Date: 08/16/2008
http://english.ohmynews.com/ArticleView/article_view.asp?menu=A11100&no=383396&rel_no=1&back_url=
The prospects of signing a Final Peace Agreement between the Ugandan government and the rebel Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) appears dimmer following LRA leader Joseph Kony's persistent failure to honor appointments with chief mediator Riek Machar.
According to David Nyekorach-Matsanga, leader of the LRA peace delegation, Kony has been communicating with Machar and UN Special Envoy for LRA affected areas Joaquim Chissano with a view to having a meeting where he can air his grievances following his refusal to sign the Final Peace Agreement on April 10, citing his fears over the warrants issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC).
But the recent attack on the South Sudanese border town of Nabanga by the LRA rebels has only lent credence to allegations that their leader Kony is not willing to come in from the cold. All indications now point to a joint military operation to smoke out the elusive Kony, as prospects of a resumption of the stalled Juba peace talks appear dimmer by the day.
Expert opinion remains divided on what course of action the international community and the Ugandan government should adopt, but if a recent statement by a Ugandan military spokesman, Paddy Ankunda, is anything to go by, the government's patience has run out. Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni has also unequivocally stated that his government has nothing more to discuss with Kony.
While some analysts are supporting the Ugandan government's decision to use military force, others are advocating for a resumption of the talks using a new approach. In their report, "A New Strategy for Northern Uganda and the LRA," the ENOUGH Project's co-chair John Prendergast and policy analyst Julia Spiegel argue that two critical problems must be addressed now to salvage peace efforts in northern Uganda.
"First, the current peace efforts lack a channel to negotiate directly with Kony on the make-or-break issue of this deal: his security. On the remote chance that he will ever come out of the bush of his own accord, it will be conditioned on a credible guarantee that he will not be killed. Second, the peace process lacks leverage, which only the combination of the ICC indictments, a credible regional military threat, and a diminution of external support to the LRA, can provide," the authors argue.
In their view, there are now two main tracks that must be pursued simultaneously to secure peace in Uganda and the region: The first is to consolidate the fragile peace that does exist and enable the people of the North to return home and rebuild their communities, and the second is to address Kony and the regional threat he poses.
With hopes of a peace agreement dashed by Kony's intransigence, the authors argue, it is time for a new approach. While the Juba peace process did have certain benefits, it no longer makes sense for the mediators to attempt to appease an LRA that is intent upon spreading its terror across the region. Some religious and cultural leaders from the North continue to reach out to Kony in the hopes of re-energizing the peace process. "While their efforts are commendable, it has become clear that Kony is not interested in signing this agreement. Talks therefore must come to a close," the report urges.
But Kizito Renato Sesana, a Catholic missionary close to the Juba peace talks has not lost hope. He says the international community must find a way to restart the talks immediately in order to end once and for all the suffering of the people of Northern Uganda. Kizito, however, has reservations about the LRA peace delegation as currently constituted.
"The present LRA delegation to the talks is incompetent. Most of the members do not truly represent the LRA, as some of the members are almost certainly an infiltration from the Ugandan government. It is easy to imagine that even if they sign an agreement, it will not hold," Kizito observes.
Kizito, whose two organizations -- Africa Peace Point and Koinonia Community -- at one time offered humanitarian assistance to northern Uganda, notes that whereas Kony's military power is at its lowest, other rebel groups are busy preparing themselves and may soon spring up if an agreement is signed with the LRA. According to Kizito, unlike Kony these rebel groups will most probably not be motivated by spirits, but will have a no-nonsense approach and be more focused on the rights of the Acholi (one of the tribes in northern Uganda) at least as some Acholi perceive them.
"It is therefore imperative to reach an agreement soon, an agreement that will take into consideration the grievances of the Acholi. Thinking that defeating the LRA militarily will be the end of the story is a dangerous delusion," Kizito warns.
Mark Schneider, senior vice president of the International Crisis Group (ICG), argues that it would be tragic if the current process were allowed to falter given the enormous loss of life and human tragedy experienced as a result of the LRA's actions. "Every mechanism must be explored to press for a final agreement. A military approach alone would be extremely difficult and involve a regional strategy given the presence of Kony and the LRA in Garamba National Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic and Southern Sudan," Schneider observes.
According to him, negotiations remain the best option. "They have delivered more results in the past two years than fighting in the past twenty. While pressure and containment are essential, hopefully the release of women and children, who Kony frequently uses as a shield, can be obtained. Using credible emissaries, efforts must continue to convince Kony to sign the final agreement. Negotiations related to Ugandan prosecution and the ICC indictment can only take place after the agreement is signed and has begun to be implemented," Schneider argues.
Still, Kony's true intentions and whether the LRA would be able to deliver on a peace agreement have remained unclear. But despite that, the Juba negotiations represented the best chance for peace and an end to the conflict.
"I think it is still probably uncertain how the situation will ultimately be resolved, but I believe the commitment to peace on the part of the government and the international community has been strong and sincere," offers Scott Worden, Rule of Law Program adviser for the US Institute of Peace (USIP).
Peace talks to end the 22-year LRA insurgency began in the South Sudanese capital city of Juba in July 2006 and were often marred by walkouts by the LRA. A final peace deal was to be signed on April 10 but Kony never showed up. He also skipped three subsequent meetings arranged in May and July by chief mediator Machar.
Previous peace efforts also failed to yield the desired results.
The LRA rebels, led by Kony, have been fighting to overthrow the government of President Museveni since 1986, supposedly to replace it with one based on the Biblical Ten Commandments. The ferocious war, characterized by the abduction and forced conscription of thousands of children into the rebel ranks, has left tens of thousands dead and forced two million people, or 90 percent of the population of northern Uganda, to live in squalid camps for the internally displaced.
Such is the irony that has characterized the war. Whereas LRA claims that it took up arms to save the north from discrimination and humiliation by Museveni, it is the northern population that has borne the brunt of the conflict.
