The Economics of Ethnic Cleansing in Darfur

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COVER PHOTO

Displaced Beni Hussein cattle shepherds take shelter on the outskirts of El Sereif village, North Darfur. Fighting over gold mines in North Darfur's Jebel Amer area between the Janjaweed Abbala forces and Beni Hussein tribe started early this January and resulted in mass displacement of thousands.

AP PHOTO/UNAMID, ALBERT GONZALEZ FARRAN
Overview

Darfur is burning again, with devastating results for its people. A kaleidoscope of Janjaweed forces are once again torching villages, terrorizing civilians, and systematically clearing prime land and resource-rich areas of their inhabitants. The latest ethnic-cleansing campaign has already displaced more than 300,000 Darfuris this year and forced more than 75,000 to seek refuge in neighboring Chad, the largest population displacement in recent years.¹

An economic agenda is emerging as a major driver for the escalating violence. At the height of the mass atrocities committed from 2003 to 2005, the Sudanese regime’s strategy appeared to be driven primarily by the counterinsurgency objectives and secondarily by the acquisition of salaries and war booty. Undeniably, even at that time, the government could have only secured the loyalty of its proxy Janjaweed militias by allowing them to keep the fertile lands from which they evicted the original inhabitants. Today’s violence is even more visibly fueled by monetary motivations, which include land grabbing; consolidating control of recently discovered gold mines; manipulating reconciliation conferences for increased “blood money”; expanding protection rackets and smuggling networks; demanding ransoms; undertaking bank robberies; and resuming the large-scale looting that marked earlier periods of the conflict.

Recently, many Janjaweed groups, including those incorporated into the Sudanese government’s Border Guards and Central Reserve Police, have slipped out of government control as patronage networks have shrunk with declining government budgets. Janjaweed militias have increasingly undertaken criminal activities to make up for lost revenues. During the past six months, the regime has sought to bring many of their favored Janjaweed elements back into closer alliance around shared objectives. Throughout 2013, in addition to attacking Fur, Masalit, and other non-Arab ethnic groups,² some of the regime’s favored Janjaweed militias have also targeted civilians from Arab tribes that were historically aligned with the government.³ The newly expanded scope of violence in Darfur is tied to the emergence of pressing economic imperatives,
largely triggered by the loss of oil revenues following South Sudan’s secession in 2011. As the government struggles to develop alternative revenue streams and to pacify the increasingly restless Janjaweed militias, Sudanese government officials are increasingly willing to fan the flames of violence, even against some of their erstwhile allies.

Since the regime in Khartoum, Sudan, denies journalists, aid workers, and U.N. peacekeepers access to locations where civilian targeting is frequent, the killing, looting, and burning occurs in an information blackout. As a result, journalists and diplomats have mostly accepted the Sudanese government’s explanation that the latest resurgence of violence is the inevitable product of intractable “inter-tribal” hatred between groups. Circumscribed by restrictions from Khartoum, the African Union – United Nations Mission in Darfur, or UNAMID, provides minimal protection to civilians and has not yet adjusted to the deepening economic and security drivers of the rapidly intensifying conflict.

Though it is true that competing Arab groups have clashed in the past, the Sudanese government’s role in exacerbating recent disputes and benefiting from the growing intercommunal strife is being ignored. Drawing on firsthand interviews with refugees on the Chadian border with Darfur, as well as many others inside Sudan, this report challenges the oversimplification of intertribal causes and highlights the Sudanese government’s role and ongoing interest in the latest rounds of violence.

In light of the comprehensive roots of the problems in Darfur, we recommend a way forward that would prioritize the creation of a comprehensive peace process that addresses all of Sudan’s conflicts in one forum, maximizing participation from a wide swath of elements of civil society, opposition, rebels, and government. Unfortunately, the African Union Peace and Security Council recently took a step in the opposite direction, calling for increased international support for the failed Doha Document for Peace in Sudan, a process that stovepipes Darfur’s conflict, promotes divisive deals with small rebel splinter factions, and leaves the main rebels out of the process. The United States, which has a long history of rhetorical support for a comprehensive approach, now must act with bold diplomacy to promote a solution for the grievances of all Sudanese and provide new support to those elements inside Sudan that are on the front lines of the struggle for peace and democracy.

Identifying economic and security motives

Notwithstanding the popularly accepted “endemic inter-tribal hatred” narrative, recent large-scale violence in Darfur is systematic, state sponsored, and driven by economic and security objectives. The government actively promotes the image of uncontrollable, anarchic intertribal violence between Darfur’s tribes to mask the underlying intent behind its divide-and-rule strategy: to consolidate control of Darfur’s economy and to appease the increasingly restless Janjaweed constituencies that the government needs for its fight against the rebel Sudan Revolutionary Front.
North Darfur’s gold: An economic motive

The violent side of the gold rush in North Darfur indicates both the economic facet of the recent surge in violence and the security objectives. In May 2013 the Enough Project documented the Abbala militias’ strategic attack on the areas around newly discovered gold mines. This attack sought to remove the traditional Beni Hussein custodians and to consolidate control of the mines, facilitating government officials’ monopoly over rapidly expanding gold exports, which have played a critical role in replacing lost oil revenues after South Sudan’s 2011 independence. Following deadly rounds of clashes, however, the Abbala community’s key spokesmen began to express concerns over the possibility of being instrumentalized by the government and threatened to cut their long established ties with the regime. Splinter factions of the Abbala groups soon began to openly challenge North Darfur Gov. Osman Mohammad Yusuf Kibr’s attempts to control the area by establishing roadblocks and declaring their own administration over towns. The growing lack of cohesion between these groups highlights fissures in the government’s long established patronage networks.

South Darfur’s gum arabic: An economic motive

Recent violence in South Darfur has cleared native inhabitants from some of the most productive land in Darfur. In South Darfur, the Beni Halba are attempting to seize control over the Gimr’s traditional homestead, which boasts valuable gum-arabic-producing land. The Beni Halba, the tribe of Sudanese Second Vice President al-Haj Adam Youssef, are relying on implicit government support for their campaign against the Gimr. Without oil exports, gum arabic, which is exempt from U.S. sanctions, is a key export for Sudan’s faltering economy. Gimr leaders and the governor of South Darfur have openly voiced concerns about the second vice president’s backing of the Beni Halba’s recent attacks. Abkar Al Toum, a spokesman for the Gimr tribe, told Radio Dabanga that throughout the hostilities, which flared up at the end of March 2013, “no official force intervened to protect the inhabitants of Kateela [the homeland of the Gimr]. The troops that were there were reluctant to intervene, which confirms the conspiracy.” Gaining control over gum arabic, an increasingly precious raw product, is likely to appease the Beni Halba group, an important Janjaweed ally of the government.

Central Darfur’s arable land: An economic motive

In Central Darfur, the forces of Ali Kosheib, a Janjaweed commander and the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court, or ICC, are seizing fertile land in Wadi Saleh to expand the territory available to favored Arab ethnic groups, particularly Kosheib’s Taaysha tribesman and President Omar al-Bashir’s Misseriya constituency. One refugee of the fighting explained to Enough that, “They want to
take the land and get rid of the people.” Well-placed sources confirmed reports that Ali Kosheib has been receiving significant financial and logistical support from Central Finance Minister Ali Mahmoud, another highly placed Taaysha leader. Furthermore, reliable sources also confirm that following recent battlefield successes in Darfur, the Finance Minister Ali Mahmoud, acting under Sudanese President Bashir’s direct instructions, authorized Kosheib to recruit 400 more militiamen into the Janjaweed and to purchase more military equipment for his forces. Kosheib was targeted for assassination on July 7, 2013, during the recent fighting in Nyala. After treatment in a hospital in Nyala, he was flown to Khartoum almost immediately.

Patronage networks: An economic motive

During the height of the genocide, Khartoum developed a huge security-patronage network that pays the militias to act as paramilitary units or integrates them formally into the army. In the absence of oil revenues, the government is struggling to fulfill its patronage obligations. Instead of direct payments, the regime now secures its interests by allowing these militias to loot and pillage with complete impunity and keep the spoils as a form of compensation. Some sources suggest that the national-security services worked in conjunction with the Janjaweed to kidnap and hold for ransom foreign employees of nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, though Enough has not independently verified this information. In exchange for government indifference and assistance with illegal activities, these militias continue to support the counterinsurgency against the rebels and government attempts to secure natural resources. “They loot whatever they can carry,” said Abdul, a refugee camp resident, “and burn whatever they can’t.” Janjaweed forces are also reportedly benefitting from gum-arabic smuggling networks and elephant poaching. Government-sponsored “reconciliation conferences” are now venues for extortion by Janjaweed elements demanding huge payoffs.
Pacifying the restless Janjaweed and increasingly strained relations: A security motive

Analysts who follow the issue closely explain that the Sudanese government fears a potential backlash from the disaffected Janjaweed. The Sudan Armed Forces remain fairly weak in Darfur, with its best forces deployed to the border with South Sudan and to the embattled states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile. As a result, Khartoum’s main instruments to fight the Darfur counterinsurgency are its security agents and the Janjaweed militias, backed by small army deployments and air strikes when necessary. As the government’s dependence on proxies deepens, the financial requirements to satisfy Janjaweed leaders increase. Additionally—as vividly evidenced by July 2013 fighting in Nyala and North Darfur—if left unsatisfied, Janjaweed elements are growing increasingly willing to direct their violence against the central government.

Fallout from the economic and security issues

July 2013 clashes in Nyala
In early July 2013 tensions between Janjaweed militia groups and government security forces exploded in South Darfur’s capital city, Nyala. Although information about recent clashes is difficult to obtain, most analysts agree that jockeying for financial spoils caused the fighting. Agence France-Presse cites government officials, who explain that “differences” between the National Intelligence and Security Services, or NISS, and their Janjaweed allies sparked the violence.

Dikroom, a senior Janjaweed commander and sergeant in the Central Reserve Police, was killed in some kind of dispute over the spoils of war, sparking new rounds of violence. The fact that clashes between the Central Reserve Police and NISS escalated to wholesale violence in the state capital underscores the government’s involvement in stoking the flames. Sources on the ground confirmed that the Sudan Armed Forces joined the fighting, along with NISS forces, and that the government brought four planes with elite forces and weapons to contain the fighting and restore order. Random shelling resulted in the deaths of five civilians inside their homes, including one child and two World Vision aid workers. At least 45 others were injured. According to multiple sources, two of the main markets in Nyala, al-Malaja and al-Mawashi, were completely destroyed and looted, and the premises of nongovernmental organizations in the vicinity of the NISS compound were looted.

Abbala militias’ growing dissatisfaction
Similar fissures and fragmentation are visible in North Darfur. After renewed violence in the Jebel Amer area in late June 2013, a splinter movement self-identified as “fursan,” or “knights,” of the Abbala went as far as publicly declaring their independence from government control.
On July 8, Abbala militiamen intercepted and seized a convoy in front of the UNAMID gates with no resistance from the army forces guarding the vehicles. According to Radio Dabanga’s sources, “Members of the Sudanese army who were driving six vehicles guarding the convoy did not react and continued to Al Sareif Beni Hussein.” Fissures between the Abbala community and the government highlight the growing pressure on Khartoum to fulfill the demands of its Janjaweed allies.

Enough’s sources confirm that in mid-July, President Bashir held a special security meeting on Darfur to try to pacify the emerging Janjaweed splinter factions and reconcile them with the community’s leader, Musa Hilal. Hilal has been publicly expressing his dissatisfaction with Khartoum and threatening to side with the armed Sudan Revolutionary Front for months. At the end of July 2013, Musa Hilal publicly announced a switch of allegiance away from the government.

Evidence from the survivors

Enough Project field interviews with survivors of some of the recent violence help delineate and add depth to the assessment of regime and militia motivations described above. Much of what the refugees reported on was the local dynamics related to war profiteering. But due to the lack of transparency in Sudanese large-scale commercial activity, what remains unknown includes which companies might already be lining up for mineral concessions or mechanized farming in Darfur. It is not yet evident who will be the local partners and international investors in schemes that profit from asset stripping and land grabbing in Darfur. All the information that relates to these larger crimes is treated as a state secret, evidently because of the hijacked state’s role in the crimes. Confirming this will require additional research, but the refugee testimonies below make it clear that the specific war crimes today make much bigger profits possible tomorrow.

Money thicker than blood?

Until recently, the refugee population in Chad was predominantly from the Masalit, Fur, and other non-Arab tribes—traditional targets of the government-sponsored Janjaweed during the earlier phases of the conflict. As a result, it is sadly unsurprising to hear that a whole new wave of people has now been displaced from these communities. These non-Arab tribes have been targets for years. The Janjaweed, however, are also carrying out attacks against Arab groups who have fallen out of government favor. Some of these groups, such as the Salamat of Central Darfur, were part of Janjaweed militias in earlier years and participated in the kind of brutal ethnic cleansing that they are experiencing today. “Now they are burying their own brethren,” one refugee summarized.
One refugee used an analogy to describe what is underway: “Now the chameleon has changed its colors. Before, the Salamat and Misseriya were fighting together against us [non-Arabs]. But now the Salamat are the same color as us.”41 Another refugee used the same analogy of the chameleon, but with a different twist: “The chameleon is the government, which has changed its strategy to get rid of certain Arab groups.”42

The fighting between different groups in Darfur serves Khartoum’s interests well, since it allows the government to reinforce the popular misconception that most of the fighting in Darfur caused by intertribal feuds. This misunderstanding provides a cover for the Sudanese government to continue supporting the local Janjaweed militias, such as the one commanded by Kosheib, for the government’s own economic and security interests. More and more pro-government militias, however, are falling outside of the regime’s control, further complicating and destabilizing the region.
Conflict economics in Central Darfur

Parts of Central Darfur have become a microcosm of these evolving economic agendas. The interests of the Sudanese government and its allied ethnic militias coincide around financial gains that are often secured through violence. “The violence is now about money,” one refugee from Central Darfur said simply.\textsuperscript{43} In Central Darfur, these shared economic interests fall into two broad categories: land acquisition through population clearance and moneymaking schemes to pacify Janjaweed militiamen. The government does not hold accountable the militias that loot and control resource-rich land; not one Janjaweed commander has been prosecuted for wrongdoing.

Land grabbing and population clearing

Enough interviewed dozens of Salamat, Fur, and Zaghawa refugees from Central Darfur whose villages were burned by government-supported Janjaweed militias, principally of the Misseriya tribe. The land in these areas is fertile and supplies a major grain market in the town of Um Dukhun near the Chadian border. During this round of violence, certain Arab ethnic groups—principally the Salamat living in this area—have become the victims of Janjaweed land grabbing. Although the Salamat militias worked with the government during the height of the genocide, their tribe is considered to be more loyal to Chad. The Salamat are said to be of Chadian origin, settling in Darfur only decades ago. As a consequence of that and of decades-long land disputes, the government is permitting its much stronger Misseriya constituency to embark on a land-grabbing campaign in the Salamat’s area. According to refugees, the Misseriya militias now have free reign over much of the western part of Central Darfur on the Chad-Sudan border.\textsuperscript{44} The Fur and Masalit communities—non-Arab groups that were the focus of previous ethnic-cleansing campaigns—have also been targeted. A refugee student from Central Darfur told us that, “The Misseriya said there were too many non-Arabs living there, and we had to leave.”\textsuperscript{45}

Many displaced people remain within Darfur. The U.N. Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, or OCHA, confirmed the devastating impact of these latest clashes on civilians, noting that fighting between the Salamat and the Misseriya has displaced thousands of people.\textsuperscript{46} According to OCHA, at least 22,300 people from 4,460 families were displaced from their homes in rural areas to larger towns in Central Darfur after a conflict between the Misseriya and Salamat tribes.\textsuperscript{47} Additionally, 12,300 displaced people fled to Um Dukhun from villages in the Abu Garadil, Salaly, and Kabar administrative units.\textsuperscript{48} According to local community leaders interviewed by the Darfur Bar Association, at least 713 families, or almost 3,700 individuals, were forced to flee to Zalingei, Sudan; 245 families, or approximately 1,500 individuals, fled to Garsalia; and 280 families, or 1,700 people, sought refuge in Bindiza.\textsuperscript{49}

Refugees interviewed by the Enough Project in Chad confirmed that residents of the Wadi Saleh area are being cleared, and that land is being occupied primarily by Misseriya Janjaweed elements aligned with forces commanded by Kosheib. Human Rights Watch
corroborated these accounts with interviews with refugees in Tissi, another Chadian border town. According to refugees interviewed by Enough, the Misseriya expect to keep all the assets that are taken during the population-clearing assaults, occupy the land, and secure it for possible sale or lease by the government to investors from Persian Gulf countries.

Refugees told Enough that a total of 16 villages were burned in other parts of Central Darfur, including Um Sory, Girlia, Cojore, Taham, Baiede, Hillat Abod, Hillat Ganaye, Bisky, and Tajou. One refugee after another ascribed specific intent to the crimes they witnessed. “They burned my farm and house intentionally,” one Masalit woman from the village of Murraya reported to us, referring to Misseriya Janjaweed. “They destroyed all the water pumps, and that destroys the local economy. They don’t want us to return.” Another refugee from the town of Um Dukhun said, “The Misseriya militia wants to empty all the other groups from the area. The plan of the government is to clear the population, and the Misseriya are their instrument.”

As evidence of the government’s support for the attacking Janjaweed forces, refugees cited government license plates on all of their cars and trucks. Refugees also told Enough researchers that their attackers wore military-green khaki uniforms, which they believed were government issued.
Looting, extortion, and smuggling

Khartoum-supported Janjaweed militias are allowed to loot with impunity as partial payment for their loyal service to the state. Their asset-stripping and money-making schemes are becoming more creative and brazen, ensuring a vast transfer of wealth to a small band of favored Arab ethnic groups. Since some of the recent victims are of Arab origin, the situation is becoming more chaotic. One constant factor, however, is that the perpetrators of the violence are primarily former or current members of Janjaweed militias.
Simple looting is the most straightforward and common tactic—a fact that was verified by the refugees of the village burnings. “It is about looting,” said one refugee from the Wadi Saleh region bordering Chad.56

In the early period of violence in the town of Um Dukhun in March 2013, refugees reported that the Janjaweed broke into dozens of grain stores and market shops at night, systematically looting the accumulated wealth of targeted ethnic groups.57 Roadblocks were established to take valuables and money from fleeing populations, according to the refugees. Women interviewed by the Enough Project said that uniformed men manning the checkpoints stopped people and asked for money, and if the women had no money, the men took their valuables. These women also reported that two very young Salamat girls were kidnapped at one of these checkpoints. According to those interviewed by Enough, one was raped and left behind by her attackers; the other is still in captivity.58

Other extortion schemes are becoming more common. Refugees reported that Janjaweed militias kill people and dump their bodies in the market. The Janjaweed then claim the dead person as their associate and demand blood money, threatening to attack the area if the money is not paid.59 Racketeering and abducting for ransom money are other forms of the thriving criminal economy in Darfur. Eyewitnesses told Enough that Janjaweed militias approach merchants and demand “protection” money; if they refuse to pay, the Janjaweed threaten to beat and kidnap the merchants until their relatives pay.60

Reports of fighting over gum-arabic-producing land and of smuggling networks from South Darfur into Chad emerged in May 2013, providing evidence of another source of illicit income in the region.61

Reconciliation as a ploy

Government-sponsored reconciliation conferences, which Khartoum points to as evidence of its constructive role in trying to defuse violence, are at times used by Janjaweed leaders to negotiate extortion arrangements. In Darfur, traditional mechanisms of intergroup mediation are being undermined by the Sudanese government’s militarization of favored ethnic groups.62 In the absence of effective traditional or formal accountability mechanisms, widespread impunity persists for crimes against humanity committed during state-supported militia attacks.

After an early bout of fighting in Um Dukhun, militias from both sides—Salamat and Misseriya—left town. The Misseriya established a camp a couple of kilometers out-
side the town. Some of the Salamat went to neighboring Abu Garadil because it is the largest village in the area with a Salamat majority and a popular marketplace. Rumors of a possible Misseriya attack on Abu Garadil, however, soon surfaced. Masalit refugees interviewed in the camp told Enough that their family wanted to leave Abu Garadil when they heard of an imminent Misseriya attack. The witness, however, informed Enough that the Salamat urged and even threatened them against leaving, citing the forthcoming reconciliation conference. According to our witness, when civilians were gathered in Abu Garadil for the reconciliation conference, the Misseriya militia prepared to attack. While the talks were taking place with delegates from all groups, including the Misseriya community, others from the Misseriya delegation signaled to the attackers, who burned the whole village.

After almost two months of negotiations in Zalingei, both tribes signed a peace agreement on July 1, 2013, but there has been no formal payment of compensation yet. Salamat was awarded 12.45 million Sudanese pounds, or $2.8 million, while compensation for the Misseriya was set at 8.3 million Sudanese pounds, or $1.9 million. The signing ceremony was attended by Sudanese Second Vice President Youssef; the head of the Darfur Regional Authority, Dr. Tijani Sese; the head of the Council of States, Adam Hamid Musa; and Minister of Justice Mohamed Bishara Dosa. Darfur has historically suffered from false reconciliation conferences, where the government commits to pay reparative diya, compensation payment, but fails to meet its obligations. In many instances, this practice has led to the renewal of the fighting, leading to more casualties and higher blood-money costs.
The collection of diya—which is the cornerstone of Darfur’s centuries-old traditional conflict resolution—and tribal reconciliation practices have been hijacked by government and Janjaweed manipulations, fueling more violence rather than helping contain local conflicts.

The International Criminal Court indictee

Ali Mohammed Abd-Al-Rahman, better known by his nickname, Ali Kosheib, is an influential Taaysha tribesman and commander of a Janjaweed militia. He is currently a powerful member of the Sudanese Central Reserve Police. In 2007 the ICC issued an

Digital Globe satellite imagery dated June 4, 2013 confirms the near complete destruction of the town of Abu Garadil. The first image shows that over half of the market area of the town was destroyed. The second image evidences the completely scorched earth in the residential areas of the town.
arrest warrant for Kosheib for crimes against humanity and war crimes for his role in the genocide in Darfur. The ICC charged Kosheib with 504 assassinations, 20 rapes, and the forced displacement of 41,000 people. In one of the attacks by the militia under his command, a survivor reported that 150 people were murdered—including 30 children—in 90 minutes.

Witnesses separately interviewed by the Enough Project and Human Rights Watch in different locations in eastern Chad placed Kosheib at the scene of recent attacks. Many of the refugees who Enough interviewed identified Kosheib as the commander of the Janjaweed
unit that burned their villages. “Ali Kosheib said he is the government,” said one refugee.72

Refugee witnesses to some of the attacks said that Kosheib travels in a convoy of 16 trucks with government license plates.73 They said that his militia members wear government uniforms. Witnesses repeatedly reported that he established a camp 1 kilometer outside of the town of Um Dukhun, from which he staged looting operations and village burnings. One refugee student from Um Dukhun said that Kosheib asserted his decision that the people needed to be cleared off the land in that area.74 The government and Kosheib “have the same head,” said the refugee.75 Another refugee from a nearby area said that, “Ali Kosheib told the people of the area to look for somewhere else to live.”76 Refugees described Kosheib as the center of the looting and extortion schemes described above, from demanding blood money to manipulating the reconciliation conferences to stealing grain, livestock, and other possessions.77

Concluding remarks and recommendations

The Janjaweed militias are back. The Sudanese government’s notorious paramilitary force and favorite instrument of counterinsurgency—which earned infamy at the height of Darfur’s genocide in the mid-2000s—has unleashed several scorched-earth campaigns in 2013 that have ethnically cleansed communities off their land, displacing hundreds of thousands of Darfuris.

In terms of the immediate violence in Darfur, it is hard to imagine isolated actions that might make an impact, absent a much broader policy shift by governments with influence in Sudan. Immediate actions need to be taken, however, to contain further violence and crimes. Some actions that might be considered include holding the Sudanese government accountable for the conduct of its allied forces and its army and other security forces, such as the Border Guards and Central Reserve Police units that have committed mass atrocities. Furthermore, a joint A.U. and U.N. investigation should be opened as soon as possible to examine the recent ambush of UNAMID in which 24 peacekeepers were killed or injured. Finally, the U.N. Security Council should support Tanzania’s calls for more forceful rules of engagement for UNAMID.

But it is the bigger policy picture that needs urgent attention. The humanitarian operation succeeds in protecting hundreds of thousands of displaced persons and refugees who
Digital Globe satellite imagery dated April 16, 2013 confirms the selective destruction of tukuls in the village of Girlia, one of the destroyed villages identified by refugees.
would have otherwise succumbed to hunger and preventable diseases. Despite this success and the unprecedented outpouring of concern in the United States and other countries, the broader international response to the state-sponsored genocidal violence in Darfur beginning in 2003 has been woefully ineffective. The reasons for the policy failure are rooted in the lack of an effective, truly comprehensive peace process for Sudan and an unwillingness in most countries with leverage to use it to pressure Khartoum to change its behavior on the battlefield and compromise at the negotiating table.78

Peace efforts in Darfur since the mid-2000s have intensified conflict instead of reducing it. Deals have focused on co-opting individual rebel commanders, usually resulting in them becoming government-sponsored militia leaders. No proposal has addressed the core issues that drive violence in Darfur, and the rebels and general population have therefore rejected the proposition. Few of the economic issues addressed in this report have even been the subject of negotiations.

Furthermore, international initiatives in Darfur are disconnected from peace efforts in other embattled areas of Sudan, such as the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, and eastern Sudan. Support from the United Nations, the United States, and other countries for this segmented approach strengthens Khartoum’s divide-and-conquer strategy and decreases the chances for peace in Sudan.

Now that violence is again rising in Darfur, the lessons from previous failures must be heeded to start a new comprehensive national peace process to replace the region-specific initiatives. The United States—with new additions to President Barack Obama’s national-security team and the momentum created by the presidential visit to Africa in early July—can play a major role in helping construct such a process and create the necessary leverage to give peace a chance. Millions of survivors from Darfur have little hope without a comprehensive process.

The African Union High-Level Implementation Panel and U.N. Special Envoy Haile Menkerios must push for a new internationally backed peace process that deals with the
deep-seated Sudan-wide issues comprehensively. Such a process must address problems of representation, repression, and natural-resource exploitation with the participation of civil society and opposition. As a first order of business, it should seek to end the rebellions in Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and eastern Sudan.

While the African Union, the United Nations, and other international actors pursue a comprehensive peace, the ICC should continue its efforts to establish accountability in Darfur. These organizations could begin by investigating the current violence in Darfur to determine if it constitutes war crimes and crimes against humanity. Along this line, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda raised concerns with the U.N. Security Council about Kosheib’s involvement in the latest round of clashes.79

In order to promote real solutions, the United States must engage much more deeply with the armed and unarmed opposition in Sudan. Diplomatic contact and nonmilitary capacity-building support should be focused on the Sudan Revolutionary Front, the National Consensus Forces, and genuine civil-society representatives. These elements, which arguably represent the vast majority of Sudan’s population, must be more united and better prepared to assist in the eventual democratic transition that the Sudanese people continue to demand and should be challenged to offer their vision of a political solution for the current violence in Darfur and other conflict-affected areas of Sudan.

2 The Fur and Masalit are Darfur’s traditional African victim communities and have suffered attacks for more than a decade. John Hagan and Weonona Rymond-Richmond, Darfur and the Crime of Genocide (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 

3 Generally, Arab communities have aligned with the government and have been spared attack by fellow Arab militiamen in Darfur. Ibid. 


7 The Enough Project’s Omer Ismail and John Prendergast traveled to eastern Chad in May 2013. 


11 Ibid. 


13 Ibid. 


19 Author interview with anonymous refugee, refugee camp on Chad border, May 2013. 

20 Author telephone interview with confidential source, July 2013. 


24 Author telephone interview with anonymous source, July 2013. 

25 Author interview with Abdul, refugee camp on Chad border, May 2013. 

26 Interview with anonymous refugee, refugee camp on Chad border, May 2013. 


28 Author interview with Ahmed Hussein Adam, Washington D.C., June 12, 2013. 


31 Ibid. 

32 Author telephone interview with confidential source, July 2013; Timberlake, “Gunfire, looting in Sudan city after aid worker dies.” 

33 Ibid. 

34 Ibid. 


36 Author interview with confidential sources, Darfur, Sudan, July 2013.

38 Ibid.


40 Author interview with anonymous refugee, refugee camp on Chad border, May 2013.

41 Author interview with anonymous refugee, refugee camp on Chad border.

42 Author interview with anonymous refugee, refugee camp on Chad border, May 2013.

43 Author interview with anonymous refugee, refugee camp on Chad border, May 2013.

44 Author interview with anonymous refugee, refugee camp on Chad border, May 2013.

45 Author interview with anonymous refugee, refugee camp on Chad border, May 2013.


47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 Abdelrahman Gasim, Darfur Bar Association, email correspondence, July 13, 2013.


52 Author interviews with anonymous refugees, refugee camp on Chad border, May 2013.

53 Author interview with anonymous refugee, refugee camp on Chad border, May 2013

54 Ibid.

55 Author interview with anonymous refugee, refugee camp on Chad border, May 2013.

56 Author interview with anonymous refugee, refugee camp on Chad border, May 2013.

57 Ibid.

58 Author interview with anonymous refugee, refugee camp on Chad border, May 2013.

59 Author interview with anonymous refugee, refugee camp on Chad border, May 2013.

60 Ibid.

61 “Sudan clashes over gum arabic in Darfur.”


63 Author interview with anonymous refugee, refugee camp on Chad border, May 2013.

64 Ibid.


66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 The ICC indicted Kosheib for 22 counts of crimes against humanity: murder (article 7(1)(a)); deportation or forcible transfer of population (article 7(1)(d)); imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law (article 7(1)(e)); torture (article 7(1)(f)); persecution (article 7(1)(h)); and inhumane acts of inflicting serious bodily injury and suffering (article 7(1)(k)). He has been accused of 28 counts of war crimes: violence to life and person (article 8(2)(e)(i)); outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment (article 8(2)(e)(ii)); intentionally directing an attack against a civilian population (article 8(2)(e)(iii)); pillaging (article 8(2)(e)(iv)); and destroying or seizing the property (article 8(2)(e)(v)).

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 Author interview with anonymous refugee, refugee camp on Chad border; Human Rights Watch, “Sudan: ICC Suspect at Scene of Fresh Crimes.”

72 Author interview with anonymous refugee, refugee camp on Chad border, May 2013.

73 Ibid.

74 Author interview with anonymous refugee, refugee camp on Chad border, May 2013.

75 Author interview with anonymous refugee, refugee camp on Chad border, May 2013.

76 Author interview with anonymous refugee, refugee camp on Chad border, May 2013.

77 Author interview with anonymous refugee, refugee camp on Chad border, May 2013.


Enough is a project of the Center for American Progress to end genocide and crimes against humanity. Founded in 2007, Enough focuses on the crises in Sudan, South Sudan, eastern Congo, and areas affected by the Lord’s Resistance Army. Enough conducts intensive field research, develops practical policies to address these crises, and shares sensible tools to empower citizens and groups working for change. To learn more about Enough and what you can do to help, go to www.enoughproject.org.

The Satellite Sentinel Project launched on December 29, 2010, with the goals of preventing a return to full-scale civil war between northern and southern Sudan, as well as detecting, deterring, and documenting threats to civilians along both sides of the border. SSP focuses world attention on pending incidents of mass violence in the Sudans and uses imagery and analysis to generate rapid responses on human-rights and human-security concerns.