

Questions for the Record
Senator John Kerry
Nomination of Hillary Rodham Clinton
Department of State
Secretary of State

Role of Secretary of State

1. The new Administration will take over at a time of extraordinary challenges and opportunities for the country. What do you see as the most significant challenges facing the United States, immediately and over the longer term? What do you view as the most urgent international priorities for the new Administration? What do you see as the most significant opportunities? What role will the Secretary of State play in formulating and advancing U.S. policy objectives? What would you seek to accomplish during your first 100 days and your first year as Secretary of State?

I appreciate these vitally important questions, and I have given them a great deal of thought. I have worked to address them in the testimony that I will submit to the Committee under a separate cover. If you believe that submission does not address these issues sufficiently, I would be happy to follow up.

Afghanistan

2. What is your assessment of the security situation in Afghanistan? Has the Taliban gained or lost ground over the past year? Has our strategy to date been effective? How can we strengthen our efforts?

The security situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating and the Taliban is gaining ground. President-Elect Obama has proposed a new strategy for Afghanistan with several elements: First, end the war in Iraq responsibly and send additional troops to help complete the mission in Afghanistan. Second, provide a major increase in non-military aid to Afghanistan. Afghanistan needs a government more able to take care of its people's needs – something the President-Elect has communicated directly to President Karzai. We should help – and we should demand accountability. Third, take on the drug trade, which is funding al Qaeda and the Taliban, including the development of alternative livelihoods for poppy farmers. Afghanistan has turned into a narcostate. Fourth, develop a coherent Pakistan policy. First, that means

conditioning U.S. military aid on their efforts to close down training camps, evict foreign fighters, and prevent the Taliban from using Pakistan as a sanctuary. Second, it means tripling non-military aid to Pakistan, with a focus on the border regions, and improving the lives of the Pakistani people, so that over the long-term we are reducing the pull of the extremists.

3. Last February, Defense Secretary Gates acknowledged that some NATO members tend to group the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan together, and do not share our views on the necessity of European participation in ISAF. How does the administration plan to make a case for renewed and reinvigorated commitments to Afghanistan, including at NATO's 60th anniversary summit scheduled for this April?

President-Elect Obama and I believe that Afghanistan and the Pakistani border are the central front in the war on terror and we will make the case to our Allies that we must not let Afghanistan return to a safe haven for Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The Obama Administration will seek greater contributions from our NATO allies in Afghanistan. We will ask our NATO allies to eliminate national restrictions on NATO forces. The NATO force is short-staffed and some countries contributing forces are imposing restrictions on where their troops can operate, tying the hands of commanders on the ground. The Obama Administration will work with European allies to end these burdensome restrictions and strengthen NATO as a fighting force.

4. Should we be prepared to participate in negotiations with reconcilable elements of the Taliban that are willing to renounce al Qaeda and join the political process?

The President-Elect and I believe that it is worth exploring whether we can create opportunities for progress in Afghanistan as we did in Iraq – as does General Petraeus. In Iraq, we engaged with tribal leaders and regional leaders, which helped lead to the Sunni Awakening that changed the dynamic in Iraq fundamentally. We should certainly explore whether similar opportunities exist for engagement and collaboration with tribal and regional leaders in Afghanistan, including leaders who at one time or another may have been affiliated with or joined forces with the Taliban. Afghanistan and Iraq are very different countries, though. We cannot expect to simply export the Awakening strategy used with the tribes of Al-Anbar to Afghanistan. Any effort to separate moderate Afghans from radical elements will have to begin – and be deeply rooted in – the efforts of Afghans themselves.

5. How effective have U.S. development efforts been in Afghanistan? Do we need to increase United States economic assistance? To what extent are internationally-funded projects helping or hindering the ability of the Afghan government to realize an expanded role in Afghanistan's development?

In December 2001, the Bonn Agreement between Afghans and donors established an interim government, and donors were identified as lead nations to accomplish specific objectives. Subsequent conferences in Tokyo in 2002 and Berlin in 2004 saw donors pledge \$4.5 billion and \$8.2 billion, respectively. Due to uneven commitment among the donors, the 2006 London Conference discarded the lead-nation approach and adopted the Afghanistan Compact, a contract between the international community and the Afghan government to support a comprehensive approach to development. Donors pledged a total of \$10.4 billion.

Since fiscal year 2001, the international community has pledged approximately \$60 billion in assistance to Afghanistan. The U.S. government has provided approximately \$32.7 billion, or 57 percent, of the international total.

We need to improve our development efforts in Afghanistan. The President-Elect has proposed a policy of "more for more" – more troops and assistance from the U.S. as we seek more from NATO allies, and more from an Afghan government that needs to focus on improving the lives of its people. We will request additional non-military aid each year – above and beyond what is given now. That money will be focused on initiatives dealing with education, infrastructure, human services, and alternative livelihoods for poppy farmers and will be accompanied by tougher anti-corruption measures. We will make sure investments are made - not just in Kabul - but out in Afghanistan's provinces. We will tie aid to better performance by the Afghan national government, including anti-corruption initiatives and efforts to extend the rule of law across the country.

6. Versions of the Afghan Freedom Support Act passed the House in the 110th Congress, but did not pass the Senate. Do you support its passage?

The President-Elect and I support the goal of providing additional assistance to Afghanistan and if the legislation is reintroduced in the 111th Congress, we

look forward to reviewing the legislative language and consulting on it with Congress.

7. What are your expectations for the scheduled presidential and provincial elections in Afghanistan in 2009? What can the United States do to help ensure those elections are free and fair?

The incoming Administration hopes that the upcoming elections go forth smoothly. The U.S. can assist the Afghan military and security forces in efforts to prevent violence or disrupt the elections.

8. How do you assess the effectiveness of President Hamid Karzai's government? What more should the United States do to try to curb the widespread corruption in the Afghan government?

Despite achievements such as the expansion of educational opportunities, increased access to health care and improved sub-national governance, government effectiveness remains low. The Afghan government is plagued by limited capacity and widespread corruption. Efforts to improve the effectiveness of the Government of Afghanistan, particularly at the sub-national level, are a key element of Afghan and international efforts to stabilize the country. We need to ensure that investments are made not just in Kabul but in all of Afghanistan's provinces. We will tie aid to better performance by the Afghan national government, including anti-corruption initiatives and efforts to extend the rule of law across the country. A new strategy in Afghanistan will enable us to take the initiative back from the Taliban.

9. The Afghan National Police (ANP) are still widely acknowledged to be plagued by problems that hinder Afghanistan's capacity to improve security and development. What is your understanding of the current goal for the ANP's end-strength? Do you believe that is sufficient? What needs to be done to improve their effectiveness, and how can we strengthen efforts to train and equip them?

The President-Elect has said that we must focus more attention and resources on training Afghan Security Forces, including more incentives for Americans who carry out this mission.

The end-strength for the Afghan National Police is 82,000, and as of December 2008, there were fewer than 76,000 personnel. While it may be necessary eventually to raise the ceiling to provide wider law enforcement coverage, the immediate goal remains to staff fully the police to the level of 82,000 with vetted, qualified, trained, and equipped personnel. Once that benchmark has been reached and the quality of the police has improved, the Government of Afghanistan and the international community will be better able to assess whether to increase the ceiling.

The development and professionalism of the Afghan police have lagged behind the army's. Many police operate in extremely dangerous environments on the frontline of the war against the Taliban, conducting missions that are not traditional policing. The Afghan National Police has suffered a casualty rate three times that of the Afghan National Army. There is no single or easy answer on how to improve police effectiveness. Certainly, greater success in the core military effort will help create a more permissive environment and increase their chances for continued successful development. The Afghan National Police are key players in the counter-insurgency equation and their development and effectiveness are critically important to Afghanistan's future.

As for specific programs, the Focused District Development and In District Reform have shown positive results. These already in-place programs provide training and mentoring by international police advisors and U.S. military personnel in the police units' home districts. Given competing missions, however, we alone cannot meet the needs of the police. We must find increased roles for the European Police Mission to Afghanistan, which recently announced it would increase its staff to 400, and our NATO Allies, especially to act as police mentors.

These initiatives have improved Afghan National Police effectiveness and professionalism and I am hopeful that we have a dedicated partner in Minister of Interior Atmar.

10. How do you assess U.S. and Afghan counternarcotics efforts to date? What can be done to improve these efforts?

The United States, Afghanistan and other allies have made limited progress in reducing opium cultivation, but overall the counternarcotics strategy cannot be called a success by any measure. In 2008, the CIA Crime and Narcotics

Center estimated that Afghanistan cultivated approximately 116,365 hectares of opium poppy, down from 140,600 hectares in 2007. This quantity is believed to be enough to produce over 1,100 tons of heroin, far exceeding the world demand of approximately 400 tons per year. The glut of narcotics has fueled increasing addiction rates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran, and it serves to fund the insurgency in Afghanistan. The narcotics trade thrives in the anarchic conditions created by insurgents and warlords. In return for a portion of the profits, either paid in cash by drug lab operators and smugglers or paid in opium by farmers, the warlords provide protection for the labs, trucks, and drug markets. Exact figures for the black market economy are difficult to obtain, but the UN estimates that over \$100 million will flow from the narcotics trade to warlords, drug lords, and insurgents during 2008.

11. It will be difficult for U.S.-led efforts to stabilize Afghanistan to succeed without the full commitment and support of Pakistan's government and security services, but such a high level of cooperation may not be attainable as long as Pakistan's relations with India reflect a significant element of tension and mistrust. What new steps could the United States take to forward region-wide efforts at conflict resolution, and which countries would that involve? Would you favor the appointment of a special U.S. envoy to South Asia?

As the President-Elect and I have stated, Afghanistan and the Pakistani border are the central front in the war on terror. We cannot succeed in Afghanistan without a new and comprehensive strategy to deal with al Qaeda and Taliban militants across the border, and a Pakistan policy that conditions assistance to the government while increasing direct support for the Pakistani people. Addressing the border means implementing a sensible policy towards Pakistan. First, that means conditioning U.S. military aid on their efforts to close down training camps, evict foreign fighters, and preventing the Taliban and al Qaeda from using Pakistan as a sanctuary. Second, it means tripling non-military aid to Pakistan, with a focus on the border regions, and improving the lives of the Pakistani people, so that over the long-term we are reducing the pull of the extremists. The President-Elect and I have consistently supported bilateral dialogue between India and Pakistan that seeks to resolve their longstanding differences.

The United States should encourage India and Pakistan to work toward a peaceful settlement of their differences. No final decisions have been made on special envoys for South Asia.

Pakistan

12. There has been considerable discussion in the United States and other Western governments about the ability of Pakistan's new civilian government to crack down on extremism. How would you characterize the efforts of the Zardari government to crack down on extremists? Do you believe that Pakistan's intelligence services have severed ties with extremists in the aftermath of this November's attacks in Mumbai? To what extent do you believe that Pakistan's security concerns vis-à-vis India color their government's policies toward militancy in the tribal areas near Afghanistan?

President Zardari needs the support of the military to improve relations with neighboring Pakistan and India – to include addressing historical military ties to extremist groups – and the military has sought politicians' support in defending military operations in the Tribal Areas.

13. It is a delicate balancing act between voicing our concerns about the Pakistan government's counterterrorism strategy, while recognizing the many other challenges it faces and working to ensure this democratically-elected government has every chance to succeed. What is our strategy for balancing these interests? How do ongoing Predator strikes in the tribal areas figure into this equation? Are current U.S. policies aimed at improving security and development in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas succeeding? How would you strengthen our efforts to combat the grave terrorist threat from the FATA?

We need a stronger and sustained partnership between Afghanistan, Pakistan and NATO to secure the border, take out terrorist camps, and crack down on cross-border insurgents. We cannot tolerate a safe haven for al Qaeda terrorists who threaten the American people. Pakistan and the international community must commit to a more comprehensive approach along the border – one that involves robust economic investment and development, good governance and government accountability, and enhanced security and law enforcement capacity. If Pakistan is willing to go after high-level terrorist targets like Osama bin Laden, we must give Pakistan all of the support it needs. The United States must also provide more assistance to benefit the

Pakistani people directly, so that our nations forge a deeper and more sustainable partnership.

14. In September, the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2008 was reported out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by a unanimous vote. The bill calls for building a long-term relationship with Pakistan, in part by tripling non-military U.S. assistance to \$1.5 billion per year. It also would condition certain further military assistance and arms transfers to Pakistan on annual certifications by the Secretary of State related to Pakistan's performance in combating terrorism and strengthening democratic institutions. Do you favor such an approach to dealing with Pakistan? What can be done to assist Pakistan in dealing with its present economic crisis?

The President-Elect, the Vice President-Elect and I supported the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2008 as Senators. But this is not a blank check. We should condition some military aid on ensuring that Pakistan is taking on the extremists. Should the 111th Congress choose to reintroduce a new version of the legislation, we look forward to working with this Committee and the Congress on legislation to help build a long-term relationship with Pakistan that combats extremism and supports Pakistan's people and democratically-elected government.

15. The congressionally-appointed Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism recently issued a report in which Pakistan was singled out as a potential source of a terrorist attack on the United States involving weapons of mass destruction. What is your assessment of the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons materials and technologies? Do you feel confident that the A.Q. Khan proliferation case is closed, as Pakistani officials claim?

As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen has indicated, we "don't see any indication right now that security of those weapons is in jeopardy, but clearly we are very watchful as we should be." Pakistan's security forces are professional and highly motivated. They understand the importance of nuclear security and we understand that they have taken significant steps to enhance it. But given the political situation in Pakistan, this is clearly something that we must closely monitor as is the commitment of Pakistan to non-proliferation efforts. I have not yet been briefed on the A.Q. Khan issue that you raise.

India

16. Supporters of the civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India saw the potential to leverage this deal into broader cooperation with India. How might the United States make best use of its strategic partnership with India to address global and regional problems of shared concern, such as international terrorism, poverty, and environmental degradation? Is U.S.-India counterterrorism cooperation an urgent and potentially fruitful priority, as many suggest?

India is our friend and our relations with it are deepening. As the world's oldest democracy, we have much in common with the world's largest democracy. While the civil nuclear agreement is important to both countries, our relationship is and must be bigger than one deal. If confirmed, as Secretary of State, I will work to fulfill the commitment of the President-Elect to establish a true strategic partnership with India, increasing our military cooperation, trade, and support for democracies around the world. As our relationship deepens, the United States and India can work together to address global and regional problems of shared concern including counterterrorism, poverty, and environmental degradation.

17. Advocates of the civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India frequently argued that it would bring New Delhi into the "mainstream" of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Does the new Administration intend to strengthen non-proliferation cooperation with the Indian government, including by encouraging India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? Are there other non-proliferation initiatives in South Asia that you might have in mind?

The U.S. and India should look ahead to working together to meet global proliferation challenges. Although exempting India from existing nonproliferation rules carries some risks, we can minimize those risks by intensifying our cooperation on nonproliferation efforts. The Obama Administration will seek ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and encourage India to become a party as well.

18. To what extent do you perceive the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir to be a central cause of region-wide insecurity? Taking into account Indian sensitivities, would you favor a more active U.S. government role in helping find solutions to this issue?

President-Elect Obama and I are very concerned about rising tensions in Kashmir: the situation is dangerous for India, for Pakistan, for the people of Kashmir, and the peace and stability of the world. We must encourage all parties to work toward peaceful settlement. The U.S. role in this Administration is the same as in previous ones: Facilitate settlement, but do not mediate. India and Pakistan must work harder to establish greater economic and social cooperation in Kashmir. Kashmiris themselves should be the linchpin. Kashmir tensions must not divert Pakistan from focus on fighting terrorism and rising insurgency along Afghan border.

Iraq

19. Most experts agree that while the level of violence in Iraq has declined dramatically in the last 18-24 months, the political situation remains far more tenuous. Please provide the committee with information on the status of the following reconciliation issues: negotiations over Iraq's petrochemical laws, the implementation of the amnesty and deBaathification laws, UN efforts to resolve the status of Kirkuk and other disputed territories, and the integration of the Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi Security Forces.

The President-Elect has made it clear that Iraq must do more to reconcile its political differences. National hydrocarbons legislation continues to languish for numerous reasons, one of which remains the differences between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) over the development and management of oil and gas resources. Prior to enactment of national oil laws, the United States has discouraged companies from signing oil contracts with the KRG without Iraqi central government approval.

The Amnesty Law provides for the release of detainees who did not commit violent crimes. Review committees have granted approximately 20,000 detainees amnesty, but only 6,000-7,000 have been released. Iraq has enacted, but not implemented, legislation on de-Ba'athification reform. Disagreement between Sunni and Shi'a continues on whether this legislation adequately addresses de-Ba'athification reform.

The United States supports the role the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) is playing in the process to resolve Disputed Internal Boundaries, including Kirkuk. UNAMI is expected to release its proposals in February.

The Sons of Iraq (SOI) program remains an important element of security efforts in Iraq. Successfully transitioning the SOI into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and other employment remains critically important to sustaining recent security gains. In late summer 2008, the GOI agreed to transition 20 percent of the approximately 95,000 active SOI into the ISF and to facilitate alternative employment for the remainder. Prior to this, approximately 20,000 SOI had already transitioned into the ISF, other ministries, or other non-security education, training, and jobs programs. Of the 95,000, the GOI has transitioned over 3,000 into the Iraqi Police and over 1,600 into private employment.

20. As the United States changes our mission in Iraq to bring our troops home in meaningful numbers and allow for the redeployment of additional combat brigades to Afghanistan, renewed diplomatic efforts will be crucial to ensuring this transition occurs with the least disruption to stability in Iraq as possible. What diplomatic initiatives are you considering to help ensure a peaceful transition? Do you support the creation of a Standing Conference that includes all of Iraq's neighbors?

The Obama Administration will pursue a diplomatic initiative with all of Iraq's neighbors – including Iran and Syria – and the UN to secure Iraq's borders, isolate al Qaeda, address Iraqi refugee flows, and support national reconciliation within Iraq. It is in the interest of Iraq's neighbors and the international community to have a stable Iraq that does not become a battleground for sectarian tensions and animosities. And we will communicate that. More broadly, we have a range of diplomatic tools at our disposal that we can deploy to persuade and press Iraq's neighbors to play a constructive role. We have let these tools languish in recent years, but they have served us well in advancing our interests in other difficult conflicts. They can serve us well in Iraq.

21. Since 2003, it is well known that American efforts in Iraq have been hampered by coordination gaps between civilian and military efforts, though these gaps have been significantly reduced under the leadership of Secretary Bob Gates, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and Generals David Petraeus and Ray Odierno. Please describe the steps you and Secretary Gates will take to ensure that the efforts of the State and Defense Departments will be as closely integrated as possible.

The President-Elect has repeatedly asserted that we must more effectively integrate our military and civilian tools of national power in order to have a successful and sustainable national security strategy. If confirmed as Secretary of State, I am committed to coordinating efforts closely with the Department of Defense in Iraq and elsewhere and to instill that culture of cooperation in the Department. Secretary Gates and I worked well together during my service on the Senate Armed Services Committee and I am confident that we can work together to ensure that we continue to close coordination gaps between the Department of State and the Department of Defense. In order to facilitate that coordination, we must strengthen our civilian capacity to operate alongside our military.

22. Article 24 of the recently approved U.S. – Iraqi Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) stipulates that all U.S. combat forces shall withdraw from Iraqi cities and towns by June 30, 2009, and that all U.S. forces shall withdraw from Iraq by December 31, 2011. There are about 30 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams (ePRTs) in Iraq. How will the removal of U.S. combat troops from Iraqi towns and cities later this year affect the location and functionality of these PRTs and ePRTs, as well as the ability of the U.S. military to provide for their security? How viable is the PRT model after December 2011, or even June 30, 2009? By what other means can our diplomats engage in provincial and regional issues in Iraq?

The civilians who are serving in Iraq are making great sacrifices for the country and often serve in harm's way. The President-Elect and I are very mindful of the challenges that will come with a drawdown of U.S. troops, and the President-Elect has consistently said that protection for our civilians in Iraq will continue to be a mission for a residual force after a drawdown of our combat brigades. But there are no easy solutions to the security issues you are describing. Right now, much of the rebuilding is taking place under a security umbrella provided by the brave young men and women of our armed forces. Their departure from critical areas in Iraq will certainly change the security calculus. How we deal with this challenge – both generally and specifically with respect to PRTs – has been and will continue to be the subject of discussions among the national security team and with the President-Elect.

The incoming Administration will proceed with the following overall strategy and core principles, which we will bring to this set of security challenges. First, as we all know, Iraq is a sovereign country, and the steps we take on

security matters moving forward will have to be taken in consultation with the Iraqis. We will certainly do our best to press the Iraqi government to combat sectarianism in their security forces – and we will tie future training and equipping resources to progress on this front. Improved Iraqi security forces cannot fully replace U.S. forces in protecting reconstruction personnel, but they can certainly help, if the Iraqis step up. And our residual force will play a continued force protection role. Second, we will take additional steps to help the Iraqi government consolidate the security gains that have been made in the past two years – gains that have facilitated more intensive and effective rebuilding and aid efforts. That will include an intensive diplomatic and political strategy, including an effort to forge a comprehensive compact with Iraq’s neighbors. Third, we will pay particular attention to the humanitarian crisis in Iraq, which risks destabilizing parts of the country, including an aggressive effort to assist displaced Iraqis. But these are serious challenges, and much of this turns on the capacity and willingness of the Iraqis themselves.

23. Article 12 of the SOFA gives Iraq primary jurisdiction over U.S. contractors. However, Article 5 of the SOFA defines U.S. contractors as persons who “are citizens of the United States or a third country and who are in Iraq to supply goods, services, and security in Iraq to or on behalf of the United States Forces.” Are State Department contractors covered by the U.S.–Iraqi SOFA? What impact do you expect the SOFA to have on your department’s use of private security contractors?

I have forwarded your question to the SOFA negotiators so as to be certain that we have the exact right answer.

24. As a result of the war in Iraq, at least four million Iraqis have been displaced from their homes as refugees in neighboring countries or internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Iraq. President-Elect Obama has committed to provide \$2 billion in humanitarian assistance for these refugees and IDPs. Please provide the committee information on how the State Department will support Iraqi refugees and IDPs under your leadership.

America has both a moral obligation and a responsibility for security that demands we confront Iraq’s humanitarian crisis— there may be more than five million Iraqis who are refugees or are displaced inside their own country. The new Administration will seek to form an international working group to address this crisis. We will also make it a top priority to secure greater

regional contributions to humanitarian relief, refugee care and integration, and economic assistance, and we will make this an important subject on the agenda for regional diplomacy with all of Iraq's neighbors. Further, we will also fill all of the pledged slots for admission of Iraqi refugees to the United States, and we will be open to accept additional Iraqis, who took risks to support American efforts in Iraq.

25. During the three post-Saddam elections, the U.S. military was instrumental in providing both security and logistical support. What is your assessment of the Iraqi election commissions' related capacity at the national and provincial levels? What role will the U.S. military play in providing security and logistical support for the provincial elections scheduled for the end of January?

Unlike prior elections in post-Saddam Iraq, logistics and security for the January 31 Provincial Council elections will be Iraqi-planned, managed, and led. Iraq's Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), with significant technical support from the United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI), manages elections planning and logistics. This includes voter, candidate, and coalition registration; ballot design and printing; election center and polling place staffing; observer certification; and voter education.

The IHEC is on schedule to carry out elections on January 31. The IHEC's ability to meet its announced February 23 deadline for certifying elections results will depend in part on the number of elections-related complaints that it must review. The seat allocation formula that IHEC has devised, with UNAMI assistance, is complex. Ballots are also complicated, with nearly 2,500 candidates appearing on the Baghdad Governorate ballot for the 57 council seats there. According to State Department reporting from Iraq, despite these challenges, the mechanics for a credible election appear to be moving ahead reasonably well.

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) will provide the lead for all security measures required for elections, and the U.S. military will provide "outer ring" and emergency support as needed, as well as any necessary support to the ISF for the transportation and security of voting materials. The Elections High Security Committee, comprising senior security officials from the Iraqi Ministries of Interior and Defense, the office of the Iraqi National Security Advisor, and the U.S. military, has been planning for and advising the IHEC Board of Commissioners on security measures.

26. The embassy of the United States in Baghdad is, by a considerable margin, the largest in the world. About how many Americans diplomats and non-diplomats — are currently working in the New Embassy Compound (NEC)? How many diplomats of ambassadorial rank are currently assigned there? Are these staffing levels appropriate, given the declining military presence in Iraq and the plethora of foreign policy challenges facing the United States in the region and beyond?

There are approximately 12,500 U.S. diplomats, staff, contractors, and grant implementers from State and other civilian agencies serving under Chief of Mission authority in Iraq. Approximately 1,300 of these individuals are direct-hire USG employees.

One U. S. ambassador, Ryan Crocker, is accredited in Iraq. Some of the senior mission staff have formerly held ambassadorial appointments at other posts. One member of the mission on Temporary Duty until May is accredited as ambassador to Bahrain.

If confirmed as Secretary of State, I will work with the President-Elect and other Administration officials to determine what the appropriate staffing levels should be to pursue the President-Elect's policies and priorities.

Iran

27. There is deep concern among the United States and its key allies about Iran's nuclear program. Some have argued that Iran will soon have, if it does not already, the capability to enrich enough uranium to create a nuclear weapon. The Bush Administration's approach has not worked to date. What would the new administration do differently? What role do you envision for yourself in this process? Under what circumstances would it be appropriate for you or President-Elect Obama to engage in related talks?

The new Administration will present the Iranian regime with a clear choice: abandon your nuclear weapons program and support for terror and threats to Israel and there will be meaningful incentives; refuse, and we will ratchet up the pressure, with stronger unilateral sanctions; stronger multilateral sanctions in the Security Council; and sustained action outside the UN to isolate the Iranian regime. A nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable, and all elements of American power are on the table to prevent Iran from obtaining a

nuclear weapon – that must begin with the power of aggressive and direct American diplomacy.

The Obama Administration will support tough, aggressive, and direct diplomacy, without preconditions, with our adversaries. Note that there is a distinction between preparations and preconditions. For possible negotiations with Iran, there must be careful preparation – including low-level talks, coordination with allies, the establishment of an agenda, and an evaluation of the potential for progress. The President-Elect has said that he is willing to engage in diplomacy with any leader, at a time and place of his choosing, if he believes that it can advance America’s interests.

The US should support and participate in ongoing efforts with our European allies and assemble an international coalition that will exert a collective will on Iran so that it is in their own interest to verifiably abandon their nuclear weapons efforts. We will carefully prepare for any negotiations— open up lines of communication, build an agenda, coordinate closely with our allies, and evaluate the potential for progress.

28. Does the administration intend to push for a new round of P5+1 negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program early on? What factors will inform the timing of these negotiations? When these talks occur, how would you seek to structure them to ensure Iran does not use them to stall for time as it continues its uranium enrichment activities? Would you seek to expand negotiations to include other issues of mutual interest, including Iraq and Afghanistan?

We will not sit down with Iran just for the sake of talking. But we are willing to lead tough and principled diplomacy with the appropriate Iranian leader at a time and place of our choosing – if, and only if – it can advance the interests of the United States. No decisions have been made regarding the timing, configuration, and scope of any discussions with Iran, but we will certainly coordinate closely with our allies as we move forward.

Through aggressive diplomacy, we can create new opportunities for progress. Even if diplomacy is unsuccessful, we will be better able to rally the world to our side, strengthen multilateral sanctions, and to convince the Iranian people that their own government is the author of its isolation.

29. In 2007, the U.S. and Iranian Ambassadors to Iraq met for three rounds of talks; they have not met since. Would you be supportive of continuing these talks? If so, should the dialogue focus on Iraq security issues, or be expanded to include other topics, as well?

As noted above, the incoming Administration will support tough negotiations with Iran and will be evaluating the best forums and interlocutors for that engagement. We have also supported direct engagement with Iran as a part of a diplomatic initiative involving all of Iraq's neighbors.

No decision has yet been made on the continuation of the specific talks that you identify.

30. Earlier this year, I and six of my colleagues wrote to President Bush, to encourage the establishment of a U.S. interests section in Iran. In November, Secretary Rice announced that although President Bush had made a decision "in principle" last summer to open an interests section, the decision would be left to the incoming administration. Have you made a decision regarding whether to open a U.S. interests section in Tehran?

The decision regarding whether to open a U.S. interests section in Tehran is under review and no decision has been made yet.

Israeli – Palestinian Peace Process

31. The November 2007 Annapolis peace conference did not meet its stated goal of concluding a two-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict by the end of 2008. How do you assess the prospects for the Israeli–Palestinian peace process in light of recent, ongoing, and future events? Do you think hopes for quick progress on the peace process have been dashed, as some suggest, by the recent crisis in Gaza? What has been achieved by the Annapolis process and how do you see your role in pushing those efforts forward? Does the April 2003 Road Map remain the operative mechanism for a two-state outcome?

President-Elect Obama has pledged to work actively from the beginning of his Administration to help Israel and the Palestinians achieve peace and security through a two-state solution, because this is in both parties' interests and because it is the United States' interests. Throughout 2008, he urged Israel

and the Palestinian Authority to make as much progress as possible in their negotiations that arose out of the Annapolis conference, so that a functioning process could be continued in 2009. And indeed, the parties report that progress has been made in these talks, which they hope to build upon. Our commitment is to help them build on that progress and achieve their goal of two states living side-by-side in peace and security. That commitment remains, even in the face of very difficult and challenging events, such as the recent events in Gaza and southern Israel. The Road Map, with the mutual obligations it places on the parties, remains one of the important bases for working toward a two-state solution.

32. By most accounts, the American-funded training efforts of Palestinian security forces have borne some fruit, particularly in Jenin and Hebron. Roughly 1,000 Palestinian National Security Force (NSF) and Presidential Guard (PG) members have been trained and several hundred more are currently undergoing training in Jordan. How do you assess the performance of the units that have received American-supported training? What additional resources are required to continue making progress?

The Palestinian National Security Force and Presidential Guard members who have been trained in Jordan under the auspices of the United States Security Coordinator have performed well in early tests in Jenin and Hebron. This is an important element of strengthening Palestinian capabilities to enable the Palestinian Authority to meet its commitments to combat terrorism and maintain law and order, which are crucial to ensuring security for Israelis and improving daily life for Palestinians. The Congress has provided approximately \$161 million in funding for this successful program in fiscal years 2008 and 2009. If confirmed, I will be consulting with General Keith Dayton and others to determine appropriate funding levels for this program to continue to achieve positive results.

33. In 2008, there have been a number of high-profile missions in support of the Annapolis Peace Process: General Jim Jones, General Paul Selva, and General Keith Dayton have served respectively as special envoys for Middle East security, road-map monitoring, and Palestinian security coordination, with separate reporting channels to the Administration. Additionally, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair serves as the Quartet's special envoy. Is the current architecture in support of the Annapolis process appropriately coordinated, or would it make more sense to streamline the various security missions under a single full-time high-level envoy?

General Jones, General Selva, and General Dayton have each played important and constructive roles in advancing U.S. efforts to promote peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Former Prime Minister Blair has also made an excellent contribution as the Quartet's special envoy, promoting economic development and institution-building in the Palestinian areas. No decisions have been made about the personnel structure we will use to implement our Middle East peace efforts, but each of the important functions carried forward by the Generals and Prime Minister Blair will need to be continued in whatever structure we ultimately decide upon.

Arab Peace Initiative

34. Many believe that real progress on the peace process will require greater participation and the support of Arab countries in the region, many of which attended the Annapolis conference. What role do you envision for the Arab states in Israeli–Palestinian diplomacy going forward? Do you believe that the Arab Peace Initiative can provide a framework for future negotiations?

I believe the Arab states have an important role to play in advancing efforts to achieve peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Their chief means to do so are providing political and economic support to the Palestinian Authority, and taking steps toward normalization with Israel. The Arab Peace Initiative contains some constructive elements which could be important bases for negotiations and for proactive steps to give the initiative a more operational character. I look forward to discussing these opportunities with Israeli, Palestinian, and Arab leaders and encouraging progress in these efforts.

Syria

35. Until September, Israel and Syria were talking indirectly through Turkish mediation. Many observers believe that the talks proceeded as far as they could without direct American engagement. Do you believe that a U.S. role in facilitating Israeli–Syrian negotiations could move those talks forward? Do you support direct U.S. engagement if that would facilitate further progress? What is the likelihood that the parties will reach an agreement?

The United States and Syria have profound differences on important issues, and the President-Elect and I believe that engaging directly with Syria increases the possibility of making progress on changing Syrian behavior. In

these talks, we should insist on our core demands: cooperation in stabilizing Iraq; ending support for terrorist groups; stopping the flow of weapons to Hezbollah, and respect for Lebanon's sovereignty and independence.

The President-Elect believes that we must never force Israel to the negotiating table with Syria, but neither should we ever block negotiations when Israel's leaders decide that they may serve Israeli interests. We should engage directly to help Israel and Syria succeed in their peace efforts, which both parties have indicated could help advance the talks. The prospects of success in these talks are unknown, but we are committed to making every effort to help them succeed.

36. The last U.S. Ambassador to Syria was recalled for "urgent consultations" in the aftermath of the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. Since that time, the United States has not had an ambassador to Syria. Do you support sending an American ambassador to Damascus?

The President-Elect and I believe strongly that direct U.S. engagement with Syria will advance United States' interests. At this time, no decisions have been made regarding returning a U.S. ambassador to Damascus.

37. Although the U.S. embassy in Damascus remains open, American diplomats have been heavily restricted since February 2005 in their ability to interact with Syrian government officials, except on a narrow range of issues, such as Iraqi refugees. Do you support allowing U.S. diplomats more latitude in engaging with Syrian officials unless/until an ambassador is appointed?

We believe that direct U.S. engagement with Syria will advance United States' interests. I plan to consult with our chief of mission in Damascus to determine how best to carry out this principle in the context of the embassy's current structure.

38. The Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-Moon, announced recently that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, established by the United Nations to try suspects in the assassinations of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and other Lebanese politicians, would begin operations on March 1, 2009. How soon do you expect indictments to be issued and trials to begin? There has been speculation among some observers that Syria hopes to leverage peace negotiations with Israel to earn a reprieve from

prosecutions of top Syrian officials by the tribunal. What steps have been and should be taken to ensure the tribunal is insulated from political interference?

The United States should continue to support efforts to uncover the truth about the assassinations, and to insulate these efforts from political interference. I am encouraged to see that the Tribunal will officially begin operations on March 1, but as the head prosecutor recently stated, it is unclear when the Tribunal will bring indictments. The Security Council established various safeguards to ensure an objective and expeditious judicial process. First, it includes provisions on enhanced powers, so the Tribunal may take independent measures to prevent unreasonable delays. Second, it mandated a transparent appointment process of international officials, including the judges and prosecutor. Third, it includes provisions on the rights of victims to present their views. The Security Council explicitly requested that the Tribunal be based on "the highest international standards of criminal justice," and I will work with our international allies to ensure this pledge is fulfilled.

Global Climate Change

39. At the climate change negotiations last year in Bali, and again this year in Poznan, one of the greatest points of disagreement between industrialized and developing countries was the format and structure of funding mechanisms to support mitigation, adaptation and technology transfer. What do you believe are the most useful entities and structures for directing funds to build capacity in developing countries to reduce their emissions and manage the impacts of climate change?

President-Elect Obama spoke throughout the campaign about the need to develop partnerships and capacity in developing countries as a part of a global effort to combat climate change. He believes that technology transfer, adaptation assistance and support for mitigation in developing countries are key components of a global climate change deal. His Administration will pursue mechanisms to achieve these goals that are effective, transparent, and provide accountability.

40. In 1997, the debate over the Byrd-Hagel resolution clarified the sense of the Senate that any global climate change treaty must secure the participation of both developed and developing countries. That sentiment has not changed,

and it will guide our debate as we approach the Copenhagen climate change negotiations next year. Is it the position of the Obama administration that any global deal on climate change must secure some type of measurable, reportable and verifiable actions from China, India and the other rapidly industrializing countries?

President-Elect Obama believes that climate change is a global problem that requires a global solution. The Bali Action Plan 2007 states that the post-Kyoto agreement should include measurable, reportable and verifiable actions by developing countries. The Obama Administration will pursue such commitments during upcoming negotiations.

41. A number of prominent national security officials and organizations have highlighted the security implications of climate change, culminating in a November report from the National Intelligence Council emphasizing that climate change will intensify food and water scarcity, serving as a threat multiplier around the globe. For its part, the UN has estimated that there may be as many as 50 million “climate refugees” by 2010. How will the Obama administration integrate climate change into its national security planning and response operations?

President-Elect Obama agrees that global climate change is likely to impact U.S. national security. He has warned that competition over resources could lead to conflict and population movements, and has called our dependence on foreign oil and gas a national security crisis. He plans to fulfill existing legal requirements to integrate such considerations into national security planning, and will work with Congress to identify and define additional measures as appropriate.

Terrorism

42. In July 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated that “military efforts to capture or kill terrorists are likely to be subordinate to measures to promote local participation in government and economic programs to spur development, as well as efforts to understand and address the grievances that often lie at the heart of insurgencies.” Many have called for a new approach to terrorism that would re-conceptualize the “war on terror” as a “global counterinsurgency” that places military action in its proper context alongside our moral authority, diplomatic persuasion and development assistance. What are your views as to how we can craft a more effective worldwide

strategy that takes our military operations to capture and kill terrorists and folds them into a larger “information war” designed to win hearts and minds and prevent possible terrorists from ever being recruited?

I agree with Secretary Gates’ assessment. President-Elect Obama has made it clear that we need a comprehensive strategy to fight terrorism that balances and integrates military force, diplomacy, intelligence, law enforcement, financial action, economic might, and moral suasion. He has also stressed that our capacity must be driven by this strategy, saying that while the finest military in the world is adapting to the challenges of the 21st century, it cannot counter insurgent and terrorist threats without civilian counterparts who can carry out economic and political reconstruction missions – sometimes in dangerous places. He promised to strengthen these civilian capacities, recruiting our best and brightest to take on this challenge by increasing both the numbers and capabilities of our diplomats, development experts, and other civilians who can work alongside our military. This new construct will integrate all aspects of American might.

If confirmed by the Senate, I will also work with the President in launching a program of public diplomacy that is a coordinated effort across his Administration. And as others learn about America’s ways through their conversations with Americans, American citizens will listen and learn about people of other cultures and countries.

43. President-Elect Obama has called nuclear terrorism “the gravest danger we face.” The State Department, along with several other agencies, has a critical role to play to address this threat. In your view, has the United States done enough in its diplomatic relations with other countries to demonstrate the priority it attaches to nuclear security and the prevention of nuclear terrorism? What additional steps would you take to convey a sense of urgency and convince political leaders around the world that the threat of nuclear terrorism is real and that immediate steps are needed by every government to reduce this danger?

Terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, is indeed the gravest security threat we face today. The most effective way of preventing nuclear terrorism is to secure weapons-usable nuclear materials at their source so that they are not vulnerable to theft or seizure by terrorist groups. The Obama Administration plans to secure all nuclear weapons and materials at vulnerable sites worldwide within four years. It will also work to phase out the use of highly enriched uranium in the civil nuclear sector, strengthen international intelligence and police cooperation to prevent WMD terrorism, and help build the capacity of governments around the world to prevent the theft or diversion of nuclear materials.

44. During the campaign, President-Elect Obama said he would appoint a White House coordinator for nuclear security, specifically a deputy national security adviser to be in charge of coordinating all U.S. programs aimed at reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism and weapons proliferation. What are your views on such an appointment? Should that position be Senate-confirmed as required by an existing statute? Should it cover all weapons of mass destruction or only nuclear terrorism?

The Obama Administration will follow through on the President-Elect's campaign pledge to appoint a White House Coordinator to address the threat of nuclear terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Among the Coordinator's responsibilities will be to exercise budgetary oversight over all U.S. programs related to nuclear security and bio-security.

Nuclear Weapons and the START Treaty

45. As you know, the START Treaty is due to expire on December 5, 2009.

This treaty has served as a vital mechanism of stability and transparency in post-Cold War relations between the United States and Russia. The 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, or Moscow Treaty, has no separate verification measures, and limits deployed U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear warheads to a range of 1,700-2,200 for only a single day, December 31, 2012. The Bush administration has reportedly shared with Russia a START proposal that would, like the Moscow Treaty, limit operationally deployed strategic warheads, and would maintain some of the START Treaty's verification mechanisms. Do you plan to seek a legally binding replacement for the START Treaty that will enter into force by December 5, 2009?

The Obama Administration will seek deep, verifiable reductions in all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons – whether deployed or non-deployed, strategic or non-strategic. As a first step, we will seek a legally binding agreement to replace the current START Treaty which, as you point out, expires in December 2009.

46. If a replacement cannot be ratified and brought into force by that time, what options will you consider? Should the United States, Russia, and the other States Parties to the START Treaty (e.g., Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine) extend the Treaty for five years, as permitted under Article XVII of the treaty, while negotiations for a substitute treaty continue?

If an agreement cannot be reached, a mutually-acceptable means should be found to give the negotiators more time, without allowing key measures, including essential monitoring and verification provisions, to lapse. Ending the Cold War practice of keeping nuclear weapons ready for launch on a moment's notice should also be a priority, if it can be done in a mutual and credible manner.

47. In your view, how important is it for a follow-on to the START Treaty to lead to further reductions in the numbers of deployed and reserve U.S. and Russian warheads? Should those reductions go below Moscow Treaty numbers? Should negotiations on a substantial follow-on to the START Treaty be delayed until the legally required Nuclear Posture Review is completed?

The Obama Administration plans to set a new direction in nuclear weapons policy, one that reflects the changed security conditions of the 21st century and that shows the world that the U.S. takes seriously its existing commitment under the Nonproliferation Treaty to pursue nuclear disarmament. Such a new direction should be fully explored and elaborated in the upcoming Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that is mandated by statute. While some of the key elements of the revised approach may not take shape until the NPR is completed, negotiations on the next step in the arms reduction process – replacing the current START Treaty – can begin even while the posture review is underway.

Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty

48. Both you and the President-Elect have expressed your intention to work with the Senate to win its advice and consent to U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). In preparing for such an effort, what are the most important lessons that you take from the Senate's 1999 rejection of a resolution of ratification on the Treaty? How do you plan to address the substantive concerns that were raised in that debate?

The President-Elect and I are both strongly committed to Senate approval of the CTBT and to launching a diplomatic effort to bring on board other states whose ratifications are required for the treaty to enter into force. A lesson learned from 1999 is that we need to ensure that the administration work intensively with Senators so they are fully briefed on key technical issues on which their CTBT votes will depend, especially the issues of how well the treaty can be verified and how well the reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile can be maintained without nuclear testing. Substantial progress has been made in the last decade in our ability to verify a CTBT and ensure stockpile reliability. It will be crucial to make sure that the Senate receives the best scientific evidence available on these two issues as well as on other questions relevant to the merits of the CTBT.

49. For the last several years, the State Department has requested insufficient funding to pay all of our voluntary contributions to the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (Preparatory Commission). While Congressional actions have restored some of the funding, this shortfall has impaired construction of the International Monitoring System and has jeopardized U.S. voting rights at the Preparatory Commission. What are your views with regard to allowing sufficient and timely funding to make effective contributions to the Preparatory Commission?

The Obama Administration will fully support the CTBT's International Monitoring System, which gives the United States better capability to detect and identify very low-yield nuclear tests than we would have on our own. We will also support the work of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization's Preparatory Commission and will want to ensure that it is adequately funded. On specific questions regarding the timing and level of U.S. funding, the new Administration will want to review the situation and consult with Congress on how to proceed.

Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty

50. The Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism recommends that the United States should work "to build international support for the negotiation of a treaty halting the production of fissile materials for military purposes." The Conference on Disarmament for several years has been unable to achieve a consensus to allow negotiations to proceed. What importance do you attach to finding a way for negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty to proceed? What are the roadblocks to progress, as you see them, and how might we address them?

The President-Elect made it clear during the campaign that he supports the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. Such a treaty could help avoid destabilizing arms races in regions such as South Asia and, by limiting the amount of fissile material worldwide, could facilitate the task of securing such weapons-usable materials against theft or seizure by terrorist groups. It would also demonstrate the willingness of the NPT nuclear weapon states to fulfill their obligation under NPT Article VI to pursue nuclear disarmament. However, for over a decade, the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to achieve a consensus to allow negotiations to proceed – in part because of the difficulty of reaching

agreement on a work program but, more fundamentally, because some key states wish to continue producing fissile materials for nuclear weapons or at least keep open the option for such production in the future. The Obama Administration will work to build the necessary support to get negotiations underway. One step it will take is to return to the policy of previous Republican and Democratic administrations and end the current policy of declaring that a fissile material cutoff treaty should not contain international verification provisions.

Nuclear Nonproliferation/2010 NPT Review Conference

51. The Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism recently recommended that the United States “should work internationally toward strengthening the nonproliferation regime, reaffirming the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons.” The 2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which is scheduled for April and May 2010, provides one opportunity to pursue that goal. The 2000 Review Conference reached a consensus that 13 practical steps should be taken in order to demonstrate progress on the arms control and disarmament obligations set out in Article VI of the NPT. The 2005 Review Conference ended without reaching substantive consensus on next steps. What importance do you attach to the 2010 Review Conference, and what steps will you take in order to avoid the outcome of the 2005 Review Conference?

The President-Elect said during the campaign that he supports the goal of working toward a world without nuclear weapons. The Obama Administration will place great importance on strengthening the NPT and the nonproliferation regime in general. It will encourage all states to support more rigorous IAEA verification measures, tighter restrictions on transfers of sensitive technologies, and stronger means of enforcing compliance.

52. Though some of the conditions surrounding many of the 13 practical steps agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference have changed in the intervening years, do you see value in pursuing a comparable set of actions at the 2010 Review Conference?

The 2010 NPT Review Conference will provide an opportunity to reach agreement on such steps. But gaining the necessary support among NPT parties will require the United States and the other nuclear powers to

demonstrate that they take seriously their obligations to pursue nuclear disarmament. While the conditions surrounding agreement on the so-called “thirteen steps” at the 2000 NPT Review Conference have changed, support for a similar package of measures at the 2010 conference could help build the wide support needed to bolster the NPT regime.

IAEA

53. The Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism recently concluded that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) “is constrained in serving as the world’s nuclear watchdog because its staff is aging and its budget has increased little over the past decade.” The Commission called on the United States to “lead an international effort to update and improve IAEA capabilities.” What steps do you envision taking to address the resource constraints facing the IAEA?

Especially if the world’s reliance on nuclear power increases substantially in coming decades, a huge burden will be placed on the IAEA to ensure that civil nuclear facilities and activities are not diverted to military uses and that nuclear facilities and materials are secure against theft or seizure by terrorist groups. The IAEA is understaffed and under-resourced for the current and growing responsibilities placed on it by the international community. That is why the President-Elect has called for doubling the IAEA’s budget over the next four years. We also favor strengthening the Agency’s verification capabilities by promoting universal adherence to the Additional Protocol and by expanding the Agency’s verification authorities beyond those contained in the Additional Protocol to provide more effective means of detecting clandestine facilities and activities.

Nuclear Fuel Bank

54. The Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism has recommended that the United States should lead the international effort to create a bank that would guarantee countries a supply of nuclear reactor fuel. The United States has already transferred \$50 million to the IAEA to support the creation of a fuel bank, and the European Union recently agreed to contribute up to €25 million to support the effort. But the IAEA Board of Governors has not agreed on the mechanisms and rules under which the fuel bank will actually operate. What importance do you attach to actually expending the funds pledged and bringing the fuel bank into reality? Should there be a parallel effort to assure countries of affordable spent fuel services?

President-Elect Obama and I strongly supported legislation providing \$50 million to the IAEA for the creation of an international nuclear fuel bank. We believe the United States should work with other countries and the IAEA to put in place new mechanisms, including an international fuel bank that would allow countries to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without increasing the risks of nuclear proliferation. An international fuel bank could reassure countries embarking on or expanding nuclear power programs that, as long as they comply with their nonproliferation obligations, they could reliably purchase reactor fuel in the event that their existing fuel supplies were cut off. This would reduce any incentives a country genuinely interested in nuclear energy might have for going to the trouble and expense of building its own enrichment or reprocessing facilities. Assuring countries of reliable spent fuel services (e.g., long-term storage) would serve the same goal of reducing incentives for acquiring indigenous fuel-cycle facilities.

Organization of the State Department for Arms Control and Non-proliferation

55. The bureaus of the State Department that report to the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security have undergone numerous organizational and personnel changes in the last decade. Do you envision taking any major steps early in your tenure as Secretary to further alter the organization of the bureaus reporting to this Under Secretary? What steps will you take to ensure that, in particular, the Political-Military Affairs Bureau and the Verification, Compliance, and Implementation Bureau have the people and the resources they need to carry out their important missions?

Because President-Elect Obama and I place such high importance on arms control, nonproliferation, and other political-military issues, I am giving special attention to the three bureaus of the State Department that report to the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security. It is essential that those bureaus be well organized and well staffed with first-rate professionals, both from the Civil Service and Foreign Service. I am currently reviewing the situation and am determined to take whatever steps may be necessary to ensure that those bureaus are fully capable of doing the crucial work we will be expecting of them in coming years. I will keep Congress fully apprised of my plans in this area.

UN Convention on the Law of the Sea

56. In 1994, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (the Convention) was submitted to the U.S. Senate for accession and ratification. While the Foreign Relations Committee has favorably reported this treaty in prior years, the full Senate has not yet taken it up. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice wrote to this committee that the State Department supported "early Senate action" on the Convention. At the time, the Administration's Treaty Priority List expressed an "urgent need" for Senate approval of the Convention. More recently, President Obama stated in September 2008 that he will "work actively to ensure that the U.S. ratifies the Law of the Sea Convention." If confirmed, do you intend to make ratification of the Convention your top treaty priority at State?

The President-Elect and I both supported ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention as Senators and, as the question notes, he has publicly committed to working actively to ensure that the U.S. ratifies the Convention.

The Convention remains an important piece of unfinished treaty business. If confirmed, its ratification will be one of my top treaty priorities at State, and the new administration will work with the Senate to secure approval.

57. If the Foreign Relations Committee were to report out the Convention in the 111th Congress, how would the Administration plan to work with the Senate to help bring the Convention and Implementing Agreement to a successful floor vote?

As in the case of any treaty that the President supports, the Administration would work closely with this Committee and the Senate leadership on devising and implementing a strategy for successful approval of the treaty by the full Senate.

58. Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Admiral Gary Roughead, the Chief of Naval Operations, support approval of the Convention. Admiral Roughead stated to the Senate Armed Services Committee that "accession to the Law of the Sea Convention is in our national security interests." Do you agree with him, and if so, why? What effect, if any, would accession have on the U.S. military's ability to conduct ongoing or future operations? Would accession in any way restrict efforts to prevent the shipment of weapons of mass destruction or any other non-proliferation programs, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative?

The incoming Administration agrees with the Chief of Naval Operations, and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all of whom endorsed the Convention during the 110th Congress. Joining the Convention will advance the interests of the U.S. military. As the world's leading maritime power, the United States benefits more than any other nation from the navigation provisions of the Convention. Those provisions, which establish international consensus on the extent of jurisdiction that States may exercise off their coasts, preserve and elaborate the rights of the U.S. military to use the world's oceans to meet national security requirements.

Joining the Convention will enhance, not restrict, our ability to interdict shipment of weapons of mass destruction on the ocean. The Convention's navigation provisions derive from the 1958 law of the sea conventions, to which the United States is a party, and also reflect customary international law accepted by the United States. As such, the Convention will not affect applicable maritime law or policy regarding interdiction of weapons of mass

destruction, their means of delivery, and related materials.

Like the 1958 conventions, the LOS Convention recognizes numerous legal bases for taking enforcement action against vessels and aircraft suspected of engaging in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including exclusive port and coastal State jurisdiction in internal waters and national airspace; coastal State jurisdiction in the territorial sea and contiguous zone; exclusive flag State jurisdiction over vessels on the high seas (which the flag State may, either by general agreement in advance or approval in response to a specific request, waive in favor of other States); and universal jurisdiction over stateless vessels.

Nor will the Convention undermine the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). PSI requires participating countries to act consistent with national legal authorities and “relevant international law and frameworks,” which includes the law reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention. Finally, nothing in the Convention impairs the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense (a point which is reaffirmed in the Resolution of Advice and Consent proposed by the Committee in the 110th Congress).

National Security Reform

59. Last November, a prominent group of experts and practitioners from the congressionally- mandated Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) released a report that called for significant improvements in how the U.S. coordinates and implements national security strategy and programs. Do you agree that fundamental reform of our national security system, structures, and processes is needed so that this country can anticipate, prepare for, and respond to the kinds of complex and diffuse threats we face in the 21st Century? What types of reform are required?
60. National security missions increasingly require inputs from multiple departments to be successful. The PNSR report has concluded that existing interagency mechanisms are insufficient to achieve unity of purpose, effort, and command. Instead, PNSR has recommended that we provide interagency mechanisms backed by specific legal authorities related to the U.S. government’s capabilities to accomplish particular missions. Would you support such efforts? Would you be willing to cede authority over some of the assets and resources of your department so that an interagency team can accomplish its mission?

The President Elect has made it clear that the United States must enhance our ability to use, balance and integrate all elements of national power – military, diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, economic, and moral – to achieve our national security goals. He has called for the process of preparing the National Security Strategy (required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986) to determine the appropriate inter-agency infrastructure to maximize the use of all elements of our national power. This exhaustive review will include an examination of force sizing, intelligence agencies, and weapons systems, as well as the development of long-term plans to deal with emerging threats like cyber-terrorism. We are aware of the effort of the Project on National Security Reform report and we look forward to consulting with Congress on the appropriate structure for our national security agencies.

Foreign Aid Reform & Rewriting the Foreign Assistance Act

61. Many are calling for substantial reform of U.S. foreign assistance programs, which have been criticized as fragmented and uncoordinated, failing to match resource allocations with strategic objectives, inefficient, and lacking capacity to ensure appropriate accountability, oversight and implementation. To what degree are you in support of such reform efforts? What would you identify as the highest priority areas in need of reform?

The President-Elect is committed to a strengthened and enhanced role for foreign assistance and development in our foreign policy, as am I. It is both right and smart for the United States to renew its leadership as a nation that seeks to promote opportunity and security around the world. To that end, the President-Elect has committed to doubling U.S. foreign assistance over his first term, and I look forward to working closely with the Congress to fulfill this goal. The President-Elect has said that the current economic crisis could slow increases in foreign assistance.

Our foreign assistance infrastructure must be able to meet the challenges we face today while anticipating those in the months and years ahead. We should look at areas which can be better coordinated and streamlined, and would look forward to engaging the Committee on ideas for reform. The President-Elect has stressed the need for clearer leadership and coordination in Washington, and continued efforts to prevent abuses and corruption among recipient countries. Similarly, we should look at those areas which have

proved effective and build on those successes, while determining if poorly performing initiatives are able to be improved.

62. Many argue that to increase effectiveness, it is important to establish a strengthened and independent development agency separate from direct control and budgetary oversight of the State Department — a “USAID 2.0.” Some would even elevate this development agency to a cabinet-level department. To what extent would you support these proposals? Do you believe U.S. foreign assistance would be better served operating in an independent capacity? Is it worth revisiting the existing USAID operational model in favor of something significantly different?

USAID, like almost every federal agency, can be improved. President-Elect Obama shares the concerns that many members of this Committee have expressed about the ability of USAID and the other government aid agencies to provide help effectively and in a manner where foreign nations can sustain the progress that the United States helps to bring about. While there have been lifesaving and life-changing acts brought about by USAID, supporters and critics alike believe that the agency can do a better job at fulfilling its mission.

The President-Elect’s commitment to a strengthened and enhanced role for development in our foreign policy means a reinvigorated USAID, playing a central role in the formulation and implementation of critical development strategies. We have to make sure that we rebuild USAID so that is more nimble in the face of change, less reliant on contractors doing work that ought to be carried out by our own government professionals, and uses tax dollars responsibly. We are still in the process of thinking through the precise organizational design – and I look forward to the advice of the Committee and the Congress as we consider our approach. In moving forward with this process, the goal of the President-Elect – and my goal – is to enhance USAID’s capacity and standing to carry out its vital missions.

63. Others contend that U.S. foreign assistance should be closely linked to U.S. foreign policy priorities and should be integrated into the State Department’s operations to ensure close coordination. To what degree should the State Department exert policy oversight and control over U.S. foreign assistance programs? How would you ensure that development programs retained their distinctiveness and were not relegated to second priority status?

Efforts to modernize U.S. development and foreign assistance programs will require a substantial investment of time and effort. But the President-Elect believes that these efforts can pay significant returns in global stability, security, and prosperity. In addition, this modernization will increase accountability, transparency, and innovation. During the campaign, President-Elect Obama pledged to take a look at ways to improve the distribution of U.S. foreign assistance, including the possibility of consolidating key foreign assistance programs in an elevated and empowered USAID. I can assure this Committee that, if confirmed as Secretary of State, I will look to you for ideas and input. I also look forward to working closely with Secretary Gates, General Jones, and other members of the new administration on this challenge.

As for the possible relegation of development programs to a second-priority status, let me be clear: the Obama Administration is committed to a robust foreign assistance program.

64. What can Congress do to support foreign assistance reform efforts? Many have called for the Congress to rewrite the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Do you think this step is warranted? If so, what priority areas would you identify in need of legislative reform?

Congress – and particularly this Committee – will play an indispensable role in providing advice and guidance about the future of U.S. foreign assistance programs. As Secretary, I look forward to consulting with the Committee about foreign assistance priorities, and the implementation of those priorities. No decision has been made about the need for legislative reform.

65. There are at least 26 agencies variously responsible for different elements of foreign aid. How would you suggest reducing fragmentation and strengthening coordination? Should USAID's mandate be broadened to encompass all U.S. development programs (including those currently housed in other departments and agencies), as well as all humanitarian and post-conflict reconstruction & stabilization programs? Should the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the President's Emergency Plan for HIV/AIDS Relief be placed under the umbrella of a strengthened U.S. development agency?

The President-Elect has committed to coordinate and consolidate programs currently housed in more than 20 executive agencies so as to enhance

effectiveness and accountability. He and I are also committed to a restructured, empowered, and streamlined USAID. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the Congress as we review the best way to maximize the impact of these essential programs. The Administration will review what programs can be consolidated to elevate the importance of development in our overall foreign policy, and improving budget planning, coordination, and execution.

66. President-Elect Obama has articulated a far-reaching and detailed platform to elevate and strengthen U.S. diplomacy and development assistance as critical tools for foreign policy and national security. His commitments include: doubling foreign assistance to \$50 billion by 2012, investing at least \$2 billion in a global education fund, increasing funding to combat HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria to \$50 billion over 5 years and ending all deaths from malaria by 2015. Do you believe that U.S. foreign assistance is under-resourced? What priority areas require more resources? How do you intend to advocate for these commitments in the current budgetary environment?

President-Elect Obama said during the campaign that he would double foreign assistance to \$50 billion during his first term in office. After the onset of the economic crisis, he said it could take slightly longer to phase in this increase by the end of his first term due to the budgetary restrictions created by the need to confront the economic crisis. We will ensure that these new resources are invested wisely with strong accountability measures and directed towards strategic goals.

President-Elect Obama identified key priorities for any development program in his Administration, including: fighting extreme global poverty; achieving the Millennium Development Goals; fighting corruption; eliminating the global education deficit; enhancing U.S. leadership in the effort to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis and improving global health infrastructure; providing sustainable debt relief to developing countries; expanding prosperity through training, partnerships, and expanded opportunities for small and medium enterprise; supporting developing countries in adapting to the challenges of a changing climate; reforming the IMF and World Bank; and supporting effective, accountable, democratic institutions and governments. If confirmed as Secretary of State, I look forward to working with this Committee and your colleagues in the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs to achieve these priorities.

67. The MCC has been one of President Bush's signature development programs. It has been both praised as encompassing innovative and creative ideas, as well as criticized for being too slow to disburse funds once a compact has been signed, not demonstrating results on the ground quickly enough, and being inadequately coordinated with other U.S. foreign assistance programs. What reforms would you advocate to strengthen the MCC?

President-Elect Obama supports the MCC, and the principle of greater accountability in our foreign assistance programs. It represents a worthy new approach to poverty reduction and combating corruption. However, there are challenges within the MCC. Pace of implementation is certainly one challenge, as is the danger of a lack of coordination with overall U.S. foreign assistance. The Obama Administration looks forward to working to build on the promise of the MCC as we move forward with modernizing U.S. foreign assistance programs.

Budget Issues

68. The U.S. National Security Strategies for 2002 and 2006 divide our national security apparatus into three components: defense, diplomacy and development. However, the International Affairs Budget represents less than 7% of our nation's national security budget. In July 2008, Secretary Gates stated: "Our diplomatic leaders...must have the resources and political support needed to fully exercise their statutory responsibilities in leading America's foreign policy." What efforts do you plan to undertake to secure greater funding of the International Affairs Budget?

America's national security interests require a vigorous and well-funded State Department. I am concerned that the Department's funding is insufficient to the task.

Both President-Elect Obama and I believe that our diplomacy needs to be more robust. In keeping with that goal, he has called for a 25 percent increase in Foreign Service staffing, opening more consulates, and a doubling of our foreign assistance levels during his first term in office. We clearly also need to invest urgently in the Department's technological and other infrastructure platform, so that our diplomacy can be both efficient and effective.

The Obama Administration plans to put forward a robust FY2010 budget request. I look forward to working closely with you and your colleagues to ensure that the Department is funded to achieve its goals on behalf of the American people.

69.State has recently been short positions in Iraq, Afghanistan, areas of emerging importance, and in new language and functional requirements, among other areas. What is the nature and scope of existing shortfalls in these and other high-priority areas for your department?

All of us should be proud of what the men and women of our Foreign Service do each day to advance America's interests abroad. They and their families also deserve our gratitude for stepping up to the demands of war zone service in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Department's personnel system has been strained by staffing needs in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, leaving positions at many other important posts unfilled. We also need increased personnel to support a stronger diplomatic presence in countries of emerging importance to America's security and economic interests, and to tackle stabilization and humanitarian needs around the world. A training float is also essential if our diplomats are to learn the critical language and project management skills needed for success.

The 25 percent increase in Foreign Service staffing that President-Elect Obama has called for would do much to address these needs. That request is very much in line with the Department's own internal analysis, and with recommendations made by outside observers.

I look forward to working closely with the Congress in order to obtain the funding needed to realize this personnel increase as a high priority.

Role of Military in Foreign Policy

70.Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has said that "the United States military has become more involved in a range of activities that in the past were perceived to be the exclusive province of civilian agencies and organizations...This has led to concern among many organizations...about what's seen as a creeping "militarization" of some aspects of America's foreign policy. This is not an entirely unreasonable sentiment." Are you

concerned about this supposed trend towards the militarization of our foreign policy?

Improving the State Department's civilian capacity to respond to international crises will be a top priority for the Obama Administration – and the Department. We need to better integrate the military, the State Department, and other civilian agencies in stabilization and aid efforts. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Defense Secretary Gates and other members of the national security team to strike the right balance.

71. The Defense Department has been surprisingly vocal about calling for more civilian resources and capacity. Secretary Gates: “It has become clear that America’s civilian institutions of diplomacy and development have been chronically undermanned and underfunded for far too long – relative to what we spend on the military, and more important, relative to the responsibilities and challenges our nation has around the world.” What do you think it will take to bring civilian institutions up to the task? What reforms, investments and changes need to occur so civilians can be effective counterparts to the military? What is preventing these reforms from taking place currently? If the leaders of the State and Defense Departments are in such close agreement about the need for more resources for civilian national security agencies, do you see any possibility of reducing DoD’s share of the budget to make resources available? Or do we need to simply accept that America’s national security requires much larger State Department and USAID budgets, along with large military budgets?

The President-Elect has said that we cannot counter insurgent and terrorist threats without civilian counterparts who can carry out economic and political reconstruction missions -- sometimes in dangerous places. He has pledged to strengthen these civilian capacities, recruiting our best and brightest to take on this challenge, and to increase both the numbers and capabilities of our diplomats, development experts, and other civilians who can work alongside our military

I agree with Secretary Gates that “America’s civilian institutions of diplomacy and development have been chronically undermanned and underfunded for far too long.” In order to equip the State Department with the tools that it needs to address today’s challenges, we will need to invest additional resources in the Department. President-Elect Obama has also called for better integration of federal agencies and the military in

stabilization and aid efforts. Specifically, he has called for the creation of Mobile Development Teams (MDTs) that bring together personnel from the military, the Pentagon, the State Department, and USAID, fully integrating U.S. government efforts in counter-terror, state-building, and post-conflict operations. He has also called for the establishment of an expeditionary capability within non-Pentagon agencies (State Department, US Agency for International Development, Homeland Security, Justice, Treasury, Agriculture, and Health and Human Services, etc.) to deploy personnel where they are needed. These civilians will be integrated with, and sometimes operate independently from, our military expeditionary capabilities.

72. The dominant mode of cooperation among the State Department, USAID and the U.S. military on development operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has been the PRT model. Do you view this model as successful, and will you recommend continuing to use PRTs in other places as the need arises?

The President-Elect believes that we need to learn from the use of PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan to build upon their successes while addressing any shortcomings.

The PRTs across Iraq and Afghanistan confront different conditions and challenges, and consequently differ in structure, focus, and results. As new situations arise, the Obama Administration will carefully consider what tools will best accomplish our goals including the future use of PRTs. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the national security team in reviewing the PRT model, considering its applications elsewhere, and consulting with this Committee and the Congress as we make decisions.

Stabilization and Reconstruction

73. A key lesson from Afghanistan and Iraq is that stabilization and reconstruction efforts are as important as war-fighting in achieving our national security priorities. The U.S. government lacks capacity and coherence in its efforts to assist stabilization and reconstruction in countries transitioning from war to peace. There is currently no entity within the US government that has the mandate and means to lead stabilization and reconstruction efforts. International cooperation, essential to success, is *ad hoc* and poorly managed. What steps should we take to address these deficiencies?

74. What do you believe is the appropriate role for the Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction (S/CRS)? Is it best served working out of the State Department? Or would it improve operational effectiveness if S/CRS and the Civilian Response Corps were relocated into USAID and consolidated with several other USAID offices? Will the administration be requesting additional funding for the Office in the upcoming supplemental or in the FY2010 budget?

As the Committee knows, the Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction was created several years ago, and its functions were codified last year by legislation sponsored by Senator Lugar and Vice President-Elect Biden. Their legislation is consistent with the President-Elect's goal to build civilian capacity that can be deployed on short notice to help stabilize countries in urgent need. Stabilization and reconstruction is a mission that is of growing importance to our national security, and it is also important that the State Department have the resources and authorities to carry out this function effectively. An effective stabilization and reconstruction function within State will both reduce the burden on our armed forces and lead to better coordination among our civilian agencies and with the Pentagon to act effectively to stabilize and rebuild societies at risk of or emerging from conflict. I believe that the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the State Department has made a lot of progress despite a number of challenges it faced in implementing its mandate. If confirmed, I look forward to enhancing its capacity and to working closely with the Committee to ensure the State Department has the means and the organization to carry out these important duties effectively.

State Department Operations

75. A recent study by the American Academy of Diplomacy calls for a rapid increase in resources, training and personnel for the State Department and related civilian agencies. It proposes adding 4,735 new hires at an annual cost of \$2 billion, as a minimum needed increase. It also calls for expanding public diplomacy programs at a cost of \$445 million by 2014. Do you support these proposals? Would you go further? What do you see as the priorities for increasing America's civilian capacity to more effectively execute U.S. foreign policy?

Current Foreign Service staffing clearly is insufficient to America's diplomatic needs in today's challenging world. The Academy's staffing

recommendation is broadly in line with President-Elect Obama's call for a 25 percent Foreign Service staffing increase. If confirmed, obtaining the funds needed to realize this staffing increase will be one of my highest management goals.

The Academy is, of course, correct in calling for a more effective public diplomacy effort to improve America's image and advance critical policy goals. We also need to do more to train our personnel for new demands, including those associated with reconstruction and stabilization missions.

I look forward to working with Congress to ensure that the Department of State is staffed and equipped to meet the many challenges that America faces abroad.

76. Do we need to rethink the current personnel system, including the foreign service system, which forms the backbone of the State Department and USAID? As the HELP Commission Report on Foreign Assistance Reform pointed out, the current human resource management practice is still based on the expectation that individuals will remain with a single government agency until retirement. Does such a system make sense given present-day workforce realities? Does it hinder creativity, innovation and flexibility?

This is an issue facing the federal government as a whole. I am sure that the President-Elect's nominee to head the Office of Personnel Management will be looking closely at this matter.

For my part, I certainly want the Department to do everything possible to keep the talented men and women it works so hard to attract. If confirmed, we will evaluate how the Department's personnel policies stack up against those of America's best private sector companies and work to see that our training, assignment, and promotion policies are geared toward ensuring that our workforce is as creative, innovative and flexible as it needs to be in today's challenging world.

Finally, minorities remain under-represented at the Department. As Secretary, I will ask the Director General and the Office of Civil Rights to work vigorously to ensure that our diplomatic corps reflects the diversity of American society.

Foreign Service Pay Reform

77. Under existing law, Foreign Service (FS) personnel stationed in the United States receive a salary adjustment that is based on comparable private sector salaries in their locality (e.g., Washington, DC). Although armed services personnel receive a similar comparability adjustment while stationed overseas, FS personnel do not, despite typically serving two-thirds of their careers abroad. Some have argued that the resulting pay disparity in 2008 effectively amounted to a 20.89 percent pay cut for FS members serving overseas. In 2009, that disparity is expected to grow to 23.10 percent. Do you intend to make correction of the FS pay disparity a top management priority at State? If so, how?

Rectifying this pay disparity will indeed be a high priority for me.

At heart, this is an issue of fairness. As you have noted, Foreign Service Officers are required to spend significant portions of their careers abroad. The loss of salary income they incur is grossly unfair, all the more so given that they are compensated less than colleagues at other agencies with whom they work side-by-side in service to our country. We cannot expect to retain the best talent in these conditions.

I know that this issue has been put before the Congress in previous years. I hope that we can work together to redress this matter on a priority basis.

Georgia

78. How has the United States recalibrated its policy toward Russia in the aftermath of the country's disproportionate military response in Georgia? Now that we have had a few months to digest recent developments in Georgia, how do the salient facts of the Russian-Georgian conflict inform your view of our policy towards Russia and Georgia?

Whatever sequence of events precipitated conflict within Georgia's borders in August 2008, the Russian military response was disproportionate and illegal, a fact recognized widely within the international community. Russia's decision to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states was also disturbing. The United States must work closely with our allies and friends throughout the world to ensure that the Russian government's decision to undermine Georgia sovereignty does not gain international legitimacy.

As we have begun to go through a multiyear \$1 billion assistance package assembled by the Bush Administration and approved by Congress last fall, the United States and our allies must help to rebuild Georgia. Collapse of Georgia's economy or democracy would embolden those inside Russia who support the use of military force to achieve Russian goals and would weaken democratic forces throughout the region. The Georgian government's recent pledges to strengthen democratic institutions are a positive sign, a demonstration of the learning and recalibration that can occur in democracies.

The United States can support Georgian territorial integrity, economic recovery, and democratic development and also work with Russia on issues of common strategic interest. The United States and Russia have many mutual interests, including countering nuclear proliferation, reducing our nuclear arsenals, expanding trade and investment opportunities, and fighting Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Russia's recent choices -- not our decisions -- threaten this future and remind us that peace and security in Europe cannot be taken for granted. At the same time, I look forward to working with my Russian counterparts on those issues of common interest even when we disagree about other issues.

79. Do you believe that Russian leaders view democratic government in Georgia or any other country within what President Medvedev has called Russia's "sphere of influence" as a threat? How should the West respond?

The United States and our allies must remain unequivocal in rejecting the principle of spheres of interests and affirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries in Russia's neighborhood. Helping these countries strengthen their sovereignty will include not only diplomatic and economic support but also developing a strategy for reducing their dependence on Russian energy exports. In parallel, we also must seek a more constructive relationship with Russia, as improved relations between the West and Russia might help to demonstrate to the Russian leadership that their long-term interests are best served by becoming a stakeholder in the international community and not served as well by using coercive instruments to assert Russian power abroad.

80. The United States has made a significant investment in the future of Georgia as an independent, democratic nation. What dividends are we seeing? How

would you assess the status of Georgia's democracy? What are the country's most pressing challenges? Are you satisfied with the safeguards that have been put in place to assure U.S. assistance to Georgia is spent appropriately? In your view, has the United States coordinated effectively with other donor countries to assure that assistance is used wisely?

Over the long haul, there is no question that American assistance to Georgia has yielded dividends regarding both Georgia's democracy and independence. In the last few years, however, independent evaluators such as Freedom House have recorded a decline in Georgian democratic practices. Obviously, Georgia's territorial integrity also has been weakened by the war last August.

The response to these setbacks should not be retreat but a better, smarter policy. The American aid package approved last year, coupled with the pledges of assistance made at the donors' conference last October, will help to begin rebuilding Georgia's infrastructure, which in turn will serve as an economic stimulus package to help jumpstart the Georgian economy.

Transparency regarding the spending of these resources is essential. Because democratic institutions facilitate oversight and accountability, deepening Georgian democratic practices must be a critical objective of our assistance. It is encouraging that Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and many other senior Georgian officials have expressed a similar recommitment to strengthening Georgian democratic institutions.

81. Georgia has expressed an interest in negotiating a free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States. Would you support an FTA with Georgia?

The United States has an interest in expanding export opportunities for American companies and securing the benefits of increased imports for the American consumer. The United States and our allies also have an interest in integrating Georgia into the Western community of democratic states, and trade can facilitate this process. I look forward to working together with Congress to create the proper legal framework for expanding trade between the United States and Georgia.

Russia

82. Which areas of our relationship with Russia offer the best prospects for cooperation going forward? Are there points of convergent interest where

we can work to improve relations? What incentives could we offer Russia to act more responsibly at home, in its neighborhood and on issues of common concern like arms control, counterterrorism, and Iran? What leverage do we have to change Russian behavior if incentives do not work?

President-Elect Obama seeks a future of cooperative engagement with the Russian government on matters of strategic importance, while standing up strongly for American values and international norms. That is my view as well. Some of Russia's recent actions have been reprehensible and they have disrupted its relations with the West. As we confront those actions, we must not shy away from pushing for more democracy, transparency, and accountability. Still, there can be no return to the Cold War. Russia is not the old Soviet Union, and this is not the 20th century. The new Administration will work with Russia on areas of common strategic interest like counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation, while pressuring Russia when it interferes with its neighbors and abuses power at home – for example on Georgia, where the President-Elect condemned Russia's escalation of the conflict and clear invasion of Georgia's territory and illegal recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. Real pressure on Russia will not come from rhetoric alone – it will come from a unified transatlantic alliance, and forging that unity will be one of my top priorities. If Russia refuses to abide by international norms, its standing in the international community will diminish.

The Obama Administration will seek deep, verifiable reductions in all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons – whether deployed or non-deployed, strategic or non-strategic. As a first step, we will seek a legally binding agreement to replace the current START Treaty which expires in December 2009. It is important that we not allow essential monitoring and verification provisions, which give us a better understanding of Russian strategic capabilities than we would have without them, to lapse. The Administration will also work with Russia in a mutual and verifiable manner to increase warning and decision time prior to launch of nuclear weapons.

83. For the last several years, the Russians have proven adept at dividing traditional allies within the Euro-Atlantic community. What steps would you take to develop a joint strategy for managing relations with Russia in cooperation with our European allies? Going forward, what are the prospects for forging a common approach to Russia given the arrival of a new administration?

America's national security interests require improved ties with our European allies and stronger Euro-Atlantic institutions. Russia's actions in Georgia last August highlight how important it is to work closely and effectively with our European allies to develop a unified approach to Russia, pursue energy security, and stand up for the rights of sovereign nations in Europe and Eurasia. The President-Elect has made it clear that a strong trans-Atlantic alliance is critical to our ability to encourage Russia to abide by international norms.

84. A number of observers have commented with increasing alarm on Russia's backsliding on democracy and human rights. How would you address this trend?

Democratic backsliding in Russia is real and disturbing. Yet, Russia's political system is not monolithic and pockets of pluralism, critical thinking, and independent actions exist in Russia today. Without any illusions about short-term fixes, our Administration must do what we can to support these democratic elements.

President-Elect Obama has made clear that we will not turn a blind eye to violations of human rights and democratic practices in the false belief that doing so will help us to secure Russian cooperation on other issues. At the same time, berating Russian leaders about democracy abuses also has not worked. Our Administration must rise above ineffectual bluster and empty threats on the one hand and business as usual on the other. We can cooperate with our Russian counterparts without pretending to be personal friends and without checking our values at the door.

To support democracy, transparent government, and the rule of law in Russia and the region, our Administration will strongly support funding for the Freedom Support Act (FSA) programs and ensure robust funding for the National Endowment for Democracy.

Eastern Europe and Eurasia

85. During the last several years, Russia utilized control over scarce energy resources — and an associated financial windfall — to pursue foreign policy goals that were often at odds with those of the United States. The recent reduction in global oil and gas prices along with increasing instability in

Russia's own economy might now erode Russia's ability to apply pressure on neighboring countries that seek independence from Moscow. Given these changing dynamics, what principles should guide U.S. policy in Eastern Europe and Eurasia? In particular, how can we work with our allies to decrease their dependence on Russia's energy supplies? How can we ensure that the region will be more hospitable to the development of independent, democratic governments?

U.S.-Russia relations have been become increasingly strained over the last several years. Russia's anti-democratic drift, threats and pressure against some of its neighbors, gas cutoffs to Ukraine and others, and especially the invasion and dismemberment of Georgia last summer have made it impossible for the United States to pursue business-as-usual with Moscow. That said, there has not been and will not be a return to the Cold War. The President-elect and I both seek to engage the Russian government on matters of strategic importance, while also standing up strongly for American values and international norms.

If confirmed, I will seek to engage Russia directly on a wide range of issues of potential cooperation, including strategic arms control, nuclear nonproliferation, terrorism, the environment, Afghanistan, and economic relations. I will make clear that we will not accept "spheres of influence" in Europe, but also that our two countries have many common interests that the Obama Administration stands ready to pursue with our counterparts in Moscow.

86. How do you assess the impact of the Russian military action against Georgia on neighboring countries? Do you believe it has caused them to reevaluate their strategic calculus?

Yes. Our NATO allies want to make sure that our Article 5 commitments to them are robust and we should signal that they are through contingency planning. Other non-NATO countries in the region with close ties to the West also have expressed new worries about their security. Developing a comprehensive new strategy for the entire region, which fosters stable peaceful relations between states and respect for sovereignty of all states in the region, is a central strategic challenge for our Administration and our partners in Europe.

87. At last year's summit in Bucharest, Romania, NATO did not issue Membership Action Plans for Ukraine and Georgia, but it did agree to a communiqué which establishes a firm commitment to eventual membership. At this December's NATO ministerial, the U.S. agreed not to put the MAP issue on the summit's agenda. Is NATO's door still open to Ukraine and Georgia, and if so, what does the likely road ahead look like for Ukraine's and Georgia's candidacies?

While there are different views among allies on the best way to promote eventual NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine, it is essential that we work closely with our allies to develop a common approach on Alliance enlargement. The NATO-Ukraine Commission and the NATO-Georgia Commission (established last summer) are other avenues available for deepening relations between the Alliance and Georgia and Ukraine. NATO's door must remain open to European democracies that meet membership criteria and can contribute to our common security. How and when new countries might join must be determined together with all our allies in the alliance.

Ukraine

88. Ukraine is a country of tremendous strategic and political importance, but it has struggled to develop a stable, functional government since the Orange Revolution brought democracy to the nation four years ago. If confirmed, what steps will you take to help Ukraine fully realize its democratic potential?

President-Elect Obama and I understand the importance of helping to consolidate democracy in Ukraine. The failure of democracy in Ukraine would deliver a blow to the democratic forces throughout the entire region, including inside Russia.

We will need to work with our partners in Ukraine to develop an anti-crisis strategy, including a solution to the current standoff between Ukraine and Russia regarding gas prices. Today, an even more dramatic economic meltdown is the greatest threat to Ukrainian democracy.

In the long run, a Ukraine firmly imbedded in Europe's institutional architecture will have the greatest chance at stability and prosperity. Our

Administration will encourage our European Union partners to strengthen their links with Ukraine, including creating a membership perspective.

Transatlantic Relations

89. The United States' alliance with the democracies of Europe ranks among our country's most valuable strategic assets. However, during the last eight years, relations with our European allies have frequently been strained and occasionally dysfunctional. What are your expectations for the Euro-Atlantic alliance going forward? If confirmed, what concrete steps would you take to revitalize the United States' partnership with the members of NATO and the European Union? What should our allies expect from the new Administration — and what should we expect from them?

The U.S. alliance with the democracies of Europe is a valuable strategic asset. Indeed, of the many global challenges we will face in the coming four years — from the financial crisis to global warming, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, terrorism and nonproliferation — there is not a single one on which we are not stronger when we benefit from the cooperation of our European allies. The President-Elect has pledged to reestablish America's strong partnership with our European allies and I intend to support him in that critical task. As the President-Elect has said, we will "treat allies with respect, repair America's damaged moral authority, and recreate a mutually beneficial partnership with our European friends." At the same time, "we will ask more of our European friends. A more responsible and cooperative America will look to Europe to uphold its own responsibilities on issues such as Afghanistan, Iran, terrorism, Africa and the environment."

90. There are numerous mechanisms available to the United States when engaging the countries of Europe — NATO, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and our bilateral relationships are four of the most prominent. If confirmed, which of these mechanisms do you plan to rely on most heavily? Would you propose firmer guidelines designating specific forums for the discussion of specific issues or prefer to rely upon a more *ad hoc* approach?

NATO, the EU, the OSCE, and our bilateral relationships in Europe all serve U.S. interests in different ways. I do not believe we should favor any one mechanism over the others but rather consider all of them potential tools in helping achieve our goals of peace, prosperity and stability not just in Europe

but around the world. There are, of course, differences among these forums – NATO includes a collective defense commitment while the EU has a much greater economic role, for example – but in a world in which defense, security, and prosperity are closely linked all of these institutions must form part of a coherent overall strategy.

91. In your view, is it time for NATO to adopt a new strategic concept? If so, when and how should the process of formulating that concept occur? What should we expect when that process is over?

If confirmed, I will work with the President, the Secretary of Defense and the rest of our national security team to explore the potential need for a new NATO Strategic Concept. NATO last updated its Strategic Concept in 1999, before threats like terrorism, energy insecurity, cyber attacks, and climate change were as apparent as they are today, and before NATO was engaged in global missions such as Afghanistan. A new Strategic Concept would provide an opportunity for NATO allies, among other things, to reiterate their commitment to Article 5; reconsider and address new and emerging threats to allied security; clarify NATO's relationship to the United Nations and other multilateral bodies; clarify the NATO-EU relationship; and address the issue of global partnerships and missions. The April 2009 NATO summit will provide a useful forum for discussing this issue with our key Alliance partners and forging a consensus on whether to draft a new Strategic Concept and, if so, on the timetable for doing so.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

92. The United States made significant investments to help bring peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s, but the situation in the country has received too little high-level attention in the intervening eight years. Bosnia-Herzegovina is currently facing a serious political crisis that threatens much of what the country has achieved since the signing of the Dayton Accords. What plans do you have to address this crisis?

More than a decade after the United States led the effort to bring peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the situation in that country is still not satisfactory. We should be proud of the fact that, along with our NATO allies, we stopped a devastating civil war and gave the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina the opportunity to build a stable peace and functioning institutions, but much progress remains to be made. With the parties to the Dayton agreement at

odds over a range of issues, and with the international community uncertain about how to move forward, the situation requires urgent attention. If confirmed, I will ensure that Bosnia-Herzegovina receives the enhanced and sustained U.S. engagement its needs to overcome the divisions that prevent it from fulfilling its potential.

China

93. China's growing economic strength and global power presents the U.S. Congress with an extremely complicated set of policy issues. On the one hand, many see China as an essential partner for the United States on global issues such as the international financial system, alternative energy sources, climate change, public health and many others. On the other, many argue that China's size, international engagement, and growing confidence mean it is increasingly able to compete with — or even to challenge — the United States more directly and more effectively in economic, political, and military terms. What is the administration's view of China's role in the world? Is China a threat to U.S. interests, is it a "responsible stakeholder," or at times both? What does your assessment mean for the future of U.S. China policy, and how does it guide a U.S. strategy that can help shape China's choices?

China is a critically important actor in a changing global landscape. We cannot put a simple label on a complex relationship. We want a positive and cooperative relationship with China, one where we deepen and strengthen our ties on a number of issues, and manage our differences where they persist. But this is not a one-way effort – much of what we do depends on the choices China makes. We can encourage them to become a full and responsible participant in the international community – to join the world in addressing common challenges like climate change and nuclear proliferation – and to make greater progress toward a more open and market-based society. But it is ultimately up to them. As we engage with China, we also have to maintain and enhance our strong relationships with our allies in the region – Japan, South Korea, Australia, and others – who will help us meet the opportunities and challenges we are facing in Asia. The global financial crisis has demonstrated once again the need to think about common challenges in a new way. There are a number of emerging powers that will be critical players in this new century. With American leadership and their responsible engagement, we can improve the common good and confront common threats. That is the approach that I will take into my job if I am fortunate enough to be confirmed.

94. During the Bush Administration, the United States initiated several new high-level dialogues with China: the Senior Dialogue under the auspices of the State Department and the Strategic Economic Dialogue administered by the Treasury Department. How does the Obama Administration intend to continue or expand these efforts?

It is important to have high-level discussions to discuss economic issues with the Chinese government. We are looking carefully at the question of how to develop this important engagement with China. We expect high-level engagement to continue in some form.

95. China has been the world's fastest growing economy in recent years and is now the largest holder of U.S. Treasury Securities. What role does the administration see for China in dealing with the current global financial and economic crisis?

Our economic policy towards China has to be closely coordinated with our foreign policy. They cannot be pursued in isolation to one another. China is a critically important actor in a changing global landscape. We want a positive and cooperative relationship with China, one where we deepen and strengthen our ties on a number of issues, and manage our differences where they persist. But this is not a one-way effort – much of what we do depends on the choices China makes. The global financial crisis has demonstrated once again the need to think about common challenges in a new way.

96. Last year, China surpassed the United States as the world's largest emitter of carbon dioxide. While Prime Minister Hu Jintao has advanced and is implementing important clean energy policies, China continues to build one pulverized coal-fired power plant every week, and the country's primary energy demand is projected to double by 2030. This trend is unsustainable, in light of the urgent need to stabilize and reduce global greenhouse gas emissions. What steps will you personally – and the Obama Administration more broadly – take to improve U.S.-China collaboration on climate change and clean energy technologies?

Climate change is one of the most pressing challenges facing the United States and the global community. The United States will take a leadership role in combating the threat of global climate change from the beginning of the new Administration. The President-Elect has specifically pledged to set a goal of

an 80 percent reduction in global emissions by 2050 – a policy goal I am committed to as well. In pursuit of that goal, we will ask the biggest carbon emitting nations to join a new Global Energy Forum to lay the foundation for the next generation of climate protocols.

97. Taiwan remains the most sensitive issue in U.S.-China relations. Does the Obama Administration plan to hold another Taiwan Policy Review along the lines of that conducted in 1994 by the Clinton Administration?

The Administration's policy will be to help Taiwan and China resolve their differences peacefully while making clear that any unilateral change in the status quo is unacceptable. We will maintain our "one China" policy, our adherence to the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqués concerning Taiwan, and observance of the Taiwan Relations Act, which lays out the legal basis for our relationship.

98. The government of China and the Dalai Lama of Tibet disagree on the issue of greater autonomy for the Tibetan Autonomous Region, which has been a stumbling block in their ongoing dialogue. Meanwhile, many Tibetans have lost faith in the possibility of a negotiated compromise, while Chinese leaders have expressed a deep distrust of the Dalai Lama's intentions and foreign contacts. What options may be acceptable to both sides? What kinds of international pressure, if any, would be helpful in promoting a resolution?

The Obama Administration will speak out for the human rights and religious freedom of the people of Tibet. If Tibetans are to live in harmony with the rest of China's people, their religion and culture must be respected and protected. Tibet should enjoy genuine and meaningful autonomy. The Dalai Lama should be invited to visit China, as part of a process leading to his return. We will condemn the use of violence to put down peaceful protests, and call on the Chinese government to respect the basic human rights of the people of Tibet, and to account for the whereabouts of detained Buddhist monks. We will also continue to press China on our concerns about human rights issues at every opportunity and at all levels, publicly and privately, both through our mission in China and in Washington.

Japan

99. Some analysts have suggested that the U.S. alliance with Japan, a linchpin of stability in Asia, has become overly focused on military issues controversial

among the Japanese public. Do you think that the United States should continue to press Japan to step up its global engagement using its military resources, or instead concentrate on other shared interests like energy efficiency, climate change measures, and coordination on African development assistance? Is this an either/or choice?

The U.S.-Japan alliance has been one of the great successes of the postwar era. Japan's achievements and global leadership in world affairs over the past 60 years are a great testament to the Japanese people. A strong and enduring U.S.-Japan alliance, based on common interests and shared values, is the centerpiece for both American and Japanese policy in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan today plays a vital role in working alongside the United States to maintain regional security and stability, promote prosperity, and meet the new security challenges of the 21st century. As the world's two wealthiest democracies, the United States and Japan have shared interests that cut across a range of challenging issues: nuclear proliferation, terrorism, financial instability, poverty and climate change, to name but a few.

As the U.S.-Japan alliance continues to evolve into a truly global alliance, it must also develop truly global and complementary capacities across a broad range of issues, capacities that will allow us together to address the range of pressing issues on the regional and global agenda. We must strive, for close cooperation, communication and coordination, at every level. If confirmed as Secretary of State, I will look forward to building on our longstanding friendship to forge an even stronger alliance and partnership in the years ahead.

South Korea/KORUS FTA

100. President-Elect Obama has stated that he cannot support the KORUS FTA as it currently stands. What specific changes to the agreement will the Obama Administration be seeking? How can we work to ensure that the agreement does not affect South Korean perceptions of the United States and the U.S.-South Korean alliance?

South Korea is an important friend and ally and if confirmed I look forward to building an even stronger bilateral relationship in the years to come. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the United States Trade Representative, the Treasury Secretary, the Secretary of Commerce, and others on the President-Elect's economic team on these issues. We will

communicate forthrightly and fairly with South Korea, explaining that our concerns with the FTA are discrete and specific and have no bearing on the many collaborative dimensions of our alliance and friendship. We will also work to resolve these concerns to the satisfaction of both parties.

President-Elect Obama has opposed and continues to oppose the KORUS FTA that the Bush Administration negotiated because although it included some useful improvements for U.S. service and technology industries in South Korea, U.S. negotiators did not do a good job of obtaining a deal that provided for fair treatment for American cars and trucks and other manufactured goods. There are also concerns over U.S. beef exports that we are told are close to resolution.

Despite decades of bipartisan concern over the nontransparent practices used to block U.S. access to South Korea's market, this FTA failed to obtain a deal that provided genuine improvements in this area. Because the FTA gives South Korean auto exports essentially untrammelled access to the U.S. market, ratification of the agreement in its present form would mean the United States would lose its remaining leverage to counteract these non-tariff barriers. The result will be a competitive handicap for one of our most important industries.

If the South Koreans are willing to reengage negotiations on these vital provisions of the Agreement, we will work with them to get to resolution.

North Korea

101. What are your views on the recent State Department announcement that the United States and its partners would halt deliveries of heavy fuel oil to North Korea due to Pyongyang's refusal to agree, in writing, on a plan for verifying its nuclear program? Would the new administration be in a better position to take up the nuclear issue with North Korea if the formal verification plan was deferred into the future? Would you be prepared to travel to Pyongyang or to another capital to meet with North Korea's foreign minister or other appropriate official?

The Obama Administration will confirm the full extent of North Korea's past plutonium production and its uranium enrichment activities, and get answers to disturbing questions about its proliferation activities with other countries, including Syria. The North Koreans must live up to their commitments and fully and verifiably dismantle all of their nuclear weapons programs and

proliferation activities. If they do not, there must be strong sanctions. We will only lift sanctions based on North Korean performance. If the North Koreans do not meet their obligations, we should move quickly to re-impose sanctions that have been waived, and consider new restrictions going forward. The objective must be clear: the complete and verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons programs, which only expanded while we refused to talk. As we move forward, we must not cede our leverage in these negotiations unless it is clear that North Korea is living up to its obligations.

As to the question about the HFO shipments, the President-Elect has made clear his view that North Korea is not entitled to international support. He said that if North Korea did not live up to its obligations we may in fact reinstate some sanctions. We are going to take a hard look at where the Bush Administration and our allies in East Asian ended up on the verification protocols, but we are very much open to maintaining the suspension of the HFO shipments.

As to the questions of any potential travel and meetings, no decisions have been made. Like the President-Elect, I would be willing to meet with any foreign leader at a time and place of my choosing if it can advance America's interests.

102. Would you support appointing a special ambassador to deal directly with the North Korean nuclear issue as the United States' chief negotiator?

No decisions have been made on whether to appoint a special Ambassador to deal directly with the North Korean nuclear issue.

103. It is generally understood that the U.S. has a dearth of information about events inside North Korea. The State Department sent an official to Pyongyang this year to be located there permanently. Would you favor expanding that initiative into a proposal to North Korea to exchange interest sections (similar to the U.S. arrangement with Cuba)?

No decisions have been made about whether to exchange interest sections with North Korea. The new Administration will carefully consider its diplomatic options with North Korea.

104. Will the United States pursue the normalization of diplomatic relations with North Korea without some progress on human rights measures, including opening up the country's reported labor camps?

We remain concerned about improving the lives of the North Korean people, including the lives of refugees. The United States is now the largest provider of food aid to the DPRK through the World Food Program and U.S. NGOs under a May 2008 agreement. This Administration will continue to address North Korea's human rights abuses, including as part of any normalization process.

Burma

105. Well over a year has past since Burma's military junta violently dispersed peaceful demonstrators, including unarmed Buddhist monks and students, who were protesting the repressive policies and widespread human rights violations of the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). In the interim, conditions inside Burma have hardly improved. What do you see as the proper way forward for U.S. policy in Burma? Are existing sanctions working? What over levers are available to pressure Burma's leaders to pursue policies that respect human rights, permit the release of political prisoners like Aung San Suu Kyi and allow for national reconciliation and a return of democracy? Given that existing approaches have not produced tangible results, are you considering alternative strategies?
106. Burma's neighbors — China, India, and Thailand — and Russia could play an important role in convincing Burma's military junta to engage in dialogue with opposition leaders and ethnic minorities towards national reconciliation. Do you intend to raise this issue with these countries and encourage them to modify their current positions?
107. Burma's people have endured tremendous hardships over the years and continue to face dire humanitarian conditions in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis. What steps do you propose taking to ease their suffering? Would you support the provision of funds for humanitarian purposes to groups that are not affiliated with the Burmese regime beyond existing emergency International Disaster Assistance resources?

The continuing dire situation in Burma requires urgent attention. Burma's

military junta is one of the most repressive regimes in the world. Its odious behavior not only is harmful to the long-suffering Burmese people, but also threatens the stability of neighboring states, since Burma is a breeding ground for HIV/AIDS, narcotics and human trafficking. The Obama Administration will support U.S. trade and investment sanctions against Burma to demonstrate our strong, principled condemnation of the regime's oppressive rule and our solidarity with the Burmese people. The regime must release, unconditionally, all of the nation's political prisoners, including the symbol and leader of Burma's democracy movement, Aung San Suu Kyi.

But our sanctions, if they are to be effective, must be smart, tough and targeted. They must be crafted, as in the Lantos Bill, to bring pressure to bear on the regime itself, and seek, as best as we can, to spare the people of Burma further suffering. So I strongly believe that we should more fully explore possible modalities for humanitarian assistance that will reach the suffering people of Burma and that do not empower the military junta.

Also if confirmed, I look forward to working with the Senate to fill the important position of Special Envoy for Burma as soon as possible.

HIV/AIDS

108. One of President Bush's most notable achievements was the creation of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief which has made great strides in the fight against HIV/AIDS, particularly in helping to support treatment for over 2 million people. While the United States has created a new paradigm in demonstrating the capability to provide HIV/AIDS treatment on a wide scale in some of the poorest countries of the world, the spread of the disease continues to outpace treatment efforts. How can the United States assist partner countries in more effective HIV prevention efforts?

The President-Elect has applauded President Bush's efforts to combat HIV/AIDS, and pledged to continue and enhance PEPFAR. There are an estimated 33 million people across the planet infected with HIV/AIDS. We must do more to fight the global HIV/AIDS pandemic, as well as malaria and tuberculosis. The President-Elect is committed to fully implementing the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and to ensuring that best practices, not ideology, drive funding. He has committed to investing \$50 billion over five years to strengthen the program and expand it to new regions

of the world, including Southeast Asia, India, and parts of Europe. At the same time, the new Administration will work to more effectively coordinate PEPFAR with programs to strengthen health care delivery and address other global health challenges. The new administration will also increase U.S. contributions to the Global Fund to ensure that global efforts to fight endemic disease continue to move ahead through multilateral institutions as well. As part of these efforts, the new Administration will work with drug companies to reduce the costs of generic anti-retroviral drugs. And it will work with developing nations to help them build the health infrastructure necessary to get sick people treated - more money for hospitals and medical equipment, and more training for nurses and doctors.

Public Diplomacy

109. What measures do you think are necessary to improve U.S. public diplomacy efforts and restore America's image in the world?

The President-Elect intends to launch a coordinated, multi-agency program of public diplomacy. And I am committed to restoring the strength and vision of the State Department's public diplomacy mission. As the President-Elect has noted, this is not a peripheral enterprise, disconnected from the rest of our foreign policy. It is an important component of our overall counterterrorism strategy, and it is a vital part of our effort to restore American leadership and reassert American values.

With that in mind, the Administration will pursue concrete objectives, including opening "America Houses" in cities across the Arab world, which will be modeled on the successful program the United States launched following World War II. We will launch a new "America's Voice Corps," to rapidly recruit and train fluent speakers of local languages and public diplomacy skills. We will offer alternatives to madrassas through the Global Education Fund. In our own hemisphere, we will pursue vigorous diplomacy to rebuild the ties with our friends and neighbors in the Americas.

110. Many are critical of the decision to fold the U.S. Information Agency into the State Department in 1999, observing that the long-term efforts of public diplomacy have been subordinated to the short-term rapid-reaction goals emphasized by public affairs. Several have proposed reestablishing a U.S. agency responsible for public diplomacy and strategic communications that would be separate from the State Department. What is your assessment

of the relative strengths/weaknesses of how we conduct public diplomacy?
Are you open to considering some of the bolder proposals to restructure U.S.
public diplomacy and outreach?

If confirmed, I look forward to working to ensure that the State Department's mission of public diplomacy is matched by the personnel, resources, and organizational structure we need to carry out this critical mission. USIA was an effective, single purpose agency in many ways, but it is more practical at this time to improve the functioning of the public diplomacy in the Department than to recreate an independent entity. If confirmed, I look forward to a full assessment of public diplomacy at the State Department and will look to this Committee and the Congress for its counsel as we consider how to make improvements.

111. The 2008 Pew Global Attitudes poll found that anti-Americanism remains extremely strong in the Muslim world. Overwhelming majorities of every predominantly Muslim country surveyed except Lebanon, including Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Jordan, had negative views of the United States. What can be done to stem the tide of anti-Americanism in the Middle East? What role do you see for the State Department in these efforts?

The President-Elect has made clear his determination to enhance our relations with the world's Muslims. As indicated above, no public diplomacy task is more important for the Obama administration than restoring the respect for America around the world, but more importantly, among the world's Muslim populations. In addition to the opening of America Houses, discussed above, the President-Elect has pledged to give a speech at a major Islamic forum in the first 100 days of his Administration. He will make clear, as will I, that we are not at war with Islam, that we will stand with those who are willing to stand up for their future, and that we need their effort to defeat those who proffer only hate and violence.

112. Genocide Prevention

The recently released report of the Genocide Prevention Task Force, co-chaired by former Secretaries Albright and Cohen, concluded that preventing genocide must be a national priority. The task force concluded that the United States and the international community currently lack critical tools to identify the early warning signs of impending mass atrocities and respond to them to prevent the escalation of

violence. “Gaps remain...in the strategic understanding of the challenges that genocide and mass atrocities pose and in developing appropriate ways to anticipate and address civilian protection.” What steps would you take to address potential acts of mass atrocity or genocide from occurring or to broaden the range of tools that could be brought to bear? How could these steps be applied to the current crises in the Democratic Republic of Congo or Darfur?

The President-Elect is committed to strengthening U.S. leadership and international efforts to prevent and respond to genocide and other humanitarian crises. He has welcomed this fine bipartisan report co-chaired by two distinguished Americans, has pledged to review its recommendations carefully, and has met with Secretaries Baker and Christopher to discuss the contents of their report

The President-Elect has said, and I agree, that we are diminished when genocide or ethnic cleaning is taking place and we stand idly by.

I anticipate that the Administration will review how the United States, working with our allies, partners, and international organizations, can build greater capacity and resolve to deter, prevent, and, when necessary, take action to stop mass atrocities. And I look forward to consulting with the Committee and other Members of Congress as we consider how best to organize to address this challenge so that there is a process in place to anticipate and address any concerns as early as possible.

Darfur

113. The situation in Darfur today is far more complex than it was in 2004. Two rebel groups have splintered into over two dozen and these rebels frequently prey upon civilians and aid workers. What are the Administration’s goals in Darfur and what is its strategy to achieve them in light of this complexity?

President-Elect Obama and I have been very clear and forceful in our condemnation of the genocide in Sudan and in our commitment to far more robust actions to end the genocide and maximize protection for civilians. We have also made very clear our intent to pursue more effective diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict that underlies the genocide. Today the most immediate and urgent means of providing protection as swiftly as possible to

the civilians at risk is the rapid and full implementation of the UN-AU peacekeeping force, which is half its authorized strength.

114. More than four years after then-Secretary of State Powell's declaration that genocide was taking place in Darfur, the death toll has climbed still higher, the camps for displaced persons have grown more crowded, and humanitarian access to help people in need has diminished in many areas. The United Nations has not made good on its pledge to send 26,000 peacekeepers to Darfur, and has not provided them with the helicopters, vehicles, and other tools to fulfill their mission. Why has this process been so slow to date? What more should the U.S. government do to strengthen UNAMID so that it can effectively fulfill its mandate to protect civilians?

First, we need to send a clear message to Khartoum that they must end obstruction of the UN force, including through endless bureaucratic hurdles and delays. We also need to address some of the UN's own requirements that have inadvertently slowed UNAMID's deployment thus far. I expect that the questions of Sudan and Darfur will be subject to an early policy review. The Administration will take the opportunity to look at all of the steps that it can take most effectively and urgently to maximize protection for civilians, and help to bring this conflict to an end.

115. One of the critical gaps that peacekeepers face is the lack of attack and utility helicopters that are desperately needed to cover vast stretches of roadless territory in Darfur. What would you do, if confirmed as Secretary of State, to help secure these badly needed helicopters?

The Administration will, as part of its review, actively pursue options to fill such critical gaps. The President-Elect is committed to find ways to help move needed troops and equipment into place on an urgent basis.

Southern Sudan

116. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between North and South Sudan calls for elections in 2009 and a referendum in 2011 in which the South will vote on the question of remaining a unified country. What will your objectives be in regard to Southern Sudan and what potential pitfalls do you see in the implementation of the CPA?

As a guarantor of the CPA, the United States has a special responsibility to ensure that implementation of this landmark agreement remains a priority even in the midst of the Darfur crisis. We will work bilaterally to increase support to the Government of Southern Sudan to bolster capacity and good governance, and multilaterally to assure appropriate donor coordination and ongoing political and financial support for CPA implementation.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement aims to give the Sudanese people greater voice in their political future, and this will remain a priority. National elections that were supposed to be held by July 2009 will clearly be delayed, but the United States will work to ensure that the delay is not protracted, and that free, fair, safe elections are held before the year is out. Preparations for the 2011 referendum must remain on track as well to retain the confidence of the South.

117. In April 2008, then-Senator Obama said that “the U.S. needs to work with the International Criminal Court (ICC) to ramp up the pace of indictments of those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity, while Khartoum must feel increased pressure to hand over those individuals already indicted by the Court.” On July 14, 2008, the ICC requested a warrant for the arrest of Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir for his role in the genocide in Darfur. Many observers expect the ICC to formally indict President Bashir on genocide and possibly other charges in early 2009. Does the administration intend to support the ICC’s efforts to hold Bashir and others in Sudan accountable for genocide and other heinous crimes, and, if so, how?

Yes. Without prejudging the outcome of the ICC prosecutor's recommendation to indict President Bashir, the President-Elect believes, as do I, that we should support the ICC's investigations, including its pursuit of perpetrators of genocide in Darfur. The Bush administration has indicated publicly a willingness to cooperate with the ICC in the Darfur investigation. I commend them for this position, which we also support. We can provide assistance in the investigation; we can and should work with our allies in this effort. This is important because it would send a sign of seriousness about Darfur and our determination to end the killings and bring those responsible for war crimes to justice.

International Criminal Court

118. President-Elect Obama has said that the United States should cooperate with the ICC on many activities, including Darfur. He has not, however, indicated that he will sign the Rome Treaty and join the ICC. Questions linger over the scope of the ICC's activities and, in particular, whether U.S. service members would have the necessary legal protections given their disproportionate burden in preserving international peace and security. What concerns, if any, need to be resolved before the administration would consider supporting ratification of the Rome Statute? How will the administration work with our military commanders, Congress, and the ICC to address such concerns?

Now that it is operational, we are learning more about how the ICC functions. Thus far, the ICC has operated with professionalism and fairness—pursuing perpetrators of truly serious crimes, like genocide in Darfur, and atrocities in the Congo and Uganda. The President-Elect believes as do I that we should support the ICC's investigations, including its pursuit of perpetrators of genocide in Darfur. Along these lines, the Bush administration has indicated a willingness to cooperate with the ICC in the Darfur investigation, a position which the new Administration will support.

But at the same time, we must also keep in mind that the U.S. has more troops deployed overseas than any nation. As Commander-in-Chief, the President-Elect will want to make sure they continue to have maximum protection. Therefore, we intend to consult thoroughly within the government, including the military, as well as non-governmental experts, and examine the full track record of the ICC before reaching decisions on how to move forward. I also look forward to working closely with the Members of the Committee. Whether we work toward joining or not, we will end hostility towards the ICC, and look for opportunities to encourage effective ICC action in ways that promote U.S. interests by bringing war criminals to justice.

Zimbabwe

119. The Mugabe government's brutality and mismanagement in Zimbabwe have ruined the country's economy, destroyed its health system, and deprived its citizens of basic rights and freedoms. Last March the people of Zimbabwe were brave enough to vote for change, but Mugabe continues his hold on power. A massive cholera epidemic is just the latest

symptom of the government's failure to provide for its people. What tools can the United States bring to bear to promote democratic change in Zimbabwe?

The people of Zimbabwe have suffered for far too long under a corrupt leadership that does not serve the needs of its people. The destruction of Zimbabwe's economy and repeated abuses of power have been a catastrophe for Zimbabweans, and threaten the stability of the region.

The United States and the world must take steps to address this growing crisis.

Widened U.S. sanctions are appropriate. It was the right policy to have supported a UN Security Council resolution calling for targeted sanctions and an arms embargo.

As Zimbabwe's crisis continues and becomes even more destabilizing to the Southern African region, South Africa, the African Union, and the SADC must play a stronger role in pressuring the Mugabe regime.

It will require concerted and sustained diplomacy to try to get the international community to acknowledge the need to act to apply more pressure to the illegitimate government of Robert Mugabe, and to bring an end to the man-made humanitarian crisis that grips Zimbabwe today.

The Zimbabwean people are suffering and the U.S. will push for more efforts, including having humanitarian NGOs resume activity in Zimbabwe.

We will need to consider incentives for reform, and work closely with the EU and other international donors to create a very generous aid and recovery package for Zimbabwe once it has a legitimate government. We would make very clear the specific and practical steps that any Zimbabwean government can take to qualify for this package.

120. **Mugabe and his government are responsible for the deaths of untold numbers of people in Zimbabwe. Is this an appropriate matter for the International Criminal Court?**

This is a question that the new Administration will review and consider carefully. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the national security

team to determine how best to confront and address the extreme abuses in Zimbabwe.

The suffering inflicted on the Zimbabwean people by the illegitimate government of Robert Mugabe is appalling. Ideally, the people of Zimbabwe will decide for themselves how best to address the issues of accountability and justice for crimes committed by Robert Mugabe and his inner circle in ZANU-PF.

As discussed in other responses, I believe that as a general rule we should support the ICC's investigations, including its pursuit of perpetrators of genocide in Darfur. And we should work with our allies in shaping this court for years to come. Whether the ICC is the best vehicle to address the situation in Zimbabwe will be the subject of discussions within the new administration, and if confirmed I would also look forward to hearing the views of this Committee.

Somalia

121. Somalia today embodies the principles of failed statehood. The recent increase in the number, range, and impact of acts of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and beyond are only the latest consequence of the lack of government and rule of law in the country. As Secretary of State, what will govern your strategy toward Somalia and the Horn of Africa as a region? What steps can the United States and the international community take to promote prospects for democracy, stability, and security in the region?

We need to take a very careful look at this set of questions. There are no simple solutions. First and foremost, we have a serious counter-terrorism challenge in the context of Somalia. Second, we have a serious humanitarian concern and imperative. Third, we have an interest in trying to facilitate national reconciliation and long-term stability in Somalia. In this context, the question is what tools and initiatives will best advance our efforts along all three of our objectives? If confirmed, I expect to consider this issue in the near future with the President-Elect and my colleagues in the cabinet. As a starting point, an important effort should be finding ways to increase support for and build the capacity of the African Union force.

AFRICOM

122. The creation of the new unified command for Africa, AFRICOM, may represent sound policy from the standpoint of efficiency and management. The new command also has the potential both to elevate and improve U.S. relations with many African countries, particularly in critical areas such as the training of peacekeepers and the professionalization of forces. However, the presentation and roll-out of the new command raised diplomatic concerns. The creation of AFRICOM has also raised questions about the role of the Department of Defense in U.S. development efforts. What do you see as the role of AFRICOM in U.S. Africa policy and in development and humanitarian engagement?

The President-Elect supports the concept of AFRICOM, but has concerns about how it is being implemented. The new Administration will review AFRICOM and consult with African nations. The original concept behind AFRICOM was that our engagement with Africa will be improved by streamlining our command structure so that there is a single unified command responsible for Africa, rather than three separate commands as has been the case. A well-conceived AFRICOM, playing the traditional role of a combatant command rather than supplanting the State Department's traditional role, can enhance U.S. government efforts to foster peace and stability on the continent. The President-Elect has cautioned that we must be very careful not to over-militarize our relations with African nations. On the other hand, there is a role to play for AFRICOM in helping train and equip African rapid response forces for peacekeeping operations. AFRICOM can also contribute to an enhanced capability of African nations to patrol their own waters.

U.S. Policy toward Latin America

123. Many observers believe that the United States has not dedicated adequate attention and resources to Latin America, allowing other countries with hostile ideologies to fill the vacuum. Would you agree with this assessment? What is your agenda for the Americas? What are the most significant challenges confronting U.S. interests in the region?

Too often, U.S. policy toward the Americas in recent years has been negligent to our friends, ineffective with our adversaries, and disinterested in the challenges that matter to peoples' lives throughout the region. The vacuum

created by the lack of sustained U.S. engagement with the region has been filled, in part, by others – including Hugo Chavez, who has tried to use this opportunity to advance outmoded and anti-American ideologies.

As President-Elect Obama has stated, Administration policy toward the Americas will be guided by the simple principle that what is good for the people of the Americas is good for the United States. We will work in partnership with countries throughout the region to promote an agenda that helps advance democratic governance, opportunity and security from the bottom up. It is time to focus on working to overcome the common challenges we face in the Western hemisphere, including economic development, climate change, energy security, and the battle against transnational illicit networks. We must also provide support for democracy that includes strong legislatures, independent judiciaries, free press, vibrant civil society, honest police forces, religious freedom, and the rule of law.

I look forward to working with members of this Committee, as well as other members of Congress to do exactly that and to help create the new partnership in the Americas described by President-Elect Obama.

Brazil

124. In recent years, the U.S. and Brazil have worked more closely together on several important issues, including peacekeeping efforts in Haiti and promoting the use and production of bio-fuels. At the same time, Brazil has taken a leading role in trade and political forums, such as MERCOSUR, the Rio Group, and the newly established Union of South American Nations, which have at times been at odds with U.S. interests in the region. How would you assess the current state of bilateral cooperation between the United States and Brazil? What are possible areas where we might strengthen our relationship? What is your view of the United States-Brazil Energy Cooperation Pact?

The current U.S.-Brazil relationship provides a foundation for a deeper, more comprehensive partnership between our two countries. We welcome the important leadership role Brazil has played in the United Nations stabilization force in Haiti. We look forward to ensuring that continued U.S.-Brazil energy cooperation is environmentally sustainable and spreads the benefits of alternative fuels. The expansion of renewable energy production throughout

the Americas that promotes self-sufficiency and creates more markets for U.S. green energy manufacturers and producers is vitally important.

There are a number of areas in which the United States and Brazil can work together. In partnership we can work to help advance democratic governance, opportunity, and security from the bottom up throughout the Americas. Brazil has an important voice on the global stage where we can work together on climate change, energy security, and the global financial crisis, among other important issues.

The March 2007 Memorandum of Understanding to Advance Biofuels Cooperation and the work that has been done since then are an important feature of the U.S.-Brazil relationship. We look forward to ensuring that continued U.S.-Brazil energy cooperation is carried out in an environmentally sustainable manner and in a manner that spreads the benefits of alternative energy development throughout the region while expanding the market for U.S. green energy manufacturers and producers. It is also important that U.S. biofuel producers not be prejudiced by efforts to increase U.S.-Brazil cooperation. We must also ensure that all stakeholders, including those from the labor, environmental and business sectors, are adequately represented in the biofuels cooperation process.

Colombia

125. An October 2008 report by the GAO concluded that, although Plan Colombia improved security conditions in Colombia, it has not significantly reduced the amount of illicit drugs entering the United States. What lessons can be drawn from Plan Colombia, not only to improve its effectiveness, but to improve other U.S. counternarcotics policies, including the Merida Initiative, in Latin America?

The President-Elect has supported the Andean Counter-Drug Program, and believes that it must be updated to meet evolving challenges.

The security situation in Colombia has improved, but very significant quantities of illicit narcotics continue to flow from Colombia to the United States. I look forward to working with Congress and our friends and partners in Colombia to ensure that future investments help staunch the flow of illegal drugs and help consolidate security gains to contribute to a durable peace in Colombia. To do so, we must learn from the successes and failures of the past.

We will fully support Colombia's fight against the FARC, and work with the government to end the reign of terror from right wing paramilitaries.

As we continue our struggle against the scourge of illegal drugs in our society and throughout the Americas, we must ensure that we are doing what is necessary here at home to reduce demand, enforce our laws through effective policing, and disrupt the southbound flow of money and weapons that are an essential element of the transnational illicit networks that operate in Colombia and elsewhere in the Americas. It is important that we work together with countries throughout the region to find the best practices that work across the hemisphere and to tailor approaches to fit each country.

126. In light of the concerns previously expressed by President Obama and others, including members of this Committee, related to violence against labor unions and other abuses in Colombia, what are your views on the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement? How can we work to minimize the impact that disagreements over trade have over other aspects of our bilateral relationship?

It is important that we not lose sight of the many aspects of the important, dynamic and complex bilateral relationship that the United States and Colombia have when we discuss the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement. I look forward to working to maintain the across-the-board vibrancy of the relationship.

With regard to the trade agreement, it is essential that trade spread the benefits of globalization. Without adequate labor protections, trade cannot do that. Although levels of violence have dropped, continued violence and impunity in Colombia directed at labor and other civic leaders makes labor protections impossible to guarantee in Colombia today.

Colombia must improve its efforts. I look forward to working with members of this Committee, as well as other members of the Senate and House of Representatives to see what the United States can do to help contribute to an end to further violence and continued impunity directed against labor and other civic leaders in Colombia.

The United States and Colombia have long enjoyed a close, mutually-beneficial relationship. I am confident that through continued cooperation on

the full array of bilateral issues, we can maintain and deepen that relationship. Active engagement with Colombia will be an important part of this Administration's approach to hemispheric relations.

Cuba

127. As you know, Cuban Americans currently must obtain a U.S. Treasury Department license to visit family in Cuba. Even if issued such a license, they are permitted to visit immediate family in Cuba only once in a three-year period. Similarly, Cuban Americans are allowed only to send up to \$300 to their family in any 3-month period. Will the new Administration ease these burdensome restrictions so that the Cuban people have to rely less on their repressive government for assistance, as President-Elect Obama called for during the election? If so, what is the likely timing of this announcement? Are there other ways that we can send a message to the Cuban people that the United States intends to play a positive role in their future and support their democratic aspirations?

There are many ways to that we can send a message to the Cuban people that the United States intends to play a positive role in their future. President-Elect Obama believes that Cuban-Americans especially can be important ambassadors for change in Cuba. As such, he believes that it makes both moral and strategic sense to lift the restrictions on family visits and family cash remittances to Cuba. We do not currently have a timeline for the announcement of such a new policy, and the Obama-Biden Administration will consult closely with Congress as we prepare the change.

President-Elect Obama also believes that it is not time to lift the embargo on Cuba, especially since it provides an important source of leverage for further change on the island.

Venezuela

128. U.S.-Venezuelan relations have been marked by considerable friction under the rule of President Hugo Chavez. There are a number of areas of U.S. concern: Chavez's concerted efforts to export his brand of populism throughout the region; declining Venezuelan cooperation on counternarcotics and counterterrorism; Venezuela's relations with Cuba, Iran, and Russia; its recent military exercises and arms purchases; and the state of democracy in Venezuela. How do you view recent developments in

Venezuela? What approach will you recommend to start to reverse some of these negative trends? Do you see any opportunities for direct engagement over these issues? Would you or President-Elect Obama participate in any discussions that occur? Under what circumstances?

For too long, we have ceded the playing field to Hugo Chavez – a democratically elected leader who does not govern democratically, and whose actions and vision for the region do not serve his citizens or people throughout Latin America. While we should be concerned about Chavez’s actions and posture, we should not exaggerate the threat he poses. It’s time for the United States to fill that void with strong and sustained US leadership in the region, and tough and direct diplomacy with Venezuela and Bolivia. We should have a positive agenda for the hemisphere in response to the fear-mongering propagated by Chavez and Evo Morales. We believe that bilateral cooperation with Venezuela and Bolivia on a range of issues would be in the mutual interest of our respective countries – for example, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, energy, and commerce.

The pursuit of tough, principled, direct diplomacy has been and must again be a hallmark of effective U.S. foreign policy. We should not take any tool off the table that may help promote our interests and values throughout the hemisphere. Direct, high-level diplomatic engagement with Venezuela, of course, also requires careful preparation and a partner willing to engage in meaningful dialogue. It remains to be seen whether there is any tangible sign that Venezuela actually wants an improved relationship with the United States.

No decision has been taken with regard to the appropriate manner and level at which to engage with the Venezuelan government.

Democracy Promotion and Human Rights

129. What role will democracy promotion and human rights have as part of the broader U.S. foreign policy agenda? What lessons do you take away from the Bush Administration’s efforts to promote democracy and human rights?

The President-Elect has pledged to be a strong advocate for democratic change around the world. And I wholeheartedly support this policy. Under his leadership, we will support new democracies and help them build

sustainable democratic institutions. Democracy must mean more than elections – it must mean support for strong legislatures, independent judiciaries, free press, vibrant civil society, honest police forces, religious freedom, and the rule of law.

We must not allow the war in Iraq to continue to give democracy promotion a bad name. Supporting democracy, economic development, and the rule of law is critical for U.S. interests around the world. Democracies are our best trading partners, our most valuable allies, and the nations with which we share our deepest values. But democracy must be nurtured with moderates on the inside by building democratic institutions; it cannot be imposed by force from the outside.

130. Although the Bush administration made the “freedom agenda” a centerpiece of its second term, by most objective measures these efforts have not been successful in the Middle East. The Middle East remains arguably the world’s least democratized region; regimes like Iran and Syria have been emboldened; Hezbollah and Hamas have been empowered at the ballot boxes; and prominent democracy and human rights activists are jailed throughout the region, including in countries enjoying close relations with the United States. How can the United States best promote democratization and political reform in the Middle East? Which aspects of the United States’ recent democracy promotion policies in the region need to change and which aspects have been effective?

There is no doubt that democracy has been slower to take root in the Middle East than it has in some other parts of the world. Promoting democratization and political reform in the Middle East will require skill, patience, and a clear commitment to our principles. It will involve engaging with leaders and with the region’s people to find opportunities to advance reforms that can benefit both. We need to understand that these changes happen over time, not overnight, and that they are most successful when they are homegrown, and not perceived to be imposed from outside. Elections are important, but they are not sufficient, and often fail when they precede the establishment of institutions that bolster democratic society—strong legislatures, independent judiciaries, free press, vibrant civil society, honest police forces, religious freedom, and the rule of law. In addition to standing for democracy in the region, we must also stand for opportunity for the region’s people – including greater access to education.

Public diplomacy, assistance to reformers, and dialogue with leaderships will all be crucial elements of our approach, but as President-Elect Obama has said, our greatest tool in advancing democracy is our own example. That is why closing the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay and following through on a commitment to end torture will not only strengthen our values at home, but will bolster our national interests overseas.

131. President Bush and Secretary Rice often met with foreign dissidents and victims of human rights abuses, apparently as a way to signal the importance of these issues to him and his administration. Do you intend to continue this practice?

Yes. Throughout my career, I have met with and championed the causes of those who have fought for their own rights and the rights of their fellow citizens, and I will continue to do so, if confirmed, in my role as Secretary of State.

Global Financial Crisis

132. What role can and should the State Department play in facilitating a recovery from the global financial crisis? What steps do you intend to take consistent with this role?

The President-Elect and I understand the connection between our economy and our strength in the world. We often hear about two debates – one on national security and one on the economy – but that is a false distinction. We must be strong at home to be strong abroad. It is close to an iron law of history that great nations owe their greatness to their economic strength – and that nations decline if they let their economy decline. Our economy supports our military power, it increases our diplomatic leverage, and it is a foundation of America’s leadership in the world.

As the new Administration develops new policy approaches and implements new initiatives to deal with the financial crisis, I intend to collaborate with my colleagues at Treasury and the White House to enhance international cooperation in support of our efforts. State will deploy our embassies worldwide to update foreign governments on U.S. policy responses, to encourage appropriate policies in other countries, and to discourage counterproductive or protectionist reactions to the crisis. And we will seek to

address the broader implications of the crisis for economic growth, development, and security around the world. It has become clear that this crisis, concentrated initially in the United States and Western Europe, is undermining both economic progress and stability in many developing and emerging economies, with adverse repercussions for U.S. economic and security interests.

Global Poverty

133. Today, more than 1 billion people live in slums around the world, with that number expected to grow to 2 billion within a couple decades. It is now estimated that for the first time in history more people live in urban areas than in rural areas. Yet, U.S. foreign assistance has almost zero capacity to deal with complex issues related to the concentration of poverty in slums. Furthermore, neither USAID nor the Department of State has an office devoted to addressing urban development issues, either from a programmatic or policy perspective. How do you intend to place greater emphasis on supporting those who live in extreme poverty and slums?

America must renew its effort to bring security and development to the disconnected corners of our interconnected world. These efforts must strengthen the capacity of weak and failing states, while expanding education and opportunity for the world's people. As we seek to lead the world, the United States has a significant stake in ensuring that those who live in fear and want today can live with dignity and opportunity tomorrow. That is why President-Elect Obama and I have embraced the Millennium Development Goals to cut global poverty in half by 2015. He has also pledged to double our foreign assistance budget over time – a pledge that I agree with and will help him implement.

The challenges posed by the rise of mega-cities, of the global youth bulge, of increasing resource scarcity, and of the growing gap between rich and poor are challenges we must face in order to uphold our common humanity and ensure our common security. The sharp rise in urban poverty – whether manifested in the growth of slums, an increase in youth violence, rampant unemployment, or gross shortfalls in health and education services – threatens the stability and well-being of literally billions of the world's people.

The good news is that there are clear steps we can take. We have seen in India, for example, that by investing in organizations that can create

employment opportunities for women and their communities, we can create jobs and foster dignity – even in slums. We also know that by helping to strengthen government institutions, build economic and trade linkages, and support the private sector – starting with small enterprises and building up – we can help to change the economic environment that generates urban poverty. And finally, we know that if we invest in agriculture, we can ease the global food crisis and help farmers to stay on their land.

Global Food Crisis

134. The global food crisis is a triple threat – humanitarian, economic, and strategic. It is pushing an additional 100 million people into poverty, and high prices have caused unrest and riots dozens of countries, including Egypt, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Haiti. This crisis can be explained by a convergence of factors – a dearth of investment and inattention to long-term agricultural development, high growth in demand, rising energy prices, over-reliance on corn-based bio-fuels, restrictive trade policies, and climate change. What steps would you advocate as Secretary of State to address some of the root causes of the global food crisis?

Although a long-simmering problem, the sharp increases in global food prices last year, combined with supply constraints in many parts of the world, created a severe humanitarian and economic crisis, particularly for countries least able to cope with these developments. A food crisis of this magnitude poses a threat to both prosperity and security in many developing countries. Millions of people are at risk of being pushed back into poverty, jeopardizing achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Moreover, states that cannot feed their people are inherently fragile ones. The United States therefore has not only a moral responsibility but also a strong practical interest in doing its part to address a food crisis of this scope and severity.

The underlying causes of the food crisis that erupted last year were both cyclical and structural. The more immediate causes included poor harvests in key grain-producing nations, sharply higher oil prices, and a surge in demand for meat in high-growth Asian countries. Longer-term factors include inadequate investment in enhanced agricultural productivity, inappropriate trade and subsidy programs, and climate change.

Similarly, responses to the crisis must include both short- and long-term measures. In the near term, the United States must work with its partners in

the international community to address immediate humanitarian needs and make seeds and fertilizers available in critically affected nations. Key long-term steps include putting more focus on efforts to enhance agricultural productivity in the world's poorest nations, including agricultural research and development, and investment in improved seeds and irrigation methods.

I also fully support and will work to implement President-elect Obama's pledge to launch an "Add Value to Agriculture" (AVTA) initiative, which aims to increase the incomes of subsistence farmers, decrease the pressure on shrinking arable lands, and minimize the vulnerability of commodity exports to global price shocks.

Treaties

135. Does the administration intend to submit a Treaty Priority List during the 111th Congress? If so, when does the administration expect to submit the list?

We are still considering whether and when to submit a Treaty Priority List.

136. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the bipartisan Senate Arms Control Observer Group gave members of the Senate an opportunity to observe arms control negotiations and to better understand the treaties that would ultimately be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. As Secretary, what consultative measures, prior to submittal of a treaty for Senate advice and consent to ratification, do you envision taking to ensure that the Senate is fully prepared to understand and evaluate such treaty? Will you restore regular prior consultation with our committee on treaties and invite Senators to directly observe arms control negotiations?

I will direct Department officials to closely consult with this Committee on treaty negotiations. Members of the Committee and the Senate must be kept well informed of the process of developing and negotiating arms control and nonproliferation agreements so that they have a better basis for evaluating such agreements when and if they are completed and brought before the Senate for review or approval. Various arrangements could be used to keep the Senate well informed, including a mechanism similar to the Senate Arms Control Observer Group. I and my Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security will want to consult with Members to figure out which approach or approaches would be practical and effective.