Prospects for peace in Uganda have reached a make-or-break point. After 20 years of civil war across northern Uganda between government forces and the messianic Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) – an infamous conflict marked by widespread massacres, rape and slavery in which 1.7 million members of the ethnic Acholi population were driven from their homes – peace talks are now underway in Juba, southern Sudan. The talks provide northern Ugandans with a chance for lasting peace, but the process is on the verge of collapsing and must be rescued. Currently, the U.S., which probably boasts the most diplomatic leverage over the participants in the peace talks, remains almost totally absent from the process.
The Bush administration refuses to get directly involved in negotiations with the LRA, which it has branded as a terrorist outfit – thus missing out on the best opportunity in years to permanently neutralize the LRA threat. The U.S. has also been unwilling to push Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni to be more forthcoming in the peace process, and seems uninterested in sending a message to the LRA that if they ended the war through peace talks, the U.S. would not continue to pursue LRA leader Joseph Kony. He and his top commanders have been indicted for crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Renewed warfare between the LRA and the Ugandan army would be absolutely disastrous for the 1.5 million homeless Ugandans still confined to squalid camps – and in particular for the 200,000 who have left the camps since peace talks began in July, 2006, and who would be caught once again in the crossfire. Already, 1,000 people die every week in northern Uganda because of malnutrition and disease. Renewed conflict would throw the region into another vicious cycle of violence and death.
The U.S. should take a lead role in providing the kind of incentives and disincentives that will alter the calculations of the LRA and President Museveni, and will push the peace process forward. Absent U.S. leadership, other members of the international community will remain hesitant to fully engage in the current talks.
Here's what must be done to reverse the situation:
Peacemaking:
The U.S. should appoint a senior diplomat to work in direct support of the peace process and in close collaboration and coordination with the UN Special Envoy, support the process financially, and use its significant leverage with the Ugandan Government to exhaust all peaceful options for resolving the conflict.
Protection:
The international community – particularly the U.S. – should pressure the Ugandan government to curb human rights abuses by its own security forces and deploy a police force capable of protecting civilians. Uganda, Congo, and Sudan should also work with the international community to develop a regional strategy to prevent further LRA atrocities within their national borders.
Punishment:
The International Criminal Court should continue to pursue its case against Joseph Kony and his lieutenants. If a comprehensive peace agreement is in fact implemented, then the UN Security Council should suspend the ICC cases against Kony and other indicted LRA leaders for one year at a time – conditional on their good behavior – in the interests of peace in the region.
Crisis Group Analysts In The Field For ENOUGH
Massed in a crumbling concrete house dilapidated by years of neglect, a group of residents from Anaka in northern Uganda recently met with ENOUGH staff and spoke of their hopes for peace and their fear of continued conflict. A frail elderly man stood up and said, "We want peace, we want to return home, that's all we want."
When peace talks between the Ugandan government and the LRA began in the southern Sudanese town of Juba in July 2006, some camp residents slowly began to trickle out of the squalid and overcrowded camps toward their homes. When progress slowed and problems began to emerge in the talks, however, the residents quickly opted to return to the camps. For the people of Anaka, the promise of returning home is on the horizon, but seems fleeting and precarious.
Like the rest of northern Uganda's 1.5 million internally displaced persons (down from 1.7 million since the peace process began), the people of Anaka eagerly eye ongoing Juba peace talks mediated by the Government of Southern Sudan. The LRA has inflicted immense suffering on northern Ugandans, displacing 90 percent of the ethnic Acholi population and creating a generation of youth who know nothing but hunger, poverty, and trauma.
At the most basic level, the conflict is a struggle between the LRA and the Ugandan government, yet the Acholi population bears the brunt of the war as they are often the prime victims of the LRA through indiscriminate killings and the abduction of thousands of children to become fighters, auxiliaries, and sex slaves. The Ugandan government's response to the LRA insurgency has been blemished by a failure to protect the civilian population and a lack of will to deal with the conflict's underlying political root causes.
The Ugandan government has herded northern Ugandans into camps that lack even the most basic services. Humanitarian groups are keeping people alive, but some 1,000 northern Ugandans die each week from malnutrition and disease. Moreover, the Ugandan military has not dealt decisively with the LRA, and Ugandan troops are guilty of human rights abuses against the civilians they are supposed to protect.
On August 26, 2006, the parties signed a cessation of hostilities agreement which established areas for LRA forces to assemble and provided security and humanitarian assistance, and contained promises by the Ugandan government to move their forces away from these areas. The agreement has not been fully implemented, however, and negotiations are at a precarious point: LRA leader Joseph Kony refuses to gather his forces at the designated locales for fear, the LRA claims, that they will be attacked by the Ugandan army. The lack of progress on political issues and the LRA's dissatisfaction with the venue and the mediation have further stalled the process.
If the peace talks collapse, however, the Ugandan army may well take decisive action against the LRA, which could prove equally destabilizing since most of the LRA forces are now hiding in eastern Congo. With the conclusion of successful national elections in the Congo, the Ugandan government may have less patience with peace talks, and thus might decide to send its forces into Congo to attack the LRA. The Ugandan army has a history of such incursions, as shown in an intervention in eastern Congo from 1998-2003 during which looting and serious human rights abuses were committed.
Policy Challenges And Opportunities
Although the peace talks in Juba, southern Sudan, have advanced further than any previous initiative and currently present the best opportunity in 20 years to end the war in northern Uganda, the process is plagued by disconnected and unrepresentative LRA delegates and insufficient international support, especially from the U.S. Talks may collapse absent U.S. leadership to reform the mediation process and refocus the substance of the discussions.
The legacy of past failed peace initiatives and the stigma of dealing with ICC-indicted rebels, branded as terrorists by the U.S., has made members of the international community initially hesitant to fully engage in the current talks. As the negotiations built credible momentum, however, international support trickled in slowly until late last year. On December 1, 2006, the UN named former President of Mozambique Joaquim Chissano as its Special Envoy to LRA-affected areas and tasked him to coordinate international efforts to end the conflict. While a step in the right direction, the international community can do much more to push for peace in northern Uganda.
With the ICC arrest warrants hanging over Kony and his inner circle like the Sword of Damocles, the Juba peace talks have teetered between success and stagnation. Kony and the bulk of his fighting forces – estimated by most observers at around 1,000 troops, including many child soldiers – remain in a sparsely populated and densely forested national park inside neighboring Congo.
Kony is the key to peace, but rather than negotiate directly with the Ugandan government, a delegation made up primarily of Acholi from the diaspora is representing the LRA at the peace talks. The LRA's representatives in Juba are disconnected from the LRA's decision makers in the field and from displaced northern Ugandans who have borne the brunt of LRA atrocities and government neglect. The LRA delegation claims to be championing the cause of all disempowered Acholi victimized by the conflict, but a 20-year history of abduction, mutilation, and murder does not earn the LRA the right to speak on behalf of their victims.
The key to ending LRA atrocities is a security deal between the Ugandan government and Joseph Kony and his military commanders. With increased international engagement, particularly from the U.S., the obstacles to direct negotiations between the Ugandan government and Kony could be overcome. The Government of Southern Sudan has a strong interest in attaining an agreement, but does not have much leverage over the LRA or Ugandan government.
The international community must work together to develop a set of clear costs for the LRA if it sabotages the peace process. Pressure was what brought the LRA to the bargaining table in July 2005, with the International Criminal Court's first-ever issuance of arrest warrants targeting Kony, his deputy Vincent Otti and three other LRA commanders. Maintaining a credible threat of further pressure is now needed to get them to complete a peace accord.
If the international community develops a coordinated regional military strategy to apprehend the leaders of the LRA if they walk away from the table, the cost of failure would increase significantly. Donor pressure must also be put on the Ugandan Government to ensure that they expend every effort to make this process work.
But that's not all that needs to be done. The subjects under discussion in the Juba talks are also increasing their chances of failure. The goal of the talks between the LRA and the government must be to defuse the security threat posed by Kony and his followers, not address the complex problems facing northern Uganda. As the prime perpetrators of northern Uganda's plight, the LRA are not legitimate representatives of the north's interests. The extensive agenda of the LRA does not have a place at the bargaining table. Attention must be shifted to offering the LRA military leadership security guarantees and resettlement packages that will induce them to leave the bush.
Forging a lasting peace in the region, however, requires more than dealing with the military problem of the LRA. Northern Uganda's economic, political, and social marginalization from the more developed south of the country must also be addressed. The current divide between the northern and southern parts of Uganda is not solely an Acholi or northern problem but is also a structural issue of budget allocation, security provisions and political representation that needs to be dealt with at the national level.
Dealing with the north's redevelopment needs will require a separate, internationally-supported process conducted within Uganda that engages all necessary stakeholders. Northern Uganda has been locked in a 20-year cycle of conflict that has terrorized the civilian population, torn apart the community's social fabric, and decimated its physical prosperity. Potential conflict in the north over land, the only tangible economic asset remaining for most Acholi and the foundation for reconstructing the north must be addressed to provide tenure security and prevent dispossession.
ENOUGH Policy Recommendations
Peacemaking: The U.S. should appoint a senior diplomat to work in direct support of the peace process and in close collaboration and coordination with the UN Special Envoy, support the process financially, and use its significant leverage with the Ugandan Government to exhaust all peaceful options for resolving the conflict.
A comprehensive peace process must proceed in two stages. The first stage between the Ugandan government and LRA leaders should defuse the LRA security threat by focusing on the specific details of the LRA's return from the bush – notably security arrangements for Kony and his top lieutenants – and more technical issues such as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, or DDR, of LRA fighters back into society.
The second stage between a wider set of actors from Northern Uganda must deal with the accumulated wounds of war and directly address the conditions that have made northern Uganda prone to conflict for the last 20 years. Assisted by the international community, the Ugandan government must hold an inclusive national reconciliation forum to deal with the underlying political and structural issues that have fuelled the cycle of conflict in the north.
Formal negotiations need to be combined with informal attempts to convince the LRA that they will be accepted back into the community if they return home. Facilitating meetings between the LRA and Acholi leaders, former commanders that have successfully reintegrated, and family members will be critical to overcome these understandable concerns and build confidence that a peaceful return is possible.
Protection: The international community – particularly the U.S. – should pressure the Ugandan government to curb human rights abuses by its own security forces and deploy a police force capable of protecting civilians. Uganda, Congo, and Sudan should also work with the international community to develop a regional strategy to prevent further LRA atrocities within their national borders.
Despite improved security conditions, protecting northern Ugandans from a possible return to full-scale civil war and addressing the plight of displaced and vulnerable northern Ugandans remains an urgent priority. The miserable conditions of life in the camps is the primary cause of death in northern Uganda, with malnutrition and disease killing 1,000 people every week.
In response to the LRA attacks, the Ugandan government herded people into camps, and the government now must take appropriate measures to protect people from the consequences of this encampment policy. The Ugandan government's responsibilities must be clearly laid out and international human rights officers must be deployed – preferably under UN auspices – to monitor the voluntary return of displaced Ugandans to their homes.
Furthermore, if the Juba peace talks fail to end the conflict, LRA-infiltrated Uganda, Sudan, and Congo must work together with the international community to develop a cooperative regional strategy to prevent further LRA atrocities. This collective response should have four main elements:
- Coordinated military actions to apprehend the ICC-indicted LRA leadership.
- Enticements to rank-and-file LRA to return home through offers of amnesty, improved reintegration packages, and programs targeted at improving the capacity of war-affected communities to accept and absorb former fighters.
- Measures to sever the LRA's supply lines by establishing a Panel of Experts to investigate sources of support and recommend offenders for multilateral sanctions, such as asset freezes and travel bans. Ideally this would be pursued through the UN Security Council.
- Steps to contain the LRA within the remote jungles of Congo to neutralize the threat they present to civilian populations. If military force must be used, national armies should operate in concert but within their own borders.
The Ugandan army has drastically improved on its poor history of protecting civilians from LRA attacks. Camps are better protected than in the past and troops have been deployed to prevent the LRA in Sudan and Congo from crossing back into Uganda. The Ugandan government should take the next steps to improve security by providing a capable police force in the war-impacted areas and rebuilding the court system to enforce the rule of law.
Punishment: The International Criminal Court should continue to pursue its case against Joseph Kony and his lieutenants. If a comprehensive peace agreement is in fact implemented, then the UN Security Council should suspend the ICC cases against Kony and other indicted LRA leaders for one year at a time – conditional on their good behavior – in the interests of peace in the region.
The ICC indictments ratcheted up pressure on Kony and the LRA leadership and were crucial in driving them to the bargaining table in July 2005. Strong justice and accountability mechanisms must be central to any meaningful peace agreement to win domestic acceptance and broader international support, but also to deliver justice to victims and deter future crimes.
With respect to the indicted commanders, the most principled, pragmatic compromise balancing the short-term interests of peace and longer-term interest of justice would be third-country asylum for the indicted LRA commanders in a country that is not a member of the ICC. If the LRA undermines the talks or is responsible for their collapse, then regional partners in collaboration with the international community must exert all efforts to apprehend the indicted and bring them to justice.
Traditional reconciliation ceremonies are important to ensure reintegration and rehabilitation of returning LRA fighters, but are not sufficiently adapted to the scale, scope, and nature of the current conflict's crimes and must be supplemented with more formal mechanisms.
ENOUGH Activist Agenda
"Press for Peace"
Activists' efforts should focus on rousing the Bush administration from its slumber so that the U.S. fully backs the Juba peace process with financial and diplomatic support and uses its close ties to Ugandan President Museveni to exhaust all peaceful options. The U.S. must also ensure that Uganda does not pursue destabilizing unilateral military action against the LRA in Congo.
The Ugandan government is a close ally of the U.S., and the Bush Administration has an essential role to play in ensuring that we do not miss this opportunity to end the war. By giving diplomatic backing to the peace process, the U.S. can help end this conflict.
As was the case for Darfur, citizen activism will be critical to press the Bush administration to appoint a senior diplomat to work with the Government of Southern Sudan, the UN Special Envoy, the EU and other concerned parties to help achieve a deal between the Ugandan government and the LRA.
ENOUGH urges you to take three activist actions: learn more about the crisis, lead your leaders in resolving the conflict in a comprehensive and regionally-focused way, and link up with other activists and campaigns fighting for tangible policy change.
Learn More
Read Crisis Group's in-depth reports about the conflict
Read these recent opinion pieces by Crisis Group staff about the role of International Criminal Court in ending the conflict in northern Uganda
Go to Reuters AlertNet for the latest humanitarian developments
Check out what the activists from Invisible Children are doing to help the people of northern Uganda
Lead Your Leaders
This is a crucial moment for the people of northern Uganda, and your voice can make a difference. By contacting your elected representatives, you will be joining thousands of concerned activists from across the country in "leading their leaders" on this issue. Ensure that your elected officials know that their constituents care about northern Uganda and bringing an end to this conflict.
Call your member of Congress and tell him or her:
- to urge the Bush Administration to appoint a senior diplomat to work in direct support of the peace process in close collaboration and coordination with the UN Special Envoy, support the process financially, and use its significant leverage with the Ugandan Government to exhaust all peaceful options for resolving the conflict;
- to urge the Bush Administration to pressure the Ugandan government to curb human rights abuses by its own security forces and deploy a police force capable of protecting civilians;
- to urge the Bush Administration to work multilaterally to help Uganda, Congo, and Sudan develop a regional strategy to prevent further LRA atrocities within their national borders; and
- to support the International Criminal Court's efforts to pursue its case against Joseph Kony, the head of the Lord's Resistance Army, and his lieutenants.
Call the White House at 1-202-456-1414, and tell President Bush:
- to appoint a senior diplomat to work in direct support of the peace process and in close collaboration and coordination with the UN Special Envoy, support the process financially, and use its significant leverage with the Ugandan Government to exhaust all peaceful options to resolving the conflict;
- to pressure the Ugandan government to curb human rights abuses by its own security forces and deploy a police force capable of protecting civilians;
- to urge the Bush Administration to work multilaterally to help Uganda, Congo, and Sudan develop a regional strategy to prevent further LRA atrocities within their national borders; and
- to support the International Criminal Court's efforts to pursue its case against Joseph Kony, the head of the Lord's Resistance Army, and his lieutenants.