GETTING BACK ON TRACK
Implementing the UN Regional Strategy on the Lord's Resistance Army
THIS REPORT IS PRODUCED BY
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On June 29th 2012, the United Nations Security Council welcomed the Secretary General's ‘Regional Strategy to address the threat and impact of the activities of the Lord’s Resistance Army’ (UN Regional Strategy or ‘Strategy’).¹ The Strategy was well received by local and international civil society organizations as an ambitious framework with the elements of a comprehensive response. Then, as now, the message was clear – if fully implemented, the Strategy could resolve this devastating 26-year conflict and pave the way for the long-term recovery of the affected region and its people.

The governments of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda, South Sudan, Central African Republic (CAR), and Sudan bear the primary responsibility for defeating the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and protecting their populations. However, under the Strategy, United Nations (UN) departments, agencies, and offices have committed to augment their efforts, and those of the African Union (AU), by taking specific action to address the threat of the LRA. While there is a limit to how much progress can have been made in the five months since the Strategy was adopted, this report seeks to assess progress made by UN actors against the benchmarks outlined in the UN Regional Strategy.

Progress towards achieving the Strategy’s five goals has been slow. There is no comprehensive plan in place to implement the Strategy and the situation on the ground is largely unchanged. The African Union Regional Cooperation Initiative (AU-RCI) – a framework for cooperation on counter-LRA activities among the DRC, Uganda, South Sudan, and CAR – has not been operationalized. Its military component, the Regional Task Force (AU-RTF), lacks capable troops and resources, clear command and control, and access to key LRA safe havens. There has been little progress in activities to enhance efforts to protect civilians, with few of the planned training programs underway. UN departments, agencies, and offices have not finalized planning for programs that donors can fund. Demobilization, Disarmament, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration (DDRRR) activities remain limited, and there are still humanitarian needs in LRA-affected areas that remain unmet. And on the ambitious goals of peacebuilding and long-term development, even those projects that have been identified as priorities and that require no further funds have not been advanced.

There are significant political barriers to implementing the UN Regional Strategy and to achieving cooperation among the regional governments. Each of the Strategy’s goals requires cross-border cooperation and full political commitment from each government. This is especially true of its first goal, the full operationalization of the AU-RCI, which depends on close military and intelligence coordination. Tensions between the DRC and Uganda, however, and tepid political commitment from each of the regional governments – DRC, South Sudan, CAR, and Uganda – have prevented meaningful progress in implementing the AU-RCI and the AU-RTF. Given the thorny political issues involved in achieving military cooperation,² and the shortage of funds made available to support operations, it is possible that the AU-RTF will remain stalled. Because supporting the AU-RCI is a core piece of the broader UN Regional Strategy, many UN offices have assumed a ‘wait and see’ approach to key activities, even those entirely independent of the AU-RTF. As a whole, UN departments, agencies, and offices, have shown a lack of urgency in implementing those elements of the Strategy for which they are directly responsible. As a result of this dynamic, the Strategy thus far has failed to achieve any of its objectives. Without urgent action, it will fail permanently.

The costs of failing to implement the Strategy are high. Civilian populations will continue to endure the preda-


² The DRC government has contributed no troops to the AU-RTF. The Ugandan government recently threatened to withdraw all troops from counter-LRA operations in response to UN Group of Experts reporting on alleged Ugandan support to the M23 rebel group in eastern Congo. See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20187369
tions of the LRA. Regional stability – already fragile – will be further threatened, and the prospects for future UN-AU collaboration weakened. The efforts invested in the Strategy will be wasted.

A two-tiered approach, with dynamic leadership from the Security Council and the Secretary General, can put the Strategy back on track to achieve its goals.

First, the Security Council and Secretary General should pursue aggressive diplomacy at the highest levels to ensure regional governments and the African Union fulfill their commitments under the AU-RCI. Political challenges must be overcome, not used as an excuse for abandoning existing international commitments. The Security Council and Secretary General must enlist greater commitment from their counterparts in the AU Peace and Security Council and the AU Chairman, as well as from regional governments, to forge a political path for each of the regional governments to play a constructive role in the AU-RCI and to spend the political capital necessary to operationalize the AU-RTF.

Second, the UN should recognize that the vast majority of the UN Regional Strategy can and should be implemented independent of the AU. With or without the AU military cooperation framework in place, there is progress to be made on the protection of civilians, demobilizing and disarming former LRA members, ensuring humanitarian assistance meets needs, and progressing peacebuilding and development activities in LRA-affected areas.

The role of Abou Moussa, Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and Head of the United Nations Office Regional Office for Central Africa (UN-OCA), remains very important, particularly in forging a common regional approach to the LRA violence and creating cross-border cooperation and the exchange of information between UN missions. SRSG Moussa and Department of Political Affairs representatives have done an excellent job in raising awareness of LRA violence and drafting a Strategy to marshal UN resources – diplomatic, military, and economic – that will have an enormous impact if implemented. But that framework will not be achieved without renewed public support from the Security Council and action by the Secretary General, who must engage directly with their counterparts at the African Union as well as regional governments to ensure that the full implementation of all activities in the UN Regional Strategy is made a political priority.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the UN Security Council

1) The UN Security Council should urge regional governments to fulfill their commitments under the AU-RCI and request the Secretary General convene the heads of state from the regionally affected governments to promote regional cooperation in counter-LRA initiatives.

2) The UN Security Council should urge regional governments, including Sudan and Chad, to fulfill their responsibility to protect civilians by taking all steps necessary within each of their own territories to deny the LRA safe haven, including robust investigation of reported LRA presence or attacks, and to ensure counter-LRA forces are able to reach all LRA combatants.

To the UN Secretary General

3) The UN Secretary General should work with the Chairperson of the AU Commission to convene a meeting with the heads of state of the regionally affected governments and forge a political path for the full operationalization of the AU-RCI. The meeting should seek a common vision for the AU-RTF with political support from all affected governments that ensures sufficient cross-border cooperation to deny LRA forces safe haven.

4) The Secretary General should publicly affirm his determination to see the UN Regional Strategy on the LRA implemented in full.

To UN departments, agencies, and offices

5) UNOCA and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), together with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and UN LRA focal points should urgently finalize planning documents for projects that can be funded by donors to implement priority activities of the UN Regional Strategy. Examples of such priority activities include:

- expanding early warning systems;
- expanding FM radio coverage;
- disseminating ‘come home’ messaging in close collaboration with NGOs to promote LRA defections; and
- rehabilitating critical roads and bridges.

6) SRSG Moussa should move urgently to raise funds for priority projects by convening a high-level donor conference.
7) UNOCA should oversee the design of projects that provide the AU-RTF with the capacity to investigate LRA-attacks and facilitate the exchange of information on LRA-related activities among UN actors, regional armies and other partners (including U.S.-initiated Counter-LRA Operation Fusion Centers and MONUSCO's Joint Information and Operations Cell (JIOC)).

8) Appropriate UN offices and agencies including UNOCA, the UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU), DPKO, and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) should work with the relevant AU offices and regional government officials to help the AU finalize its document on “Common Measures on the Treatment of LRA Combatants and Assistance of Victims of the LRA.” They should also ensure that the document includes specific standard operating procedures (SOPs) for the handover, repatriation and reunification of children and women who leave the LRA. The SOPs developed by UNICEF and currently used by the Ugandan army should form the basis for this document. The AU should be encouraged to emulate UNICEF’s model of appointing focal points and a coordinator to monitor these practices in LRA affected areas.

9) DPKO should work with the UN missions in DRC (MONUSCO), the Central African Republic (BINUCA) and South Sudan (UNMISS), to finalize the standard operating procedures for UN support to the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of LRA combatants and abductees across the affected region.

10) MONUSCO, BINUCA and UNMISS, with support from DPKO, affected governments and other relevant international partners should expand work to establish and publicize ‘safe reporting sites’ along the CAR-DRC, CAR-South Sudan, CAR-Sudan, and DRC-South Sudan borders, where the LRA can safely surrender.

11) The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) should work with relevant UN actors to undertake a regional needs assessment and best practices study on human rights in the LRA-affected areas and to develop a comprehensive regional plan to support human rights in those areas.

12) UNOCA in cooperation with DPA staff should convene a meeting of headquarters and field-based LRA focal points to review implementation of the UN Regional Strategy, identify next steps to address remaining gaps, and improve cross-border coordination.
1. INTRODUCTION

On June 29th, the Security Council welcomed the Secretary General’s ‘Regional Strategy to address the threat and impact of the activities of the Lord’s Resistance Army’ (‘UN Regional Strategy’ or ‘Strategy’).\(^3\) The United Nations Office on Central Africa (UNOCA) led the development of the Strategy, which had been requested by the Security Council\(^4\), and consulted widely within the UN system, the AU, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) while drafting. UNOCA’s careful consultations, transparent process, and collaborative approach yielded impressive results.

The response from local activists and international NGOs to the Strategy was clear – the UN got the elements right. The Strategy’s five goals are thorough and comprehensive: 1) operationalization of the AU’s Regional Cooperation Initiative (AU-RCI), 2) enhanced protection of civilians, 3) expansion of DRRR activities to all LRA affected areas, 4) a coordinated humanitarian and child protection response, and 5) long-term peacebuilding, human rights, and rule of law development. Yet progress towards each of these goals has been slow.

This report, commissioned by 11 organizations, provides an assessment of that progress to date, and recommendations for how to close the gap between the aspiration to end the scourge of the LRA and the current reality.

The report was drawn up on the basis of research carried out by a consultant from September-November 2012. Most of the information collected was received through interviews conducted by the consultant in person, by phone, or via email. Representatives from the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) as the lead agency in implementing the UN Regional Strategy were frequently consulted.

The report first introduces UNOCA, the main UN vehicle tasked with coordinating implementation of the UN Regional Strategy, and outlines its inherent limits and need for high-level political support. It then assesses progress toward achieving each of the Strategy’s five goals in turn. For each, the report analyzes progress made to date and outlines critical gaps in Strategy activities that must be corrected if the Strategy is to succeed.

For too long, the people of the DRC, CAR, South Sudan, and Uganda have suffered from unspeakable atrocities committed by the LRA. Their children have been abducted and murdered. Their families have been forced from their homes and their livelihoods destroyed. Their communities have been torn apart.

The UN has shown great leadership, and invested a great deal, in developing a Strategy to support these populations and respond to the horrors of the LRA. It must not fall short now. There is too much at stake and too much to lose.

2. IMPLEMENTING THE UN STRATEGY – THE ROLE AND LIMITS OF UNOCA

After the UN Regional Strategy was made public in June of this year, the newly established United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) was designated to lead its implementation.\(^5\) Headed by SRSG Abou Moussa, UNOCA was created to address cross-border security threats in Central Africa, in particular the LRA. As a political mission, UNOCA is attached to the UN’s Department of Political Affairs (DPA).\(^6\) DPA staff in New York backstop UNOCA’s programs including leading inter-agency meetings relating to the implementation of the UN Regional Strategy.

SRSG Moussa has played an important role in driving forward the implementation of the UN Regional Strategy. In particular, the SRSG has established a strong working relationship with the African Union Special Envoy for the LRA issue, Mr. Francesco Madeira, and has worked well with regional politicians, diplomats and NGO representatives working on the LRA conflict.

SRSG Moussa and his staff have also led planning on implementation of the Strategy.\(^7\) In July 2012, SRSG Moussa and AU Envoy Madeira convened a meeting of stakeholders in Entebbe aimed at producing a roadmap for implementing the Strategy. After further consultations within the UN as well as with NGOs and donor governments, UNOCA is working with LRA focal points throughout the UN system to develop a programmatic document outlining high priority programs that need outside funds.

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\(^6\) http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/activities_by_region/africa/central_africa
\(^7\) Telephone interview with Gumisai Mutume, UNOCA, Libreville, October 11, 2012.
However, more than five months after the Strategy was adopted, no projects are sufficiently developed to be funded. As a relatively new office with limited resources, UNOCA’s efforts must be augmented if it is to succeed. The Security Council and Secretary General must set a clear agenda within the UN system and insist that all agencies and departments give sufficient priority to developing projects to implement activities under the Strategy. In doing so they will both empower UNOCA and create clear grounds to hold it accountable for results.

3. ASSESSMENT OF THE PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING THE FIVE GOALS OF THE UN REGIONAL STRATEGY

a) Goal 1: The African Union led Regional Cooperation Initiative against the Lord’s Resistance Army is fully operational and implemented.

The African Union Regional Cooperation Initiative (AU-RCI) against the LRA was authorized by the African Union Peace and Security Council in November 2011 and officially launched in March 2012. The AU Special Envoy for the LRA issue, Ambassador Madeira, is responsible for overall coordination of the AU-RCI. It is focused on the military response to the LRA and has two main components: the Joint-Coordination Mechanism (JCM) and Regional Task Force (AU-RTF). The JCM is composed of security ministers from South Sudan, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Central African Republic (CAR) and chaired by the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security. The AU-RTF is headquartered in Yambio, South Sudan, and, as originally conceived, is intended to include a brigade of 5,000 soldiers sourced from the four countries and deployed across the LRA affected areas.

By making operationalization of the AU-RCI the Strategy’s first goal, the UN has effectively incorporated the AU-RCI into its own Strategy. The success of the UN Regional Strategy is, to a significant extent, contingent on the success of the AU-RCI. This is a deliberate move by the Security Council to promote African solutions to African problems, with the UN playing a supporting role. Under this strategic goal, UN offices are intended to support the AU-RCI by encouraging countries to contribute necessary troops to the AU-RTF, identify gaps in capacity and providing training to the AU-RTF, and help create a unified approach to dealing with the LRA.

However, the AU-RTF is not close to realizing the vision of a multi-national force conducting effective offensive operations against the LRA and protecting civilians. It exists only on paper and cannot be considered operational.

The failings are four fold: a shortage of troops, no clarity on command and control of troops, poor capacity of those troops provided, and the lack of access to all LRA-affected areas. All of these failings are underpinned by the political challenges arising from the current state of relations among the member states, in particular between Uganda and the DRC.

**Troop shortages**

As a preliminary matter, there are too few troops available. SRSG Moussa has worked closely with the AU Envoy to secure AU-RTF troop contributions from regional governments. Their lobbying has produced some results. Uganda has reportedly pledged 2,000 of its soldiers to the AU-RTF, which were already in the LRA theater of operations as part of the ongoing Ugandan offensive. The South Sudanese government has provided 500 of its troops (SPLA) to the AU-RTF, now stationed in Nzara, South Sudan, and the CAR government has pledged a further 500 of its troops (FACA). This is progress. However, the DRC government has not contributed any troops to the AU-RTF and, according to field reports, the FACA contingent is closer to 90 soldiers than the 500 pledged. In total, there are fewer than 2,600 troops available to the AU-RTF at the moment, only slightly more than half the requested 5,000. These troops are insufficient to cover the vast area in which the LRA operates, which is approximately 115,000 square miles.

But the problems in operationalizing the AU-RTF run much deeper. Even the available troops are hamstrung by three interrelated problems that are, at their root, political: no clear command and control structure, inadequate troop capacity, and a lack of access to key LRA safe havens.

**No clear command and control**

A fundamental problem is that no Concept of Operations (CONOPS) has been agreed to and adopted by the four regional governments and the AU. The CONOPS is a foundational document that would outline a coherent and agreed vision for the mission. Criti-

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9 Field research conducted by Resolve in October of 2012 puts the number of Ugandan forces in the field at closer to 1200. Email correspondence with Resolve, November 27, 2012.

10 Phone interviews and email correspondence with UN sources, international diplomats and aid workers. September and October 2012.
cally, it would establish a chain of command for troops assigned to the AU-RTF. The CONOPS is also essential to codify the mission, area of operation, rules of engagement, tactics, logistics and supply plan, and overall strategy for the AU-RTF. Without it the AU-RTF simply does not function. 11

The failure to adopt a CONOPS is political. During consultations that led to the creation of the AU-RCI, the AU-RTF was conceived as a multi-national force that would have a unified command structure at AU-RTF headquarters in Yambio, South Sudan. 12 Once handed over to the AU-RTF, troops would be outside their national chains of command and accountable to AU-RTF leadership in Yambio, until they were formally returned to their national armies.

This vision for the AU-RTF papered over deep-seated distrust between the Ugandan and Congolese governments, and has not been codified in a CONOPS because it has proved politically untenable. Under this vision, troops under AU-RTF command would be able to access LRA affected areas of three countries with reported LRA presence; CAR, DRC and South Sudan. But the Congolese government will not allow access to DRC territory for Ugandan troops under the AU-RTF umbrella, citing reports of exploitation of natural resources by the Ugandan army (UPDF) and Ugandan support to rebel militias operating in the eastern Congo. 13 The DRC has not formally allowed access for any troops operating as part of the AU-RTF to its territory, and has not handed troops over to the AU-RTF. This political impasse has made, to date, the centralized command and control option politically untenable.

A second option has emerged over time and is being considered as a possible plan-b in diplomatic and policy circles. 14 Under this option, the AU-RTF would act in a robust coordination role, facilitating cooperation, collaboration, and information flow among national armies out of its headquarters. Each national army would operate against LRA elements in its own country (with a special exemption for Ugandan forces to operate in CAR and South Sudan), and would be supported by the AU-RTF leadership. Access to CAR for UPDF troops could be considered on a case-by-case basis. The role of the AU-RTF would be to enhance ongoing operations. This is closer to the de facto state of affairs on the ground now.

Without a clear vision for the force with the full political support of the regional governments, the AU-RTF is all form and no function. Resolving this will require the UN to encourage the AU urgently to adopt a CONOPS with the political support of all regional governments. Given the political tensions between the DRC and Uganda, this is likely to require the attention of the Security Council and the engagement of the Secretary General to supplement SRSG Moussa’s efforts. The AU-RTF may be most effective—and may only be politically plausible—in a robust coordination role backed by the full commitment of each state and allowing a special exception for UPDF access to CAR and South Sudan. But regardless of which vision is endorsed in the CONOPS, until this crucial issue is settled the AU-RTF will not be operational, and there will be no chance to address two related problems: the lack of troop capacity and the inability to access all LRA-affected areas.

The lack of troop capacity

All the troops provided to the AU-RTF lack capacity in some way. The troops provided to the AU-RTF by the armed forces of South Sudan and the Central African Republic lack the capacity to conduct effective operations against the LRA and protect civilians. The SPLA battalion in Nzara, South Sudan, reportedly lacks elemental supplies like rations and fuel for their vehicles, making it impossible for them to conduct the most basic operations. 15 The FACA contingent is, if anything, less adequately supplied than the SPLA troops. Both sets of troops lack basic military training needed to be an effective, professional fighting force in addition to critical mission-specific training. 16 The Ugandan force is much better trained and equipped, in part due to

11 The CONOPS was supposed to have been completed by 10 October 2012 but has not been adopted at the time of writing. There is reportedly a draft version of the CONOPS but it has not been approved by the AU-RCI’s Joint Coordination Mechanism, made up of the Ministers of Defense of CAR, DRC, South Sudan, and Uganda.

12 Phone interview with UN source, Addis Ababa, October 4, 2012.


14 This option has been discussed internally by the AU and western governments. Call with US diplomat, September 21, 2012.

15 Phone interviews with UN staff, October 11, 2012 and international consultant, 18 October 2012.

16 Interview with diplomat, Washington DC, October 12, 2012.
bilateral support of the US government. It is the most capable national army in the region by far. But even the UPDF forces are often without the logistical support and intelligence gathering capabilities needed to pursue the LRA in such a difficult operational environment.17

Furthermore, staff at AU-RTF headquarters based in Yambio, South Sudan, are stymied by a shortage of supplies and logistical support. Staff have extremely limited basic communications systems, and reportedly no means of secure communication.18 They lack basic transport capacity, including fuel for trucks, making it difficult for them to complete even the most basic tasks.19

Confusion over the structure and role of the AU-RTF is contributing to the continued low capacity of troops and command centers under the AU-RTF. The AU leadership expects each troop contributing country to equip and support its soldiers, while the governments expect the UN or the international community to provide for their troops. As a foreign diplomat said in the case of the SPLA contingent, “the South Sudanese said to [AU Envoy] Madeira, you can have 500 soldiers but they are your responsibility now.”20 AU Envoy Madeira has turned to the UN, asking UN missions to help with communication, logistics and movement, and beginning to plan, along with SRSG Moussa, a donor conference to raise funds.21 But UN support and a successful donor conference will not be possible without a needs assessment and clear vision for the AU-RTF as laid out in an authorized CONOPS.

The lack of access to all LRA-affected areas

The confusion around command and control of troops directly affects the access of the AU-RTF to all LRA affected areas. SRSG Moussa and AU Envoy Madeira have been unable to convince DRC officials to contribute to troops to the AU-RTF, or to allow AU-RTF soldiers into Congolese territory. Given the behavior of Ugandan troops in Congo during the late 1990s and early 2000s, and recent allegations of Ugandan support to the M23 rebel group in eastern Congo, the DRC government has legitimate reason to be concerned about allowing Ugandan troops to operate in DRC.22 But a clear CONOPS with the proper political support could assuage their concerns, either by endorsing a coordination role for the AU-RTF (rather than one of command and control) or by negotiating robust guarantees against abuses by the UPDF. As it stands, neither path is being pursued. This allows the DRC government to continue its preferred course of refusing to cooperate in any way with regional counter-LRA initiatives, blaming reported LRA attacks on isolated cases of banditry, and suggesting a basic police response is the best course of action. As a result, there are isolated pockets of DRC, beyond the reach of current MONUSCO patrols, where the LRA are, in effect, provided a safe-haven in which to operate.

Denying Safe Haven in Sudan

Though not explicitly referenced in the Strategy, its success will also depend on denying the LRA safe haven anywhere in the region. In addition to the risk of safe haven for the LRA in DRC as outlined above, credible reports from multiple sources indicate that the LRA has moved in and out of territory controlled by the Sudanese government since October 2009. LRA activity has been concentrated in the Kafia Kingi enclave, a disputed area on the border of Sudan and South Sudan that is claimed by both countries. LRA leader Joseph Kony’s personal bodyguard Otto Agweng is said to have led the first LRA mission to Kafia Kingi in October 2009, where they met with representatives from Sudan’s armed forces and discussed the possibility of Kony later using the territory as a safe haven. LRA defectors report that Kony himself was located near the town of Dafak within the enclave from October 2011 until at least early 2012, and that the LRA is receiving protection and material support from Sudanese military forces. Local traders and community members from border areas in both South Sudan and CAR have confirmed reports of the LRA’s presence in the Kafia Kingi enclave. None of the regional forces currently operating under the AU-RTF have permission to enter the Kafia Kingi enclave.

17 Enough Project, Chasing the Lord’s Resistance Army: Challenges Faced by Ugandan Soldiers Pursuing the LRA, November 2012.
18 NGO partner interview with AU-RTF commander in Yambio, October 2012.
19 Id.
20 Interview with diplomat, Washington DC, October 12, 2012.
21 Phone interview with AU diplomat, September 28, 2012.
In July, the UN Security Council included language in the new mandate of the United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) encouraging it to share information about LRA activity with regional UN missions. Sudan publicly denied any LRA presence in its territory and objected to LRA-focused language in the mandate. In October, AU Envoy Madeira traveled to Khartoum and discussed the allegations of LRA activity in Kafia Kingi with Sudanese officials and encouraged them to provide their support for regional counter-LRA initiatives. He has since publicly stated he “received a commitment they will collaborate” with the AU-RCI. However, no action whatsoever has yet been taken by the Sudanese government.

It is extremely difficult for UN offices to fulfill their role to support and assist the AU-RTF until these basic political issues are addressed. This is not an easy task. Strained relations between the Ugandan and Congolese governments, and an African Union distracted by competing crises in Mali and eastern Congo, mean the odds are long for success in operationalizing the AU-RTF. But having placed the AU initiative at the center of its own Strategy, the UN has a responsibility to take all necessary steps to ensure the AU supports its own initiative and regional governments break their impasse and collaborate effectively. Nothing short of clear direction from the UN Security Council and the direct engagement of the Secretary General will do.

b) Goal 2: Efforts to promote the protection of civilians are enhanced.

The protection of civilians should be at the core of all efforts to defeat the LRA. The Strategy rightly includes objectives to protect civilians both during military operations and as part of a humanitarian and development agenda. On each, progress has been inadequate. In particular, there has been little progress in training troops in the protection of civilians, ensuring information sharing across borders, expanding civilian early warning programs, and facilitating humanitarian access.

Much of the protection of civilians section of the Strategy focuses on the links to the AU-RTF. There, progress is understandably slowed by the failure of the AU-RTF to become operational. But this must not prevent the urgent implementation of those portions of the Strategy related to the protection of civilians that are directly within the UN’s control. Indeed, it makes the need for their implementation all the more apparent.

Inadequate training

The Strategy rightly recognizes that military forces conducting counter-LRA operations under the AU-RTF umbrella must ensure that civilians are protected, and must be properly trained. However, there has not been enough progress in this area. There is no formal pre-deployment training program for AU-RTF soldiers. Ugandan forces have reportedly received systematic training in child protection, including training on Standard Operating Procedures adopted by the Ugandan army when encountering children. However, troops from CAR operating under the AU-RTF have received only one training session on child protection and South Sudanese forces haven’t been trained on child protection at all. None of the troops provided to the AU-RTF have received broader training in international humanitarian law or human rights, as outlined in the Strategy. If and when the AU-RTF forces are equipped and able to conduct missions in the field, their lack of training will put the civilian population at risk.

Blocks on funding

The draft UN program document calls for US $2 million for training AU-RTF troops in international humanitarian law and child protection. This would be a good start. But the draft program document has not been developed sufficiently to approach potential donors to provide funding. Furthermore, as with the Strategy’s first goal, development of the CONOPS will be critical to paving the way for training and capacity building for troops necessary to protect civilians. Donors will be hesitant to provide funding to train troops without a CONOPS and a clear understanding of the mission with political support.

Weak information sharing across borders

The UN Regional Strategy identifies increased cooperation and information sharing between the AU-RTF and UN offices as a key objective. Such cooperation is important in many areas, including protection of civilians, DDR and humanitarian access. While the UN has tried to improve coordination internally by appointing focal points at field level and headquarters, and SRSG Moussa and AU Envoy Madeira maintain good lines of communications, there has been little information sharing between the AU-RTF and UN actors and humanitarian agencies. Below the most senior levels, information sharing between UN offices and the AU-RTF is infrequent, in part because the AU-RTF doesn’t have the basic communications equipment needed to send and receive secure messages. This is a missed

23 Email correspondence with AU Envoy Madeira, October 23, 2012.
24 Public statement of AU Envoy Madeira at LRA Global Summit, November 17, 2012.
26 Id.
27 Email correspondence with UN official, international
opportunity. UN actors should invite and urge the AU-RTF staff to participate in existing information sharing mechanisms like MONUSCO’s Joint Information and Operations Cell (JIOC) in Dungu, DRC. Furthermore, UNOCA should seek funding for secure communication systems for the AU-RTF headquarters to make information sharing possible and secure.

UNOCA could also encourage the AU-RTF staff to aggressively investigate and analyze reports of LRA activity, and help coordinate transport and logistical support from UN missions. Fact-finding investigations of reported LRA activity would have enormous value-added for relatively little cost, particularly in remote areas where national armies have little presence. In doing so, the AU-RTF staff could immediately begin to fill their intended role of facilitating intelligence and information sharing across borders.

The need to expand civilian early warning systems

Early warning systems have proven effective in helping to protect civilians. The Strategy makes clear that such systems should be expanded. There has been some progress since the Strategy was adopted. NGOs have expanded high frequency radio networks in Congo, with logistical assistance from MONUSCO. In CAR, USAID has independently pledged US $15 million over 3 years to implement a Secure, Empowered, Connected Communities program, intended to reduce communities’ isolation and vulnerability including through communications technology. But there is much more that the UN can and should do to promote early warning and protect civilians without waiting for the AU-RTF to become operational. The UN should design and prioritize programs that expand low cost HF radio, FM radio, and cellular infrastructure to LRA affected areas, and should aggressively seek donors for these programs. MONUSCO, UNMISS, and BINUCA should provide logistical and political support to NGOs seeking to establish these networks themselves, including by engaging national governments to reduce the barriers for local communities to utilize these technologies.

Facilitating humanitarian access

UN field missions can also do more to fulfill the Strategy’s objective to create the necessary conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance. Prior to adopting the Strategy, MONUSCO made great strides in carrying out Operation ‘Bienvenue a la paix’ in Haut Uele, in northeastern DRC, and also opened two new bases in Bas Uele at Ango and Buta, farther west towards the CAR border. While MONUSCO’s peacekeepers have been unable to stop LRA attacks, their presence has proven effective in protecting civilians and creating a secure environment in which humanitarian organizations can deliver assistance. The poor quality of roads, however, continues to hinder humanitarian access, and MONUSCO could play an expanded role in rehabilitating vital arteries for the provision of aid. There is a key gap in CAR where BINUCA, as a small political mission, does not have the logistical capacity to tackle road rehabilitation or provide security directly. But BINUCA can work with the CAR government to stress the need to provide security to enable humanitarian actors to reach LRA affected populations.

The UN must move urgently to implement those portions of the Strategy related to the protection of civilians that are independent of the AU-RTF and focused on early warning systems, community protection strategies, and infrastructure development.

c) Goal 3: Current DDRRR activities are expanded to cover all LRA affected areas.

The UN Regional Strategy’s third goal is to expand current disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration (DDRRR) programs. Under the Strategy, UN missions in the affected countries are to implement the Coordinated Approach on DDRRR of the LRA, in particular the establishment and support of assembly points where there are high levels of LRA movements. MONUSCO is tasked with providing technical support to BINUCA and UNMISS. UNICEF is to lead the development of SOPs for national armies in the region on the handover, repatriation, and reunification of children separated from the LRA, while BINUCA and UNMISS are tasked with developing procedures for the repatriation of adult LRA escapees from South Sudan and the CAR back to their countries of origin.

The UN Regional Strategy is right to emphasize DDRRR as a critical component of the overall effort to defeat the LRA. Effective DDRRR programs are a cost-effective means of weakening the LRA by persuading

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29  For example, taxes levied by the CAR government on HF radios can be prohibitively expensive, as high as several thousand dollars per radio per year. In CAR and DRC, taxes on mobile phone towers are extremely high, and a major impediment to expanded coverage. Email correspondence with Resolve, November 27, 2012.
30  Interview with Kathy Jones and Kwami Mawunyo Lavon, DPKO, New York, 16 October 2012.
31  MONUSCO has played some role in rehabilitating the East-West road from Faradje to Dungu and the Dungu airstrip. It has begun some work on the roads from Dungu to Duru, and from Faradje to Duru. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/factsheet_%20MONUSCO.pdf.
combatants to leave the bush voluntarily, and without risking the lives of abducted combatants or soldiers.

**The progress in establishing standard operating procedures**

The Strategy rightly seeks specific DDRRR standard operating procedures (SOPs) on the LRA to be developed by BINUCA, MONUSCO, and UNMISS in close consultation with national governments, and applied regionally. The German government, in collaboration with DPKO, has taken a step that could pave the way for significant progress on this objective. It funded a four-day meeting in November 2012 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, intended to develop LRA specific SOPs on DDRRR for all persons separated from the LRA. The meeting included UN missions, representatives from the AU, UNICEF, as well as regional governments and armed forces. The aim was to develop SOPs that are common to all stakeholders and enable actors in the region to work together to promote DDRRR.32 Though the impact of the meeting remains to be seen, this was a much needed step.

The Strategy also inherited some successes on which to build. UNICEF signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Ugandan army agreeing to SOPs regarding the handover and repatriation of children taken into UPDF custody in May of 2011. The SOPs are consistent with international best practices in child protection. Through regular coordination with the Ugandan army command in Kampala, UNICEF has trained Ugandan troops on the SOPs and child protection, including UPDF troops based in Obo, CAR,33 and provided soldiers with simple cards in English and Kiswahili reminding them of the required steps should they take a child separated from the LRA into custody.34 In addition, MONUSCO has previously developed innovative and effective SOPs on DDRRR of adults in foreign armed groups, including the LRA. Because UNMISS, BINUCA, and regional armies are all without SOPs on DDRRR for former LRA combatants, it is critical that all stakeholders build on the progress made in the Addis Ababa meeting and agree and adopt SOPs on DDRRR to fill this gap.

However, there are five key areas essential to the third goal of the Strategy where not enough progress has been made.

**The lack of radio coverage**

First, UN agencies have not made sufficient progress in designing and supporting programs to expand FM radio coverage. FM radio is the most efficient way to reach isolated LRA cells with ‘come home’ messages that have proven enormously effective – and cost effective – in persuading LRA to defect. MONUSCO has played a pivotal role in supporting radio stations in Congo, but FM coverage with ‘come home’ messages is incredibly limited in CAR and, in total, covers only approximately 30% of LRA affected areas.35 Acting on the release of the Strategy, the German government has made plans to support expanded FM coverage and messaging, with a specific program to be developed at the meeting in Addis Ababa.36 However, the UN has not designed fundable projects to expand FM infrastructure.

**Revoking amnesty**

Second, there has been no progress on the difficult but critical issue of treatment of LRA escapees with respect to amnesty provisions and potential criminal prosecution. The UN Regional Strategy tasks relevant UN actors with “encourage[ing] the AU to work with affected Governments to identify a common policy for treatment of LRA escapees and non-indicted LRA ex-combatants who escape or surrender, particularly with respect to amnesty provisions and potential criminal prosecution.”37 A clear legal framework that allows for amnesty for rank and file LRA, in line with international best practices and human rights law, is an essential building block of effective DDRRR. Without clear, transparent law and policy on the process of demobilization and reintegration into society, LRA combatants fear prosecution and are less likely to defect.

In a significant setback in May of 2012, Uganda’s Minister of Internal Affairs declared the Amnesty Act to have lapsed. Local civil society organizations organized to condemn the decision38 but it has not been

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32 Telephone interview with German diplomat, November 13, 2012.
34 Email correspondence with AU official, November 9, 2012.
35 Resolve and Invisible Children calculations based on research on the ground, November 28, 2012. The total LRA-affected areas are calculated as 230,893 square kilometers. Total possible radio coverage is calculated as 69,414 square kilometers, or some 30% of the total LRA-affected area. It is worth noting that most stations tend to broadcast no more than 10 hours of DDRRR programming per week, and some much less.
36 Telephone interview with German Diplomat, November 13, 2012.
37 UN Regional Strategy Objective 3.3.
38 Communiqué of Traditional and Religious Leaders, Civil Society and other Organisations Concerning The decision of the Minister of Internal Affairs of Uganda to declare, on 23rd May, 2012, the lapse of the amnesty provisions of the Amnesty Act of Uganda (The Amnesty Act (Declaration of Lapse of the Operation of Part II) Instrument, 2012), June 12, 2012.

http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/Communique%27%20on%20Amnesty%20Act-June%202012.pdf
reversed. The AU has not raised this issue with regional governments, and none of the sources interviewed for this paper indicated that UN actors are urging the AU or regional governments to prioritize a common policy for treatment of LRA escapees. This is a significant missed opportunity.

The lack of assembly points

Third, there has not been sufficient progress in establishing and resourcing assembly points to receive LRA combatants who have escaped and are attempting to defect. In the DRC, MONUSCO began a project in January of 2012, prior to adoption of the Strategy, to create a series of secure assembly points in DRC.39 This initiative is to be applauded, but the assembly points have not been sufficiently resourced to be effective. MONUSCO assembly points are in remote areas, and patrols to the assembly points are not frequent enough to ensure safe deflection. Furthermore, UNMISS and BINUCA have not been active enough in supporting safe deflection in South Sudan and CAR respectively. Both are aware of and participate, to some degree, in “safe reporting sites” established by US military advisors in collaboration with national militaries and local community leaders. However, UNMISS and BINUCA should do more to support the development of these assembly points and to ensure they are sustained, including by supporting community-led efforts to sensitize people to the need to receive defectors peacefully.

Failures to adhere to agreed procedures for repatriation

Fourth, UNICEF, UN missions on the ground, and UNOCA must do more to ensure that repatriation, in particular by the Ugandan army, follows SOPs, where adopted, and is in line with international standards in all cases. MONUSCO repatriates all Congolese adults that surrender outside of Congo as well as Ugandan adults who surrender in Congo. UNICEF, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and non-governmental organizations such as Save the Children and Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI) repatriate children. There have been, however, reported cases of former combatants who surrendered to the Ugandan army, including children, who were not handed over to UN or aid workers but instead used as scouts by the Ugandan soldiers.40 Ugandan army officials have previously stated that it is difficult to hand over former combatants to UN or aid workers when former combatants surrender in remote locations with no international presence. However, in some cases, the Ugandan army reportedly transports defectors to Uganda themselves, and does not hand over former combatants, children or adults, to the UN or designated NGOs. UNICEF, the relevant UN mission, and UNOCA should raise any reported abuses directly with the UPDF.

The lack of resources for BINUCA DDRRR staff

Finally, the staff of the UN’s political mission in CAR tasked with DDRRR has not been supported with sufficient resources. BINUCA has long been the weakest link in the regional DDRRR process. Before the summer of 2012, it did not have DDRRR officers in LRA-affected areas. Though two DDRRR officers supported by the World Bank are now stationed in Obo, CAR, their work has been hindered significantly by a lack of office space, communication devices, and electricity.41 They have been unable to work with any regularity outside of Obo, as they have not been provided the resources to travel to other LRA-affected areas where DDRRR sensitization and support is greatly needed.42 Given that many LRA fighters are still in CAR, it is imperative that the new DDRRR officers are provided with the means necessary to work effectively.

d) Goal 4: A coordinated humanitarian and child protection response is promoted in all LRA affected areas.

In June of 2012, just as the UN Regional Strategy was being adopted, OCHA compiled a regional analysis of the humanitarian needs and priorities in LRA affected communities.43 The report concluded that humanitarian aid in LRA affected areas remains inadequate due to insecurity and poor infrastructure. A lack of funding for programs has forced some NGOs to leave the LRA affected areas and there is a perception among some humanitarian actors that the UN Regional Strategy, in the words of one aid worker, “tended to treat the humanitarian aspect as an afterthought.”44 As of June 2012 the consolidated humanitarian appeals for DRC and CAR, a critical source of humanitarian assistance to LRA affected areas, remained underfunded, at 35% and 42% respectively of total requirements.45 It is unclear how the UN intends to find funds to increase aid in these areas and if discussions to improve aid delivery are taking place.

41 Phone interviews with BINUCA staff, 11 and 21 October 2012.
42 Id.
43 Available at http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/humanitarian-action-lra-affected-areas-regional-overview-needs-and
44 Phone interview with aid worker, October 21, 2012
45 Id.
The Strategy’s activities under the humanitarian goal must be aggressively implemented if it is to overcome these inherent barriers, and meet the significant humanitarian needs of LRA affected populations. But little progress has been made.

One of the projects LRA focal points, in collaboration with UNOCA, have prioritized for development includes an estimated budget of $9 million to “provide humanitarian assistance including food, support and enhanced Protection Monitoring to the most vulnerable groups, particularly children, women, refugees, IDPs and people with special needs.” While the funds would be welcome, this is a recycling of existing appeals, and does not represent new funds or programs being sought specifically for LRA affected populations under the Strategy.

A second proposal under development by DPA aims to promote civil-military coordination between humanitarian actors and the AU-RTF, including by creating a regional operational focal point. Improved information sharing between civilian and military actors is critical. However, the project does not outline any significant new activities, nor clarify how civilian-military information sharing would be improved. It seems to rely on supporting the existing coordination mechanisms, such as Protection Clusters and Monitoring Working groups. At $1 million, the proposed cost is high for such modest activities. Vigorous leadership from OCHA to ensure existing mechanisms work is likely to be as effective.

e) Goal 5: Peacebuilding, human rights, rule of law and long-term development support is provided to LRA-affected governments to enable them to establish authority across their territory.

The UN is intended to support regional governments to develop peacebuilding and recovery frameworks that specifically address LRA-affected areas, with particular attention to gender and human rights issues. UN actors and international partners are to play a role in supporting LRA-affected countries in improving infrastructure and encouraging economic activity.

Due to the enormity of some of the tasks, the activities under this strategic goal are perhaps the most neglected. Planning must begin to implement two priority activities. First, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) should carry out the regional needs assessment and a best practice study on human rights abuses in the LRA-affected areas as a foundation to develop a comprehensive regional plan to support human rights in those areas. There is no reported progress on this activity. It is an essential first step to long-term efforts to establish the rule of law and human rights in LRA-affected areas.

Second, much more must be done to fulfill the objective of supporting LRA-affected countries in improving infrastructure. In particular, better roads, bridges and airfields in LRA-affected areas will improve accessibility and encourage economic activity. LRA focal points and UNOCA have discussed rehabilitation of the vital Obo-Bambouti road, in southeastern CAR. However, proper assessment and planning has not yet been done, and there is no credible budget for the project. UNOCA needs to partner with an appropriate development organization to carry out a clear and concise assessment of the cost and implementation process of rehabilitating the Obo-Bambouti axis. Furthermore, more ambitious planning and assessment must be done to determine which roads will provide the greatest return on investment for LRA-affected populations in terms of promoting economic development and facilitating the protection of civilians and humanitarian assistance. The road from Obo to Djema, also in southeastern CAR, is a likely candidate. UNOCA should prioritize and coordinate the development of fundable projects for the rehabilitation and construction of top priority roads. In addition to seeking funds from donor states, UNOCA should approach MONUSCO, UNMISS, and senior DPKO officials to determine which roads might be rehabilitated within existing mission resources. Additionally, UNOCA should consider joint ventures with the World Bank to secure funds for road infrastructure projects in CAR and South Sudan.

Planning for programs aimed at sustainable long-term peacebuilding can and should begin immediately. UN agencies should implement programs within their existing capacities wherever possible. A list of steps that require no additional funding was compiled at the meeting in Entebbe. Many of its recommendations are related to UN-wide planning mechanisms, and should be begun now: incorporating LRA affected areas into country-specific United Nations frameworks such as United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks, Integrated Strategic Frameworks, the Peacebuilding Support Plan and appointing lead Focal Points for each agency including OHCHR. In addition, SRSG Moussa should lobby regional government to establish LRA focal points in order to improve communications, exchange of information and to form a

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46 Project 2, Humanitarian Assistance to Civilians in LRA affected areas, Draft.
47 Project 3, Coordinated humanitarian protection and assistance, Draft.
48 There are reportedly plans within the UN to organize workshops to train civil society members to report on LRA crimes. While this is a welcome, it is not a significant step towards a comprehensive regional plan to support human rights.
49 A budget of $3-5 million is contemplated in draft documents, without providing any further breakdown.
50 No cost immediate LRA activities, Draft.
unified approach in dealing with the LRA between the UN, AU and the countries involved. These steps are cost effective, will facilitate vital long-term investment needed to ensure a sustainable peace, and should be fully implemented immediately.

Since January 2011, and predating the Strategy, the UN has been implementing a long-term peacebuilding project in Uganda involving eight different UN agencies and funded by the Peacebuilding Fund. The program, carried out in conjunction with the Ugandan government, focuses on the areas of Justice and Human Rights, Social Protection, Livelihoods and Economic Recovery. The UN is currently developing a follow up program on peacebuilding to support the Ugandan government’s Peace Recovery and Development Plan for northern Uganda that covers LRA-affected areas. Once developed and if funded, the new program will address education, access to justice (including land issues and transitional justice), livelihoods and reintegration of LRA-returnees. However, no such peacebuilding plans exist for the countries most affected by LRA violence now: CAR, DRC and South Sudan. Planning for comprehensive peace-building plans such as that in Uganda should begin now for areas currently affected by the LRA.

4. CONCLUSION

The UN’s Strategy to tackle the consequences inflicted on hundreds and thousands of people by the Lord’s Resistance Army is the result of decisive action by the Security Council, effective leadership from the Secretary General, a growing partnership with the African Union, determined campaigning from NGOs, and an initial commitment from the regional governments. A great deal has been invested in getting the right strategy on paper, and providing a chance to finally resolve one of the world’s most protracted and complex crises. The UN must seize this opportunity.

For the Strategy’s ambitious goals to be achieved, the efforts of SRSG Moussa must be augmented by renewed and direct engagement by the Security Council and the Secretary General. The political issues that risk derailing the AU-RCI, and by extension the UN Regional Strategy, go to the heart of relations between DRC and Uganda, and to the failure of regional governments to prioritize the LRA conflict. The technical challenges in coordinating a response across five countries, three peacekeeping missions, a political mission, and a dizzying array of UN agencies and NGOs are significant. It will take the determined engagement of the Security Council and a clear message from the Secretary General of continued priority if these barriers are to be overcome.

What’s at stake is not only the 440,000 currently displaced by the LRA, the thousands more living in limbo under constant fear of LRA attacks and abductions, or the memories of tens of thousands murdered. It is also the credibility of UN-AU collaboration to resolve and prevent myriad conflicts to come. The UN must ensure that the commitments already made in tandem with the AU are credibly and fully implemented. It must fulfill the promise of the UN’s Regional Strategy, of an end to the conflict and preventative action that will extend state authority and empower a devastated population.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the UN Security Council

1) The UN Security Council should urge regional governments to fulfill their commitments under the AU-RCI and request the Secretary General convene the heads of state from the regionally affected governments to promote regional cooperation in counter-LRA initiatives.

2) The UN Security Council should urge regional governments, including Sudan and Chad, to fulfill their responsibility to protect civilians by taking all steps necessary within each of their own territories to deny the LRA safe haven, including robust investigation of reported LRA presence or attacks, and to ensure counter-LRA forces are able to reach all LRA combatants.

To the UN Secretary General

3) The UN Secretary General should work with the Chairperson of the AU Commission to convene a meeting with the heads of state of the regionally affected governments and forge a political path for the full operationalization of the AU-RCI. The meeting should seek a common vision for the AU-RTF with political support from all affected governments that ensures sufficient cross-border cooperation to deny LRA forces safe haven.

4) The Secretary General should publicly affirm his determination to see the UN Regional Strategy on the LRA implemented in full.

To UN departments, agencies, and offices

5) UNOCA and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), together with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and UN LRA focal points should urgently finalize planning documents for projects that can be funded by donors to implement

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51 See http://www.unpbf.org/countries/uganda/
priority activities of the UN Regional Strategy. Examples of such priority activities include:

- expanding early warning systems;
- expanding FM radio coverage;
- disseminating ‘come home’ messaging in close collaboration with NGOs to promote LRA defections; and
- rehabilitating critical roads and bridges.

6) SRSG Moussa should move urgently to raise funds for priority projects by convening a high-level donor conference.

7) UNOCA should oversee the design of projects that provide the AU-RTF with the capacity to investigate LRA-attacks and facilitate the exchange of information on LRA-related activities among UN actors, regional armies and other partners (including U.S.-initiated Counter-LRA Operation Fusion Centers and MONUSCO’s Joint Information and Operations Cell (JIOC)).

8) Appropriate UN offices and agencies including UNOCA, the UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU), DPKO, and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) should work with the relevant AU offices and regional government officials to help the AU finalize its document on “Common Measures on the Treatment of LRA Combatants and Assistance of Victims of the LRA.” They should also ensure that the document includes specific standard operating procedures (SOPs) for the handover, repatriation and reunification of children and women who leave the LRA. The SOPs developed by UNICEF and currently used by the Ugandan army should form the basis for this document. The AU should be encouraged to emulate UNICEF’s model of appointing focal points and a coordinator to monitor these practices in LRA affected areas.

9) DPKO should work with the UN missions in DRC (MONUSCO), the Central African Republic (BINUCA) and South Sudan (UNMISS), to finalize the standard operating procedures for UN support to the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of LRA combatants and abductedees across the affected region.

10) MONUSCO, BINUCA and UNMISS, with support from DPKO, affected governments and other relevant international partners should expand work to establish and publicize ‘safe reporting sites’ along the CAR-DRC, CAR-South Sudan, CAR-Sudan, and DRC-South Sudan borders, where the LRA can safely surrender.

11) The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) should work with relevant UN actors to undertake a regional needs assessment and best practices study on human rights in the LRA-affected areas and to develop a comprehensive regional plan to support human rights in those areas.

12) UNOCA in cooperation with DPA staff should convene a meeting of headquarters and field-based LRA focal points to review implementation of the UN Regional Strategy, identify next steps to address remaining gaps, and improve cross-border coordination.
### ANNEX A – UN LRA STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION CHART

#### GOAL 1: THE AFRICAN UNION-LED REGIONAL COOPERATION INITIATIVE AGAINST THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY IS FULLY OPERATIONAL AND IMPLEMENTED

**1.1: Adequate resources are mobilized to ensure the full operationalization of the AU-RCI LRA**

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<td>Relevant United Nations actors encourage the LRA-affected countries to provide the 5,000 troops to the AU-RTF as soon as possible.</td>
<td>Some progress. Close to 3000 troops are reportedly deployed as part of the AU-RTF. The Ugandan (UPDF) contingent of 2,000 soldiers already in the field of operations as part of the on-going military operations makes up the bulk of the force. An additional force of 500 South Sudanese (SPLA) soldiers is also in situ, deployed in Nzara in Western Equatoria, and was officially handed over to the AU-RTF in Sept. 2012. Unclear how many Central African Republic (FACA) troops have been provided. 360 were initially provided to the AU-RTF but, following an LRA attack on FACA troops on Sept 10, it is reported that only 90 soldiers have remained part of the force. They are deployed in Obo, CAR. No Congolese (FARDC) forces whatsoever have been provided to the AU-RTF. As of November 30, 2012, there was no accepted concept of operations including command and control structures for the AU-RTF, though one has reportedly been drafted.</td>
<td>UNOAU and UNOCO SRSG Moussa and Ambassador Madeira conducted meetings in various capital cities to seek support for the AU-RTF.</td>
<td>Without a concept of operations for the 5,000 troops, their handover to the AU-RTF makes little contribution to efforts to track the LRA and protect civilians. No Congolese troops available to AU-RTF despite visits to Kinshasa from Moussa, Madeira and AU-RTF commanders. Lack of clarity on number of soldiers. Uganda claims 2000 but possibly fewer troops while the CAR government promised 500 troops, only 90 are available so far. The South Sudanese have provided about 500 troops, but they are essentially inactive.</td>
<td>The AU concept of operations was not finalized (by 15 November 2012). Once it is available UN offices could provide support for the operation within existing resources, help with resource mobilization, and encourage countries to provide all the troops needed. Existing AU-RTF troops can work to coordinate more closely with UNMISS and MONUSCO</td>
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Relevant United Nations actors support the AU in identifying the gaps and financial resources required to ensure that the 5,000 troops are adequately equipped, including with regard to air capabilities, communications, office and living accommodation, medical support, and fuel and rations, as soon as possible, and no later than December 2012.

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<td>Minimal progress. After a Technical Assessment Mission carried out early in 2012, UN military advisers have participated in identifying key gaps and needs. It is possible that the needs requirements should be covered in a concept of operations the AU reportedly has in the works.</td>
<td>UNOAU with support from BINUC, MONUSCO, UNMISS and DFS for the AU-RTF Headquarters and the secretariat of the JCM including Madeira’s office.</td>
<td>AU-RTF troops, particularly the FACA and SPLA contingents, lack basic food and armament supplies and mobility capacity.</td>
<td>The AU-RTF will risk losing its EU funding for headquarters at the end of 2012 if the AU does not request continued EU funding and move quickly to finalize the Concept of Operations and operationalize the AU-RTF.</td>
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<td>AU has asked for UN support to AU-RTF, status of that request is still pending.</td>
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<td>There are plans in the making for a donor conference to secure funds for AU and UN programs but they are only in preliminary stages. Originally planned for November, there is now no fixed date but only the possibility of a conference sometime in the first quarter of 2013. A concept of operations, needs assessment, and a budget would all have to be completed for an effective conference.</td>
<td>Additional funding requirements to be determined on the basis of the AU TAM report</td>
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### Actions

**Relevant United Nations actors encourage international partners to provide additional training to the 5,000 troops where necessary.**

- Minimal progress. UNICEF has conducted training on SOPs on child protection and handover procedures with UPDF troops, now part of AU-RTF.

  Specific SOPs on extraction and repatriation of LRA and on information-sharing processes between regional UN missions and AU are currently being developed by MONUSCO. Should be regional in scope, but suggestions by those who have seen drafts indicate they are very focused on the DRC. It remains to be seen how this can be “regionalised.”

  DPA has begun initial planning for a $2 million program to cover training for AU-RTF troops specifically on international humanitarian law and Child Protection, but planning is in very early stages.

  No other training as UN agencies are waiting for the AU to identify training needs and include as part of the Concept of Operations, which has yet to be adopted.

**Relevant United Nations actors organise regular meetings with the AU and international partners to mobilize financial resources with international partners to ensure the full operationalization of the initiative.**

- Minimal progress. One meeting took place in Entebbe (25-27 July 2012) with international partners and UN workers. However, there have been no meetings to date presenting fundable projects designed to operationalize the AU-RTF to possible donors. There was discussion of a donor conference for November 2012, but now the earliest possible date will be the first quarter of 2013.

### Progress Report

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<td>UNOAU with support from BINUCA, MONUSCO, UNMISS, DPKO, OCHA, OHCHR, UNDP, UNICEF and UNHCR</td>
<td>UN agencies are waiting for the AU to identify its own training needs. This approach is too passive. The $2 million project on international humanitarian law and child protection is not sufficiently developed to be proposed to donors, and no outreach to donors has yet been done. Unclear where the funds would come from or what forum will be created to pursue funding.</td>
<td>DPA suggested a needs assessment was to be undertaken as a priority to determine type of training necessary and timelines. It also recommended that DPKO’s Integrated Training Services be considered in providing training.</td>
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<td>UNOAU and UNOCA with support from BINUCA, MONUSCO, UNMISS, DPKO, OCHA, OHCHR, UNDP, UNICEF and UNHCR</td>
<td>Without a concept of operations and a needs assessment, funding will not be possible. Furthermore, there are limited resources and financial assistance for counter LRA initiatives has not been made a top political priority given competing needs in Mali, Somalia, and eastern DRC.</td>
<td>SRSG Moussa and Special Envoy Madeira reportedly planning a donor conference for early 2013 but the date has not been fixed.</td>
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**Objective 1.2: All aspects of the AU-RCI LRA implementation are fully coordinated at the political level**

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<td>Relevant United Nations actors encourage the AU Joint Coordination Mechanism to meet at least once every six months to decide on policy and strategy matters related to the AU-RTF.</td>
<td>No progress. The JCM has not met since the strategy was adopted in June 2012.</td>
<td>UNOAU and UNOCA with support from BINUCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS.</td>
<td>Concern that the JCM is not meeting and fulfilling its role to provide dynamic leadership in reaching agreement on a concept of operations, command and control of the AU-RTF, hot pursuit, etc.</td>
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<td>The United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Central Africa and Head of UNOCA (SRSG), in collaboration with the AU Special Envoy on the LRA, continues to identify opportunities to enhance the capabilities of the AU-RTF troops and to engage the Governments of the affected countries to build consensus on a unified approach to the LRA issue.</td>
<td>Minimal progress. In terms of capabilities, AU-RTF troops from SPLA and FACA lack basic training and supplies. The UPDF are the only troops capable of effective offensive operations, but often lack adequate logistical support. Despite close collaboration between SRSG Moussa and Special Envoy Madeira, no comprehensive needs assessment for AU-RTF troops has been undertaken.</td>
<td>UNOCA with support from BINUCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS, OCHA, OHCHR, UNDP, UNHCHR and UNICEF</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ugandan troops, now under the AU-RTF, are not permitted to enter Congolese territory, as well as parts of northeastern and south-central Central African Republic. With recent allegations of Ugandan support to M23 in Congo the task is politically very difficult.</td>
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<td>Further, there has been minimal progress in building a unified approach to the LRA. The DRC government refuses to acknowledge significant LRA presence in the DRC, attributing the violence to bandits and calling for a police response, rather than a military and humanitarian response.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>FACA logistically unable to pursue LRA in the bush. Beyond the logistical difficulties, senior diplomats from multiple governments and field staff on the ground report doubts over the FACA troops determination to pursue the LRA.</td>
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<td>The regional armies lack the requisite real-time intelligence to monitor the movements and activities of the LRA in order to effectively arrest the group’s senior leaders and protect civilians.</td>
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<td>SPLA troops are also logistically unable to pursue the LRA and protect civilians.</td>
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<tr>
<td>No comprehensive needs assessment for AU-RTF troops has been undertaken.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The regional armies lack the requisite real-time intelligence to monitor the movements and activities of the LRA in order to effectively arrest the group’s senior leaders and protect civilians.</td>
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The SRSG for Central Africa and Head of UNOCA, in collaboration with the AU Special Envoy on the LRA, engages the troop contributing countries at the highest political level on a regular basis on issues of common interest, including those related to information gathering and exchange.

Some progress. SRSG Moussa and AU Envoy Madeira travel regularly to countries in the region to lobby for further support to the AU-RTF, including by participating in International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) meetings.

However, so far there is little information exchange between UN missions, AU-RTF headquarters and national armies, in part due to lack of communication capacity in AU-RTF headquarters.

UNOCA to lead with the support from BINUCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS

Sharing of information on LRA remains a significant obstacle to anti LRA strategy.

The SRSG for Central Africa and Head of UNOCA, in collaboration with the AU Special Envoy on the LRA, engages the United Nations presences in the LRA-affected countries on a regular basis to discuss issues of common interest regarding the LRA, including issues related to coordination between the United Nations presences and the AU-RTF.

Significant progress. SRSG Moussa has frequently travelled with Ambassador Madeira to meet with UN presences in LRA-affected countries. SRSG Moussa and DPA host regular meetings of the Interagency Task Force (ITF) on the LRA, with participation of the UN missions by video link. These take place at least monthly. UN focal points on the LRA at the field and headquarters level already exist, and are part of a network led by UNOCA and DPA.

Furthermore, the SRSG and AU Envoy have travelled to national capitals to engage directly with national governments to discuss issues of coordination between the UN presences and national governments including troops under the AU-RTF umbrella.

UNOCA to lead with the support from BINUCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS

Relevant United Nations actors encourage the AU to develop a communication strategy on the AU RCI-LRA as soon as possible and by no later than December 2012.

No progress. No formal communication strategy as of 15 November 2012.

UNOAU and UNOCA with support DPI, BINUCA, MONUSCO UNMISS, OCHA, OHCHR, UNDP, UNHCHR and UNICEF
Objective 1.3: Policies that encourage defections amongst the LRA fighters are in place.

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<td>Relevant United Nations actors, in close collaboration with the AU, encourage the LRA-affected countries to put in place policies or provisions that promote defections, for example through the establishment of comprehensive DDRRR programmes and possible enactment of amnesty laws in line with international standards, to cover LRA elements with the exception of those responsible for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or gross violations of human rights. Children should be excluded from any criminal responsibility for crimes committed while associated with the LRA because of the forced nature of their recruitment.</td>
<td>No progress. Uganda’s amnesty act expired this May, and there are no LRA specific legal frameworks in any other country. No evidence suggests UNOAU, UNOCA, or other UN bodies have engaged LRA-affected countries on this issue.</td>
<td>UNOAU and UNOCA to lead with the support from BINUCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS as well as OCHA, OHCHR, UNDP and UNICEF</td>
<td>Uganda allowed its Amnesty Act to expire in May of 2012 which has raised concerns over treatment of defectors and might put in jeopardy the on-going DDRRR campaign.</td>
<td>DPKO were unable to provide any details on SOPs, or concrete plans to see them finalized and implemented. It is unclear whether the SOPs are ready and at which level. It is only through unconfirmed reports that we are able to present this information.</td>
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UNICEF has already agreed SOPs on child protection with UPDF as of May 2011. UNICEF teams are working to train other armies involved on a similar model. However, these UN projects do not address the underlying problem of legal frameworks in affected governments that discourage defection.
Relevant United Nations actors, in close collaboration with the AU, encourage LRA-affected countries to ensure a common approach with respect to a legal framework on issues related to the treatment of defectors and abductees that have escaped from the LRA.

Minimal progress. Treatment of defectors and abductees continues to be country specific. There has been some minimal progress in providing a forum at which these issues might be discussed, namely a DDRRR SOP meeting sponsored by the German government in coordination with DPKO scheduled for late November. However, there is no actual progress in creating common legal frameworks so far.

UNOAU and UNOCA with support from BINUCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS as well as OCHA, OHCHR, UNDP and UNICEF

**Objective 1.4: An effective outreach programme is put in place to raise awareness about the AU RCI-LRA.**

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<td>Relevant United Nations actors, in collaboration with the AU, develop an advocacy strategy, complementary to the communication strategy, as soon as possible and no later than December 2012, to create awareness of initiatives against the LRA, promote defections and mobilise support among other countries and actors.</td>
<td>No progress. UNOCA with support from DPI, BINUCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS, OCHA, OHCHR, UNDP, UNICEF and UNHCR</td>
<td>OCHA also releases quarterly updates on LRA activity in the region.</td>
<td>UN actors could partner with active civil society networks including the Regional Civil Society Task Force to raise awareness of counter-LRA initiatives among the population and support advocacy activities.</td>
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## GOAL 2: EFFORTS TO PROMOTE THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS ARE ENHANCED

Objective 2.1: The risk of harm to civilian populations is minimized during military operations to combat the LRA threat.

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<tr>
<td>Relevant United Nations actors encourage the AU-RTF troops and other military actors to prioritise the protection of civilians and uphold international humanitarian law as they engage in operations to track and capture LRA combatants</td>
<td>Minimal progress. No structures to encourage troops to prioritise POC or uphold IHL have been put in place. No training so far due to lack of finalization of concept of operations from AU. LRA focal points did identify need for training on IHL and Child Protection in its project document out of the July meeting in Entebbe, and the need for at least $2 million to cover training to AU-RTF.</td>
<td>UNOCA and UNOAU with support from BINUCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS as well as OCHA, OHCHR, UNDP, and UNHCR</td>
<td>Some AU-RTF troops have already been trained by the US. This applies to the UPDF, SPLA (a battalion trained by Ethiopian troops paid for by the US) and some FACA trained by the US Special Forces in Obo.</td>
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| Relevant United Nations actors, in collaboration with other humanitarian actors, support the development of the AU Strategic Framework for the Protection of Civilians in LRA-affected areas. | No progress. Proposals to merge or learn from UNICEF SOPs but not such action undertaken yet. | UNOAU and OCHA to lead with support from DPKO | |

<p>| Relevant United Nations actors encourage the AU-RTF troops to conduct operations in a manner that minimizes the risk of harm to civilian populations in the affected areas. This includes the application of standard operating procedures regarding the treatment, repatriation and reintegration of defectors, abductees and others released from the LRA. | Minimal progress. There is some progress on DDRRR SOPs but no concrete evidence from DPKO that SOPs will be ready imminently. The meeting in Addis Ababa funded by the German government to develop SOPs on DDRRR is a good step, but must be adopted by AU-RTF troops in their national capacities to be considered significant progress. | BINUCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS to lead with the support from UNOAU, OCHA, UNOCA, UNICEF and CAAC | |</p>
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<td><strong>Relevant United Nations actors conduct regular assessments of the military response to the LRA with a view to ensuring that it is in compliance with international standards in line with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy.</strong></td>
<td>No progress. No assessments so far.</td>
<td>DPKO</td>
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<td><strong>Relevant United Nations actors support the AU pre-deployment programmes to ensure that troops are trained on international humanitarian law, human rights and child protection and that refresher courses and in-theatre training on these issues are provided to AU-RTF troops at least once within a six-month period.</strong></td>
<td>Minimal Progress. No formal training provided yet. UNICEF has provided training on child protection to UPDF and informally to FARDC and SPLA but these initiatives pre-date the adoption of the strategy. Critically, there is no formal AU-RTF pre-deployment programme established and, as a result, no obvious forum for pre-deployment training to the AU-RTF.</td>
<td>OHCHR, UNICEF and CAAC to lead with the support from BINUCA, MONUSCO, UNMISS, UNOAU and UNOCA</td>
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<td><strong>United Nations inter-agency country-specific security risk management strategies and practices are developed to improve access to populations in LRA-affected areas, taking into account the need for an operating environment more conducive to principled humanitarian operations.</strong></td>
<td>No progress.</td>
<td>UNDP, BINUCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS to lead</td>
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### Objective 2.2: Coordination among humanitarian, development, gender, child protection, peacekeeping and military actors is enhanced

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<td><strong>Relevant United Nations actors establish mechanisms for coordination and information exchange between the AU RCI-LRA and the humanitarian actors in the field.</strong></td>
<td>Minimal Progress. SRSG Moussa and Ambassador Madeira meet frequently and AU-RTF officials interact with humanitarian actors in South Sudan. However, it does not appear that there is any coordination between AU-RCI and LRA humanitarian actors, in part because the AU-RTF is only minimally operational. BINUCA and MONUSCO have had LRA focal points for some time, and UNICEF has designated a point person at headquarters level.</td>
<td>BINUCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS to lead with the support from OCHA, OHCHR, UNHCR, UNOAU and UNOCA</td>
<td>AU-RTF officers stationed in Yambio, South Sudan, do not have the vehicles and logistical support required to travel to gather intelligence and brief humanitarian actors and other partners.</td>
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<td><strong>BINUCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS continue their operations in LRA-affected areas within the constraints of existing resources to create the necessary conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance.</strong></td>
<td>Some progress. MONUSCO bases in Bas Uele, Buta and Ango (though all predate strategy) are critical in facilitating humanitarian access. UN and ECHO flights to Obo, CAR, bring food and supplies to IDP and refugee camps though they are infrequent. BINUCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS to lead with the support from OCHA</td>
<td></td>
<td>AU-RTF officers stationed in Yambio, South Sudan, do not have the vehicles and logistical support required to travel to gather intelligence and brief humanitarian actors and other partners.</td>
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<td><strong>Relevant United Nations actors strengthen their cooperation with the AU-RTF on the protection of civilians in LRA-affected areas.</strong></td>
<td>No progress. AU-RTF only minimally operational. BINUCA, MONUSCO, UNMISS and OCHA to lead with the support from UNICEF and OHCHR</td>
<td>MONUSCO has no AU-RTF partner with which to cooperate. No FARDC troops under AU-RTF umbrella and no UPDF access to the DRC.</td>
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<td><strong>The United Nations LRA Focal Points, including United Nations child protection focal points and focal points for Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV), take part in strategic decision-making and planning exercises related to the LRA.</strong></td>
<td>Ongoing. Takes place through Interagency Task Force. BINUCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS to lead with the support from CAAC, OCHA, OHCHR, UNDP, UNICEF</td>
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Relevant United Nations actors develop and share a list of DDRRR areas of interest [and questions] with child protection actors for incorporation, in accordance with the principles of the cross border operational plan between child protection actors in the CAR, the DRC, South Sudan and Uganda, within their interview processes for children escaping from or being rescued from the LRA.

Relevant United Nations actors, in collaboration with international partners and non-governmental organizations, continue to support programmes to establish early warning systems to ensure the protection of civilians.

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<td>Some progress. So far only implemented fully in DRC, though there is a DDRRR working group in Yambio, South Sudan, that AU-RTF officers participate in. Unclear if any action has been taken on this in CAR.</td>
<td>BINUCA, MONUSCO and UN-MISS to lead with the support from CAAC, OHCHR, UNDP and UNICEF</td>
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<td>Relevant United Nations actors, in collaboration with international partners and non-governmental organizations, continue to support programmes to establish early warning systems to ensure the protection of civilians.</td>
<td>Some progress. HF radios in the DRC, now stretching into areas of CAR with MONUSCO support to NGOs and in close cooperation with US advisors. MONUSCO has also previously provided transportation, protection, and other logistical support to USAID projects establishing cell phone towers in DRC and Community Action Networks (implemented by Catholic Relief Services). In early October 2012 (USAID) awarded a new contract to Catholic Relief Services to help support communities in CAR and reduce their vulnerability to violence from the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The Secure, Empowered, Connected Communities (SECC) program will support communities to develop and implement security plans and reduce their isolation and vulnerability through communications technology and skills building.</td>
<td>BINUCA, MONUSCO and UN-MISS to lead with the support from OCHA</td>
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Relevant United Nations actors hold regular meetings with military actors, community leaders in LRA-affected areas, child protection agencies, non-governmental organizations and United Nations presences in each of the LRA-affected countries to discuss the LRA threat.

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<td>Ongoing. However, the quality of feedback to local communities is poor. Local communities report feeling excluded from true consultations and from hearing back on changes to policies and their possible impact on communities.</td>
<td>BINUCA, MONUSCO and UN-MISS to lead with the support from OCHA, OHCHR, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF and UNOCA</td>
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**GOAL 3: CURRENT DDRRR ACTIVITIES ARE EXPANDED TO COVER ALL LRA-AFFECTED AREAS**

**Objective 3.1: A common and coordinated approach on DDRRR in LRA-affected countries is developed by the UN Missions**

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<td>BINUCA, MONUSCO and UN-MISS, within the limits of their mandates, implement the Coordinated Approach on DDRRR of the LRA in coordination with relevant national authorities and/or in accordance with national DDR programmes. This will include identifying greater synergies between military and DDRRR operations by supporting the establishment of assembly points where there is a high level of LRA movements and/or the anticipated movement of LRA due to military pressure or for other reasons. Some progress. MONUSCO initiated a project in January 2012 (prior to the strategy) to establish a number of permanent areas or Assembly Point sites, specifically intended for receiving potential LRA-Combatant (ex-com) surrenders and escapees. However, MONUSCO assembly points are in remote areas, and patrols to the assembly points are not frequent enough to ensure safe defection. BINUCA and UNMISS are aware of &quot;safe reporting sites&quot; run by US military advisors, and coordinate with them to some extent. BINUCA consultants in Obo, CAR, have limited means to implement DDRRR operations. They have been effective in Obo, but lack transport to reach other LRA affected areas. MONUSCO in lead on DDRRR through leaflet and message distribution as well. BINUCA has been provided two seconded consultants from the World Bank, but they have not been able to make significant progress due to lack of resources and prioritization from BINUCA.</td>
<td>BINUCA, MONUSCO and UN-MISS to lead with the support from DPKO</td>
<td>DDRRR consultants in BINUCA do not have means of transport to get to LRA affected areas of CAR other than Obo, where they are based.</td>
<td>Need for Assembly Point project to be expanded in CAR and South Sudan in conjunction with regional actors, including the U.S. military advisors.</td>
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<td>MONUSCO provides technical support and backstopping to facilitate BINUCA and UNMISS field offices in implementing the Coordinated Approach on DDRRR.</td>
<td>Some progress. There is a reported strengthening of field-level coordination and information-sharing between UN missions on disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration issues. MONUSCO officials spoke of an increasing close collaboration on DDRRR efforts, particularly of repatriation of ex-combatants. MONUSCO also continues its DDRRR efforts in terms of active participation in JIOC in information-sharing and information analysis, with the aim of further engaging disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration activities within the JIOC.</td>
<td>MONUSCO to lead with the support from BINUCA and UNMISS</td>
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<td>UNICEF leads in the development of SOPs for national armies in the region on the handover, repatriation and reunification of children who escape or are rescued from the LRA on the basis of existing SOPs currently in use by the UPDF. The SOPs will be developed jointly by relevant child protection actors operating in the CAR, the DRC and South Sudan, in close collaboration with the respective national armies and the AU-RTF.</td>
<td>Significant progress. The SOPs have largely been developed. UNICEF had previously signed MOU with UPDF in May 2011. SOPs have not been signed with FACA, SPLA, or FARDC though progress in development of SOPs is significant.</td>
<td>UNICEF to lead with the support from BINUCA, MONUSCO, UNMISS and CAAC</td>
<td>Progress in developing SOPs needs to be translated into adoption and operationalization of SOPs, including formal training. Multiple sources in the field indicate that UPDF do not always hand children over to UNICEF or NGOs, and use them as scouts or combatants in violation of the SOPs.</td>
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<td>Repatriation of Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups is the primary responsibility of ICRC. Under circumstances where this is not possible, resources from BINUCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS are jointly leveraged to facilitate the return of children across borders to their communities of origin with minimum delay.</td>
<td>No progress. No framework. Case by case basis, MONUSCO assists in repatriation of children associated to LRA wherever possible.</td>
<td>UNICEF to lead with the support from ICRC, BINUCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS</td>
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### Objective 3.2: Information exchange and coordination between military and DRRRR actors and operations are increased.

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<td><strong>BINUCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS</strong> enhance field-level coordination and information exchange through regular meetings/VTCs.</td>
<td>Some progress. Reportedly meeting at irregular intervals.</td>
<td>MONUSCO to lead with the support from BINUCA, UNMISS and OCHA.</td>
<td>Unclear if there is a framework developed to organize the meetings and associated issues.</td>
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<td>MONUSCO and UNMISS lead efforts to establish a mechanism for coordination of military operations and cooperation between the forces of MONUSCO and UNMISS as well as relevant military actors in accordance with their respective mandates. This mechanism will be affiliated with AU-RTF structures as they become operational.</td>
<td>Some progress. No formal mechanism has been established or is being planned though there is informal information sharing between MONUSCO and UNMISS. The AU-RTF is not sufficiently operational to allow for coordination of military operations and cooperation with MONUSCO and UNMISS. US military advisors and UPDF forces in the Combined Operation Fusion Center (COFC) do informally share information with MONUSCO and UNMISS, and the COFC has facilitated information sharing between UNMISS, US advisors, and UPDF commanders in the field.</td>
<td>MONUSCO to lead with the support from UNOAU, UNOCA and UNMISS</td>
<td>Currently COFC (US military advisors and UPDF) in CAR do not coordinate military operations with MONUSCO and UNMISS.</td>
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<td>MONUSCO JIOC in Dungu begins regular information sharing and exchange with the Combined operations information fusion cells and, when operational, the AU-RTF Joint Operations Centre, especially with regard to time-sensitive and actionable information to increase the effectiveness of military operations.</td>
<td>Some progress. Joint Information Operation Cell (JIOC) shares information with Counter-LRA Operations Fusion Centers (COFC) very regularly. However, no progress in sharing with AU-RTF Joint Operations Center and minimal progress in responding to time-sensitive and actionable information in a way that increases the effectiveness of military operations.</td>
<td>MONUSCO to lead with the support from OCHA</td>
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<td>Relevant United Nations actors establish sector-specific mechanisms to regularize information exchange on LRA related activities and movements and other cross border issues, particularly in the areas of DDR, DDRRR and child protection.</td>
<td>Minimal progress. Some planning has been started as DPA project documents outline a one year program to strengthen cross border information sharing. The program would include a consultant seconded to UNOCA (Libreville) and another with BINUCA (Obo). The program was intended to start in October 2012, but has not started yet because funds have not been secured. New DDRRR SOPs may facilitate information sharing in the DDRRR sector when adopted.</td>
<td>BINUCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS to lead with the support from OCHA, UNDP and UNHCR</td>
<td>The World Bank is funding the hiring of three consultants to work on DDRRR, one based in Goma/Dungu in DRC and two in CAR (Obo and Bangui).</td>
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Relevant United Nations actors, in collaboration with the AU-RTF (as it becomes operational), facilitate regular meetings with relevant humanitarian actors and community leaders in LRA-affected areas to enhance early warning capacity within the affected communities.

No progress as far as AU-RTF is concerned. AU-RTF only minimally operational. UNOCHA regularly holds meetings in Congo that include discussions of early warning.

BINUCA, MONUSCO and UN-MISS to lead with the support from OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR and UNICEF

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<th>Objective 3.3: Policies, strategies and legal frameworks relating to DDRRR are harmonized</th>
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<td>Relevant United Nations actors encourage the AU to work with affected Governments to identify a common policy for treatment of LRA escapees and non-indicted LRA ex-combatants who escape or surrender, particularly with respect to amnesty provisions and potential criminal prosecution.</td>
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<td>BINUCA, MONUSCO and UN-MISS jointly develop specific DDRRR Standard operating procedures (SOPs) on the LRA, based on the general SOPs developed by MONUSCO on DDRRR of foreign armed groups. The SOPs to be developed in consultation with national counterparts should include, inter alia, the handover of LRA elements from regional militaries, repatriation to countries of origin, reintegration and provision of medical, psycho-social and other assistance as necessary.</td>
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GOAL 4: A COORDINATED HUMANITARIAN AND CHILD PROTECTION RESPONSE IS PROMOTED IN ALL LRA-AFFECTED AREAS

Objective 4.1: The most vulnerable groups, particularly children, women, refugees, IDPs and people with specific needs, receive strengthened and coordinated humanitarian protection and assistance.

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<td>Relevant United Nations actors continue to deliver humanitarian protection on the basis of need and within the framework of existing country-specific coordination frameworks. To ensure respect for humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence, humanitarian action remains distinct from the wider political and military objectives of this strategy.</td>
<td>UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, and UNDP continue to work in many LRA affected areas. UNOCA project documents contemplate seeking US $9 million for UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, and UNDP humanitarian assistance projects including in particular NFI's to IDPs and host communities, reintegration support to child escapees, psycho-social services, and food and nutritional support.</td>
<td>OCHA to lead with the support from BINUCA, MONUSCO, UNMISS and UNOAU</td>
<td>Logistical constraints including poor roads lack of air support continue to prevent aid reaching many LRA affected persons in remote areas.</td>
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<td>United Nations humanitarian actors prioritize the provision of assistance to women and children in the affected areas, including refugees and displaced persons.</td>
<td>Programs on going, with priority as according to each agency internal policy.</td>
<td>OCHA, UNHCR and UNICEF to lead with the support from BINUCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS</td>
<td>Concerns that UN system is unable to cover all the needs due to lack of funds.</td>
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<td>United Nations Humanitarian Coordinators and Humanitarian Country Teams continue to enhance information sharing and analysis on humanitarian needs and priorities in LRA-affected areas.</td>
<td>Some progress. No formal framework but informal discussions are taking place.</td>
<td>UNDP and OCHA in the lead with the support from BINUCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS</td>
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<td>Relevant United Nations actors carry out a regional analysis on humanitarian needs and priorities in LRA-affected communities to determine short, medium and long-term needs by the end of 2012.</td>
<td>Already carried out in May 2012 by OCHA. A new analysis intended to be carried out prior to December 2012.</td>
<td>OCHA to lead with the support from BINUCA, MONUSCO, UNMISS and UNDP</td>
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<td>Humanitarian stakeholders continue discussions on how to improve access and strengthen, as required, humanitarian response capacities in the affected countries.</td>
<td>Ongoing.</td>
<td>OCHA to lead with the support from BINUCA, MONUSCO, UNMISS, UNICEF and WFP</td>
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GOAL 5: PEACEBUILDING, HUMAN RIGHTS, RULE OF LAW AND LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT IS PROVIDED TO LRA-AFFECTED GOVERNMENTS TO ENABLE THEM TO ESTABLISH AUTHORITY ACROSS THEIR TERRITORY

Objective 5.1: Policies and strategic frameworks conducive to the implementation of human rights, peacebuilding, and long-term recovery initiatives for LRA-affected communities and countries are established.

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<td>LRA-related issues are addressed in relevant country-specific United Nations strategic, peacebuilding and/or development frameworks (e.g. United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks, Integrated Strategic Frameworks or Peacebuilding Support Plan) at the earliest possible date. Consultations with populations in the LRA-affected areas should inform the process.</td>
<td>Some progress. DPA has identified (in project document on LRA strategy) the need for two consultative workshops to be held in each of the four countries next year. It needs $280,000 to fund the workshops.</td>
<td>RCs/UN Country Teams to lead with the support from BINUCA, MONUSCO, UNMISS and PBSO</td>
<td>Genuine and consistent consultation with populations in LRA affected areas is critical and can be achieved by working with existing civil society networks such as the Regional Civil Society Task Force.</td>
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Relevant United Nations peacebuilding, development and human rights actors support the Governments in the region to develop peacebuilding and recovery frameworks that specifically address LRA-affected areas, including gender and human rights issues.

Some progress. UNDP has been involved in helping the Ugandan government with the Peace, Recovery and Development Program. The UN is currently developing a follow up programme on peacebuilding to support the Government’s newly extended Peace Recovery and Development Plan (2012-2015) for northern Uganda that covers LRA-affected areas. The new programme will be divided into 4 UN joint programmes addressing: Education for Peace; Access to Justice (including land issues and transitional justice); Livelihoods and Entrepreneurship for youth; Reintegration of LRA-returnees.

UN Country Team/OHCHR and UNDP to lead with the support from BINUCA, MONUSCO, UNMISS and UNOCA

However, there has been no progress in ensuring new or existing peacebuilding frameworks of each government reflect the needs of LRA-affected areas.
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<tr>
<td>Relevant United Nations peace-building, development and human rights actors support the identification and capacity building of a lead Government focal point to address LRA-affected countries to strengthen local legal institutions and policies to address land disputes, with support from international partners and specialized NGOs</td>
<td>No progress.</td>
<td>OHCHR and UNDP to lead with the support from BINUCA, MONUSCO, UNMISS and PBSO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relevant United Nations peace-building, development and human rights actors support LRA-affected countries to strengthen local legal institutions and policies to address land disputes, with support from international partners and specialized NGOs</td>
<td>No progress.</td>
<td>OHCHR and UNDP to lead with the support from BINUCA, MONUSCO, UNMISS and PBSO</td>
<td>No significant progress could be expected in the short time since the strategy was adopted, but concerning that no specific planning being done for this activity.</td>
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Objective 5.2: The capacities of LRA-affected countries to address human rights, peacebuilding and long-term recovery needs of LRA-affected communities are strengthened.

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<tr>
<td>Relevant United Nations actors, in collaboration with the AU and international partners, including specialized NGOs, assist LRA-affected countries in strengthening their national human rights institutions to fulfil their protection mandate including by strengthening access to justice and accountability, inter alia, through training and technical support, particularly in the LRA-affected regions.</td>
<td>No progress.</td>
<td>UNOCA and OHCHR to lead with the support from BINUCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS</td>
<td>No significant progress could be expected in the short time since the strategy was adopted, but concerning that no specific planning being done for this activity.</td>
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Relevant United Nations actors conduct country-specific and regional training for civil society actors in LRA-affected countries to monitor and investigate abuses committed by the LRA within one year.

- No progress. UNOCA project planning does include plans to train civil society on identifying and integrating community priorities into peacebuilding, recovery and development projects and encouraging dialogue between different stakeholders. But no plans to train on investigating abuses committed by the LRA.

Relevant United Nations actors, in collaboration with international partners and relevant national authorities, assist in strengthening local justice systems to respond to local needs.

- No progress. No particular plans or structured engagement on strengthening local justice.

### Objective 5.3: Programming in human rights, peacebuilding and long-term development for LRA-affected communities is carried out and implemented on the basis of agreed priorities.

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<td>Relevant United Nations actors in collaboration with relevant national authorities, carry out a regional needs assessment and a best practice study on human rights abuses in the LRA-affected areas within 6 months and develop a comprehensive regional plan to support human rights in those areas.</td>
<td>No progress. Regional needs assessment and best practice study have not been completed.</td>
<td>OHCHR to lead with the support from BINUCA, MONUSCO, UNMISS, OCHA, UNDP and UNOCA</td>
<td>OHCHR to lead with the support from BINUCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS</td>
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<td>Relevant United Nations actors enhance joint planning, programming and monitoring in LRA-affected areas identified as priorities (for example through a United Nations Area Coordinator System) within two years.</td>
<td>No progress. This system is already set up in Uganda, but not in other affected countries.</td>
<td>RCs/UNCT to lead with the support from BINUCA, MONUSCO, UNMISS, OHCHR and UNICEF</td>
<td>Unclear if it applies to other countries.</td>
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<td>Relevant United Nations actors, in collaboration with international partners, including non-governmental organizations, continue to support the LRA-affected countries in improving basic social services, particularly health services, including maternal health and psychosocial support, education, water and sanitation, with a special focus on LRA-affected areas.</td>
<td>Ongoing. However, no new plans beyond existing projects have been developed.</td>
<td>UN Country Teams to lead with the support from BINUCA, MONUSCO, UNMISS and PBSO</td>
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<td>Relevant United Nations actors, in collaboration with international partners, continue to support LRA-affected countries in improving infrastructure, particularly roads, bridges and airfields, in the LRA-affected areas with a view to improving accessibility and encouraging economic activity.</td>
<td>Some progress. UNOCA planning document includes plans to raise US $3-5 million for rehabilitation of Obo-Bambouti road.</td>
<td>UNDP to lead with the support from BINUCA, MONUSCO, UNMISS</td>
<td>Immediate/long-term</td>
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<td>Relevant United Nations actors arrange regular country-specific meetings between community leaders in LRA-affected and development actors to discuss priority geographic areas of peace-building and recovery intervention in LRA-affected areas.</td>
<td>Minimal progress. Apart from July meeting in Entebbe. Critical to have regular meetings with community leaders for UN and other development actors to receive community input.</td>
<td>UNDP to lead with the support from BINUCA, MONUSCO, UNMISS and OCHA and PBSO</td>
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### Objective 5.4: Political will to address human rights, peacebuilding, and long-term development needs of LRA-affected communities is elicited and sustained

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<td>The SRSG for Central Africa, in collaboration with the AU Special Envoy on the LRA, engages LRA-affected countries at the highest political level on a regular basis on issues related to human rights, peacebuilding and long-term recovery.</td>
<td>No progress. Focus so far has been on AU-RTF.</td>
<td>UNOCA to lead with the support from BINUCA, MONUSCO, UNMISS, OHCHR, PBSO and UNDP</td>
<td>No progress. Focus so far has been on AU-RTF.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The SRSG for Central Africa, in collaboration with the AU Special Envoy on the LRA, engages international partners at the highest political level on a regular basis to encourage them to consider sustainable funding for recovery initiatives in LRA-affected areas. This should include advocacy for access to Peacebuilding Funds in the affected countries.</td>
<td>No progress. There have been discussions of a donor conference, but without sufficiently developed projects there has been no platform for engaging international donors for funds.</td>
<td>UNOCA to lead with the support from PBSO</td>
<td>No progress. There have been discussions of a donor conference, but without sufficiently developed projects there has been no platform for engaging international donors for funds.</td>
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<td>Relevant United Nations actors continue to raise awareness on an on-going basis about the need to address peacebuilding and long-term development needs of LRA-affected communities.</td>
<td>Ongoing. However, only informally. No concerted or formal framework.</td>
<td>UNOCA and DPI to lead with the support from UNDP</td>
<td>Ongoing. However, only informally. No concerted or formal framework.</td>
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<td>Relevant United Nations actors advocate on an on-going basis for the reintegration of LRA elements through development programmes addressing both economic recovery and peacebuilding, with special attention for youth and children.</td>
<td>No progress.</td>
<td>UNDP and UNICEF to lead with the support from BINUCA, MONUSCO, UNMISS and UNOCA</td>
<td>No progress.</td>
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<td>Relevant United Nations actors prepare and disseminate annual regional Human Rights LRA reports, with the first one issued within 6 months</td>
<td>On-going.</td>
<td>OHCHR to lead with the support from BINUCA, MONUSCO, UNMISS, DPI OCHA and UNDP</td>
<td>On-going.</td>
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**Objective 5.5: Capacity of affected countries to address issues related to the rule of law in LRA affected areas is enhanced.**

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<td>Relevant United Nations actors support the AU in strengthening the rule of law advisory element in the AU-RTF structure to provide technical advice and support in matters relating to the rule of law.</td>
<td>No progress. No deployment yet.</td>
<td>UNOAU and OHCHR to lead with the support from BINUCA, MONUSCO and UNMISS</td>
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<td>Relevant United Nations actors encourage international partners to continue to support the affected countries in establishing rule of law programmes to improve the capacity and coordination of Government law enforcement agencies, especially the police, judiciary and correctional services in the areas affected by the LRA in the short, medium and long term.</td>
<td>No progress. No specific programs.</td>
<td>UNOCA to lead with the support from BINUCA, MONUSCO, UNMISS, OHCHR and UNDP</td>
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ANNEX B – ACRONYMS USED IN REPORT

AU – African Union
AU-RCI – African Union Regional Cooperation Initiative
AU-RTF – African Union Regional Task Force
BINUCA – United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic
CAR – Central African Republic
COFC – Counter-LRA Operation Fusion Center
CONOPS – Concept of Operations
COOPI – Cooperazione Internazionale
DDRRR – Demobilization, Disarmament, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration
DPA – Department of Political Affairs
DPKO – Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo
FACA – Forces Armees Centrafricaines
ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross
JCM – Joint Coordination Mechanism
JIOC – Joint Information and Operations Cell
LRA – Lord’s Resistance Army
MOU – Memorandum of Understanding
NGO – Non-governmental Organization
OCHA – Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR – Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
SOP – Standard Operating Procedure
SPLA – Sudan People’s Liberation Army
SRSG – Special Representative of the Secretary General
UN – United Nations
UNAMID – African Union – United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund
UNMISS – United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNOAU – United Nations Office to the African Union
UNOCA – United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa
UPDF – Ugandan People’s Defence Force