in any substantive changes to how Sudan is governed.²⁰ The NCP's main concern appears to be accommodating these parties just enough to quell their dissent while maintaining its grip on power. More radical change is dependent on clear alternative political agendas, which the traditional opposition parties appear to lack, as well as the space for voicing differing perspectives, which the government prevents.

In January, it seemed that the revolutionary fervor that had hit Tunis and Cairo would spread to Khartoum. Sudanese youth led protests against the regime and opposition parties, in cities and universities across the North in a sign of growing frustration with the entire political status quo.²¹ Scattered protests against austerity measures instituted by the government, the conflict in Darfur, and government attempts to take land without compensation, have also taken place.²² Thus far, protests have had little traction, because government security forces have swiftly crushed the demonstrations.

The government is also faced with militant groups on the periphery, such as those in Darfur and South Kordofan, who recognize the links between violence in their regions and broader government policies and are therefore incorporating calls for national reforms into their negotiating positions. For instance, the JEM has called for “the effective participation of Darfur and all other Regions of Sudan in decision-making” on wealth-sharing.²³ Similarly, one of the principles listed in the framework agreement outlining the path to peace for South Kordofan is “[a] commitment to balanced development in all parts of Sudan with special attention to Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and other less developed areas.” This is followed by the assertion that the, “[p]arties shall work together towards an inclusive national process in the Republic of Sudan, aimed at constitutional reform.”²⁴

Rethinking Sudan’s multiple processes

A number of political processes have been underway in recent years that have the potential to begin to address the root causes of Sudan’s perennial instability. These processes—popular consultations in Blue Nile and South Kordofan, peace talks and civil society consultations for Darfur, and a constitutional review—are ideally forums in which the wider Sudanese public and the various levels of government can engage in a conversation on how the new Sudanese state should be run. Without international engagement, the likelihood that the government will participate in these processes genuinely or allow these processes to be inclusive and transparent, is slim.

The ‘Two Areas’: South Kordofan and Blue Nile

Popular consultations in Blue Nile and South Kordofan are exercises meant to ascertain whether the citizens of the two states are satisfied with their peace protocol in the CPA. The protocol lays out how these two areas, recognized as unique territories, should be administered—including, among other items, how power and wealth are shared between the federal government and the two states, and how land is managed. If the consultations ultimately demonstrate that residents are dissatisfied with the provisions in place, the states’ legislative assemblies can renegotiate with the government the terms of the states’ relationship with the center.²⁵ Consultations have stalled in Blue Nile and been upended by the return to war in South Kordofan, but they should continue after July 9 according to the framework agreement signed between the NCP and SPLM-N on June 28.

Internationally-supported negotiations at the political party level, between SPLM-N and the NCP, will also be ongoing. Aside from securing a ceasefire and political arrangements amenable to both parties in South Kordofan, talks will likely touch on the relationship between the two states and the center, and the role the SPLM-N is allowed to play in the constitutional review.

Darfur

Negotiations in Doha between rebel groups and the government have been ongoing since February 2009. The content of the talks have included, among other things, the level of political power given to the region on the national stage, the distribution of wealth, issues of justice and reconciliation, and issues affecting the displaced, such as their return, land, and compensation. Currently, only two rebel groups, JEM and LJM, out of a number of other groups engaged in fighting, are participating in the talks. In April, international mediators put forward a draft agreement that some observers believe is a weak document whose provisions will be unenforceable. The NCP is encouraging LJM to sign the agreement, while JEM has put forward its own draft document in response, which has been rejected by the NCP.

At the same time, the Sudanese government, the A.U., and the AU-UN Mission in Darfur, or UNAMID, are pushing for the continuation of the peace process inside Darfur, which would consist of consultations with Darfuri citizens without rebel representation. This comes in the wake of the All Darfur Stakeholders' Conference, which brought approximately 500 Darfuri leaders to Doha to express their views and concerns about the peace process, and to gain their buy-in for the draft peace document. Although the participants were allowed the unique opportunity to publicly vent their frustrations, the government's continuing control over stakeholder participation and its refusal to discuss Darfur in the context of wider Sudanese issues, suggest that the potential for the stakeholder conference to lead to significant change was limited from the outset and the potential for any internal process to bear fruit at this time is virtually negligible.

Constitutional review

The interim constitution that has governed Sudan since the signing of the CPA needs to be replaced with a permanent constitution. Under the CPA, the constitution should be the result of a review process that “provide[s] for political inclusiveness and public participation.”²⁶ Among other key details, the language of the text should define the structure of the Sudanese government, the source of legislation in the country (currently Sharia and customary law), citizenship, and the rights of the Sudanese population. The document should also touch deeply on those issues that have become important in discussions in the peripheries—including how to draw the administrative regions of Sudan (15 states or 6 regions), define the type of federalism or relationship that should be in place between states and the center, and lay out how wealth is distributed throughout the country.

The process of drafting and approving the document is as crucial as the text of the constitution itself. Civil society groups representing all 15 states in the North have come together to collectively call for a “participatory, inclusive, and transparent constitution-making process” and a “nationally owned nationally respected constitution that reflects

the needs and aspiration of the people of Sudan.”²⁷ The coalition also highlighted the need for wide civic education to be conducted in order for dialogue to be substantive and genuinely participatory. A transparent, participatory, and inclusive Sudan-wide dialogue on its future constitution should be viewed as an important means of empowering the Sudanese people to decide the future of their state.

In May, the government floated vague details of a constitutional review process during a U.N. meeting that appears to fall well short of the mark. During the meeting, government officials revealed that a “National Committee” for constitution-making would be created, consisting of 300 to 400 members nominated by the president. Political parties and civil society would be allowed to participate, though remarks by officials at the time suggest that the selection of who gets to participate and with what degree of representation would be government-controlled. The committee would be charged with holding consultative meetings—likely only one per state—followed by a referendum on the final draft. Participants in the meeting predicted that the mandate of the committee would be very broad given officials’ preliminary descriptions, and noted that officials voiced skepticism over wider consultations with the public because of the financial costs. Officials proposed a four-month timeline, beginning after July 9, for the review.²⁸

Thus far, opposition parties have mistakenly only focused on the content of the future constitution, rather than engaging with the government on the review process itself. Some parties have demonstrated no clear vision on an ideal process, and have appeared disorganized and vague in their response to the government’s proposed plans.²⁹

Talks in Doha have, to some extent, led to a larger conversation about the need for national reform. However, the government, in response, has expressed its unwillingness to address these nation-wide issues through its Darfur negotiations. Instead, it has pushed for a Darfur-based process that, even in its most perfect form, would not even begin to address the broader policies of Khartoum that led to regional unrest in the first place.

The framework agreement signed between the NCP and the SPLM-N on June 28, stated that, “The Popular Consultations Process is a democratic right and mechanism to ascertain the views of the people of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile and shall be complete and its outcomes fully implemented and fed into the constitutional reform.”³⁰ While undoubtedly an encouraging sign, the document itself is simply a ‘framework,’ not a binding agreement.

One process going forward?

The merits of holding separate tracks of negotiations on top of a national process, which in theory would address many of the same issues, should be reexamined. Fundamentally, grievances in Darfur, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan are based on questions of how power and wealth is distributed throughout Sudan, which in turn tie to questions of

Sudanese identity and the relationship between the country's diverse communities. These questions are not exclusive to Darfur, South Kordofan, or Blue Nile; they are national issues that can only be genuinely addressed at the national level.

The plurality of processes, while seemingly all-encompassing, poses a challenge to the future of Sudan. The danger is that separate consultations will ultimately pit peripheries, all claiming pieces from the same pie, against each other. Additionally, discussing national issues with select regional actors has the potential to encourage other regions to agitate for their own unique relationship with the center. For example, discussions on wealth-sharing in South Kordofan and Blue Nile have reportedly piqued the interest of the state government in another northern state, Sennar, to negotiate a better wealth-sharing deal itself.³¹ This is especially threatening under the watch of a regime that has long mastered the art of sowing divisions between its various constituencies.

The recognition that a national dialogue is needed to address the root causes of Sudan's crises is not a new concept. In an effort to create a New Sudan, in 1986 a large number of Sudanese political parties and civil society representatives issued a declaration that proposed a National Constitutional Conference, which would discuss questions of Sudanese nationality, religion, human rights, system of rule, and culture. More contemporary models are also worth examining. For example, the popular consultations that have taken place in Blue Nile could be replicated on a wider scale as a means to engage with the Sudanese public on the draft of a constitution.

How talks in the peripheries can feed into, or are at least coordinated with a national process is a complicated task, one that will require the juggling of multiple agendas and personalities. On the one end, the processes in Darfur and the two areas could be completely scrapped in favor of a new, nationwide process that brings everyone to the table. On the other, the different tracks could continue to proceed in parallel, followed by last-minute efforts to reconcile and coordinate the resolutions of each. Another option that has also been proposed, is to continue the discussion on issues particular to the regions in regional talks, while separating out national questions for discussion at the national level.³²

Recommendations for international engagement

The international community must be smarter in its engagement with Khartoum after July 9, shifting its strategy to one that reframes the country's multiple conflicts as manifestations of the same disease: government policies that concentrate wealth and power at the center at the expense of the people on the peripheries. While the United States has been a critical actor in the history of international diplomacy with Khartoum, Washington's hand will be constrained in pushing for a national reconciliation process. As a result of its own policy that was unveiled in November 2010, the U.S.'s biggest points of leverage are tied to the implementation of the CPA and a

resolution to the conflict in Darfur. U.S. officials have also shown reluctance toward the inclusion of national issues in the Darfur talks, citing doubts over rebel movements' sincerity to push for a broader agenda, as well as the Sudanese government's own unwillingness to discuss national issues in that context.³³

Nevertheless, the U.S. can begin to engage in the peace processes for Darfur and the Two Areas as pieces of a necessary national process, rather than as end goals unto themselves. A strategic rethink beginning in the U.S. Special Envoy's office is necessary to examine some critical questions: How does the U.S. approach Sudan as a whole? And how can the separate processes be sequenced to feed into a national process?

In its public and private communications to Khartoum, as well as international actors with influence over the regime, it is important that the U.S. conveys its expectations of a participatory, inclusive, and transparent constitutional review process. Particular emphasis should be placed on the quality of the process, not just its outcome. Support for a constitutional review should be accompanied by U.S. and international pressure on Khartoum to create an environment conducive to genuine dialogue including greater respect for human rights. This pressure can and should be enhanced by U.S. support for and engagement with civil society and political parties, as well as its support for initiatives that foster independent media in Sudan, such as Radio Dabanga.

The U.S. must continue its diplomatic response to the ongoing crisis, which should be centered around pressure on Khartoum to protect its civilians, and a push for a ceasefire in South Kordofan. Consistent with stated Sudan policy, steps toward normalization should be suspended absent progress on the ground. The expansion of targeted sanctions and other unilateral and multilateral consequences for individuals responsible for fomenting war in Sudan can and should form an integral component of this effort.³⁴ Going forward, however, the deployment of such pressures—or any other diplomatic tools—must secure more than just another regional peace agreement; it should be used to advance the greater goal of laying the foundation for sustainable peace throughout the whole of Sudan.

Endnotes

- 1 This is primarily as a result of renewed fighting in Jebel Marra and the corridor between North and South Darfur. Eric Reeves, "The Bombed Everything that Moved," Aerial military attacks on civilians and humanitarians in Sudan, 1999 – 2011, available at <http://www.sudanbombing.org/>.
- 2 United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator, "Key Messages on South Kordofan," July 6, 2011, available at <http://reliefweb.int/node/424224>.
- 3 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Sudan - South Kordofan," Situation Report No. 10, July 5, 2011, available at <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA%20Situation%20Report%20%2310%20on%20South%20Kordofan%2030%20June%20to%205%20July%202011.pdf>.
- 4 For more on relations between Misseriya and the Sudanese government see: International Crisis Group, "Sudan's Southern Kordofan Problem: The Next Darfur?" (2008), available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/Sudans%20Southern%20Kordofan%20Problem%20The%20Next%20Darfur.pdf>.
- 5 Small Arms Survey, "Armed Entities in South Kordofan," (2011), available at <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/facts-figures/armed-groups/three-areas/HSBA-Armed-Groups-South-Kordofan.pdf>.
- 6 International Crisis Group, "Divisions in Sudan's Ruling Party and Threats to the Country's Stability" (2011), p. 19, available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/174-divisions-in-sudans-ruling-party-and-the-threat-to-the-countrys-future-stability.aspx>.
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- 9 Human Rights Watch, "Sudan: Protesters Describe Torture by Security Officers," March 4, 2011, available at <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/03/04/sudan-protesters-describe-torture-security-officers>.
- 10 Ghazi Salahuddin, the government official in charge of the Darfur file, recently proposed removing the state of emergency for Darfur, but no further action has been taken, leaving those in the restive region vulnerable to the state and without means of voicing their discontent.
- 11 United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator, "Key Messages on South Kordofan," available at: <http://reliefweb.int/node/424224>; All Africa Conference of Churches, "Press Briefing," June 11, 2011, available at <http://globalministries.org/news/news/PRESS-STATEMENT-ON-SOUTH-KORDOFAN.pdf>; Alan Boswell, "Aid workers recount ethnic killings in central Sudan," June 16, 2011, available at <http://www.mclatchydc.com/2011/06/16/115997/aid-workers-recount-ethnic-killings.html>; Sudan Democracy First Group, "Ethnic cleansing once again: Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains," June 13, 2011, available at <http://www.sudantribune.com/Ethnic-cleansing-once-again,38972>.
- 12 In the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Two Areas are defined as follows: "The boundaries of Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains State shall be the same boundaries of former Southern Kordofan Province when Greater Kordofan was sub-divided into two provinces. For the purpose of this Protocol, Blue Nile State shall be understood as referring to the presently existing Blue Nile State," available at: http://www.aec-sudan.org/docs/cpa/cpa_06south_kordofan_blue_nile.pdf.
- 13 For more information see Enough Project, "A Roadmap to Peace in Darfur," (2011), available at: <http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/road-map-peace-darfur>.
- 14 The NCP and SAF's stated rationale for attempting to disarm the SPLM-N fighters was the claim that after secession, these fighters would be rebels who pose a threat to domestic peace.
- 15 AUHIP, "AUHIP Proposals towards a Resolution of the Issue of Abyei," November 27, 2010.
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- 17 Enough correspondence with a confidential source in the region, May 22 and 24, 2011.
- 18 Sudan Tribune, "Sudan opposition urges international community to press ruling party on detainees, reforms," January 30, 2011, available at <http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-opposition-urges,37809>; <http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-opposition-gives-NCP,37418>.
- 19 Agreements reportedly included: Sharia would be implemented on a territorial, not personal, basis; that the source of law would be both Sharia and customary law; that a democratically elected panel would ensure that laws, while adhering to Sharia, would not contravene human rights norms ratified by Sudan; that the people would be considered the source of power; and that future Darfur peace agreements must be incorporated into the constitution. International Crisis Group, "Divisions in Sudan's Ruling Party and Threats to the Country's Stability."
- 20 Enough phone interview with Sudanese political commentator, Feb. 2011; Enough interview with Sudanese civil society representative, June 2011.
- 21 Liberal Democratic Party, "Peaceful Demonstrations to Take Place in Sudan 30 January 2011," Press Release, January 28, 2011 available at <http://www.prlog.org/11259417-peaceful-demonstrations-to-take-place-in-sudan-30-january-2011.html>.
- 22 Opheera McDoom, "Students Protest in Sudan's North Over Food Prices," Reuters, January 13, 2011, available at <http://af.reuters.com/article/sudan-News/idAFMCD34958120110113>; Radio Dabanga, "New demonstrations in Sudan to stop the Darfur war and to replace regime," April 22, 2011, available at <http://www.radiodabanga.org/node/13501>; AFP, "Sudan farmers protest government 'land grab'," April 1, 2011, available at http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iept85JmdjxVWFD4bW_h27PgWw?docId=CNG.1fd1c4853d22c9c6fd2476a783525b0d.ad1.
- 23 Draft Darfur Peace Document, JEM Revised Draft, June 8, 2011.
- 24 "Framework Agreement between Government of Sudan and Sudan People's Liberation Movement (north) on Political Partnership between NCP and SPLMN, and Political and Security Arrangements in Blue Nile and South Kordofan States," June 28, 2011.
- 25 For more information on the popular consultation process, see Jason Gluck, "Why Sudan's Popular Consultation Matters," U.S. Institute of Peace (2011) available at <http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR260%20-%20Why%20Sudan%27s%20Popular%20Consultation%20Matters.pdf>. In the context of this paper, "the center" refers to the ruling party in Khartoum and those within its patronage network, including many of the Riverine elite, who benefit from the spoils of the state.
- 26 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, p. 31 available at <http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/Documents/General/cpa-en.pdf>.
- 27 Sudanese Initiative for Constitution Making, "Sudanese Initiative for Constitution Making Declaration and Mission Statement," Statement, April 11, 2011.
- 28 Enough interview with participant in meeting, June 2011.
- 29 Enough interview with civil society representative, June 2011.
- 30 Framework Agreement between the Government of Sudan and Sudan People's Liberation Movement (North), June 28, 2011.
- 31 Enough interview with international expert, April 2011.
- 32 See Jon Temin and Theodore Murphy, "Toward a New Republic of Sudan," U.S. Institute of Peace (2011) available at <http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR278.pdf>. They propose that the Darfur peace process "should be re-envisioned and ultimately made subordinate to a larger northern process." Issues of more 'local' character, such as returns, traditional authority, justice, and compensation, should still be addressed in Darfur-specific talks, while those national issues related to power and wealth sharing should be a national discussion.
- 33 Enough interview with U.S. diplomat, June 2011.
- 34 See previous Enough statements on the expansion of consequences on Khartoum: Sudan Now, "Escalating War in Sudan: Urgent U.S. Policy Responses Needed," June 15, 2011, available at: <http://www.sudanactionnow.org/node/96>; David Sullivan and John Prendergast, "It's time for action on Sudan," June 22, 2011, available at: http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-22/opinion/sullivan.prendergast.sudan_1_abyei-southern-sudan-darfur?_s=PM:OPINION.