By Omer Ismail
Updated on June 26, 2008
Peace will not come to Darfur in isolation. If Southern Sudan goes back to war, then there will be no chance for peace in Darfur. If Chad [1] remains on fire, Darfur will continue to burn. If the Lord's Resistance Army [2] continues to undermine regional security, peace in all of Sudan remains more elusive. And peace will not be lasting in Sudan until there is a more inclusive, democratic governing system [3] in the country.
1. Latest Updates [4]
2. What is the Comprehensive Peace Agreement? [5]
3. What is the Darfur peace process? [6]
4. How are the CPA and the Darfur peace process related? [7]
5. Why does ENOUGH support a democratic transformation in Sudan? [8]
6. What is the status of CPA implementation [9]? [10]
6.1 What is the impasse over Abyei? [11]
6.2 What is the status of the elections? [12]
6.3 What is the future of the self-determination referendum? [13]
7. What is the status of the Darfur peace talks? [14]
7.1 What are the rebels saying? [15]
7.2 What are Darfurians saying? [16]
7.3 What are Darfurians in the Diaspora saying? [17]
7.4 What about the Sudan/Chad proxy war? [18]
The Sudan Peace and Democracy Watch is a Q&A that addresses efforts to implement the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA, achieve a lasting peace for Darfur, and promote the democratic transformation of Sudan.
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1. Latest Updates
Abyei
The recent violence in Abyei threatens to undermine the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and to plunge Sudan back into full-scale civil war. Last month, Brigade 31 of the Sudanese Armed Forces, or SAF, displaced the entire civilian population—some 50,000 people—and burned Abyei’s market and housing to the ground. (See Roger Winter’s report, Abyei Aflame) Two rounds of discussions between the ruling National Congress Party, or NCP, and Southern People’s Liberation Movement, or SPLM, ended on June 8 when the parties agreed to a “road map” to contain the violence. This road map contains two critical steps to improve security in Abeyi: 1) the withdrawal of SAF and SPLA forces, and 2) the deployment of a joint SPLA/SAF force of over 600 soldiers. The deployment of this joint mission began on Wednesday, June 18, 2008.
According to JEM, the objectives of this attack near Khartoum were twofold. First, they wanted to bring the war to those who have been largely oblivious to the violence in Darfur so they could experience firsthand the daily plight of Darfurians. Second, JEM sought to send a message to the remaining Darfuri movements and others at odds with Khartoum that the fortified capital is easily penetrable, hoping to encourage more allies in its fight for regime change in Sudan. JEM also believes that threatening the ruling National Congress Party with attacks on the capital will force Khartoum to negotiate and give them an advantage whenever discussions restart.
Subsequent talks in Juba, the NCP and SPLM—represented by Second Vice President Ali Osman Taha and First Vice President Salva Kiir respectively—failed to reach an agreement on implementation of the Abyei Protocol within the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (read below [20]). On June 22, the parties concluded that the best way forward is to submit the dispute the Permanent Court of Arbitration, or PCA, in The Hague to make another “final and binding” ruling. The PCA examine the ruling of the Abyei Boundaries Commission, or ABC, to determine whether the ABC exceeded its mandate and wrongly demarcated the border of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms transferred from the South to the North by the British in 1905.
According to a press statement quoted in the Sudan Tribune [21], “If the arbitral tribunal determines that the ABC did not exceed its mandate, it shall make a declaration to that effect, and order for the full implementation of the ABC Report… and if the arbitral tribunal determines that the ABC Experts exceeded their mandate, it shall make a declaration to that effect, and shall proceed to define and demarcate on map the boundaries of the Nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms…”
The decision to refer the case for arbitration is a confounding case of déjà vu. The U.S.-brokered Abyei Protocol created the ABC to act as an arbiter; the NCP’s rejection of that “final and binding” ruling has sparked the latest violence. Unfortunately, another round of arbitration is unlikely to break the deadlock unless the international community puts significant pressure on the NCP to implement the ruling.
The Darfuri Leaders Network Conference
The international community seems to have stopped investing in a negotiated settlement for Darfur and is now focused on pushing the Government of Sudan to take baby-steps to improve the situation on the ground. Meanwhile, violence continues unabated, and the frustration of the people of Darfur and the humanitarian community deepens. Car jacking of humanitarian vehicles has become a daily occurrence. Food rations have been halved in most of the camps for internally displaced persons, or IDPs, and banditry is rampant.
However, a group of Darfurians from the diaspora are keeping hope alive by working diligently to articulate a way to resuscitate the peace talks. The Darfuri Leaders Network, or DLN, a loose alliance of several Darfuri organizations in the United States, has held three workshops to forge a consensus on recommendations for a future peace agreement. Among the issues discussed are:
1. Property Restitution and Victim Compensation
2. Fiscal and Political Devolution
3. End of Marginalization: Wealth and Power Sharing
4. The Right of Return
5. Rebuilding and Development
A conference will be held by the end of July 2008 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, under the auspices of Darfur Documentation Project, a Darfuri organization based in Geneva, Switzerland. The Darfurians who will attend the conference include civil society representatives from Sudan, Europe, the United States, Africa, and the Middle East. About 25 percent of the participants are women. The DLN efforts will serve as a resource for discussing the following papers:
1. Overview: Security and humanitarian situation in Darfur
2. The Darfur Peace Agreement, or DPA, and its implications: Critical Analysis
3. Root causes of the conflict in Darfur;
a. Power Sharing.
b. Wealth Sharing.
4. The basis for a just resolution of the conflict in Darfur;
5. Land use and land control;
6. Compensation for the victims;
7. The role of civil society in the peace process as well as the post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation;
8. Civil society perspective and strategy to reenergize the peace process in Darfur
A unified position on these issues could, with strong international support, blunt the negative impact of the Darfur rebels’ ideological differences and personality squabbles on previous rounds of peace talks.
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2. What is the Comprehensive Peace Agreement?
Signed on January 9, 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement [23] ended the 22-year civil war between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, or SPLM, a rebel movement based in the South of the country. The United States worked tirelessly with a regional mediation team from the regional organization IGAD [24](the Intergovernmental Authority on Development) and a core group of allies—the United Kingdom, Norway, and Italy—to push the parties toward a final deal and has a significant stake in keeping the CPA on track.
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3. What is the Darfur peace process?
Since early 2004, the international community has engaged in sporadic efforts to negotiate a ceasefire and peace agreement for Darfur. These efforts yielded the Darfur Peace Agreement [26] in 2006, but only one major rebel leader signed that flawed agreement. This led to further fragmentation of the rebel groups and complicated current peacemaking efforts. The current peace process is led jointly by the United Nations and the African Union through a pair of senior diplomats—Jan Eliasson [27], the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy, and Salim Ahmed Salim [28], AU Special Envoy on the Darfur Conflict.. In “Creating a Peace to Keep,” ENOUGH and Save Darfur call for the appointment of a single, empowered mediator to drive the peace process. This appointment is expected in the near future.
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4. How are the CPA and the Darfur peace process related?
Negotiating peace in Darfur requires a commitment to implementing the CPA, and vice versa (see ENOUGH report An All Sudan Solution [30]). Interlocking peace agreements which address power imbalances in Sudanese society and lay the groundwork for democratic change are the best chance for an end to cycles of genocide, crimes against humanity, dictatorship, and deadly conflict in Sudan. The challenge for the joint U.N./AU negotiating team for Darfur is to broker an agreement that fits within the framework for democratic transformation established by the CPA.
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5. Why does ENOUGH support a democratic transformation in Sudan?
By setting forth a timetable for elections, the CPA seeks to give Sudanese citizens significantly more control over how their country is governed. The fundamental cause of war throughout Sudan is the concentration of wealth and absolute power in the hands of unrepresentative elites—principally the ruling National Congress Party, or NCP. The establishment of strong democratic institutions and processes in Sudan will be a key prerequisite for peace because in a free and fair election the NCP would almost certainly lose its firm grip on power. (see ENOUGH report Democracy: A Key to Peace in Sudan [32]). Legitimate elections have the potential to reshape the distribution of political power at all levels of governance in Sudan. Elections are mandated to take place next year at six levels of government: the Presidency of the Government of National Unity, the Presidency of the Government of Southern Sudan, the National Assembly in Khartoum, the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly in Juba, 25 State Legislatures, and 25 State Governors.
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6. What is the status of CPA implementation?
For two years, the SPLM has expressed frustration at the snail’s pace implementation of the CPA, and blames the NCP for its lack of commitment to peace and the democratic transformation of the country. In October 2007, that frustration led the SPLM to suspend its participation [34] in and recall its ministers from the Government of National Unity. Agreement was reached in late December to return to the Unity government, but critical issues remain unaddressed.
Several significant milestones must be achieved to implement the CPA, the most important of which are resolving the impasse over the oil-rich area of Abyei, carrying out free-and-fair national elections, and completing the referendum on self-determination for Southern Sudan. The cost of failure is immense: a likely return to war that would devastate the South and doom peace efforts in Darfur.
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6.1 What is the impasse over Abyei?
Both the SPLM and NCP claim the area of Abyei is owned by their respective supporters, the Ngok Dinka or the Arab Missiriya. The NCP’s rejection of the July 2005 Abyei Border Commission [36] report—defining the North-South border in the oil-rich area of Abyei—did not bode well for the implementation of the CPA. While the SPLM accepted the commission’s report, the NCP alleged favoritism to the Dinka in that report and consequently denounced it. The NCP’s rejection of the “final and binding report” may have damaging consequences to Sudan’s peace and stability as a whole. Abyei has become the litmus test that will reveal the will of the parties, in particular the NCP, to achieve lasting peace.
Because of Bashir’s rejection of the Abyei Protocol, the local government provided for in the Protocol has never been established. As a result, the two percent of revenues generated from oil extracted in the Abyei area remain unavailable to help improve public services in Abyei, further heightening tensions. Although Khartoum’s oil transactions are thoroughly opaque, if reports that the NCP is in a rush to essentially drain those oil deposits geographically subject to the Abyei Protocol are accurate, Abyei’s economic situation could be negatively affected well into the future.
Abyei remains the most dangerous flash point in South Sudan and threatens to become the trigger that will return the two parties to war in the absence of significant diplomatic action. The clashes and low-level violence in the area that began in December 2007 continue unabated, leading to a build-up of troops and tensions on both sides, to the peril of the CPA and the future of the country as a whole. (see ENOUGH report Abyei Aflame [37] for the latest analysis)
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6.2 What is the status of the elections?
After repeated delays and snags, the census—a critical prerequisite to holding elections—officially ended on May 6, 2008. An estimated 90-95 percent of the South Sudanese population was counted although certain villages in the South were not fully accounted for due to insecurity and heavy rainfall. And in the Darfur region of western Sudan, where a war has been raging on for over five years, the census was seriously hindered by violence and the lack of access to many parts of the region. Some of the data collectors were detained by rebel groups for brief periods of time, and once released, were unable to carry out their mission. The massive displaced populations were excluded from the count, ostensibly because relief organizations have records of all the camp inhabitants that may be added to the census later. So far no preliminary results have been published to explain how the census was conducted and what percentage of the country was covered. Serious doubts remain as to whether this census will yield any credible information necessary to determining the power and wealth sharing in the country, let alone serving as a crucial tool to conduct the up coming elections, if it is to be free and fair.
Finally, Sudan’s Election Bill was scheduled to be passed by the National Assembly by December 2007, but the Assembly has yet to take a vote. With the election scheduled for March 2009, the electoral commission—if it is established—will have limited time to accomplish the many difficult tasks necessary to hold elections.
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6.3 What is the future of the self-determination referendum?
The premise of the CPA is that during the six years between the signing of the agreement in 2005 and the self-determination referendum in 2011, the NCP, SPLM, and the agreement’s international guarantors and supporters work to “make unity attractive,” thereby increasing the likelihood that Southerners would vote for national unity. However, given that the war was fought principally in the South and Southerners were the primary victims of a conflict that killed 2 million people, the burden to make unity attractive rests overwhelmingly with the NCP in Khartoum. The clock is ticking, and the NCP must soon demonstrate a real commitment to unity. At this juncture, the chances for a vote for unity seem more remote [40] and Southern independence more probable.
7. What is the status of the Darfur peace talks?
Hopes were high for peace talks that convened in early November 2007 in Sirte, Libya. (see ENOUGH Report, A Strategy for Success in Sirte [41]) However, the U.N./AU joint mediation team made a critical mistake by trying to unify the more than 25 rebel groups and assemble them all in one place without a clearly defined vision for an end state that resonates with Darfur’s civilian population. A critical majority of the rebel groups refused to attend the talks, and the mediators delayed the process to get more of the rebels on board. Salim and Eliason lacked a clear strategy on how to bring the rebels to the table, running the risk of dragging the process to a point that renders the attempted solutions unworkable to all parties.
Consultations aimed at reviving the Darfur peace process are sputtering along dual tracks, and missing a crucial third track.
• The first track is direct negotiation between the parties, which have all but ground to a halt. In an effort to resuscitate the talks in Sirte, Libya, the AU/U.N. mediation kept the lights on by maintained a scant presence of the parties that attended the opening session. The Libyans placed high hopes on their efforts to bring back the parties to the table, but the Libya track has reached a dead end. Various other proposals, such as British Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s offer to host talks in the United Kingdom, have failed to generate any new momentum.
• The second track must be strengthened immediately: broader consultations with civil society groups in Darfur, including the community leaders among displaced people, women’s groups, and tribal chiefs. Creating such a forum would lead to a wider consensus among Darfurians on the issues that matter the most to them, and help bring to the table the non-rebel component that has been conspicuously absent from the peace process thus far. Critical to the success of this dialogue is the legitimacy of the participants, who should include the Arab tribes who seek a peaceful settlement to the crisis. Mediators must be cognizant, however, that a large number of actors could hamstring the process, and seek to overcome this constraint by presenting concrete proposals.
• The missing track is aggressive shuttle diplomacy—visiting rebel leaders, government officials, and regional actors—using a draft agreement to reinvigorate the talks. (see ENOUGH Report, A Strategy for Success in Sirte [42] for detailed discussion of shuttle diplomacy)
Given the inadequacy of these efforts, the JEM attack near Khartoum, and the violence erupting in Abyei, it is safe to say that the Darfur peace process is stalled. The mediation has nothing new to offer, the Libyans are in Sirte waiting for the rebel groups to show up, and the rebels in turn are waiting for a miracle to put this process back on track. A meeting in Geneva in mid-March 2008 on the future of the peace process was inconclusive, and provided no new energy or ideas on the way forward.
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7.1 What are the rebels saying?
So far, five rebel groupings have emerged:
1. JEM, led by Khalil Ibrahim and Ahmed Tugud Lisan.
2. SLA Unity, comprised of Suliman Jamous, Sharif Hareer and Abdalla Yahia and other commandors from the former G-19.
3. SLA Abdelshafie, consisting of five rebel groups still in Juba, South Sudan.
4. SLA Abdelwahid.
5. URF, the group of Bahar Abu Garda, former Secretary General of JEM, together with commanders Adam Bakhit, Adam Shougar, Abdallan Banda and Khamis Abdalla Abbakar, formerly of G-19 and the National Resistance Front, or NRF, formed with Eritrean backing in 2006.
Khalil Ibrahim has called for one-on-one negotiations between JEM and the government, citing the strength of JEM on the ground and refusing to include what he called the “media rebels” in the coming peace talks. Recent attacks by JEM in Omdurman, a suburb city of Sudan’s capital of Khartoum, possibly were meant to “slap” the governing National Congress Party so that JEM could cut a power sharing deal with the ruling party—without the other Darfur factions. This will further complicate an already difficult situation facing the mediators, and it underscores the urgent need for a credible peace process to deal with the crisis in Darfur.
Negotiations began in late June in Chad between rebel factions—including JEM, URF, and SLA Unity—concerning the possibility of yet another new alliance. The talks, mediated by Chadian President Deby, are scheduled to conclude at the end of July and the outcome could impact the future of the peace process. However, any new alliance of rebel factions would face the same obstacles that previous alliances have faced—principally a profound lack of trust and historical animosities between various personalities within the rebel movements.
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7.2 What are Darfurians saying?
Civil society leaders (and many rebel leaders) want the mediation team to present a draft agreement to begin a new round of discussions. “The time for shuttle diplomacy is over,” says Professor Mahmoud Mousa Mahmoud, a leading Darfurian civil society activist in Khartoum. “We would like to see real engagement with Darfurians of all walks of life, not just the Government of Sudan and the rebel groups.”
When U.N. Envoy Eliasson met in December with rebel leaders and tribal chiefs, he was confronted by leaders of displaced communities who told him that he is not welcome in Darfur partly because of statements he made about arms in the displaced persons’ camps. One of the camp leaders accused Eliasson of “marketing Khartoum’s false propaganda.” The camp leader continued, “[Eliasson] tries every time he comes to Darfur to distort our cause.” Community leaders reiterated their demand for quick deployment of the U.N./AU peacekeeping force and expressed great skepticism about the viability of Libya as a venue for meaningful peace talks because of the negative influence of Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi.
Inside Darfur, the dialogue between community leaders and civil society organizations continued, creating several networks of leaders who are in regular contact with Darfurians abroad. One such network is the Darfur Working Group, which is headed by prominent community leaders inside Sudan and in the Diaspora. According to Dr. Hamid Ali, “the efforts of the Darfur Working Group are geared toward rallying Darfurians behind a goal of sustainable peace and unity among all ethnic groups.”
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7.3 What are Darfurians in the Diaspora saying?
The failure of Sirte resulted in a surge of activity in the Diaspora. In the United States, for instance, the Save Darfur Coalition [46], the law firm Baker and McKenzie [47], the Public International Law & Policy Group [48], and the U.S. Institute for Peace [49] have collectively sponsored two workshops for the Darfurian civil society leaders in the United States. The Darfur Leaders Network benefited from marathon training on negotiations and other skills that yielded six draft documents covering the issues that are likely to be on the table in the coming rounds of peace talks (whenever and wherever they convene). Several committees were formed to contact civil society actors inside Darfur, rebel groups as well as Darfurian Diaspora elsewhere for a buy-in on these issues, and a wider discussion prior to the next talks.
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7.4. What about the Sudan/Chad Proxy War?
On March 13, 2008, Sudan and Chad [51] signed an accord in Dakar, Senegal that calls for the cessation of hostilities between the two countries and a curb on the activities of each others’ rebels operating within their respective territories. The non-aggression deal —the fourth such deal since 2006—was brokered by Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade, who has actively taken part in several similar attempts before, without the participation of the major rebel groups from both countries. Dubbed a “miracle” by Abdoulaye Wade, and praised by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and the French Government, the accord was scorned by Chadian rebels, who said it does “not concern” them and vowed to continue their challenge to Chadian President Idriss Deby.
In conversations with ENOUGH, Timane Erdimi, the head of RFC, who was speaking from Khartoum, and Mohamat Nouri of the National Alliance, who was speaking from Chad, both rejected the deal and threatened to “halt the flow of oil” by attacking the Doba Basin, from which Chad exports over 160,000 barrels of oil a day. But following the attacks by JEM near Khartoum, Sudan cut off all diplomatic ties [52] with Chad. (see ENOUGH report, Nasty Neighbors [53]). The Chadian government denies any involvement in the attack, despite ample evidence of its support for some Sudanese rebel factions. In mid-June, Chadian rebels supported by Khartoum attacked a government garrison in the eastern town of Goz Beida. Against this violent backdrop, Chadian and Sudanese officials continue to discuss implementation of the Dakar agreement. However, there is little to indicate that this deal will prove more successful than the previous regional peace efforts.
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