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The project to end genocide and crimes against humanity



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## Seize the Peace

Four Issues to Target Now in the CAR Peace Process

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By Kasper Agger, Jacinth Planer, and Holly Dranginis  
September 2014



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#### Executive Summary and Recommendations

In recent months, the Central African Republic (CAR) has appointed a new transitional government, started a fragile peace process, and seen the signing of a cessation of hostilities agreement.<sup>1</sup> In addition, on September 15, a U.N. peacekeeping operation will officially deploy, and the U.S. embassy in Bangui will resume operations for the first time in almost two years.<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately, the prospects for peace in CAR are diminished without sustained international support and action in four key areas: planning for elections scheduled for next year; accountability for the perpetrators of atrocities; the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of armed combatants; and local reconciliation initiatives.

During a visit to CAR in July, the Enough Project found that relentless violence from a myriad of dispersed armed groups, combined with a lack of focus on and resources for each of these four areas, has led to a policy drift that could threaten recent achievements and make peace harder to attain. These four areas of focus do not cover all urgent tasks necessary to allow Central Africans to return to their homes in safety. They are focused on areas of activity that could derail the peace process without policy focus and sufficient international support.

CAR's presidential and legislative elections, which had been scheduled for February 2015, were recently pushed back to later in the year because of persistent violence across the country and a delay in preparations.<sup>3</sup> Security, protection, logistical support for planning, and public outreach strategies are all lacking, yet urgently needed in order to lay the groundwork for an electoral process that the Central African people can consider credible. A poorly run election held on an unrealistic timeline could exacerbate violence and lead to greater mistrust in government institutions. CAR's election could be an important step to effective and credible governance, if it is run well under the right conditions.

Over the course of the most recent armed conflict, armed actors from diverse groups have committed widespread atrocities against civilians. Evidence shows that many of these atrocities may amount to grave war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide, and possibly all three. Efforts to end impunity

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Seize the Peace: Four Issues to Target Now in the CAR Peace Process

and bring perpetrators of these crimes to justice are critical to CAR's peace process in order to establish a record of what happened, restore dignity to victims, and send a message that CAR's new authorities and the international community will not tolerate grave crimes in CAR's new phase of governance. Failing to address these crimes could allow for repeated violence and entrench existing gaps in trust between CAR's citizens and its government.

Disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating armed combatants is a critical cornerstone of CAR's peace process. Most of the DDR efforts to this point have been ad hoc and poorly coordinated and supported—with dangerous effects.<sup>4</sup> The absence of an effective DDR program will leave thousands of fighters with their weapons as their only livelihood tool. It will also leave intact armed groups such as Séléka and Anti-Balaka that must be disbanded for sustainable peace to take hold.

Local dialogue and reconciliation efforts spearheaded by civil society are starting to take shape in Bangui and nearby towns.<sup>5</sup> These initiatives have successfully helped resolve local disputes and improve understanding between conflicting groups, but they also face considerable challenges and need support to extend outside the capital. Local talks are easily buffeted by security conditions that cannot be guaranteed by signatories of a fragile peace agreement who do not control all of the forces that commit atrocities in CAR.

The peace process cannot succeed if the armed combatant groups are not constructively engaged. These groups have a significant capacity to undermine progress and could be significant spoilers. Enough found during its research in CAR that schisms and weak chains of command in the armed groups, particularly Séléka and Anti-Balaka, complicate political transition and threaten efforts to bring peace and security to the country.

A key aspect of engaging the armed groups is determining the economic drivers of the conflict and sources they use to fund their activities. The Enough Project will address these issues in future publications.

## **Recommendations**

1. The U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) should prioritize civilian protection with logistical and technical resources necessary to deploy rapidly in response to incidents, particularly threats against internally displaced people and in enclaves where civilians are at a heightened risk of attack.
2. The U.S. government should ensure CAR's national electoral authority has the security, institutional support, and expertise it needs from MINUSCA and the International Contact Group to plan for presidential and legislative elections. The U.S. government should lead the international community in supporting CAR's national electoral authority in its independence and its determination of an appropriate timeline that does not result in premature elections. Such a timeline should be based on adequate safety and security for voters, candidates, and electoral officials and the achievement of key electoral planning benchmarks, such as the establishment of an electoral presence in all 16 provinces, a voter registry, and a legal framework for elections.
3. MINUSCA should support CAR's new special tribunal by assisting substantially with investigations, witness protection, and expertise on prosecutorial strategies and due process.

Its support should be in furtherance of the ultimate goals of prosecuting the worst atrocity crimes, transferring evidence and information to the International Criminal Court where appropriate, and helping build lasting expertise within CAR's domestic justice system.

4. The U.S. should take a leadership role in the establishment and operations of the tribunal, as it has in previous ad-hoc tribunals, by contributing resources and legal experts to ensure cases remain independent and national jurists are effective in their efforts to investigate crimes, apprehend perpetrators, and carry out fair trials.
5. The U.S. government should lead the International Contact Group in ensuring Central African leaders and MINUSCA have the resources they need to develop an effective DDR plan as quickly as possible. The DDR plan should account for CAR's diverse community needs, exclude amnesty for perpetrators of grave crimes, and offer reintegration projects that target marginalized youth in particular and integrate male and female ex-combatants with their local communities.
6. MINUSCA should help secure, coordinate, and support local reconciliation efforts already underway and scale efforts to reach remote areas outside of Bangui with the aim of transitioning to a more formal, nationwide reconciliation process when security and political agreements allow. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) should contribute resources and mediation teams to support locally-led processes that address small-scale divisions related to religion but also political association, gender, age, livelihoods, and natural resources.

## Introduction

The security situation in CAR remains highly volatile and violent in some areas, while other areas are currently more peaceful.<sup>6</sup> Although violence recently flared outside and within CAR's capital, Bangui,<sup>7</sup> conditions in the city have measurably improved compared to conditions in early 2014. Street markets have reopened, people stay out past nightfall, and daily shootings have declined considerably over the past few months.<sup>8</sup> International peacekeepers have helped quell the violent activities of the armed groups, but most of CAR's Muslim population has fled the capital and the country as a whole because of repeated attacks from Anti-Balaka fighters and local youths. Rural parts of CAR remain insecure, with heavy clashes between the armed groups, unprecedented levels of attacks on aid workers,<sup>9</sup> and inter-communal clashes. Thousands of people across the country have been killed since the March 2013 Séléka coup, and the Associated Press estimates that more than 5,000 people have been killed since December 2013.<sup>10</sup> More than 591,000 people remain displaced. This total includes almost 175,000 internally displaced and more than 416,000 Central African refugees living outside of CAR,<sup>11</sup> many in Chad and Cameroon, where they live in deteriorating conditions and lack sufficient food and water.<sup>12</sup> More than half of CAR's population needs humanitarian assistance in an effort that remains severely under-funded.<sup>13</sup>

National and international efforts to stabilize CAR and provide security and humanitarian support are facing stark challenges. Some 2,000 French soldiers have been deployed in CAR since December 2013 as part of the Sangaris operation, and 700 European Union (EU) soldiers deployed in May 2014. On September 15, MINUSCA will re-hat 5,800 African Union peacekeepers and add 1,800 additional soldiers from Morocco, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and other countries, bringing the number of MINUSCA troops in CAR initially to 7,600.<sup>14</sup> Peacekeeping efforts have thus far helped to stabilize some areas, but they have not been able to stop the fighting in others.

As peacekeeping operations progress, peace negotiation efforts continue at the regional and international levels. The International Contact Group and the Economic Community for Central African States (ECCAS) remain seized of developments in CAR. Recent regional peace negotiations have been constructive, but they also reveal the extent of the heavy direct influence from leaders of neighboring countries on CAR's political trajectory.<sup>15</sup> Republic of Congo President Denis Sassou-Nguesso is the official mediator for the CAR crisis and remains engaged with political talks he has convened in Brazzaville in July and August. Meetings led by President Sassou-Nguesso in July were meant to address a government restructuring and disarmament plans. While those talks did not encompass those issues, they did result in the signing of a cessation of hostility agreement by some of the Anti-Balaka and Séléka leaders. Meetings led by President Sassou-Nguesso in August followed growing political discontent that resulted in the dissolution of the Central African government and the appointment of Prime Minister Mahamat Kamoun. Controversy over the appointments of Kamoun and other government members has endured, and members of Séléka have rejected the government and the cessation of hostilities accord signed in Brazzaville in July. CAR has been far from peaceful since these talks unfolded.<sup>16</sup>

As engagement on the regional and international level continues, the national-level political process in CAR is principally led by transitional president Catherine Samba-Panza, who succeeded Séléka leader Michel Djotodia in January 2014. President Samba-Panza and the transitional government, however, lack an army and funding, and they have been unable to secure the country, exacerbating political uncertainty and prompting the government restructuring in an effort to represent more groups. Despite the changes she and others have made in the political appointments, President

Samba-Panza and other leaders lack the tools, institutions, and support that they need to govern effectively amid insecurity.

International and regional efforts to stabilize and secure CAR and to provide for the humanitarian needs of Central Africans have failed thus far to meet needs on the ground, as have regional and national efforts to develop a viable political and security reform process. While local peace and reconciliation efforts have begun to help some communities stabilize, peacekeepers and peace builders face great challenges as they grapple with the root causes of a complex conflict.<sup>17</sup> The grievances and motivations fueling the fighting in CAR are far from contained as armed and unarmed groups in CAR and a range of external actors with a stake in CAR's security situation and political future pursue their interests. Understanding the motivating interests of these actors is critical to charting a viable path forward to address CAR's most urgent security and political issues.

### Four critical issues to move the political process forward

The transitional government assumes authority amid widespread skepticism. It has a challenging agenda to secure the peace process and establish effective governance. The government's lack of resources to govern effectively, however, should not be a reason for it to avoid tackling essential issues to strengthen the process towards peace. Among its many tasks, the government, supported with finance and experts from the international community, should take early action to address the following key issues which implicate the effective delivery of government services and could build trust in government institutions:

- Holding secure, free and fair, and well-run elections
- Prosecuting atrocity crimes and combatting widespread impunity
- Disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating armed fighters
- Supporting local civil society reconciliation efforts

#### **Holding secure, free and fair, and well-run elections**

CAR's next presidential and legislative elections are meant to install a democratically elected government and conclude a political transition that began in 2013. Elections were originally scheduled for February 2015,<sup>18</sup> under a time frame that pre-dates the current government<sup>19</sup> and presumes a degree of security, state authority, and political stability that CAR has not enjoyed.<sup>20</sup> The country's electoral body recently announced that elections in February 2015 would be untenable—due to insecurity and its inability to extend authority in the provinces—and shifted the election time frame to the fall of 2015.<sup>21</sup> As CAR's newly operational electoral body, the Autorité Nationale des Elections (ANE), proceeds with planning, the international community and the U.S. government must ensure that the ANE has sufficient security, institutional support, and technical assistance to carry out its duties and maintain its independence. The ANE should have domestic and international support in its authority to determine an appropriate timeline that does not result in premature elections.<sup>22</sup> Such an electoral timeline should be based on adequate safety and security for voters, candidates, and electoral officials. The timing of elections that the ANE advocates should also be based on the achievement of key electoral planning benchmarks, such as the establishment of an electoral presence in all 16 provinces,<sup>23</sup> a voter registry, and a legal framework for elections. ANE officials should also develop a strategy for including Central African refugees in the electoral process, as these

populations, large numbers of which fled sectarian violence in late 2013 and early 2014, remain significant stakeholders in CAR's political future.<sup>24</sup>

Despite volatile security conditions and its inability to extend an electoral presence in many provinces, the ANE has made progress toward developing a legal framework and operating plan for elections.<sup>25</sup> It has, however, not finalized these plans, particularly with regard to voter registration, and the sequencing of polls.<sup>26</sup> It also needs financial and material support.<sup>27</sup> Resolving logistical needs and details are essential to holding an effective elections. A U.N. electoral needs assessment mission in early 2014 emphasized the importance of improved security across CAR and the electoral authority's ability to establish local branches in provinces throughout CAR and develop civil registries and voter registries, the latter of which has not been formed.<sup>28</sup> MINUSCA can play a crucial role in providing security to electoral officials as they travel outside of Bangui in the coming months and work to build a credible voter registry.<sup>29</sup> Personal and infrastructural security are critically important within Bangui as well, as violent attacks have destroyed buildings and records the ANE needs to operate.<sup>30</sup>

The International Contact Group has urged Central African leaders to accelerate efforts toward elections.<sup>31</sup> As this process gets underway, key actors such as the United Nations and the United States should support the independence of the electoral authorities as they work to ensure elections are inclusive, free, fair, and safe for Central African citizens. If elections are carried out poorly and not considered to credibly reflect the will of the people, violence could escalate, political instability in the government could persist, and peace could unravel on other fronts.

### **Prosecuting atrocity crimes and combating widespread impunity**

There is ample evidence of grave war crimes, crimes against humanity, and possible genocide in CAR. The prevention and punishment of these crimes is a critical component of peace and security because it will send a strong message that such grave crimes will not be tolerated in CAR's new phase of governance. Investigations, indictments, and fair trials are critical to removing the worst perpetrators, deterring ongoing crimes, restoring dignity to victims, and laying the groundwork for a more robust domestic justice sector. A recent joint African Union, European Union, and U.N. assessment of security sector reform in CAR found that, there is "unanimous conclusion that the judicial and penal systems [are] almost in a state of complete breakdown..."<sup>32</sup>

In the absence of a functioning justice sector, a number of institutions and initiatives have been established to investigate war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. The United Nations established a Commission of Inquiry to investigate crimes, and the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Fatou Bensouda, opened preliminary investigations in late 2013 as reports of atrocities began to flood the public media.<sup>33</sup> In June 2014, the Central African government asked the ICC to undertake a formal investigation into the ongoing violence.<sup>34</sup> Soon after, the transitional government inaugurated a Special Unit of Inquiry and Investigation to investigate atrocity crimes.<sup>35</sup> MINUSCA has paid specific attention to the investigation of war crimes, by establishing a monitoring "arrangement" by which it would seek to "prevent sexual violence and ensure accountability."<sup>36</sup> Most recently, in the first week of August 2014, MINUSCA and CAR's transitional minister of justice agreed to establish a Special Tribunal to prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide with significant support from MINUSCA's justice unit and other international funds and expertise.<sup>37</sup>

The special tribunal and the ICC should be understood as complementary institutions, rather than mutually exclusive or adequate alternatives to one another. Robust investigations by both institutions

should proceed, aimed at the gravest incidents of violence, and the international community should volunteer funds and experts to work alongside Central African judges and other relevant staff. All parties involved should take particular care to use the ICC's new policy on investigating sexual violence, established earlier this year in order to close gaps in accountability for sexual violence in conflict.<sup>38</sup> The special tribunal presents a much-needed opportunity to establish justice as a critical component of peace and stability— without undermining efforts to create local and national dialogues and initiatives to disarm and reintegrate low- and mid-ranking armed actors.

The special tribunal needs substantial support to succeed. MINUSCA's role in the operations of the tribunal is crucial to ensure that investigations and trials are carried out in an independent manner. MINUSCA must prioritize fair and thorough processes for gathering diverse forms of evidence, protecting witnesses, and affording the accused fair trials and due process standards. The mission should also assist in training and accompanying Central African jurists and investigators with international legal experts. The United States is also well-suited to supporting the special tribunal. The U.S. government has historically taken leadership roles in shaping effective, inclusive mechanisms for delivering justice in the midst of or in the immediate aftermath of armed conflict and genocide, notably in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and Sierra Leone.<sup>39</sup> Without outside support and thorough policies on issues like the investigation of sexual violence, protection of witnesses, and due process for the accused, the tribunal could be a lost opportunity to give Central Africans the truth and justice they deserve in the wake of such abuses. However, with collaborative backing and expertise from the International Criminal Court, Commission of Inquiry, U.N. Panel of Experts, and MINUSCA, the tribunal has the potential to support much-needed medium- and long-term justice sector development in CAR.

### **Disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating armed fighters**

The peace process and transition must be anchored by a well-planned and well-executed disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process in CAR that gets weapons out of the hands of combatants and creates a place for ex-combatants in a post-conflict society. A well-run program could create, as one Central African youth leader said, “partners, not beneficiaries” in a future CAR.<sup>40</sup> The lack of a viable DDR program could lead to increasing violence and eclipse progress on the peace process.

Expectations among combatants are high, and will be difficult to fully meet these expectations. Many foot soldiers of the armed groups told Enough that they expect a formal DDR process, which would include financial support and cash incentives.<sup>41</sup> Leaders from Anti-Balaka and Séléka told Enough that they do not wish to be reintegrated as civilians. They want to be part of a reformed national army, which raises significant questions about the vetting of the armed group leaders for significant crimes.<sup>42</sup>

Currently, DDR efforts have been carried out on an ad hoc basis, without central coordination or adequate resources. As a result, some disarmament efforts are unfolding with the potential to create mistrust and increase the ranks of armed groups. For example, some voluntary disarmament initiatives are underway with Séléka fighters in Bangui under a program organized by the International Organization for Immigration and MINUSCA.<sup>43</sup> The combatants are given two weeks of training on Central African citizenship, a resettlement support package, and transportation back to their home area.<sup>44</sup> Without alternative livelihoods training, support for reintegration in local communities, and adequate follow-up, such fighters—some of whom are being returned to key Séléka strongholds in the north like Bria—could find their way back to Séléka ranks.<sup>45</sup> In areas like Bossangoa, where tensions have escalated with Anti-Balaka and Séléka combatants who may not perceive disarmament

strategies to be even and equitable, clashes have erupted and mistrust has deepened in the course of an activity that is otherwise designed to build trust and confidence.<sup>46</sup>

Central African authorities should design a DDR program that provides long-term economic reintegration projects for host communities, victims and ex-combatants. Such DDR programs can provide strong incentives for youth to remain disarmed instead of returning to armed groups. A key disarmament lesson from northern Uganda, for example, has been to design projects that allow ex-combatants, victims and local communities to work together on agricultural and commercial projects.<sup>47</sup> DDR campaigns in Congo likewise found that economic activities offering ex-combatants steady income, viable skills, and structured activities, worked more effectively than providing lump sums of cash.<sup>48</sup> CAR's DDR plan should also include special care for the needs of female and child combatants and women and children who have been abducted by armed groups and used as domestic servants, occasional combatants, or targets of sexual abuse.<sup>49</sup>

Central African leaders, with MINUSCA, African Union, U.N., and European partners recognize the need for a DDR plan in CAR,<sup>50</sup> and a recent joint African Union, European Union, and U.N. assessment of security sector reform in CAR has identified institutions within CAR that can be leveraged to this end.<sup>51</sup> As Central African leaders and institutions partner with MINUSCA to develop a viable plan, the Contact Group with help from the U.S. government should ensure that DDR planners have the financial support and expertise they need to develop a plan that fits CAR's needs and underwrites, not undermines, the overall peace process.

### **Supporting local civil society reconciliation efforts**

Although most institutional focus has been on national-level initiatives, some of the most important reconciliation efforts to date have occurred on the local and grassroots level. The need for local dialogues and reconciliation cannot be underestimated, given the decentralized nature of the violence and the diversity of stakeholders—both armed and civilian. Loyalties of armed actors have proved to be fluid, and neighborhoods in urban settings have become more religiously segregated, making communities more vulnerable to attack.<sup>52</sup> Local dialogues and initiatives aimed at interpersonal and inter-communal reconciliation have the potential to bolster security efforts and tamp down fear, which helps prevent the incitement of violence.

Along with support for the government, donors should focus on small-scale, local-level reconciliation for urgent interventions, information sharing, and initial dialogues about religious, political, gender, and ideological differences. These efforts could later feed into a larger process as part of CAR's political transition and national reconciliation programs. For example, shoring up security around local initiatives and building radio communication into existing initiatives could boost their effectiveness and reach.<sup>53</sup>

A number of positive initiatives for reconciliation and security have taken shape over the course of the past year, many initiated by religious leaders, local peace committees, and international organizations.<sup>54</sup> While many of the initiatives have been effective in sensitizing and reconciling communities in times of great division and trauma, they have been relatively ad hoc and under-resourced, reliant on transient security forces and piecemeal international financial and expert support.<sup>55</sup> These local initiatives present an opportunity for the U.S. Department of State and other donors to provide relatively small funds that have enormous payoff for the individuals involved and the comprehensive peace process in CAR overall.

Finally, national high-level peace negotiations should include the consideration of the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission. Small-scale initiatives are no substitute for a national effort to engender reconciliation. CAR's new government should aim to establish a formal public process to engender national reconciliation and establish a record of the diverse abuses and interests in play during the worst periods of the violence.

### **Positions and interests of the armed groups**

The two main armed groupings, Séléka and Anti-Balaka, are fighting for a variety of reasons that encompass economic, political, and social concerns. Their engagement in the peace process and cooperation with the transitional government is essential to the development of a sustainable peace. This section sets out an overview of their core positions and interests as can be discerned now, but recognizes that the centrifugal forces that are pulling both groups apart can cause those interests to shift significantly. The Enough Project will explore more deeply the economic interests and sources of financial support for these groups in future publications.

### **Séléka**

The Séléka rebel coalition was always a fragile alliance, and it is now taking on a more formal split between a "Bangui faction" and a "northeast faction." The division reflects tensions between those Séléka leaders who participated in negotiations in Brazzaville and now in Bangui and who oppose partitioning of CAR, and those Séléka hardliners who remain outside the negotiations and favor partition. Influential Séléka leaders in the Bangui faction have included Abdoulaye Hissène, Eric Massi, and Mohamed-Moussa Dhaffane. Influential Séléka leaders in the northeast faction include Michel Djotodia, Nourredine Adam, Damane Zakaria, and Abakar Sabone.<sup>56</sup> These factions are not rigid, but make up the main division lines in the fractured group. A July meeting in Birao, the capital of northeastern Vakaga province that borders Chad and Sudan, led to the reconfirmation of Djotodia as president of Séléka, effectively splitting the group.

The demand for partition was a seminal issue during the Brazzaville talks, with Séléka delegation leader Dhaffane ultimately holding it up as a precondition for a deal.<sup>57</sup> This move was furiously opposed by other participants at the talks. The personal involvement of mediator and Republic of Congo president Sassou-Nguesso ultimately persuaded Dhaffane to sign the cessation of hostilities agreement.<sup>58</sup> Dhaffane never favored partitioning; he receives his strongest support from the nomadic Peulh community, who rely on green pasture in the south and central part of CAR. Partition would undermine his support base by preventing Peulh communities from moving their livestock herds back and forth through the area.<sup>59</sup> Some observers of the Brazzaville summit, however, claim that Dhaffane used the partitioning demand as a bargaining chip and only signed once he was promised a ministerial post, as part of a new transitional government.<sup>60</sup> Dhaffane was expelled from Séléka in August, by the hardliner faction, because he signed the Brazzaville agreement and gave up on the partitioning demand.<sup>61</sup> For the international community's part, partition demands have also played a major role in shaping policy messaging strategies. International actors, including neighboring countries, have strongly stated that partition is not an option.<sup>62</sup>

There is little evidence to suggest that the hardliners will relinquish their demand for partition.<sup>63</sup> Both Nourredine Adam and Michel Djotodia face international sanctions and have no real chance of returning to Bangui during the current political climate.<sup>64</sup> Partitioning the country would legitimate their control of the north and enable them to sustain their illegal cross border trade with diamonds, gold, ivory and other resources, which play a key role in financing their operations.<sup>65</sup> Adam is already

seeking to consolidate control of the northern Vakaga province. He crossed the border from South Darfur with at least 1,000 fighters carrying new arms and took control of Birao, during late June.<sup>66</sup> Vakaga province is gradually becoming a safe haven for senior Séléka leaders and their illicit activities. Adam is likely to extend his control southward to reinforce Séléka positions and to destabilize the country further. This is a worrying development for long-term peace and stability in CAR. The lawless Vakaga province has been a major zone of instability and a staging ground for launching violent rebellions in CAR for more than a decade and is on course to be used in that way again.<sup>67</sup> MINUSCA should pay particular attention to this area as peacekeepers begin to deploy outside Bangui and when reconstruction plans are drawn up.

### **Anti-Balaka**

Like the Séléka group, the Anti-Balaka has also gone through changes since the upsurge of violence in November 2013. The biggest victory for the Anti-Balaka groups was the coordinated attack on December 5 in Bangui that largely pushed Séléka out of the capital. Anti-Balaka groups have since then splintered into a myriad of different factions without a central command. Two major Anti-Balaka groups in Bangui, led by national coordinator Edouard Ngaissona and vice national coordinator Sébastien Wenezoui, briefly united for a few months preceding the Brazzaville summit, in a tactical move to consolidate control over Bangui in an effort to obtain political favors and government positions.<sup>68</sup> The groups, however, split again in August, and Wenezoui established his own group, “la Mouvance patriotique pour l’avenir.” This was a reaction to Ngaissona who accused Wenezoui of disrespect for the hierarchy in Anti-Balaka, because he went to Brazzaville in July without approval from Ngaissona.<sup>69</sup>

Meanwhile, several Anti-Balaka groups continue to operate in the southwestern part of the country. These are mostly small, local armed groups that call themselves Anti-Balaka, or are called Anti-Balaka by others though they are not formally associated with the groups in Bangui and do not necessarily follow orders from Bangui-based Anti-Balaka leaders.<sup>70</sup> Some of them attack and pillage remaining Muslim communities.<sup>71</sup> They have reportedly also attacked aid workers.<sup>72</sup> One network of groups in particular has taken control of the major trade route from Bangui to the Cameroonian border, where they collect illegal road tax. The group is mainly made up of FACA<sup>73</sup> soldiers and members of the gendarmes who moonlight as Anti-Balaka or have changed affiliations altogether. These groups that call themselves Anti-Balaka do not have a clear political leadership.<sup>74</sup>

### **Conclusion**

The transitional government and its international supporters face significant challenges in their efforts to secure peace in the Central African Republic. If strategies for free and fair elections, justice for atrocities, a viable DDR plan, and local reconciliation are not addressed and supported soon by the government and international actors, the fragile, limited progress achieved in recent months risks being derailed. The aim of these efforts should be to establish short- and long-term security and livelihoods for the Central African people and begin an era of effective governance.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> The list of new ministers and their portfolios is available from numerous news outlets, including the Internews-supported Réseau des Journalistes pour les Droits de l'Homme, "Bangui : Le Gouvernement Kamoun enfin rendu public," August 22, 2014, available at <http://www.rjdh-rca.net/actulites/actualite/bangui-le-gouvernement-kamoun-enfin-rendu-public.html>. The cessation of hostilities agreement signed in Brazzaville, Republic of Congo, on July 23, 2014, is available at <http://minusca.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Y1wvr5xC50w%3D&tabid=5620&mid=9615&language=en-US> (last accessed September 2014). See also Integrated Regional Information Networks, "A tentative ceasefire in CAR," July 29, 2014, available at <http://www.irinnews.org/report/100416/a-tentative-ceasefire-in-car>; Radio Ndeke Luka, "La polémique toujours au sujet de la participation au gouvernement Kamoun," August 27, 2014, available at <http://www.radiondekeluka.org/politique/item/19984-la-polémique-toujours-au-sujet-de-la-participation-au-gouvernement-kamoun.html>.

<sup>2</sup> The U.S. embassy suspended operations in Bangui on December 28, 2012, see press statement by U.S. Department of State Acting Deputy Spokesperson Patrick Ventrell, "Temporary Suspension of U.S. Embassy Bangui Operations," December 27, 2012, available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/12/202399.htm>.

<sup>3</sup> The president of CAR's national electoral authority has said elections in February 2015 are not possible and are unlikely to take place before the fall of 2015, following the rainy season from July to September. Sébastien Nemeth, "Elections en RCA: le délai de février 2015 n'est 'pas tenable,'" Radio France Internationale, September 1, 2014, available at <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140901-elections-rca-le-delai-fevrier-2015-est-pas-tenable-dieudonn%C3%A9-kombo-yaya-transition/>.

<sup>4</sup> Voluntary disarmament initiatives of Séléka combatants in Bangui, for example, have involved short sensitization campaigns, lump sums of cash, and transportation back to northern towns such as Bria and Bambari, that are controlled by Séléka actors and towns like Kaga-Bandoro and Mbrés that have recently seen outbreaks of violence. Disarmament efforts in Bossangoa recently resulted in clashes among French Sangaris forces, Anti-Balaka elements, and Séléka fighters. See Sylvestre Krock, "RCA: désarmement et démobilisation de 256 ex-Séléka," Journal de Bangui, September 4, 2014, available at <http://www.journaldebangui.com/article.php?aid=7242>; Laurent Lagneau, "Centrafrique : Des soldats français accrochés à Bossangoa," OPEX 360, September 5, 2014, available at <http://www.opex360.com/2014/09/05/centrafrique-des-soldats-francais-accroches-bossangoa/>; Virginie Bero, "Bangui : Une deuxième vague des ex-Séléka part pour leurs villes d'origine," Réseau des Journalistes pour les Droits de l'Homme, September 10, 2014, available at <http://www.rjdh-rca.net/actulites/actualite/bangui-une-deuxieme-vague-des-ex-seleka-part-pour-leurs-villes-d-origine.html>.

<sup>5</sup> Réseau des Journalistes pour les Droits de l'Homme, "Bambari : L'ONG PARETO pose les bases du dialogue entre l'État-major de l'ex-Séléka et les Anti-Balaka de la ville," July 30, 2014, available at <http://www.rjdh-rca.net/actulites/actualite/bambari-l-ong-pareto-pose-les-bases-du-dialogue-entre-l-etat-major-de-l-ex-seleka-et-les-anti-balaka-de-la-ville.html>; Réseau des Journalistes pour les Droits de l'Homme, "Bambari: Le général Zoundéko de l'ex Séléka reçu par les Anti-Balaka dans le cadre d'une médiation menée par l'ONG Pareto," August 12, 2014, available at <http://www.rjdh-rca.net/actulites/actualite/bambari-le-general-zoundeko-de-l-ex-seleka-recu-par-les-anti-balaka-dans-le-cadre-d-une-mediation-menee-par-l-ong-pareto.html>.

<sup>6</sup> U.N. Security Council, "The situation in the Central African Republic," Meeting record S/PV.7246, p. 3, August 19, 2014, available at [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7246](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7246). For a look at the variable security conditions across CAR see the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Central African Republic Security Event Density Analysis (weighted by fatalities)," July 2014, available at <http://reliefweb.int/map/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-security-event-density-analysis-weighted-2>; U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Central African Republic: Security Event Density Analysis (weighted by casualties) (Jan-July 2014)," July 31, 2014, available at <http://reliefweb.int/map/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-security-event-density-analysis-weighted-1>. For a map updated daily showing humanitarian information collected by local journalists in CAR see Internews and Réseau des Journalistes pour les Droits de l'Homme (RJDH), "Carte de Crise: Centrafrique," available at <http://rjdhcarterdecriserca.info/> (last accessed September 2014).

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<sup>7</sup> Agence France-Presse, "C. Africa clashes kill five, wound dozens," August 21, 2014, available at <http://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/c-africa-clashes-kill-five-wound-dozens>. See also recent reports of violence in Ngakobo (Ouaka province) Boda (Lobaye province) and Mbrès (Nana Grébizi province), Radio Ndeke Luka, "Crises à Ngakobo et à Bossangoa," September 4, 2014, available at <http://www.radiondekeluka.org/securite/item/20022-crises-a-ngakobo-et-a-bossangoa.html>; Réseau des Journalistes pour les Droits de l'Homme (RJDH), "Boda: De nouveaux cas de violences signalés dans la ville," August 22, 2014, available at <http://www.rjdh-rca.net/actualites/actualite/boda-de-nouveaux-cas-de-violences-signalés-dans-la-ville.html>; Radio France Internationale, "RCA: au moins 30 personnes tuées dans le nord, selon des villageois," August 17, 2014, available at <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140817-rca-moins-30-personnes-tuees-le-nord-selon-villageois-centrafrique-mbres-kaga-bandoro/>.

<sup>8</sup> Author observations and international aid workers, interviews with author, Bangui, CAR, February and June, 2014; see also, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data project, "Conflict trends (No. 27) real-time analysis of African political violence," June 2014, available at <http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/ACLED-Conflict-Trends-Report-No.-27-June-2014.pdf>; Christian Panika, "Centrafrique: Bangui va mieux," Agence France-Presse, July 31, 2014, available at <http://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/centrafrique-bangui-va-mieux>.

<sup>9</sup> In August, Senior Humanitarian Coordinator in the Central African Republic Claire Bourgeois issued a statement noting that there had approximately 50 attacks on humanitarian aid workers since August 2013—a toll that had not been seen before in CAR. Agence France-Presse, "Attacks against aid workers in CAR at record high," News 24, August 22, 2014, available at <http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Attacks-against-aid-workers-in-CAR-at-record-high-20140822>.

<sup>10</sup> Krista Larson, "AP: More than 5,000 dead in C. African Republic," Associated Press, September 12, 2014, available at <http://www.bigstory.ap.org/article/ap-more-5000-dead-c-african-republic-0>. Armed Conflict Location & Data (ACLED) Project documented 3,107 conflict-related fatalities in CAR in 2014 alone in "Realtime 2014 All Africa File" data accessed by Enough on September 10, 2014 that is available at <http://www.acleddata.com/data/realtime-data-2014/>. ACLED Project documented 2,182 conflict-related fatalities in CAR in 2013, in "ACLED Version 4 (1997 – 2013)" data accessed by Enough on September 10, 2014 that is available at <http://www.acleddata.com/data/version-4-data-1997-2013/>. For results of a recent mortality survey in CAR see also Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), "Central African Republic: Study Reveals Massive Deaths Due to Violence," July 16, 2014, available at <http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/article/central-african-republic-study-reveals-massive-deaths-due-violence>.

<sup>11</sup> U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Central African Republic," available at <http://www.unocha.org/car> (last accessed September 2014).

<sup>12</sup> U.N. High Commission for Refugees, "Central African Republic Situation: UNHCR Regional Update 28," August 9-15, 2014, available at <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNHCR%20Regional%20Update%20-%20CAR%20Refugee%20Situation%20%2328.pdf>.

<sup>13</sup> U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Central African Republic," available at <http://www.unocha.org/car> (last accessed September 2014). As of September 2014, the U.S. government has provided almost \$118 million in humanitarian assistance to CAR. U.S. Agency for International Development, "Central African Republic – Complex Emergency fact sheet #19, Fiscal Year (FY) 2014," August 29, 2014, available at [http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/car\\_ce\\_fs19\\_08-29-2014.pdf](http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/car_ce_fs19_08-29-2014.pdf). To review international donations for humanitarian assistance to CAR see U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Financial Tracking Service page on CAR, available at <http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencyDetails&appealID=1029> (last accessed September 2014).

<sup>14</sup> U.N. Radio, "Road to stabilize CAR will be "bumpy": UN Envoy," August 19, 2014, available at [http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/2014/08/road-to-stabilize-car-will-be-bumpy-un-envoy/index.html#.U\\_e\\_WSTD-B8](http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/2014/08/road-to-stabilize-car-will-be-bumpy-un-envoy/index.html#.U_e_WSTD-B8). MINUSCA's full authorized force size is 10,000 soldiers and 1,800 police officers. See U.N. Security Council, "Resolution 2149 (2014) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7153rd meeting, on 10 April 2014," S/RES/2149 (2014), para. 20, April 10, 2014, available at [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2149\(2014\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2149(2014)).

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<sup>15</sup> Africa Confidential, "Regional leaders take charge," July 11, 2014, available at [http://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/5695/Regional\\_leaders\\_take\\_charge](http://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/5695/Regional_leaders_take_charge); Africa Confidential, "Fears for the new regime," February 7, 2014, available at [http://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/5210/Fears\\_for\\_the\\_new\\_regime](http://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/5210/Fears_for_the_new_regime).

<sup>16</sup> Radio France Internationale, "Brazzaville: à peine signé, l'accord sur la Centrafrique déjà menacé," July 24, 2014, available at <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140724-brazzaville-peine-signé-accord-centrafrique-déjà-menacé-Sassoungouesso-dhaffane-awa/>. Andrew Harding, "Central African Republic rebel chief rejects ceasefire," BBC News, July 25, 2014, available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28487894>.

<sup>17</sup> Interpretations of the root causes vary widely, as many sources of analysis, including "The Central African Republic (CAR) in a Hot Spot," a collection of articles by academics and experts and curated by Louisa Lombard suggest. Marielle Debos, for example, identifies "political violence, a concessionary economy, the capture of resources by political and economic entrepreneurs connected to the global economy, the marginalization of rural areas, and the dereliction of public services...the profusion of injustice" among the root causes of CAR's conflict. Henri Zana and Rebecca Hardin describe the influences of "colonial and postcolonial relationships," "political-military entrepreneurship," and rebel efforts to "restructure commercial networks, civic government, or land and transport at local and regional scales." Cathérina Wilson identifies the root causes as "a mix of political opportunism and an omnipresent feeling of mistrust of the foreigner, set against a background of poverty and lack of opportunities," and she further describes mistrust as "expressed in foreignness, exacerbated by poverty and ignited by (personal) political agendas." See Louisa Lombard, ed., "The Central African Republic (CAR) in a Hot Spot," *Cultural Anthropology*, June 11, 2014, available at <http://culanth.org/fieldsights/538-the-central-african-republic-car-in-a-hot-spot>; Marielle Debos, "'Hate' and 'Security Vacuum': How Not to Ask the Right Questions about a Confusing Crisis," available at <http://culanth.org/fieldsights/545-hate-and-security-vacuum-how-not-to-ask-the-right-questions-about-a-confusing-crisis>; Henri Zana and Rebecca Hardin, "'Professional Death' and Rebirth? History, Violence, and Education," available at <http://culanth.org/fieldsights/546-professional-death-and-rebirth-history-violence-and-education>; Cathérina Wilson, "Changing Definitions of Autochthony and Foreignness in Bangui," available at <http://culanth.org/fieldsights/540-changing-definitions-of-autochthony-and-foreignness-in-bangui>.

<sup>18</sup> Enduring expectations for an 18-month political transition, beginning in August 2013 and culminating in elections in February 2015, were set forth when Michel Djotodia was in power, first in an April 2013 peace agreement and roadmap signed in N'Djamena. The 18-month time frame was then reinforced in CAR's transitional constitutional charter, which was signed in July 2013 and took effect in August 2013, starting the clock for elections in February 2015. See Présidence de la République de Tchad, "Déclaration de N'Djamena sur la République Centrafricaine," para. 3, April 18, 2013, available at [http://www.presidencetchad.org/affichage\\_news.php?id=587%20#sthash.4d3vjJmL.dpuf](http://www.presidencetchad.org/affichage_news.php?id=587%20#sthash.4d3vjJmL.dpuf); République Centrafricaine, "Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition," Loi n° 13.001, art. 102, July 18, 2013, available at <http://www.pmcar.org/docs/chartedetransition.pdf>.

<sup>19</sup> An emergency political plan crafted in November 2013 includes a three-phase roadmap to elections, with the first phase beginning in December and include developing an electoral code and designating and training members of the national electoral authority. See République Centrafricaine, "Programme d'urgence du gouvernement d'union nationale de transition 2013-2015," November 2013, available at [http://www.lanouvellecetrafrique.info/PROGRAMME\\_D\\_39\\_URGENCE\\_DU\\_GUNT\\_CENTRAFRICAIN\\_06\\_No.p df](http://www.lanouvellecetrafrique.info/PROGRAMME_D_39_URGENCE_DU_GUNT_CENTRAFRICAIN_06_No.p df). See pages 15-18 for the electoral timetable.

<sup>20</sup> Prohibitive insecurity and dramatic political changes since November 2013 have set back progress on electoral planning. Violence in Bangui escalated shortly after the elections roadmap was developed. Plans for operationalizing an electoral code and a national electoral body in late 2013 shifted. U.N. Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic submitted pursuant to paragraph 48 of Security Council resolution 2127 (2013)," S/2014/142, para. 21, March 3, 2014, available at [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/142](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/142). Djotodia, and the leaders who were aligned with him, left the government and Bangui in early 2014 to regroup in northern CAR and abroad. CAR's demography changed dramatically with massive displacement of people amid violence and the flight of most of CAR's Muslim population. CAR's government has undergone changes in the intervening months with the appointment of President Samba-Panza in January 2014 and her appointment of two different governments within the past year.

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<sup>21</sup> Radio Netherlands Worldwide, “Centrafrique: le CNT reporte sine die des elections,” Journal de Bangui, September 2, 2014, available at <http://www.journaldebangui.com/article.php?aid=7232>; Nemeth, “Elections en RCA: le délai de février 2015 n'est ‘pas tenable.’”

<sup>22</sup> Calls for national support for the electoral authority have begun to emerge within CAR. See Sylvestre Sokambi, “Bangui : Le président du MDREC appelle à la mobilisation générale autour de l’ANE,” Réseau des Journalistes pour les Droits de l’Homme, September 3, 2014, available at <http://www.rjdh-rca.net/actualites/actualite/bangui-le-president-du-mdrec-appelle-a-la-mobilisation-generale-autour-de-l-ane.html>.

<sup>23</sup> The August 1, 2014 U.N. Secretary-General’s report on CAR found that Séléka-aligned actors currently exercise state control in half of the country’s provinces. U.N. Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic,” S/2014/562, para. 28, August 1, 2014, available at [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/562](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/562).

<sup>24</sup> For perspective on the potential of local-level electoral processes as a means to build reconciliation and also strengthen participatory political practices in CAR see Henry Berrian, “Elections as a means to peace: The case of the Central African Republic,” Consultancy Africa Intelligence, August 22, 2014, available at [http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=1706:elections-as-a-means-to-peace-the-case-of-the-central-african-republic&catid=42:election-reflection&Itemid=270](http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1706:elections-as-a-means-to-peace-the-case-of-the-central-african-republic&catid=42:election-reflection&Itemid=270).

<sup>25</sup> Rokhaya Paquita, “L’Autorité Nationale des Elections s’approprie les pratiques et les textes électoraux en Centrafrique,” U.N. Development Programme, July 11, 2014, available at [http://www.cf.undp.org/content/car/fr/home/presscenter/actualites/2014/07/l\\_autorite-nationale-des-elections-sapproprie-les-pratiques-et-l/](http://www.cf.undp.org/content/car/fr/home/presscenter/actualites/2014/07/l_autorite-nationale-des-elections-sapproprie-les-pratiques-et-l/).

<sup>26</sup> U.N. Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic,” S/2014/562, para. 26.

<sup>27</sup> Radio Netherlands Worldwide, “Centrafrique: le CNT reporte sine die des elections,” Journal de Bangui, September 2, 2014, available at <http://www.journaldebangui.com/article.php?aid=7232>.

<sup>28</sup> U.N. Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic submitted pursuant to paragraph 48 of Security Council resolution 2127 (2013),” S/2014/142, para. 21, March 3, 2014, available at [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/142](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/142). The current voter registry is non-existent and a completely new national registration is needed before elections can take place, according to CAR’s electoral commissioner. Interview with author, Bangui, CAR, June, 2014.

<sup>29</sup> U.N. Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic,” S/2014/562, para. 26, August 1, 2014, available at [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/562](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/562); African Union, “4th Meeting of the International Contact Group on the Central African Republic - Brazzaville, Republic of The Congo Friday, 21 March 2014,” para. 7, available at <http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/4th-meeting-of-the-international-contact-group-on-the-central-african-republic-brazzaville-republic-of-the-congo-friday-21-march-2014-brazzaville-republic-of-the-congo-friday-21-march-2014>.

<sup>30</sup> Paquita, “L’Autorité Nationale des Elections s’approprie les pratiques et les textes électoraux en Centrafrique.”

<sup>31</sup> African Union, “Conclusions of 5th Meeting of the International Contact Group on the Central African Republic (ICG-CAR),” paras. 8, 10, July 7, 2014, available at <http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/conclusions-of-5th-meeting-of-the-international-contact-group-on-the-central-african-republic-icg-car#sthash.SRu5KODJ.dpuf>.

<sup>32</sup> African Union, United Nations, European Union, and African Security Sector Network, “Report of the Joint Security Sector Reform (SSR) Assessment Mission to the Central African Republic,” para. 11, p. 3, May 18-26, 2014, on file with the Enough Project.

<sup>33</sup> Lizzie Dearden, “Central African Republic: International Criminal Court starts war crimes investigation,” *The Independent*, February, 8, 2014, available at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/central-african-republic-international-criminal-court-starts-war-crimes-investigation-9116576.html>.

<sup>34</sup> CAR had already been an International Criminal Court situation country related to distinct investigations into criminal allegations against the Democratic Republic of Congo’s former vice president Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo. See, ICC, “Situation and cases,” available at [http://www.icc-cpi.int/en\\_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx](http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx) (last accessed September 2014).

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<sup>35</sup> U.N. Security Council, “Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in the Central African Republic,” S/2014/562, para. 25.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 48.

<sup>37</sup> Based on interviews with sources that wish to remain anonymous. See also La Nouvelle Centrafrique, “Centrafrique: To set up a special court to try serious crimes committed during the conflict,” August 12, 2014, available at <http://www.lanouvellecentrafrique.org/centrafrique-to-set-up-a-special-court-to-try-serious-crimes-committed-during-the-conflict/>.

<sup>38</sup> International Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor, “Policy paper on sexual and gender-based crimes,” June 2004, available at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Policy-Paper-on-Sexual-and-Gender-Based-Crimes--June-2014.pdf>.

<sup>39</sup> The U.S. has contributed significant financial and expert resources to the establishment and operations of these tribunals. In addition, American legal practitioners, including prosecutors, investigators, judges and defense attorneys have served in numerous leadership roles at each of the courts, including as chief prosecutors and appeals court judges.

<sup>40</sup> Martine Theodora Kessy Ekomo-Soignet, 2014 Young Africa Leaders Mandela Washington Fellow, remarks in panel discussion, “Peace and Reconciliation in Central African Republic,” organized by the Prevention and Protection Working Group and Friends Committee on National Legislation in cooperation with the Congressional African Staff Association, August 13, 2014, in Washington, D.C.

<sup>41</sup> Senior Séléka, senior Anti-Balaka leaders and combatants, interviews with author, Bangui, CAR, February and June, 2014.

<sup>42</sup> Senior Séléka and senior Anti-Balaka leaders, interviews with author, Bangui, CAR, June, 2014.

<sup>43</sup> Réseau des Journalistes pour les Droits de l’Homme, “La MINUSCA, l’OIM et la MISCA organisent le désarmement volontaire et le transfert des ex-combattants du camp RDOT,” July 25, 2014, available at <http://www.rjdh-rca.net/actualites/actualite/bangui-la-minusca-l-oim-et-la-misca-organisent-le-desarmement-volontaire-et-le-transfert-des-ex-combattants-du-camp-rdot.html>; Krock, “RCA: désarmement et démobilisation de 256 ex-Séléka”; Bero, “Bangui : Une deuxième vague des ex-Séléka part pour leurs villes d’origine.”

<sup>44</sup> Réseau des Journalistes pour les Droits de l’Homme, “La MINUSCA, l’OIM et la MISCA organisent le désarmement volontaire et le transfert des ex-combattants du camp RDOT.”

<sup>45</sup> One report provides a counter-example to these concerns and describes a reintegration of Séléka ex-combatants in Kaga Bandoro that seems to have gone smoothly. Réseau des Journalistes pour les Droits de l’Homme, “Kaga-Bandoro : Des ex-Séléka transférés sont accueillis et cohabitent avec la population,” September 5, 2014, available at <http://www.rjdh-rca.net/actualites/actualite/kaga-bandoro-des-ex-seleka-transferes-sont-accueillis-et-cohabitent-avec-la-population.html>.

<sup>46</sup> Laurent Lagneau, “Centrafrique : Des soldats français accrochés à Bossangoa,” OPEX 360, September 5, 2014, available at <http://www.opex360.com/2014/09/05/centrafrique-des-soldats-francais-accroches-bossangoa/>.

<sup>47</sup> Grassroots Reconciliation Group, for example, has integrated former Lord’s Resistance Army combatants with victims and local communities and led these groups to collectively pursue such diverse projects as fruit farming, livestock production, and small business entrepreneurship. See Grassroots Reconciliation Group website, available at <http://grassrootsgroup.org/> (last accessed September 2014).

<sup>48</sup> Fidel Bafilemba, Aaron Hall, and Timo Mueller, “Crafting a Viable DDR Strategy for Congo,” (Washington: The Enough Project, February 2014), Annex 1, available at <http://www.enoughproject.org/reports/crafting-viable-ddr-strategy-congo>.

<sup>49</sup> African Union, United Nations, European Union, and African Security Sector Network (hereafter “African Union et al”), “Report of the Joint Security Sector Reform (SSR) Assessment Mission to the Central African Republic,” para. 11, p. 3, May 18-26, 2014, on file with the Enough Project.

<sup>50</sup> Discussion of DDR plans was a key goal for the Brazzaville forum in July, but talks concluded before participants could discuss DDR. Integrated Regional Information Networks, “A tentative ceasefire in CAR,” July 29, 2014, available at <http://www.irinnews.org/report/100416/a-tentative-ceasefire-in-car>; République Centrafricaine, “Programme d’urgence du gouvernement d’union nationale de transition 2013-2015,” pp. 7-0, November 2013, available at [http://www.lanouvellecentrafrique.info/PROGRAMME\\_D\\_39\\_URGENCE\\_DU\\_GUNT\\_CENTRAFRICAIN\\_06\\_No.p](http://www.lanouvellecentrafrique.info/PROGRAMME_D_39_URGENCE_DU_GUNT_CENTRAFRICAIN_06_No.p)

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df. Discussions with U.S. policymakers, Washington, D.C., August 2014; African Union et al, "Report of the Joint Security Sector Reform (SSR) Assessment Mission to the Central African Republic," p. 3.

<sup>51</sup> For example, under President Bozizé, a permanent secretariat for managing security sector reform (SSR) was established in 2008 and issued a statement identifying several SSR priorities in 2013. In 2013, Djotodia's government established two SSR and two DDR committees. African Union et al, "Report of the Joint Security Sector Reform (SSR) Assessment Mission to the Central African Republic," para. 4, pp. 1-2.

<sup>52</sup> Civilians in CAR, interview with author, Bangui, CAR, June 2014, see also, African Union et al, "Report of the Joint Security Sector Reform (SSR) Assessment Mission to the Central African Republic."

<sup>53</sup> Remarks by Martine Theodora Kessy Ekomo-Soignet, August 13, 2014.

<sup>54</sup> International aid worker and local civil society leaders, interviews with author, Bangui, CAR, June 2014, see also African Union et al, "Report of the Joint Security Sector Reform (SSR) Assessment Mission to the Central African Republic."

<sup>55</sup> International aid worker and local civil society leaders, interviews.

<sup>56</sup> This distinction is based on multiple interviews with aid workers, international diplomats, local experts in CAR and analysis by the author.

<sup>57</sup> Radio France Internationale, "RCA: à Brazzaville, les négociations dans l'impasse," July 22, 2014, available at <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140722-rca-brazzaville-negociations-impasse-seleka-anti-balaka-ngaissona-nguesso-samba-pan/>; Jeune Afrique and Agence France-Presse, "À Brazzaville, les ex-Séléka demandent la partition de la Centrafrique," July 22, 2014, available at <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20140722085936/-Centrafrique-Séléka-crise-centrafricaine-Anti-Balaka-brazzaville-les-ex-seleka-demandent-la-partition-de-la-centrafrique.html>.

<sup>58</sup> Radio France Internationale, "Brazzaville: à peine signé, l'accord sur la Centrafrique déjà menacé"; Louis Okamba, "Central African Republic's rebels sign cease-fire," Associated Press, July 23, 2014, available at <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/central-african-republics-rebels-sign-cease-fire>.

<sup>59</sup> Dhaffane and local observer, interview with author, Bangui, CAR, June 2014.

<sup>60</sup> International diplomat, telephone interview with author, Kampala, Uganda, July, 2014.

<sup>61</sup> Vincent Duhem, "Centrafrique : Dhaffane écarté de l'ex-Séléka, qui suspend sa participation à l'accord de Brazzaville," Jeune Afrique, August 6, 2014, available at <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20140806154417/>; World Bulletin, "CAR's Seleka suspends deputy chief for 'high treason,'" August 7, 2014, available at <http://www.worldbulletin.net/todays-news/142074/cars-seleka-suspends-deputy-chief-for-high-treason>.

<sup>62</sup> The cessation of hostilities accord specifies that signatories renounce partition plans. "Accord de cessation des hostilités en République Centrafricaine," art. 3(d), July 23, 2014, available at <http://minusca.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Y1wvr5xC50w%3D&tabid=5620&mid=9615&language=en-US>. See also Emmanuel Braun, "Angry Muslims in Central African Republic call for partition," Reuters, April 24, 2014, available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/24/us-centralafrica-partition-idUSBREA3N1R720140424>; Madjiasra Nako, "Chad says U.N. force needed to stabilize Central African Republic," Reuters, February 18, 2014, available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/18/us-centralafrican-chad-un-idUSBREA1H0WK20140218>; Gary Sands, "A Muslim Call to Partition the CAR," Foreign Policy Association, May 12, 2014, available at <http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2014/05/12/a-muslim-call-to-partition-the-car/>.

<sup>63</sup> International diplomat, interview with author, Bangui, CAR, June, 2014.

<sup>64</sup> International diplomat and aid workers, interviews with author.

<sup>65</sup> Kasper Agger, "Behind the Headlines: Drivers of Violence in the Central African Republic," (Washington: The Enough Project, May 2014), available at <http://www.enoughproject.org/reports/behind-headlines-drivers-violence-central-african-republic>.

<sup>66</sup> U.N. security officer and local journalist, interview with author, Bangui, CAR, June, 2014.

<sup>67</sup> Former President François Bozizé, who came to power through a military coup in 2003, launched his rebellion from Vakaga province with help from Chadian soldiers. Vakaga was then under the control of shifting armed groups from CAR, some with members from Sudan and Chad. Some of these groups fought, but ultimately came together during 2012 where they established Séléka to form a united front against then-president Bozizé.

<sup>68</sup> International diplomat and local journalist, interview with author, Bangui, CAR, June, 2014.

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<sup>69</sup> Journal de Bangui, “S. Wenezoui crée une plateforme politique mixte chrétiens-musulmans,” August 29, 2014, available at <http://www.journaldebangui.com/article.php?aid=7209>.

<sup>70</sup> U.N. Security Council, “Interim report of the Panel of Experts in accordance with paragraph 59(c) of resolution 2127 (2013),” S/2014/452, June 26, 2014, available at [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/452](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/452).

<sup>71</sup> See in particular the attacks in February 2014 on Muslim men and boys in Guen, in southwestern CAR, documented by Human Rights Watch, “Central African Republic: Massacres in Remote Villages: Attacks Show Urgent Need to Protect Civilians,” April 3, 2014, available at <http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/03/central-african-republic-massacres-remote-villages>.

<sup>72</sup> UN security official, interview with author, Bangui, CAR, see also UN Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic.

<sup>73</sup> Forces Armées CentraAfricaines.

<sup>74</sup> U.N. Security Council, “Interim report of the Panel of Experts in accordance with paragraph 59(c) of resolution 2127 (2013).”