Strategy Briefing
The crisis in Kenya poses an enormous challenge to the United States, not least because it has already triggered the killing of over 1000 Kenyans and displaced hundreds of thousands. Kenya has experienced violence in the wake of every election in its modern history, and though the recent violence is unprecedented, its roots extend well beyond the feud between Mwai Kibaki’s Party of National Unity, or PNU, and Raila Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement, or ODM.
In the fight to eliminate genocide and crimes against humanity from the face of the earth, we cannot rely on ad hoc responses based on the whims of political will every time a crisis erupts around the globe. At some point, there must be some measure of automaticity associated with our response, built solidly upon principles of international law and hard-earned lessons from previous efforts. To that end, the world has recently seen the birth of two essential pillars in that foundation: the International Criminal Court and the doctrine of the "Responsibility to Protect.”
The establishment of strong democratic institutions and processes in Sudan will be a key prerequisite for peace in Darfur and the South. By setting forth a timetable for elections, the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement seeks to give Sudanese citizens significantly more control in how their country is governed. However, the CPA election clock is ticking and neither the institutional foundations nor the requisite electoral processes are in place.
Dissension, disarray, deaths, and defections within the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army leadership provide a major opportunity for negotiators to pursue—parallel to an expeditious conclusion of the formal negotiations process in Juba—the conclusion of a swift deal with LRA leader Joseph Kony himself. Such a deal would seek to find an acceptable set of security and livelihood arrangements for the LRA leadership—particularly those indicted by the International Criminal Court—and its rank and file. This moment of weakness at the top of the LRA must be seized upon immediately.
The stakes in Sudan in terms of protecting human life may have no equal throughout the world today. As Darfur continues to churn and burn, the 2005 peace deal that ended a far deadlier war in Southern Sudan is at risk and in danger of eventual collapse. If it unravels, there will be no chance for peace in Darfur, and if Darfur continues to deteriorate, the likelihood increases dramatically of a return to what was—for 20 years—a far more destructive war in the South. [1]
*Correction: The original report mistakenly said that the UN would not have a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) in Chad. This is incorrect. According to UN Security Council resolution 1778, the UN will have a multidimensional presence in the Central African Republic and Chad - with an SRSG - working in concert with the European Union force. We apologize for the error.*
If there is a Guinness Book of World Records entry for most threats issued with no follow up, the international community’s response to Darfur is likely setting a new standard.
On April 18, in a speech at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, President Bush correctly stated that Sudanese President Omer al Bashir’s “record has been to promise cooperation while finding new ways to subvert and obstruct the U.N.'s efforts to bring peace to his country.” The President continued, “The time for promises is over -- President Bashir must act.” Today, one month later, the government of Sudan continues to obstruct the deployment of a stronger peacekeeping force, support the Janjaweed and other militia groups, and harass and intimidate humanitarian workers. The U.S.
President Bush’s announcement today that his administration will begin implementing a set of punitive measures -- its oft-threatened “Plan B” -- against the Sudanese Government could have marked a real turning point in U.S. policy to end what the president calls genocide. Unfortunately, it doesn't.
Although war clouds remain on the horizon, the cessation of hostilities agreement between the Government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army that resulted from the Juba peace process now has largely held for 10 months. But the relative progress is fragile, as small LRA units could re-infiltrate northern Uganda and conduct ambushes, abduct kids, or burn a camp, and the fear and paranoia generated by such attacks could undermine any chance for peace.
